EMA Removed from Review Developing by DBRS

March 12th, 2015

DBRS has announced that it:

has today removed Emera Inc.’s (Emera or the Company) Issuer Rating and the ratings of its Medium-Term Notes and Cumulative Preferred Shares from Under Review with Developing Implications. DBRS has also confirmed Emera’s Issuer Rating and Medium-Term Notes rating at BBB (high) and the Cumulative Preferred Shares rating at Pfd-3 (high), all with Stable trends. The rating actions follow DBRS’s review of Emera’s funding strategy for its medium-term growth plans, the repayment of the USD 350 million non-revolving credit facility used to partially finance the acquisition of the merchant New England Gas Generation assets, and the closing of a $250 million non-revolving credit facility by Emera Brunswick Pipeline Company (Emera Brunswick) in February 2015. Pro forma these transactions, Emera’s non-consolidated debt-to-capital has now decreased to below 30%. The rating actions also reflect the Company’s reasonable business risk profile for the current rating category and DBRS’s expectation that Emera will maintain its deconsolidated debt-to-capital metric below the 30% threshold.

It’s been quite a while! The imposition of the Review was reported on PrefBlog in August 2013.

EMA has three preferred share issues outstanding: EMA.PR.A, EMA.PR.C and EMA.PR.F (FixedResetS) and EMA.PR.E (PerpetualDiscount). All are tracked by HIMIPref™; all are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

BSD.PR.A: Critchley Cites PrefBlog in Financial Post

March 12th, 2015

As kindly pointed out by Assiduous Reader adriandunn in the comments to the post BSD.PR.A Term Extension Proposal: More Sleaze From Company, Barry Critchley has cited PrefBlog in his Financial Post piece PrefBlog doesn’t like the choices offered at Brookfield Soundvest Split Trust:

The website PrefBlog has weighed in on the matter of the upcoming vote by preferred shareholders of Brookfield Soundvest Split Trust on the extension of the term of the securities.

And the website, whose focus is Canadian Preferred Shares: Data and Discussion, is not a big fan of what has been proposed.

For example, it notes that “Brookfield Asset Management is a fine company. I find it very difficult to understand why they are mixed up in this.” BAM owns 50% of the manager.

This isn’t the first time Mr. Critchley has written about BSD.PR.A. On February 27, the Financial Post published No mood for five more years of negative returns from Brookfield Soundvest Split Trust:

We are referring to the situation at Brookfield Soundvest Split Trust, a company with a market cap of $9 million, which has been around for about a decade, and which over the past five years has generated a total return of -5.79% or more than 50 percentage points worse than the composite. By any measure, the fund, whose manager and investment adviser is an affiliate of Brookfield Asset Management, is a dog and Brookfield couldn’t confirm if any of its executives have a stake.

Brookfield declined to comment.

And on March 2 there was Giving the Brookfield Soundvest owners choices on extensions and redemptions:

“It’s been a disappointment for us here,” said Kevin Charlebois, the fund’s chief executive, speaking about the performance, especially for the unitholders who haven’t received distributions nor enjoyed redemption rights for more than three years, and who own a security that trades at a discount to its net asset value.

AIM.PR.A & FFH.PR.E: Convert Or Hold?

March 12th, 2015

It will be recalled that AIM.PR.A will reset to 4.50% and that FFH.PR.E will reset to 2.91% effective March 31.

Holders of both securities have the option to convert to FloatingResets, which will pay 3-month bills plus 375bp and plus 291bp, respectively. Deadlines for notifying the company of the intent to convert are March 17 and March 16, respectively; note that these are company deadlines and that brokers will generally set their deadlines a day or two in advance, so there’s not much time to lose if you’re planning to convert!

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., AIM.PR.A and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

To this end, we may construct a table showing similar pairs currently trading:

Fixed Reset Fixed Rate Floating Reset Spread over Bills Bid Price
Fixed Reset
Bid Price
Floating Reset
Break-Even 3-Month Bill Rate
Investment Grade
BNS.PR.P 3.35% BNS.PR.A 205 25.31 24.60 0.30%
TD.PR.S 3.371% TD.PR.T 160 25.24 23.90 0.01%
BMO.PR.M 3.39% BMO.PR.R 165 25.20 24.00 0.19%
BNS.PR.Q 3.61% BNS.PR.B 170 25.47 23.86 -0.09%
TD.PR.Y 3.5595% TD.PR.Z 168 25.42 23.85 -0.06%
BNS.PR.R 3.83% BNS.PR.C 188 25.65 24.11 0.13%
RY.PR.I 3.52% RY.PR.K 193 25.39 24.10 0.11%
TRP.PR.A 3.266% TRP.PR.F 192 20.17 18.75 -0.06%
Junk
DC.PR.B 5.688% DC.PR.D 410 25.12 22.11 -1.73%
AZP.PR.B 5.57% AZP.PR.C 418 13.48 12.75 0.48%
FFH.PR.C 4.578% FFH.PR.D 315 23.15 21.00 -0.78%

We can show this graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

pairs_FR_150311A
Click for Big

The market appears to have a profound distaste at the moment for floating rate product; the implied rates until the next interconversion are all lower than the current 3-month bill rate and many are negative! While a negative average bill yield over the next 4-5 years is not impossible, I suggest that it’s very unlikely, leading to the conclusion that, as a group, FloatingResets are currently cheap relative to their FixedReset counterparts (since FloatingResets’ total return will be greater if the actual average exceeds the implied average).

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity. The average in the table above for the junk issues is about -0.70%; for the investment grade issues it is about 0.10%. If we plug in these implied yields and the current bid prices of the FixedResets, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for the two pairs under consideration:

Estimate of FloatingReset Trading Price In Current Conditionss
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread -0.70% +0.10%
AIM.PR.A 20.51 375bp 19.07 19.87
FFH.PR.E 15.00 216bp 13.53 14.34

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that may result from conversion of AIM.PR.A and FFH.PR.E will be cheap and trading considerably below the price of the continuing FixedResets. Therefore, I recommend that holders of AIM.PR.A and FFH.PR.E continue to hold these issues and not to convert. I will note that, given the apparent cheapness of the FloatingResets, it may be a good trade to swap the FixedReset for the FloatingReset in the market once both elements of each pair are trading. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time.

March 11, 2015

March 11th, 2015

Matthew Katke has pleaded guilty to being a bond trader:

A former Nomura Holdings Inc. and Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc trader pleaded guilty in a securities-fraud case and agreed to cooperate with U.S. prosecutors.

Matthew Katke pleaded guilty Wednesday to conspiracy to commit securities fraud for participating in a multimillion-dollar scheme to cheat customers who bought and sold bonds, U.S. Attorney Deirdre Daly in Connecticut said in a statement. A lawyer for Katke, Richard Albert, declined to comment on the plea.

As part of the scheme, Katke and his co-conspirators made misrepresentations to induce buying customers to pay inflated prices and sellers who were customers to accept deflated prices for bonds, prosecutors said.

It’s basically similar to the Litvak case, last discussed on PrefBlog on March 7, 2014, which is currently being appealed:

But the government failed to prove that Litvak acted with the fraudulent intent necessary for a securities fraud conviction, his attorneys told the Second Circuit Wednesday, adding that the court failed to instruct the jury that they couldn’t convict him without that element.

“The government prosecuted Mr. Litvak for conduct that was not a crime,” attorneys for Litvak wrote in the brief. “The district court’s deficient jury instructions, and its exclusion of evidence central to Mr. Litvak’s defenses of immateriality and good faith, exacerbated the flaws inherent in the government’s theory of the case and enabled the jury to reach a verdict that does not comply with the law.”

But Litvak’s attorneys countered Wednesday that under the government’s theory, “garden-variety statements” made in the course of any negotiation could be used to support felony charges.

“Every car salesman who tells a customer that he cannot lower his price any further because he would earn only a miniscule profit on the sale as it is would be guilty of fraud,” they said in the brief.

Although Litvak was sentenced in July, the Second Circuit in October granted his bail request while he awaits the outcome of his appeal, saying there’s a substantial chance Litvak’s conviction will be overturned.

But the war on markets is being led by weenies who’ve never traded a bond:

Investigators have been finding signs that dealers are lying to clients and striking improper deals such as parking debt, Michael Osnato, head of the complex financial instruments group in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement division, said in an interview earlier this year. He called bad behavior in the market “more pervasive than we would like.”

So we must all be regulators (until the objective of making everything exchange-traded has been reached):

Regulators have been trying to change behavior on Wall Street after the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, extracting tens of billions of dollars in settlements for probes ranging from sales of mortgage bonds to the setting of benchmark interest rates.

Banks placed at least eight traders on leave last year amid investigations of activities after the financial crisis in the markets for bonds backed by loans and leases, where trades aren’t executed on exchanges and prices generally aren’t disclosed publicly, people with knowledge of the decisions said at the time.

“People in the industry are scared of making a mistake or even asking a question,” said Andrew J. Frisch, a lawyer who’s represented people against whom enforcement actions have been brought. The heightened scrutiny and sense that it can lead to arbitrary regulatory actions is putting traders on a “knife’s edge,” he said.

The government’s case against former Jefferies Group LLC trader Jesse Litvak raised the specter that certain types of alleged dishonesty can be treated as criminal even though they’re regarded as commonplace by traders and investors. The Litvak case is one model for future potential action by investigators, people with knowledge of the matter said in November.

The agency is using technology to further its policing of markets, combing repositories of data such as Finra’s Trace system to look for red flags instead of waiting for complaints, he said. Employers as well as individuals may be held accountable, he said.

And adult behaviour will no longer be required:

Canter testified for the prosecution saying the spreadsheet showed that Litvak had misled him about how much Jefferies had paid for bonds, including one instance when Canter agreed to raise a bid, yet the firm still paid the original price.

Canter, then AllianceBernstein’s portfolio manager responsible for its public-private investment fund, said Litvak apologized after being confronted following a long weekend. Litvak said it was a “hard year” and that “guys were doing whatever they needed” to make money, according to Canter. Canter said he was “very angry” and yelled at Litvak.

Canter told the jury that he put Jefferies in “the penalty box” after confronting Litvak in November 2011, stopped doing business with the firm for about a month and hadn’t done much with Jefferies since.

Because regulation is wonderful:

David Sutton is looking for the worst possible news about Uber Technologies. An accident in San Francisco, an assault in Boston: Such bad tidings for Uber are ammunition for Sutton, a 48-year-old publicist. “Uber is a creep magnet,” Sutton says in a news release sent to U.S. local and national media outlets in February.

Sutton is a hired gun in the dirty war that’s broken out between old-line taxi companies and Uber, the ride-share phenom. His client, a powerful trade association, represents 1,000 taxi and limousine firms worldwide. These firms want to kill the young juggernaut—or at least buy themselves enough time to develop rival car-hailing apps.

Behind the scenes, one of the world’s largest private transportation companies—a firm few people have probably ever heard of—is exerting pressure through operators like Sutton. The company, Transdev, is Uber’s single biggest competitor. It has 10,000 vehicles in more than 100 cities worldwide, including Denver, London, and Paris, as well as shuttle services to 50 airports in North America. Transdev is co-owned by two French companies—Veolia Environnement, a public utility company, and Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, a state-owned bank. And it’s lobbying hard to contain the disruption to the $11 billion global taxi market.

Joseph says Transdev subsidiaries have prompted investigations into Uber by sending letters to regulators in core markets like Colorado, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Transdev was also among the companies that took the battle to a commercial court in Paris, which last year resulted in a 100,000-euro ($107,000) fine for Uber’s UberPop ride-sharing service, Europe’s equivalent of UberX.

On another note, there is push to make American universities more expensive members of the Junior Justice League:

Three U.S. senators introduced a new bill on Wednesday, March 11, that would require all colleges receiving federal funding to appoint an independent advocate to help sexual assault victims.

The revamped Survivor Outreach and Support on Campus Act, also known as the S.O.S. Campus Act, is sponsored by Democratic Senators Barbara Boxer of California, Kirsten Gillibrand of New York, and Tim Kaine of Virginia. It hits the Senate floor weeks after a dozen senators introduced a bipartisan sexual assault bill that would steepen penalties for colleges that fail to report attacks.

If passed, the legislation would require colleges receiving federal funding to appoint a confidential, independent advocate to guide students who’ve reported being sexually assaulted through the disciplinary process. The advocate would help students access medical care and forensic exams, if necessary; make sure students are aware of their options for reporting sexual assault to law enforcement; and help students get counseling and crisis intervention services. They would not require students to report the sexual assault to police or to university officials.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 7bp, FixedResets up 8bp and DeemedRetractibles off 10bp. Despite this apparent calm, the Performance Highlights table shows a lot of churn, dominated by winning FixedResets. Volume was above average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.01%, equivalent to 6.51% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 3.8%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 270bp, a narrowing from the 280bp reported March 4.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150311
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 24.12 to be $1.15 rich, while TRP.PR.G, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $1.16 cheap at its bid price of 24.71.

impVol_MFC_150311
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 24.05 to be $0.47 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.89 to be $0.42 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150311
Click for Big

The fit on this series is actually quite reasonable – it’s the scale that makes it look so weird.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 21.21 to be $0.61 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 23.80 and appears to be $0.42 rich.

impVol_FTS_150311
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.60, looks $1.51 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.71 and is $1.01 rich.

pairs_FR_150311
Click for Big

The cancellation of the previously announced deflationary environment had an immediate effect on the implied three month bill rate, with investment-grade pairs predicting an average over the next five years of a whopping 0.10%

pairs_FF_150311
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 2.6243 % 2,385.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 2.6243 % 4,171.4
Floater 3.18 % 3.16 % 71,256 19.35 3 2.6243 % 2,536.2
OpRet 4.07 % 0.99 % 105,146 0.27 1 0.0000 % 2,764.8
SplitShare 4.47 % 4.42 % 54,365 4.45 5 0.1556 % 3,211.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,528.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % 0.35 % 56,366 0.08 25 0.0250 % 2,520.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.00 % 5.01 % 157,285 15.40 9 0.0714 % 2,795.8
FixedReset 4.40 % 3.62 % 236,637 16.69 82 0.0751 % 2,422.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % -0.50 % 106,129 0.14 37 -0.0970 % 2,652.6
FloatingReset 2.53 % 2.97 % 84,528 6.32 8 0.2679 % 2,336.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -3.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 17.05
Evaluated at bid price : 17.05
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 21.21
Evaluated at bid price : 21.21
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 16.44
Evaluated at bid price : 16.44
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
BMO.PR.R FloatingReset 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 15.85
Evaluated at bid price : 15.85
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.48
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 15.73
Evaluated at bid price : 15.73
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 16.60
Evaluated at bid price : 16.60
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.39
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 2.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 20.17
Evaluated at bid price : 20.17
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 5.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 15.49
Evaluated at bid price : 15.49
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.Q FixedReset 898,300 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
TD.PF.D FixedReset 212,820 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.94
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 45,881 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 24.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
ENB.PF.A FixedReset 31,759 Desjardins bought 15,800 from Nesbitt at 22.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 30,493 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 21.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 21.59
Evaluated at bid price : 21.93
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 26,357 Called for redemption effective 2015-4-30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-04-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : -1.50 %
There were 38 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.15 – 24.58
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2784

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %

PWF.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 25.01 – 25.40
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2536

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.26
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %

SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.71 – 24.08
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2389

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.71
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %

GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.27 – 26.61
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2193

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.27
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %

ENB.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 19.76 – 20.13
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2668

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 19.76
Evaluated at bid price : 19.76
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.84 – 24.40
Spot Rate : 0.5600
Average : 0.4618

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.84
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %

CM.PR.Q Soft on Good Volume

March 11th, 2015

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce has announced:

that it has completed the offering of 12 million Basel III-compliant Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares Series 43 (the “Series 43 Shares”) priced at $25.00 per share to raise gross proceeds of $300 million.

The offering was made through a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC World Markets Inc. The Series 43 Shares commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today under the ticker symbol CM.PR.Q.

The Series 43 Shares were issued under a prospectus supplement dated February 27, 2015, to CIBC’s short form base shelf prospectus dated March 11, 2014.

CM.PR.Q is a FixedReset, 3.60%+279, announced February 26. The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been assigned to the FixedResets subindex.

CM.PR.Q traded 1,150,500 shares today (consolidated exchanges) in a range of 24.80-89 before closing at 24.80-81. Vital statistics are:

CM.PR.Q FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %

March 10, 2015

March 11th, 2015

The feds’ buddies at the IMF have proposed a new Canadian civil service expansion plan:

Two key steps are worth considering.

First, providing a mandate for macroprudential oversight of the financial system as a whole to a single entity would strengthen accountability and reinforce policymakers’ ability to identify and respond to future potential crises. Such a body should have participation broad enough to “connect the dots” and form a complete and integrated view of systemic risks with powers to collect the required data.

Second, putting in place a coordination framework to support timely decision-making and test the capacity of both federal and provincial authorities to respond to crisis scenarios would benefit crisis preparedness. Extending the institutional arrangements and frameworks along these lines can help support both the capacity and willingness to act, especially at times of financial stress, and strengthen Canada’s financial system and economy.

The loonie had a rough ride today:

The loonie has touched a high point of 79.37 cents (U.S.) and a low of 78.85 cents today, edging closer to its most recent low of 78.22 cents and, arguably, to the 75-cent level that [chief currency strategist of Bank of Nova Scotia] Ms. [Camilla] Sutton and others expect later this year.

By late afternoon, it stood at 78.87 cents.

The U.S. dollar, in turn, is on a roll, spurred on by stronger economic readings that suggest the Federal Reserve will launch its first interest rate hike soon, possibly in June.

Feeding into that were the uncertainties of Europe, specifically the fears over whether Greece could default on its hefty debts or even leave the euro zone.

And equities got hit:

A looming rate hike from the U.S. Federal Reserve is taking its toll on stocks, currencies and commodities. Markets were a sea of red on Tuesday as the Dow Jones industrial average shed more than 333 points, or 1.8 per cent, the S&P 500 fell 1.7 per cent and the S&P/TSX Composite index gave back more than 200 points, or 1.4 per cent.

The U.S. dollar index rose to its highest level since September, 2003, as the euro continued to crumble and the Canadian dollar retreated below 79 cents (U.S.). The U.S. dollar is soaring as investors anticipate the Fed will begin hiking rates some time this year amid consistently strong readings on the country’s labour market.

But the greenback’s surge is raising concerns about the bottom line for corporate America. A strong U.S. dollar poses a headwind for major U.S. multinational companies that generate a substantial portion of their revenues overseas.

My new favourite SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher really screwed up when talking about the bond markets today:

With a record notional amount of outstanding corporate debt and dealers unable to commit capital and hold significant inventories, there is a real liquidity crisis brewing. The significant risk is that when the Fed starts to hike interest rates, which some tea leaves tell us could happen as early as this June[13] — investors may rush to exit their positions in high yielding and less liquid debt and may have severe difficulty in doing so.

Interestingly, while the biggest banks have cut back on their positions in more risky debt, insurance companies and mutual funds have increased their positions in those assets.[14] These firms have boosted their holdings of corporate and foreign bonds to $5.1 trillion, a 65% increase since the end of 2008.[15] This has offset the $800 billion decline in holdings at banks and securities firms in the same period.[16] Rather than banks holding the inventory, there are now “ballooning bond funds that own more and more risky debt,” and it is unclear how institutional asset managers and their clients will react when interest rates rise.[17]

Although the SEC may not have a silver bullet to address these issues, there are some discrete steps the agency can take to address the liquidity risks that plague the debt markets. For example, the Commission should be looking at all options for facilitating electronic and on-exchange transactions of these products.

Electronic and on-exchange transactions of these products will harm liquidity, not help it; how many times does this need to be pointed out? Exchange trading leads to thinner, more brittle markets; if Gallagher is seeking to find ways in which a 1994-style bond bear market can be experienced in an orderly fashion, he needs to think more about how to encourage bond salesmen, dark markets and deep pools of opportunistic capital.

While this potential liquidity crisis is a serious risk that warrants serious attention, there is a more discrete and addressable issue in the fixed income markets, an issue that disproportionately impacts retail investors. That issue is the lack of transparency. Retail participation in the municipal and corporate bond market is very high: over 70% in the municipal markets and 40% in the corporate markets.[21] And yet, these markets are incredibly opaque to retail investors.

Footnote [21] See Fed Flow of Funds.

It’s not entirely clear where he gets his 40% figure from. If we examine Table L.212 in the Fed Flow of Funds, December 2014 we see that the Fed estimates there are $11,441.4-billion in Corporate and Foreign Bonds outstanding at the end of 14Q3. Classes of holder that might reasonably be classified as retail are:

  • Household, 919.2
  • Money market mutual funds, 71.1
  • Mutual funds, 2,232.3
  • Closed-end funds, 77.8
  • Exchange-traded funds, 194.4

The total is $3,494.8-billion, which is 30.5% of the total. Maybe he’s also counting

  • Private pension funds, 582.5
  • State and local govt. retirement funds, 433.4
  • Federal government retirement funds, 6.9

This would bring the total to $4,517.6-billion, or 39.5%, which agrees well with his figure.

Regrettably, if he is getting to his 40% figure like that and weeping hysterically over the poor sweet innocent retail investor ravaged by the evil secretive dealers, his argument isn’t even internally consistent. Only the Household holdings, of 919.2-billion, less than 10% of the total outstanding, are being traded by retail; all the rest enjoys the (sometimes dubious!) benefits of professional management and it really doesn’t matter whether or not the finer details of the market are opaque to retail.

I will also point out that share of holdings is by no means equivalent to share of trading. My guess is that retail turnover is lower than institutional turnover, but we’ll leave that question for another day.

If we repeat the exercise for Table L.211, Municipal Securities and Loans, we get a total of $3,631.1-billion, of which:

  • Household, 1,557.6
  • Money market mutual funds, 278.7
  • Mutual funds, 645.4
  • Closed-end funds, 84.2
  • Exchange-traded funds, 13.4
  • Private pension funds, 0
  • State and local govt. retirement funds, 0
  • Federal government retirement funds, 0

Total $2,579.3-billion, or 71.0%, against his claim of “over 70%”, so I suspect I’ve been able to reproduce his calculation.

Well, fine. Maybe the purpose of the corporate and municipal bond markets is, in fact, not the transfer of investment capital from savers to investors, as I have always (perhaps naively) thought. Maybe the purpose of these markets is “to be fair to Granny”. If this is the case, then the idea of exchange trading makes more sense – but let’s be explicit about this in advance of any rule-making, and let us continually bear in mind that changing the system to favour one group will act to the disadvantage of another group. The loss of liquidity and greater volatility that will result from a greater emphasis on exchange trading will result in increased yields; these increased yields will knock some issuers out of the market by rendering marginally profitable investment opportunities economically unfeasible.

Can we please think about what we’re doing, why we’re doing it, what we want to accomplish and just plain think things through a bit?

He redeems himself somewhat with a jab against FSOC, the Financial Stability Oversight Council:

The SEC is also bringing cases against state and local entities — San Diego, New Jersey, Illinois, and most recently Kansas — for making misleading disclosures about the funding of their pension plans. The failure by municipal issuers to provide adequate disclosures of underfunded pension plans is an unpardonable sin. Politically-powerful state workers’ unions, and state constitutional protections for benefits, make the reduction of these liabilities extremely difficult. The failure to set aside adequate funds to cover these liabilities creates a material risk that future payments to bondholders would need to be sacrificed. This risk is not merely theoretical; we have seen it play out already in Detroit’s bankruptcy.[30] Pension liabilities are a true systemic risk, but don’t hold your breath waiting for FSOC to address it. They are probably too busy with Stage 3 assessments of lemonade stands anyway![31]

Footnote [31] I’ll spare you the suspense. Lemonade stands will be designated as systemically important. Expert forecasts of global warming’s effects on summer temperatures create a risk that the sudden withdrawal of sweet, tangy liquid relief from the U.S. financial system could cause a sudden collapse. If you doubt me, this is at least as plausible as FSOC’s designation of insurance companies.

TransAlta Corporation, proud issuer of TA.PR.D, TA.PR.F, TA.PR.H and TA.PR.J, was confirmed at Pfd-3 by DBRS today:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today confirmed the Issuer Rating and Unsecured Debt/Medium-Term Notes rating of TransAlta Corporation (TAC or the Company) at BBB and the Preferred Shares rating at Pfd-3, all with Stable trends. The confirmations are based on DBRS’s expectation that TAC will further improve its relatively constrained key credit metrics over the near term to be more in line with the current rating category. Moreover, DBRS notes that TAC’s ratings reflect its high level of contracted output, strong position in the Alberta (the Province) market and reasonable level of geographic and fuel diversification, while also factoring in unplanned outage risks, the challenging wholesale market conditions over the next several years and TAC’s merchant exposure (including post-2020 power purchase agreement expiries in Alberta).

It was a poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 38bp, FixedResets down 12bp and DeemedRetractibles off 5bp. The Performance Highlights table is relatively short (by recent standards), with losing Floaters being prominent. Volume was above average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150310A

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 24.05 to be $1.12 rich, while TRP.PR.G, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $1.11 cheap at its bid price of 24.72.

impVol_MFC_150310
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 24.05 to be $0.50 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.75 to be $0.51 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150310
Click for Big

The fit on this series is actually quite reasonable – it’s the scale that makes it look so weird.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 21.89 to be $0.36 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 24.20 and appears to be $0.49 rich.

impVol_FTS_150310
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.36, looks $1.68 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.71 and is $1.13 rich.

pairs_FR_150310
Click for Big

The cancellation of the previously announced deflationary environment had an immediate effect on the implied three month bill rate, with investment-grade pairs predicting an average over the next five years of a whopping 0.10%

pairs_FF_150310
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -3.4850 % 2,324.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -3.4850 % 4,064.7
Floater 3.24 % 3.22 % 72,163 19.11 3 -3.4850 % 2,471.4
OpRet 4.07 % 0.98 % 106,820 0.28 1 -0.0397 % 2,764.8
SplitShare 4.48 % 4.62 % 56,197 4.45 5 -0.0359 % 3,206.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0397 % 2,528.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % 0.84 % 56,545 0.08 25 -0.0391 % 2,519.9
Perpetual-Discount 4.98 % 5.02 % 154,748 15.40 9 -0.3764 % 2,793.8
FixedReset 4.41 % 3.65 % 233,337 16.51 81 -0.1167 % 2,421.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % 0.14 % 106,338 0.14 37 -0.0491 % 2,655.2
FloatingReset 2.54 % 2.98 % 85,831 6.32 8 -0.2352 % 2,329.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -6.75 % Not real. The closing bid was 14.79, compared to a day’s range of 15.56-03, so the reported bid is about 5% below the day’s low. It is not clear whether this is due to inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange reporting or inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange supervision of market-makers.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 14.79
Evaluated at bid price : 14.79
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 15.65
Evaluated at bid price : 15.65
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 15.81
Evaluated at bid price : 15.81
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 16.36
Evaluated at bid price : 16.36
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.34
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 21.53
Evaluated at bid price : 21.89
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 5.78 % A rebound from yesterday’s poor reported performance. There was also a problem on March 2 / March 3. This nonsense is brought to you courtesy of the Toronto Stock Exchange.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 16.65
Evaluated at bid price : 16.65
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.D FixedReset 777,595 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 93,075 TD crossed 30,000 at 24.97; RBC crossed 49,200 at 24.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 24.89
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 59,122 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 24.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 53,541 TD crossed 25,000 at 20.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 20.68
Evaluated at bid price : 20.68
Bid-YTW : 4.32 %
CM.PR.P FixedReset 47,505 TD crossed 35,000 at 24.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 23.01
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 47,178 TD crossed 30,000 at 24.67.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.63
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 14.79 – 15.90
Spot Rate : 1.1100
Average : 0.6382

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 14.79
Evaluated at bid price : 14.79
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %

TRP.PR.F FloatingReset Quote: 18.65 – 19.39
Spot Rate : 0.7400
Average : 0.5073

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 18.65
Evaluated at bid price : 18.65
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %

MFC.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 24.20 – 24.60
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2528

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.00 – 24.50
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3542

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %

BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.00 – 23.34
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2297

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %

MFC.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.75 – 26.05
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2051

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %

TD.PF.D Soft On Good Volume

March 11th, 2015

TD.PF.D is a FixedReset, 3.60%+279, announced February 27. It is NVCC-compliant and will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been assigned to the FixedReset subindex.

The issue traded 1,077,395 shares today in a range of 24.795-96 before closing at 24.95-97. Vital statistics are:

TD.PF.D FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-10
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %

The Implied Volatility calculation has some points of interest:

impVol_TD_150310
Click for Big

Firstly, the market does not appear to be differentiated between the NVCC compliant and non-compliant issues, as the latter appear to be plotted on a line more or less defined by the former. Additionally, the Implied Volatility is very high – ridiculously high, for NVCC-compliant issues – so I would expect TD.PF.D to outperform the three other compliant issues (TD.PF.A, TD.PF.B and TD.PF.C) as the market comes to realize what the word “perpetual” means.

March 9, 2015

March 9th, 2015

There’s a bit more colour about the effect of the US jobs number, discussed March 6 on the treasury long bond:

Since hitting an all-time low of 2.22 percent on Jan. 30, Treasury 30-year bond yields have posted the biggest five-week jump in six years as better-than-forecast employment growth led investors to pull forward wagers for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates.

The 30-year bond yield rose 25 basis points, or 0.25 percentage point, this week to 2.84 percent, according to Bloomberg Bond Trader prices.

That pushed the yield increase to 62 basis points since January. The move is the biggest since a 1 percentage point rise in the five weeks ended Jan. 30, 2009, after the Fed said it was considering buying Treasuries to help stimulate economic growth.

Yields soared March 6 after the Labor Department reported the U.S. added 295,000 jobs last month, compared with a forecast for a 235,000 gain in a Bloomberg survey. The unemployment rate fell to 5.5 percent, an almost seven-year low, from 5.7 percent.

It was 12th straight month payrolls have increased by at least 200,000, the best run since March 1995. Payrolls rose 3.1 million in 2014, the most in 15 years.

And some colour on the effect of the suspension of Canadian forward guidance:

Pacific Investment Management Co.’s Ed Devlin is getting out of Canadian government bonds, and Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz is the reason why.

Mr. Devlin, who oversees about $17-billion (U.S.), including the Canadian portfolios for the world’s biggest manager of bond funds, said higher yields are needed to compensate for the risk of buying debt whipsawed by Mr. Poloz’s policy pronouncements.

“Investors should require a bigger risk premium to invest in these bonds,” Mr. Devlin said by phone from Los Angeles on Friday. “If you don’t know what they’re going to do, you should get paid more money to invest in them than if they were fairly predictable.”

And there are the usual arguments about this:

Gluskin-Sheff chief economist David Rosenberg said last week the confusion was putting the Bank of Canada’s credibility at risk.

“The fact that they decided to stop offering guidance and start serving up confusion makes me gun-shy about making a call,” Rosenberg told Bloomberg. “If you’re trying to promote economic growth, you probably don’t want to generate too much volatility in the financial markets to achieve that goal.”

But [Dominion Lending Centres Chief Economist Sherry] Cooper says Bay Street should spend more time watching the data, instead of obsessing about what the bank will do.

“What caused this hissy fit on Bay Street was the economists were wrong,” Cooper wrote in a note. “No one expected the rate cut, so caught with their proverbial pants down, the pundits dumped on Poloz for having misled them.”

Cooper said not only was Poloz right to cut rates, but she also sees no reason why the central bank should “telegraph rate moves in advance.”

“The lamentation over the loss of ‘forward guidance’ is pathetic .… Everyone knows that central bank action is data dependent. When the data surprise, all bets are off,” she wrote.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 15bp, FixedResets down 21bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 3bp. Volatility was down from the levels we’ve generally seen for the past three months. Volume was low.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150309
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 24.14 to be $1.20 rich, while TRP.PR.G, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $1.07 cheap at its bid price of 24.75.

impVol_MFC_150309
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 23.91 to be $0.34 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.91 to be $0.38 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150309
Click for Big

The fit on this series is actually quite reasonable – it’s the scale that makes it look so weird.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.Z, resetting at +296bp on 2017-12-31, bid at 25.26 to be $0.45 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 24.42 and appears to be $0.61 rich.

impVol_FTS_150309
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.66, looks $1.56 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.77 and is $1.04 rich.

pairs_FR_150309
Click for Big

The cancellation of the previously announced deflationary environment had an immediate effect on the implied three month bill rate, with investment-grade pairs predicting an average over the next five years of a whopping 0.10%.

Not shown is the DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair, which implies an average rate of negative 1.77% until its exchange date 2019-9-30.

pairs_FF_150309
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4777 % 2,408.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4777 % 4,211.5
Floater 3.12 % 3.16 % 73,188 19.26 3 -0.4777 % 2,560.6
OpRet 4.07 % 0.83 % 105,283 0.28 1 0.0000 % 2,765.8
SplitShare 4.48 % 4.60 % 56,172 4.45 5 0.0080 % 3,207.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,529.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % -0.36 % 56,628 0.08 25 -0.0454 % 2,520.9
Perpetual-Discount 4.96 % 5.03 % 154,171 15.08 9 -0.1531 % 2,804.3
FixedReset 4.42 % 3.64 % 233,557 16.51 80 -0.2081 % 2,423.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.90 % 0.02 % 105,071 0.14 37 0.0277 % 2,656.5
FloatingReset 2.53 % 2.91 % 87,195 6.33 8 -0.0854 % 2,335.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -4.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 15.74
Evaluated at bid price : 15.74
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 19.62
Evaluated at bid price : 19.62
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 18.65
Evaluated at bid price : 18.65
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 23.30
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 19.04
Evaluated at bid price : 19.04
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 352,980 Called for redemption 2015-4-30
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-04-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : -1.38 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Premium 85,708 Nesbitt crossed 85,000 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-04-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : -4.58 %
OSP.PR.A SplitShare 66,500 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2020-03-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.21
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 35,817 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-04-08
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : -8.38 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset 33,480 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 30,317 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 19.04
Evaluated at bid price : 19.04
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 15.74 – 16.64
Spot Rate : 0.9000
Average : 0.5670

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 15.74
Evaluated at bid price : 15.74
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %

ENB.PF.G FixedReset Quote: 22.21 – 22.70
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3279

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 21.77
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 17.95 – 18.42
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3253

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.95
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 18.65 – 18.98
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2528

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 18.65
Evaluated at bid price : 18.65
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 19.62 – 19.90
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.2046

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-09
Maturity Price : 19.62
Evaluated at bid price : 19.62
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %

PVS.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 25.07 – 25.30
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1589

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %

March 6, 2015

March 6th, 2015

Jobs, jobs, jobs!

The U.S. job-creation machine kept exceeding expectations in February. Wages continued to disappoint.

Employers added 295,000 workers to payrolls last month, more than forecast, and the unemployment rate dropped to 5.5 percent, the lowest in almost seven years, figures from the Labor Department showed Friday in Washington. Hourly earnings rose less than forecast.

A lingering appetite to boost headcounts comes as increased purchasing power from cheaper fuel helps drive consumer spending. The jobless rate has now reached the Federal Reserve’s range for what it considers full employment, keeping policy makers on course to raise interest rates this year as persistent job growth sets the stage for a pickup in wages.

The median forecast in a Bloomberg survey of economists called for a 235,000 advance in February payrolls. Estimates ranged from 150,000 to 370,000. Employment in January climbed 239,000. The drop in the unemployment rate was also bigger than projected, and down from 5.7 percent in January.

Average hourly earnings rose 0.1 percent from the prior month after advancing 0.5 percent in January, which was the most since November 2008. The median forecast called for a 0.2 percent gain. Earnings were up 2 percent over the past year, also less than projected and matching the increase on average since the expansion began in mid-2009.

So the previously scheduled deflation has been cancelled:

U.S. stocks fell, with the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index tumbling the most in two months, as better-than-forecast jobs data fueled speculation the Federal Reserve is moving closer to raising interest rates.

The S&P 500 fell 1.4 percent, the most since Jan. 5, to 2,071.26 at 4 p.m. in New York. The equity gauge lost 1.6 percent for the week. The Dow retreated 278.94 points, or 1.5 percent, to 17,856.78 for its worst drop in five weeks. The Nasdaq Composite Index slipped 1.1 percent. More than 7.4 billion shares changed hands on U.S. exchanges, 7.2 percent above the 30-day average.

Utility companies in the S&P 500 tumbled 3.1 percent. Selling picked up in the industry as the rate on 10-year Treasury notes spiked 13 basis points to 2.25 percent, the highest this year. The group’s dividend yield of 3.7 percent is the second-highest in the index.

AllBanc Split Corp., proud issuer of ABK.PR.C, was confirmed at Pfd-2 by DBRS:

Since the last rating action in March 2014, the net asset value of the Company has been slightly volatile, mirroring the performance of Canadian banks over the past year. However, downside protection rose from 60.1% on February 20, 2014, to 62.6% as of February 26, 2015. As a result, the rating of the Class C Preferred Shares has been confirmed at Pfd-2.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 9bp, FixedResets gaining 26bp and DeemedRetractibles down 15bp. The Performance Highlights table is its usual lengthy self. Volume was high.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150306
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 24.14 to be $1.18 rich, while TRP.PR.G, resetting 2020-11-30 at +296, is $1.10 cheap at its bid price of 24.71.

impVol_MFC_150306
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 24.91 to be $0.30 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.88 to be $0.47 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150306
Click for Big

The fit on this series is actually quite reasonable – it’s the scale that makes it look so weird.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PF.X, resetting at +188bp on 2017-6-30, bid at 18.68 to be $0.17 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 24.45 and appears to be $0.68 rich.

impVol_FTS_150306
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.70, looks $1.51 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.80 and is $1.13 rich.

pairs_FR_150306
Click for Big

The cancellation of the previously announced deflationary environment had an immediate effect on the implied three month bill rate, with investment-grade pairs predicting an average over the next five years of a whopping 0.10%.

pairs_FF_150306
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.9857 % 2,420.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.9857 % 4,231.7
Floater 3.11 % 3.14 % 75,974 19.31 3 0.9857 % 2,572.9
OpRet 4.07 % 0.80 % 106,402 0.29 1 0.0794 % 2,765.8
SplitShare 4.48 % 4.54 % 56,213 4.46 5 0.0080 % 3,207.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0794 % 2,529.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.29 % -0.78 % 54,523 0.08 25 0.0360 % 2,522.1
Perpetual-Discount 4.95 % 5.03 % 155,274 15.09 9 -0.0927 % 2,808.6
FixedReset 4.41 % 3.43 % 236,285 16.83 80 0.2630 % 2,429.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.90 % -0.16 % 105,040 0.15 37 -0.1502 % 2,655.8
FloatingReset 2.50 % 2.88 % 90,150 6.34 8 -0.1440 % 2,337.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset -3.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.38
Bid-YTW : 4.40 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.32
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 2.53 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 18.63
Evaluated at bid price : 18.63
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 16.05
Evaluated at bid price : 16.05
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 19.31
Evaluated at bid price : 19.31
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 17.78
Evaluated at bid price : 17.78
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
CM.PR.P FixedReset 1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 23.02
Evaluated at bid price : 24.59
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 18.84
Evaluated at bid price : 18.84
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 2.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.90
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 3.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.78
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.J FixedReset 105,427 TD bought blocks of 12,600 and 11,400 from anonymous, both at 25.05. Nesbitt bought 10,000 from anonymous at 25.03.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset 74,341 TD crossed 50,000 at 19.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 19.31
Evaluated at bid price : 19.31
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset 49,200 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 23.02
Evaluated at bid price : 24.71
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 48,813 To be extended.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.40
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 31,651 RBC crossed 11,500 at 25.59.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-04-05
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : -6.04 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 29,945 RBC bought 17,900 from TD at 18.79.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 18.68
Evaluated at bid price : 18.68
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
There were 44 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 19.90 – 20.48
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.3639

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.90
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %

PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount Quote: 25.13 – 25.58
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2779

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 24.70
Evaluated at bid price : 25.13
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %

RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.53 – 26.08
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.4084

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : -0.16 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.05 – 25.37
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2125

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 24.62
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.75 %

BAM.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 25.60 – 25.91
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2094

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 23.49
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %

ENB.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 18.63 – 18.92
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1991

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-03-06
Maturity Price : 18.63
Evaluated at bid price : 18.63
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %

GCS.PR.A Upgraded to Pfd-2 by DBRS

March 6th, 2015

Global Champions Split Corp., proud issuer of GCS.PR.A, has been upgraded to Pfd-2 by DBRS:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today upgraded the rating of the Class A Preferred Shares, Series 1 (the Preferred Shares) issued by Global Champions Split Corp. (the Company) to Pfd-2 from Pfd-2 (low). The Company issued 2,000,000 Preferred Shares at an issue price of $25.00 per Preferred Share and an equal number of capital shares (the Capital Shares) on March 7, 2013.

The redemption date for the Preferred Shares will be on or about July 31, 2019. Net proceeds from the initial offering were used to invest in a portfolio of common shares of 15 international large capitalization companies (the Portfolio).

The Portfolio may be comprised of non-U.S. dollar denominated securities. The Company intends to substantially hedge all of the Portfolio’s investments denominated in currencies other than the U.S. dollar back to U.S. dollars. Dividends received on the Portfolio securities denominated in currencies other than U.S. dollars are currently being hedged back to U.S. dollars, but the Company is not required to do so. Distributions to holders of the Preferred Shares are denominated in Canadian dollars and are hedged back to U.S. dollars unless the net asset value (NAV) of the Company is less than the aggregate original issue price of the Class A Preferred Shares.

On March 7, 2014, DBRS confirmed the rating of the Preferred Shares at Pfd-2 (low) mainly based on the sufficient downside protection available to holders of the Preferred Shares. Since then, the NAV of the Company (after adjusting for exchange rates) has increased, with downside protection increasing from 52% to 61% and remaining with a positive trend over the past few months. As a result, the rating of the Class A Preferred Shares has been upgraded to Pfd-2 from Pfd-2 (low).

GCS.PR.A is a SplitShare paying 4.00% (probably) eligible dividends, maturing July 31, 2019; it commenced trading March 7, 2013 after its initial mention on PrefBlog on 2013-2-15.