December 1, 2014

December 1st, 2014

Moody’s downgraded Japan:

Moody’s Investors Service on Monday downgraded Japan’s sovereign debt rating by one notch to A1, citing rising uncertainty over the country’s ability to hit its debt-reduction goal.

The announcement briefly sent the yen to a seven-year low against the dollar and pushed 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB) futures down by 10 ticks.

The U.S. rating agency said the outlook was stable.

Tom Byrne, regional credit officer of Moody’s, said the downgrade was closely linked to [Japanese Prime Minister] Mr. [Shinzo] Abe’s decision to delay next year’s scheduled sales tax hike, which made it more challenging for Japan to achieve its target of reducing the primary budget deficit in fiscal 2020.

“There is concern that fiscal policy in its current state will not achieve the long-term fiscal goals,” he said.

Hours before Moody’s announcement, Mr. Abe had stressed in a televised public debate that Japan remained committed to fiscal reform, and that the Bank of Japan’s ultraloose policy was not aimed at monetizing public debt.

But Moody’s warned that the BOJ’s efforts to achieve its 2-per-cent inflation target through aggressive money printing may push up bond yields and raise government borrowing costs.

Remember that US recovery that would save the world?

U.S. stocks fell for a second day as weaker data on Black Friday sales and China manufacturing overshadowed a rebound in oil and expansion in American factories.

Retailers in the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (SPX) fell the most in a month as post-Thanksgiving holiday sales came in below forecasts. Apple Inc. fell as much as 6.4 percent in early trading before paring the loss in half. Chevron Corp. and Exxon Mobil Corp. gained at least 2 percent as crude oil ended a four-day skid.

The S&P 500 fell 0.7 percent to 2,053.44 at 4 p.m. in New York. The Dow Jones Industrial Average slumped 51.44 points, or 0.3 percent, to 17,776.8. The technology-heavy Nasdaq 100 Index lost 1.2 percent. About 7.6 billion listed shares changed hands in the U.S., 13 percent higher than the three-month daily average.

Black Friday, as noted above, was a fizzle:

Spending tumbled an estimated 11 percent over the weekend from a year earlier, the Washington-based National Retail Federation said yesterday. And more than 6 million shoppers who had been expected to hit stores never showed up.

Consumers were unmoved by retailers’ aggressive discounts and longer Thanksgiving hours, raising concern that signs of recovery in recent months won’t endure. Retailers also were targeted by protesters, who called on consumers to boycott Black Friday to make a statement about police violence. Still, the NRF cast the decline in a positive light, saying it showed shoppers were confident enough to skip the initial rush for discounts.

There may be relatively little effect on Canada, though, as Roy Osing reminds us that our main product is mewling sycophancy:

… I was less than impressed with the organization structure he proposed. It was a structure I had “lived with” in my previous life and could see the pluses and minuses.

When asked whether I could support the proposed structure, I asked for time to consider it before declaring my position.

One of my peers virtually condemned it and with his “outside voice” declared his non-support; he left the company soon thereafter.

A previous president once told me “Roy, if your boss puts forward what you consider to be a ‘dumb idea’, you only have two choices: one, support it and try to make it work; or two, leave.”

And there’s the usual amount of rate punditry:

Poloz will keep his benchmark overnight rate at 1 percent Dec. 3 according to all 22 economists surveyed by Bloomberg News through Nov. 28, stretching the pause that began with Mark Carney in 2010. That would make it the longest since February 1944 to September 1950, exceeding the October 1950 to January 1955 hiatus.

While Fed policy makers debate the language they might use to flag potential policy-rate increases, their Canadian counterparts say they remain focused on providing stimulus to bring the world’s 11th-largest economy back to full output over the next two years.

Canada’s economic growth slowed to a 2.8 percent annualized pace in the third quarter from 3.6 percent the prior three months, Statistics Canada reported Nov. 28. In contrast, U.S. growth came in at 3.9 percent.

Poloz won’t raise rates until the fourth quarter of next year, according to a Bloomberg economist survey. The quarter-point increase forecast for Canada compares with an estimated Fed move to 1 percent from 0.25 percent over that time.

The anticipation of rising Fed rates has is already helping keep Canadian bond yields lower than Treasuries. Canada’s five-year bonds had a 1.35 percent yield at 9:25 a.m. Toronto time today, while similar Treasuries yielded 1.46 percent.

In honour of Cyber Monday, the Canadian preferred share market was on sale today, with PerpetualDiscounts down 12bp, FixedResets losing 18bp and DeemedRetractibles off 11bp. Volatility was high and comprised almost entirely of losers. Volume was below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.9738 % 2,518.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.9738 % 3,987.3
Floater 2.99 % 3.11 % 62,372 19.39 4 -0.9738 % 2,677.3
OpRet 4.39 % -12.35 % 25,827 0.08 2 -0.0195 % 2,759.6
SplitShare 4.28 % 3.90 % 47,274 3.75 5 -0.3161 % 3,188.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0195 % 2,523.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.42 % -8.03 % 71,155 0.09 20 -0.0897 % 2,483.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.12 % 5.06 % 114,040 15.36 15 -0.1241 % 2,678.9
FixedReset 4.17 % 3.51 % 178,614 8.64 73 -0.1848 % 2,582.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.97 % -1.78 % 99,350 0.09 40 -0.1064 % 2,614.6
FloatingReset 2.53 % -0.48 % 59,985 0.08 5 -0.0469 % 2,554.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -4.13 % Completely legitimate and not just another Toronto Stock Exchange screw up, for a change. The closing quote was 21.81-00 and all trades after 2:30 pm were under 22.00, although the VWAP for the day was 22.22. The thumping is probably due to the HSE new issue, FixedReset, 4.50%+313 announced today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-12-01
Maturity Price : 21.47
Evaluated at bid price : 21.81
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.81
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-12-01
Maturity Price : 21.73
Evaluated at bid price : 22.08
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.03
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-12-01
Maturity Price : 17.02
Evaluated at bid price : 17.02
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
CGI.PR.D SplitShare -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 2.65 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 172,040 RBC crossed 142,100 at 21.39.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-12-01
Maturity Price : 21.32
Evaluated at bid price : 21.32
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 124,636 National crossed 120,000 at 25.44.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : -1.48 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 80,232 RBC crossed 65,000 at 25.46.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-12-01
Maturity Price : 23.33
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 57,172 RBC crossed 37,600 at 24.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-12-01
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.66
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 51,001 Scotia crossed 41,400 at 25.53.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-12-01
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 47,395 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PF.G FixedReset Quote: 25.80 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.2987

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %

BAM.PF.F FixedReset Quote: 25.71 – 26.15
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2765

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %

GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.11 – 25.50
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2728

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 5.07 %

TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.32 – 26.79
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3614

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.32
Bid-YTW : -15.06 %

SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.25 – 24.50
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1663

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %

CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.50 – 22.75
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1686

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-12-01
Maturity Price : 22.19
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %

FTN.PR.A To Get Bigger

December 1st, 2014

Quadravest has announced:

Financial 15 Split Corp. (the “Company”) is pleased to announce it has filed a preliminary short form prospectus in each of the provinces of Canada with respect to an offering of Preferred Shares and Class A Shares of the Company. The offering will be co-led by National Bank Financial Inc., CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and will also include Scotia Capital Inc., BMO Capital Markets, GMP Securities L.P., Canaccord Genuity Corp. and Raymond James.

The Preferred Shares will be offered at a price of $10.00 per Preferred Share to yield 5.25% and the Class A Shares will be offered at a price of $9.75 per Class A Share to yield 15.5%. The closing price on the TSX of each of the Preferred Shares and the Class A Shares on November 28, 2014 was $10.14 and $10.04, respectively.

Since inception of the Company, the aggregate dividends paid on the Preferred Shares have been $5.75 per share and the aggregate dividends paid on the Class A Shares have been $12.61 per share, for a combined total of $18.36. All distributions to date have been made in tax advantage eligible Canadian dividends or capital gains dividends.

The net proceeds of the secondary offering will be used by the Company to invest in an actively managed, high quality portfolio consisting of 15 financial services companies made up of Canadian and U.S. issuers as follows:

Bank of Montreal National Bank of Canada Bank of America Corp.
The Bank of Nova Scotia Manulife Financial Corporation Citigroup Inc.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Sun Life Financial Services of Canada Inc. Goldman Sachs Group Inc.
Royal Bank of Canada Great-West Lifeco Inc. JP Morgan Chase & Co.
The Toronto-Dominion Bank CI Financial Corp. Wells Fargo & Co.

The Company’s investment objectives are:

Preferred Shares:
i. to provide holders of the Preferred Shares with fixed, cumulative preferential monthly cash dividends currently in the amount of $0.04375 per Preferred Share to yield 5.25% annually, to be set by the Board of Directors annually subject to a minimum of 5.25% until 2020; and
ii. on or about the termination date, currently December 1, 2020 (subject to further 5 year extensions thereafter), to pay the holders of the Preferred Shares $10.00 per Preferred Share.

Class A Shares:
i. to provide holders of the Class A Shares with regular monthly cash dividends in an amount to be determined by the Board of the Directors and currently targeted to be $0.1257 per Class A Share; and
ii. to permit holders to participate in all growth in the net asset value of the Company above $10 per Unit, by paying holders on or about the termination date of December 1, 2020 (subject to further 5 year extensions thereafter) such amounts as remain in the Company after paying $10 per Preferred Share.

The sales period of this overnight offering will end at 9:00 a.m. EST on December 2, 2014.

That’s a pretty hefty premium over NAV! The NAVPU of the fund was $17.78 on November 28.

FTN.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog in connection with its Rights Offering that closed in September, 2014. FTN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Update, 2014-12-2: They raised $38.3-million:

Financial 15 Split Corp. (the “Company”) is pleased to announce it has completed the overnight marketing of up to 1,939,000 Preferred Shares and up to 1,939,000 Class A Shares. Total proceeds of the offering are expected to be approximately $38.3 million.

The offering is being co-led by National Bank Financial Inc., CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and will also include Scotia Capital Inc., BMO Capital Markets, GMP Securities L.P., Canaccord Genuity Corp. and Raymond James.

The sales period of the overnight offering has now ended.

New Issue: HSE FixedReset, 4.50%+313

December 1st, 2014

Husky Energy has announced that it:

has agreed to issue to a syndicate of underwriters led by Scotia Capital Inc. and TD Securities Inc. (collectively the “Underwriters”) for distribution to the public 8,000,000 Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 3 (the “Series 3 Shares”).

The Series 3 Shares will be issued at a price of $25.00 per Series 3 Share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $200 million. Holders of the Series 3 Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.50 percent annually for the initial period ending December 31, 2019. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 3.13 percent.

Holders of Series 3 Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 4 (the “Series 4 Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on December 31, 2019 and on December 31 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series 4 Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill rate plus 3.13 percent.

Husky has granted the Underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional 2,000,000 Series 3 Shares at the same offering price. The Series 3 Shares will be offered by way of prospectus supplement to the short form base shelf prospectus of Husky Energy dated December 31, 2012.

The prospectus supplement will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in all provinces of Canada, except Quebec.

The net proceeds from this offering will be used to further support the Company’s strong balance sheet and business plan as well as for general corporate purposes, which may include, among other things, the partial repayment of the 3.75% medium-term notes due in 2015.

The offering is expected to close on or about December 9, 2014, subject to customary closing conditions and receipt of required regulatory approvals.

This is a useful issue, as it provides a good distinction with HSE.PR.A, which is a FixedReset, 4.45%+173, which closed 2011-3-18. One hundred and forty basis points difference in Issue Reset Spread is not to be sneezed at!

Update, 2014-12-2 : Upsized:

Husky Energy (TSX:HSE) is increasing the size of its previously announced offering of Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 3 (the “Series 3 Shares”) to 10 million shares, due to positive investor response.

The aggregate gross proceeds from the upsized offering will be $250 million. Closing of the offering is expected on or about December 9, 2014, subject to customary closing conditions and receipt of required regulatory approvals.

MAPF Performance: November 2014

December 1st, 2014

The fund outperformed significantly in November, due largely to its overweight position in Straight Perpetuals.

relPerf_141128
Click for Big

relYield_141128
Click for Big

I continue to believe that the decline in the preferred share market remains overdone; the following table shows the increase in yields since May 22, 2013, of some fixed income sectors:

Yield Changes
May 22, 2013
to
November 28, 2014
Sector Yield
May 22
2013
Yield
October 31
2014
Change
Five-Year Canadas 1.38% 1.38% 0
Long Canadas 2.57% 2.33% -24bp
Long Corporates 4.15% 4.05% -10bp
FixedResets
Investment Grade
(Interest Equivalent)
3.51% 4.64% +113bp
Perpetual-Discounts
Investment Grade
(Interest Equivalent)
6.34% 6.51% +17bp
The change in yield of PerpetualDiscounts is understated due a massive influx of issues from the PerpetualPremium sub-index over the period, which improved credit quality. When the four issues that comprised the PerpetualDiscount sub-index as of May 22, 2013 are evaluated as of November 28, 2014, the interest-equivalent yield is 6.98% and thus the change is +64bp.

This will probably be the last time I trot out comparisons between current conditions and those of May, 2013; PerpetualDiscounts have edged back far enough that the total return since then is only just barely negative, while five year Canadas are identical (!) and long Canadas are below their May, 2013, levels (!!).

ZPR, is an ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues and a very high proportion of junk issues, returned +%, +% and +% over the past one-, three- and twelve-month periods, respectively (according to the fund’s data), versus returns for the TXPL index of +0.34%, -0.38% and +4.31% respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $1,116-million since inception in November 2012; AUM increased by $21-million in November; given an index return of +0.34% an increase of less than $1-million was expected, indicating that money is still flowing into the fund. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents.

TXPR had returns over one- and three-months of +0.73% and +0.61%, respectively with CPD performance within expectations.

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for October were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to October 30, 2014
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat N/A N/A
Floater +1.16% -0.84%
OpRet +0.61% +1.13%
SplitShare +1.06% +1.50%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium +0.77% +1.85%
PerpetualDiscount +2.05% +2.69%
FixedReset +0.58% +0.59%
DeemedRetractible +1.24% +1.97%
FloatingReset +0.16% +0.96%

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close November 28, 2014, was $10.6865.

Returns to November 28, 2014
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month +1.52% +0.64% +0.73% N/A
Three Months +1.49% +0.39% +0.61% N/A
One Year +10.58% +3.81% +5.53% +5.08%
Two Years (annualized) +4.36% +2.56% +2.62% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +7.02% +3.72% +3.72% +3.22%
Four Years (annualized) +5.37% +4.33% +3.87% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +7.88% +5.88% +5.05% +4.43%
Six Years (annualized) +18.72% +10.26% +9.34%  
Seven Years (annualized) +13.35% +5.15% +4.27%  
Eight Years (annualized) +10.88% +3.61%    
Nine Years (annualized) +10.39% +3.70%    
Ten Years (annualized) +9.99% +3.80%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +10.42% +4.01%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +11.98% +4.31%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +10.87% +4.17%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.65%, +0.97% and +5.50%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +4.09%; five year is +5.42%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.04%, -0.81% and +1.19% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +0.93%; five-year is +2.43%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Class Adv [into which was merged Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund)] (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.47%, -0.15% & +4.00%, respectively.
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.68%, +0.60% & +5.18%, respectively. Three year performance is +4.56%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are +0.70%, +0.51% and +4.26% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is +0.41%, -0.46% and +4.03% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund (Dividend Tax Credit Class, the best performing) are +%, +% and +% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively. (Figures to November 28 have not be published as of December 14)
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are +0.64% and +2.97% for the past three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for PowerShares Canadian Preferred Share Index Class, Series Fare +0.80%, +0.33% and +4.36% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The three year figure is +2.00%

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past two years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund occasionally finds an attractive opportunity to trade between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons (but in which trading is now hampered by the fact that the low-coupon issues are trading near par and are callable at par in the near term), but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index, and in June, 2013, when the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles behaved like PerpetualDiscounts in a sharply negative market.

However, it will be noted, as discussed in several reports on Portfolio Composition since June, 2014, there has been a continuing series of trades from DeemedRetractibles into low-Spread FixedResets of the same issuer … so there are some opportunities to trade, although they don’t happen often!

In October, insurance DeemedRetractibles outperformed bank DeemedRetractibles:

insBank_straightPerf_141128
Click for Big

… and were about equal to Unregulated Straight Perpetuals.

insUnreg_straightPerf_141128
Click for Big

Of the regressions for data in the above two charts, the Adjusted Correlation of the Bank DeemedRetractible performance (not shown) is slightly negative, Unregulated Straight Perpetuals come in at 31% and Insurance DeemedRetractibles are at 75%.

A lingering effect of the downdraft of 2013 has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility (all Implied Volatility calculations use bids from November 28):

impVol_GWO_141128
Click for Big

impVol_PWF_141128
Click for Big

However, while the fit for PWF is good and the Implied Volatility is high, there are many local minima for the spread:

impVol_PWF_141128_fit_varVol
Click for Big

impVol_PWF_141128_fit_varSpread
Click for Big

Implied Volatility of
Two Series of Straight Perpetuals
November 28, 2014
Issuer Pure Yield Implied Volatility
GWO 3.87% (-0.47) 18% (+2)
PWF 0.04% (-0.18) 39% (-1)
Bracketted figures are changes since September month-end

It is disconcerting to see the difference between GWO and PWF; if anything, we would expect the implied volatility for GWO to be higher, given that the DeemedRetraction – not yet given significant credence by the market – implies a directionality in prices. On the other hand, the PWF issues are mostly trading above par, which in practice tends to add directionality although this makes no sense. The GWO data with the best fit derived for PWF is distinguishable from the best fit; the best fit has a lower Sum of Squared Errors (1.28 vs. 2.85):

impVol_GWO_PWFBest_141128
Click for Big

In the September, 2013, edition of PrefLetter, I extended the theory of Implied Volatility to FixedResets – relating the option feature of the Issue Reset Spreads to a theoretical non-callable Market Spread.

impVol_BPO_141128
Click for Big

impVol_FFH_141128
Click for Big

Implied Volatility of
Two Series of FixedResets
August 29, 2014
Issuer Market Reset Spread
(Non-Callable)
Implied Volatility
BPO 100bp (-3) 40% (0)
FFH 307bp (-9) 8% (0)
Bracketted figures are changes since October month-end

These are very interesting results: The BPO issues are trading as if calls are a certainty, while FFH issues are trading as if calls are much less likely; this is probably due to the market’s over-reacting to the fact that all of the BPO issues are trading above par, while only one of the five FFH issues shares that happy status. The FFH series continues to be perplexing, this time with the four lower-coupon issues showing virtually no implied volatility – with the highest coupon issue (FFH.PR.K) being well off the mark … all I can think of is that the market has decided that FFH.PR.K, with an Issue Reset Spread of 351bp, is sure to be called in 2017, while the other four (highest spread is FFH.PR.C, +315) are not at all likely to be called. Note that FFH.PR.C will have its first Reset Date on 2014-12-31 and it would appear, given its bid of 24.90, that the market expects a reset rather than a call for redemption.

The Implied Volatility calculation for the TRP FixedResets is most interesting:

impVol_TRP_141128Click for Big

According to this calculation, TRP.PR.A is $1.56 cheap to theory, being bid at 21.46 compared to a theoretical price of 23.02. A portion of this difference is due to the approximations that have gone into the calculation, which assumes that all issues have three years to their call date and, critically, are all paying their long-term dividend rate right now. In an environment in which, given a GOC5 yield of 1.38%, virtually all dividend rates are expected to drop on reset, the time to reset and the degree of difference in the interim is important.

We can make some approximate adjustments to the theoretical prices:

Issue Current Rate Issue Reset Spread Next Reset Date Expected Future Rate Difference per annum Dividends before Reset Total Difference
TRP.PR.A $1.15 192bp 2014-12-31 $0.825 $0.325 0 $0.00
TRP.PR.B $1.00 128bp 2015-6-30 $0.665 $0.335 2 $0.17
TRP.PR.C $1.10 154bp 2016-1-30 $0.73 $0.37 4 $0.37
TRP.PR.D $1.00 238bp 2019-4-30 $0.94 $0.06 17 $0.25
TRP.PR.E $1.0625 235bp 2019-10-30 $0.9325 $0.13 19 $0.62

So a more precise calculation could be performed by subtracting $0.17 from the actual bid of TRP.PR.B, since the calculation otherwise assumes the dividend payments before reset will be $0.665/4 instead of $1.00/4; if we assume that the market is accounting for this, then subtraction of the excess from the market price will give a first-order approximation of what the market is actually paying for the expected future dividend stream (with the difference left undiscounted! That’s just another complication!).

However, making these adjustments doesn’t change the situation much, which is why I usually can’t be bothered:

impVol_TRP_adjPx_141128
Click for Big

And, with these adjustments, we still find that TRP.PR.A is cheap to theory, with an adjusted actual price of 21.46 compared to a theoretical price of $22.73 – so the adjusted calculation shows it being $1.27 cheap to theory, compared to the unadjusted calculation’s figure of $1.56 cheap to theory. The changes due to the price adjustments are significant, but do not lead to any changes in issue rankings.

I suspect that the market is simply over-reacting to an expected change in dividends that is both significant and imminent. It will be most interesting to learn, as more data becomes accumulated, whether this is always the case, for junk FixedResets as well as investment-grade, for expected increases as well as decreases.

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in well over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. As has been previously noted, very high levels of Implied Volatility (in the 40% range, at which point the calculation may be considered virtually meaningless) imply a very strong expectation of directionality in future prices – i.e, an expectation that all issues will be redeemed at par.

It is significant that the preferred share market knows no moderation. I suggest that a good baseline estimate for Volatility over a three year period is 15% but the observed figure is generally higher in a rising market and lower in a declining one … with, of course, a period of adjustment in between, which I suspect we are currently experiencing.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles; something that dismays me, particularly given that the market does not yet agree with me regarding the insurance issues! There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
September 10.4601 5.28% 0.997 5.296% 1.0000 $0.5540
November, 2014 10.6865 4.86% 0.986 4.929% 1.0000 $0.5267
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on November 28; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a small position in these issues.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas (set at 1.49% for the November 28 calculation) to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Dividend Yield” of 4.5% as of August 29, 2014, but this is the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF was 4.89% as of August 29, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s a little higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to discuss it in the context of portfolio reporting is misleading.

However, BMO has taken a significant step forward in that they are no longer reporting the “Portfolio Yield” directly on their website; the information is taken from the “Enhanced Fund Profile” which is available only as a PDF link. CPD doesn’t report this metric on the CPD fact sheet or on their website. I may have one less thing to mock the fundcos about!

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance has generally been due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: November 2014

November 30th, 2014

Turnover spiked in November to about 23%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped was the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) in early 2013 – many of the PerpetualPremiums had negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! While market weakness since the peak of the PerpetualDiscount subindex in May, 2013, has mitigated the situation somewhat, the population of PerpetualDiscounts is still exceeded by that of PerpetualPremiums – most of which are trading at a negative Yield-to-Worst.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to further footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on November 28 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2014-11-28
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 6.8% (+4.7) 4.35% 6.28
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 4.7% (-15.6) 5.38% 14.74
Fixed-Reset 39.0% (+16.0) 4.38% 11.40
Deemed-Retractible 37.9% (-6.5) 5.30% 8.03
Scraps (Various) 10.2% (+0.2) 5.80% 11.05
Cash 1.4% (+1.1) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 4.86% 9.74
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from October month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The big shift during the month was from PerpetualDiscounts (selling CU.PR.F and CU.PR.G, mostly in the range 22.45-50, almost all after earning the dividend on November 5) into FixedResets (TRP.PR.A at around 21.80, prior to earning the dividend of $0.2875, and TRP.PR.B at around 19.00, mostly prior to earning the dividend of 0.25). At month-end, CU.PR.F were bid at about 22.50, so that side is basically flat, while the post-dividend bid on TRP.PR.A was 21.46 (basically flat after accounting for the dividend) and 18.54 on TRP.PR.B (down about $0.25). So these trades were basically down by transaction costs.

Another sectoral shift was from PerpetualDiscounts (BAM.PR.M at about 21.90 and BAM.PR.N at about 22.20) into SplitShares (PVS.PR.D, about half before and half after the November 19 dividend, at an average post-dividend equivalent price of about 24.55). Given month end bids of 22.36 for BAM.PR.M and BAM.PR.N and 24.71 for PVS.PR.D, these trades were a little behind at month-end … largely because the two BAM issues spiked by a bit more than 1% each on November 28, making the timing of these trades look awful.

In addition, there was movement from DeemedRetractibles (MFC.PR.C, the bulk of it pre-dividend, at a post-dividend adjusted price of about 23.00) into FixedResets (MFC.PR.F, the bulk of it pre-dividend, at a post-dividend adjusted price of 22.14, but these prices were all over the map). Given month-end, post-dividend bids of 23.43 for MFC.PR.C and 22.13 for MFC.PR.F, these trades were executed too early and are underwater by about $0.40.

While these changes are dramatic, it will be noted that the fund is still heavily overweighted in Straight Perpetuals (almost all DeemedRetractibles now) and underweighted in FixedResets relative to the index, which is roughly 31% Straight and 60% FixedReset.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2014-11-28
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 24.7% (-0.3)
Pfd-2(high) 40.1% (-10.8)
Pfd-2 0%
Pfd-2(low) 23.6% (+12.8)
Pfd-3(high) 1.2% (+0.4)
Pfd-3 4.3% (-0.2)
Pfd-3(low) 3.5% (-0.1)
Pfd-4(high) 0.7% (0)
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0% (0)
Pfd-5(high) 0% (0)
Pfd-5 0.5% (0)
Cash 1.4% (+1.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from Octoberber month-end.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.B, which is rated P-5 by S&P and is unrated by DBRS
A position held in NPI.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3(high)” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3(high).

The change in credit distribution is due largely to the sale of the CU PerpetualDiscounts (Pfd-2(high)) into TRP FixedResets (Pfd-2(low)).

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2014-11-28
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 13.0% (-0.4)
$50,000 – $100,000 2.5% (-2.2)
$100,000 – $200,000 54.6% (-24.6)
$200,000 – $300,000 14.9% (+12.4)
>$300,000 13.6% (+13.6)
Cash 1.4% (+1.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from October month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

Prof. Jeffrey MacIntosh on the National Securities Regulator

November 30th, 2014

The following was originally part of the daily market report for November 28, 2014, but on reflection I have decided it deserves its own post.

A trade group that wants me to write them a cheque alerted me to a series of articles by Prof. Jeffrey MacIntosh on the new national securities regulator proposal. Assiduous Readers with extremely good memories will not need to be reminded that Prof. MacIntosh wrote a very good article on Pegged Orders. The first article of his new series, National Regulator 1: The Grand Market Regulator: Be afraid, very afraid, decries the enormous powers that are proposed:

In a provision that would be very much at home in Albania, North Korea, or The Peoples Republic of China, the federal legislation empowers the “Chief Regulator,” without holding a hearing or even giving advance notice, to “issue a notice of violation [for breach of the statute or regulations]… if the Chief Regulator has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a violation.” The notice may specify a penalty of as much as $1-million for an individual and $15-million for non-individuals.

It is only after this notice is delivered that the person from whom the fine is demanded has an opportunity to make representations, and these representations are made to the very person who levied the fine in the first place – the Chief Regulator. Despite the potential economic burden, the pertinent burden of proof in the hearing is the civil standard (balance of probabilities) rather than the more demanding criminal law standard (beyond a reasonable doubt). Any director or officer “who authorized, permitted or acquiesced in the contravention” is potentially liable for the full amount of the fine.

The Chief Regulator can also order any person with a connection to capital markets to furnish the regulator (the “Authority”) with any kind of information, including information that is personal and/or confidential. No judicial warrant is required.

This information can be passed on to a law enforcement agency or “a governmental or regulatory authority, in Canada or elsewhere.” Indeed, it can be passed on to anyone of the Authority’s choosing. It can also be made public, if “the public interest in disclosure outweighs any private interest in keeping the information confidential.”

The statute specifically excludes any appeal to a court; the only appeal is to the regulatory tribunal.

The second article, A Category 5 blizzard of red tape is headed for Canada’s market players, decries changes in the laws:

Insider trading laws, for example, will now apply to any public company, and not just one that is a reporting issuer in Canada. They will also apply not merely to a purchase or sale of securities, but to any act in furtherance of a trade, a change with completely unknown ramifications. While under current rules, certain insiders are liable to the company in whose securities they trade for any “benefit or advantage” they receive, the new legislation extends the liability to include any benefit or advantage received by “all other persons as a result of the contravention.” Similarly, under current legislation only persons who actually trade with an insider have a right of action. Under the proposal, all persons trading on the opposite side of the market when an insider trades will have a cause of action, with no limitation on the aggregate damages that may be claimed. In a large public company, an insider trading profit of $100 could lead to an aggregate liability in the millions.

In the past, major overhauls of corporate or securities laws have invariably been effected by appointing a blue ribbon panel of experts to consult widely with stakeholders, ruminate at length, and publish a detailed report indicating not only the panel’s recommendations for change but the whys and wherefores of the proposed changes. Not in this case.

Shades of OSFI! The third article, Where are the efficiencies?, casts doubt on promised savings:

The agreement between the provinces and the feds, however, provides initially for the secondment, and subsequently for the transfer to the CMRA of all provincial employees currently engaged in securities regulation. In addition, no provincial regulator will disappear. Rather, each will morph into a branch office of the CMRA. Thus, there appear to be essentially no initial economies in moving to a cooperative regulator. Savings can only be achieved in the long run through expensive buy-out packages or attrition.

No doubt this is a handy-dandy inducement to get more provinces and territories to sign up, since no one in any of those respective organizations need hand out any pink slips. And indeed, to the extent that duplication is in fact eliminated, many employees will end up with a substantially reduced workload.

The final article in the series, The regulatory Leviathan, voices concern regarding accountability:

Various features of the CCMRA suggest that the administrative officials who staff the agency will be largely unaccountable to anyone. One of these arises out of the pesky little problem of maintaining legislative uniformity going forward, which will require legislative amendments in each and every one of the provinces and territories that are party to the scheme. Given the overwhelming lack of importance of securities regulation to the polity, and therefore the average politician, moving the legislative behemoth in a single jurisdiction is labour enough. Doing it in multiple jurisdictions is like attempting to safely shepherd an army of banana slugs across King and Bay during rush hour.

Unfortunately, the proposed cure for this problem is worse than the disease. The CCMRA essentially cuts the various legislatures out of the regulatory process. This is done by turning the uniform provincial legislation (the Provincial Capital Markets Act, or PCMA) into a skeleton, and imbuing the CMRA with the authority to tack on the fleshy structures that constitute the pith and substance of the regulatory apparatus. They do this via a purely administrative rulemaking process.

Market actors who are treated badly by securities regulators have little incentive to fight back. The practical imperative is almost always to get on with the business at hand. And everyone knows that fighting the regulator by insisting on a regulatory hearing is a mugs game. The regulators have made it clear that they will treat those who don’t “cooperate” (i.e. settle on Commission-dictated terms) much more harshly than those who role over and play dead. And if they decide to cream you, your right of appeal plus $4.08 will buy you a Grande Latte at Starbucks. Added to this is the powerful and ever-present incentive of securities lawyers and their clients to remain in the good books of the regulators, lest present squalls breed future tempests.

OSFI Squared! This is why we need academics – practitioners and practicing lawyers are too subject to intimidation.

November 28, 2014

November 28th, 2014

Update, 2014-11-30: A large portion of the material previously published in this post has been given its own dedicated post, Prof. Jeffrey MacIntosh on the National Securities Regulator

European inflation is still elusive:

Consumer prices rose 0.3 percent from a year earlier, the European Union’s statistics office in Luxembourg said today. That was in line with the median forecast of 41 economists in a Bloomberg News survey. Unemployment (UMRTEMU) held at 11.5 percent in October, Eurostat said in a separate report.

The Eurostat report showed that energy prices fell 2.5 percent in November from a year earlier. Crude oil has plunged more than 30 percent in the past three months. Food, alcohol and tobacco prices increased 0.5 percent.

Core inflation, which strips out volatile items such as energy, food, tobacco and alcohol, stayed at 0.7 percent in November, according to Eurostat.

“The only crumb of comfort for the ECB –- and it is not much -– is that November’s renewed drop in inflation was entirely due to an increased year-on-year drop in energy prices,” said Howard Archer, chief European economist at IHS Global Insight in London.

… and at least one pundit is muttering that the oil price graph will not be V-shaped:

But Andy Xie, the often-contrarian former top Asia-Pacific economist for Morgan Stanley, warned that the massive investment overhang in China, valued at more than $6-trillion, will dramatically affect its energy demand growth, and will, as a result, rein in oil prices for a long time to come.

“China’s energy demand, the only source of growth for a decade, has fallen sharply,” he said in an interview. “There are several conspiracy theories out there. None can affect demand supply balance, which determines prices.”

In mid-September, more than a month before Goldman Sachs rocked markets with its prediction that oil prices would fall to $70 a barrel, Mr. Xie told a conference in Kuwait that he expected oil prices to nosedive to $60. The audience laughed. Now, he’s being invited back to speak again.

BMO Capital Trust is redeeming a big slug of Innovative Tier 1 Capital (or AT1, as the cool guys call it):

BMO Capital Trust (the “Trust”), a subsidiary of Bank of Montreal, today announced its intention to redeem at par all of its Trust Capital Securities – Series D (“BMO BOaTS – Series D”), on December 31, 2014. The BMO BOaTS – Series D are redeemable at the Trust’s option from December 31, 2014, at a redemption amount equal to $1,000 plus unpaid indicated distributions. Notice will be delivered to BMO BOaTS – Series D holders in accordance with the terms outlined in the BMO BOaTS – Series D prospectus.

After December 31, 2014, holders of BMO BOaTS – Series D will be entitled only to receiving the redemption price and will no longer be entitled to indicated distributions and exercising any other rights.

According to the 2013 Annual Report:

After December 31, 2014, the distribution [on BOaTS Series D] will be at the Bankers’ Acceptance Rate plus 1.5%.

The BMO BOaTS Series D and E and BMO T1Ns – Series A will each be automatically exchanged for 40 Class B non-cumulative preferred shares of the bank, Series 11, 12 and 20, respectively, without the consent of the holders on the occurrence of specific events, such as a wind-up of the bank, a regulatory requirement to increase capital or violations of regulatory capital requirements.

LBS.PR.A was confirmed at Pfd-3(low) by DBRS:

The performance of the Portfolio has experienced some volatility over the past few months, with the downside protection fluctuating between 46.4% and 52.0% from July to October. As of October 31, 2014, the downside protection available to the Preferred Shares is approximately 49.2% and the dividend coverage ratio is about 1.1 times. The Pfd-3 (low) rating of the Preferred Shares is based primarily on the downside protection available and the additional protection provided by an asset coverage test, which does not permit any distributions to holders of the Class A Shares if the NAV of the Company falls below $15.

The main constraints to the rating are (1) the Company’s dependence on the value and dividend policies of the securities in the Portfolio and (2) the reliance on the manager to generate a high yield on the Portfolio to meet distributions and other trust expenses without having to liquidate portfolio securities.

The Asset Coverage Ratio for this issue was 2.1-:1 as of November 27.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 26bp, FixedResets off 9bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 4bp. Volatility was high, with the winners being exclusively BAM PerpetualDiscounts. Volume was quite low.

And that’s it for November!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0565 % 2,543.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0565 % 4,026.5
Floater 2.96 % 3.08 % 63,165 19.47 4 0.0565 % 2,703.7
OpRet 4.04 % -3.56 % 98,179 0.08 1 0.0000 % 2,760.1
SplitShare 4.27 % 3.89 % 49,223 3.76 5 -0.2898 % 3,198.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,523.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.44 % -8.19 % 71,631 0.09 19 -0.0123 % 2,485.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.11 % 5.01 % 110,753 15.41 16 0.2586 % 2,682.2
FixedReset 4.16 % 3.57 % 184,950 4.90 73 -0.0873 % 2,587.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % -1.48 % 99,875 0.09 40 0.0414 % 2,617.4
FloatingReset 2.55 % -4.71 % 59,284 0.08 6 -0.0456 % 2,555.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.G FixedReset -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
CGI.PR.D SplitShare -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-28
Maturity Price : 21.46
Evaluated at bid price : 21.46
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-28
Maturity Price : 24.69
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-28
Maturity Price : 22.14
Evaluated at bid price : 22.46
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-28
Maturity Price : 21.98
Evaluated at bid price : 22.36
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-28
Maturity Price : 21.88
Evaluated at bid price : 22.36
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 62,900 RBC bought 11,000 from Desjardins at 25.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : -0.18 %
BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 62,674 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 28,600 and 30,000, both at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-28
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.84
Bid-YTW : -7.48 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 37,330 Desjardins crossed 31,000 at 25.76.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.73
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 30,180 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset 26,000 Nesbitt crossed 22,000 at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 24,537 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-28
Maturity Price : 18.54
Evaluated at bid price : 18.54
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
There were 19 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.52 – 25.93
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.2564

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.20 – 25.46
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1694

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %

SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.45 – 24.69
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1601

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %

ENB.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 24.54 – 24.79
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1778

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-28
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.54
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.61 – 23.95
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2720

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %

TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.46 – 26.77
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2423

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-28
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.46
Bid-YTW : -21.41 %

SBN.PR.A: Large Partial Redemption

November 28th, 2014

Strathbridge Asset Management Inc. has announced (albeit not yet on their website):

S Split Corp. (the “Fund”) (TSX:SBN)(TSX:SBN.PR.A) has announced that the Fund will effect a partial redemption of its Preferred Shares in order to maintain an equal number of Preferred Shares and Class A Shares of the Fund outstanding. The partial redemption of Preferred Shares is being made in connection with the recent approval by holders of Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares (collectively, the “Shareholders”) of a proposal to extend the term of the Fund for an additional seven-year term until December 31, 2021 and for automatic successive seven-year terms thereafter.

Pursuant to the special retraction right granted to Shareholders in connection with the extension of the Fund, 255,199 Preferred Shares and 1,760,848 Class A Shares were surrendered for retraction. In order to maintain an equal number of Preferred Shares and Class A Shares, the Fund will redeem approximately 1,505,649 Preferred Shares on a pro rata basis from all holders of record of Preferred Shares on December 5, 2014, representing approximately 51% of the issued and outstanding Preferred Shares. Each Preferred Share that is redeemed pursuant to the partial redemption will be redeemed at a price equal to $10.00, being the original issue price per Preferred Share, plus declared and unpaid distributions thereon (the “Repayment Price”). The Repayment Price will be paid to holders whose Preferred Shares are redeemed by the Fund on or before December 15, 2014.

SBN.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog in connection with a special meeting to vote on a change in mandate; it was previously mentioned in connection with its term extension to 2021-11-31 (sic). SBN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

November 27, 2014

November 27th, 2014

It’s a tangled web we weave when attempting to control the flow of capital:

Foreigners who illegally buy homes in Australia should face higher fines, a parliamentary committee said, calling on authorities to better police existing rules.

The current A$85,000 ($72,769) fine for foreigners breaching the rules, “seen by many as simply the cost of doing business,” should be replaced with penalties tied to the property’s value, the House Economics Committee said in a report that made 12 recommendations. Third parties who help foreigners break the rules should be fined, and gains from illegally purchased homes should be forfeited to the government, it said.

The committee started the inquiry in March on concerns that foreign, particularly Chinese, buyers were pricing Australians out of the home market. Sydney’s median asking price for detached houses topped a record A$1 million this month, while prices across the nation’s major cities jumped 9 percent in the 12 months through October to the highest ever.

To fund better policing, the committee recommended a “modest” administration fee. An A$1,500 fee would generate revenue of A$158.7 million over four years, yet amount to less than 0.3 percent of the purchase price of a home in Sydney or Melbourne, according to the report.

How’s that for good news for sellers? There will be a tax on the sale of a house so the government can ensure that high bidders with deep pockets are disqualified.

Structural subordination is becoming important for European bank bonds:

Senior bonds sold by Barclays Plc and Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc yield as much as 38 basis points more than equivalent securities issued by the units they use to make loans. There was little difference in yields before this month.

The divergence underscores growing investor concern that senior bonds sold by parent holding companies could suffer losses if a bank fails, while debt of the operating companies will remain intact — a scenario regulators endorse. Investors are also anticipating a surge in issuance of senior debt that can be written down as lenders prepare for the biggest overhaul of financial debt in a generation.

S&P this week told investors it will probably remove any assumption of government support when assigning senior ratings to bank holding companies, meaning these bonds may be downgraded because of the risk of being bailed in.

It’s a red letter day! The Canadian Securities Administrators are proposing something sensible!

The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) today published for comment proposed amendments that would create a streamlined prospectus exemption for rights offerings by reporting issuers.

“Although rights offerings can be one of the fairest ways for issuers to raise capital, in that they allow all existing investors to participate on a pro rata basis, they are seldom used because of the time and costs associated with them,” said Bill Rice, Chair of the CSA and Chair and Chief Executive Officer of the Alberta Securities Commission. “The proposed exemption is designed to make rights offerings more attractive to reporting issuers by decreasing both the time and costs involved.”

One of the key proposals is to remove the current regulatory review process prior to use of the rights offering circular. The CSA anticipates this will significantly decrease the amount of time it takes to conduct an offering. The CSA also proposes increased investor protection through the addition of civil liability for secondary market disclosure, and the introduction of a more user-friendly form of rights offering circular document.

The proposed amendments would also update other rights offering requirements and repeal the prospectus exemption for rights offerings by non-reporting issuers.

The CSA notice and proposed amendments are available on CSA members’ websites. The comment period is open until February 25, 2015.

The price of oil is catching up to the real economy:

West Texas Intermediate oil tumbled 6.3 percent to $69.05 a barrel in electronic trading, as Brent crude fell to its lowest level since 2010. Canadian energy companies sank the most since 2011, dragging the Standard & Poor’s/TSX Composite Index down 0.8 percent by 4:30 p.m. in Toronto.

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries maintained its collective production ceiling of 30 million barrels a day at a meeting in Vienna, resisting calls from Venezuela that a supply cut was needed to stem the rout that has sent oil prices into a bear market this year. Global energy stocks are down 25 percent in 2014, while fixed-income assets have rallied as the drop in crude damps inflation. German price growth climbed the least since 2010, data today showed, and most U.S. markets were closed for Thanksgiving.

The ruble weakened to an all-time low of 48.6550 per dollar in Moscow, while Norway’s krone, the second-worst performer against the dollar this year among 16 major currencies, lost 1.4 percent to 6.9272 per dollar. Norway is the biggest oil producer in Western Europe.

And what with one thing and another, the Great Game is making a comeback!

Russian President Vladimir Putin will seek to bolster energy ties with India on a visit next month, his latest move to expand trade links with Asian nations to counter sanctions from the U.S. and its allies.

Gas exporter OAO Gazprom (OGZD) reached a $400 billion deal with China in May to build a pipeline and start supplies after more than a decade of talks. In September, Putin offered to sell a stake in Vankor, the country’s second-biggest oil project, to “Chinese friends.” OAO Russian Railways is seeking to build a 2.8 trillion-ruble, high-speed line linking Moscow and Beijing.

“India is looking very closely at that — it’ll want to get in on the action,” said Sinderpal Singh, a senior research fellow at the Singapore-based Institute of South Asian Studies. “The Russians want to diversify, India wants hydrocarbons. Trade imperatives bind all these countries.”

India, which spent $143 billion to import crude last year, may look to diversify suppliers by buying more oil from Russia and Latin America to guard against geopolitical risks, Oil Minister Dharmendra Pradhan said in an October interview.

Economic ties between India and Russia are largely limited to arms transfers, and those have decreased over the past few decades. While the Soviet Union was India’s largest trading partner in 1981, Russia wasn’t among its top 15 commercial partners last year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Russia and the Soviet Union have been India’s biggest weapons suppliers, accounting for about 70 percent of its arms imports since 1950, according to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The U.S. surpassed Russia as India’s top supplier of defense equipment in the three years to March, according to Indian government data.

US consumers aren’t spending:

The U.S. Commerce Department reported Wednesday that personal consumption spending increased a slim 0.2 per cent in October from September, less than economists had expected after September’s flat reading. The U.S. economy is accelerating, but consumer spending isn’t. For the past 12 months, real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) disposable personal income has risen 2.5 per cent, the fastest pace in nearly two years; but personal consumption expenditures are up 2.2 per cent, the lowest in eight months.

The U.S. Conference Board’s latest consumer confidence index reading, released this week, was at a five-month low. Somehow, the combination of third-quarter economic growth of nearly 4 per cent annualized, strong employment growth and tumbling gasoline prices isn’t enough to impress our grumpy old Uncle Spender.

I don’t quote Willem Buiter much any more, which is a shame. But he has favoured us with his golden wisdom:

The initiative requiring the Swiss National Bank to hold a fixed portion of its assets in gold makes no sense, according to Citigroup Inc., which said the metal was the equivalent of the virtual currency bitcoin.

“There is no economic or financial case for a central bank to hold any single commodity, even if this commodity had intrinsic value,” Willem Buiter, the bank’s chief economist and a former Bank of England policy maker, wrote in a report dated yesterday. “Forbidding a central bank from ever selling any gold it owns reduces the value of those gold holdings to zero.”

Like bitcoin, gold has no intrinsic value and is costly to produce and store, Buiter wrote. “If the central bank is to invest in commodities, better to have a balanced portfolio of commodities or, more conveniently, a balanced portfolio of commodity ETFs or other derivatives,” he said.

And I have to admit, Japanese bond yields are more amusing than usual:

The Bank of Japan’s record bond buying is crowding out individual buyers, narrowing the investor base on which the world’s second-largest bond market stands.

The government last month canceled sales of sovereign notes maturing in 2016 through financial companies to households because buyers would have to pay more in broker fees than they would get in interest, according to the Ministry of Finance. The BOJ’s 80 trillion yen ($681 billion) a year in debt purchases has cut yields, with the latest two-year securities offering a 0.038 percent coupon, less than half the rate in June last year, and compared with about 0.02 percent interest on bank deposits.

The ratio of government bonds held by individuals was 2 percent at the end of June, compared with 21.2 percent for the BOJ and 57.7 percent for banks, life insurers and mutual funds, according to central bank data.

But despite these efforts…:

Japan’s consumer price gains slowed for a third straight month, challenging Bank of Japan Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s effort to stoke faster inflation.

Consumer prices excluding fresh food increased 2.9 percent in October from a year earlier, the statistics bureau said today in Tokyo, matching the median projection in a Bloomberg News survey (JNCPIXFF) of economists. Stripped of the effect of April’s sales-tax increase, core inflation — the BOJ’s key measure — was 0.9 percent.

Tumbling oil prices are complicating the task of stoking inflation in an economy that slid into recession last quarter. The inflation number is the last key data point on consumer price changes before an election next month, with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe seeking a renewed mandate for his economic growth strategy.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 4bp, FixedResets down 8bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 3bp. Volatility was average. Volume was very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5823 % 2,541.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5823 % 4,024.2
Floater 2.97 % 3.08 % 64,161 19.48 4 0.5823 % 2,702.1
OpRet 4.04 % -3.70 % 99,241 0.08 1 0.0000 % 2,760.1
SplitShare 4.25 % 3.88 % 51,253 3.76 5 0.3938 % 3,208.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,523.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.44 % -7.09 % 70,331 0.08 19 -0.0595 % 2,485.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.12 % 5.01 % 108,751 15.42 16 -0.0396 % 2,675.3
FixedReset 4.15 % 3.57 % 187,739 6.40 73 -0.0807 % 2,589.6
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % -1.23 % 98,695 0.09 40 0.0266 % 2,616.3
FloatingReset 2.55 % -6.56 % 60,021 0.08 6 0.0978 % 2,557.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-27
Maturity Price : 23.33
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-27
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %
CGI.PR.D SplitShare 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 3.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-27
Maturity Price : 17.22
Evaluated at bid price : 17.22
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.A FixedReset 118,550 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 65,639 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 20.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-27
Maturity Price : 20.42
Evaluated at bid price : 20.42
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 63,447 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-27
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.70
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 58,500 Desjardins crossed 10,800 at 25.66; RBC crossed 36,000 at 25.64.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 39,449 Nesbitt crossed 19,300 at 18.68.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-27
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 34,998 Nesbitt crossed 25,800 at 21.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
There were 19 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 19.20 – 19.73
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3794

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-27
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.80 – 24.15
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2352

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %

NEW.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 32.67 – 33.48
Spot Rate : 0.8100
Average : 0.7102

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-06-26
Maturity Price : 32.07
Evaluated at bid price : 32.67
Bid-YTW : 2.15 %

BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.10 – 22.43
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2383

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-27
Maturity Price : 21.67
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %

MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.38 – 23.60
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1570

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.38
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %

ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.53 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.1700
Average : 0.1103

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : -19.74 %

November 26, 2014

November 26th, 2014

There was an article on Bloomberg about tech worker visas in the US:

Along with temporary deportation relief for millions, President Obama’s executive action will increase the number of U.S. college graduates from abroad who can temporarily be hired by U.S. corporations. That hasn’t satisfied tech companies and trade groups, which contend more green cards or guest worker visas are needed to keep tech industries growing because of a shortage of qualified American workers. But scholars say there’s a problem with that argument: The tech worker shortage doesn’t actually exist.

The argument against the tech worker shortage is presented in a paper by Hal Salzman, Daniel Kuehn, and B. Lindsay Lowell titled Guestworkers in the high-skill U.S. labor market:

This paper reviews and analyzes the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) labor market and workforce and the supply of high-skill temporary foreign workers, who serve as “guestworkers.” It addresses three central issues in the ongoing discussion about the need for high-skill guestworkers in the United States:
Is there a problem producing enough STEM-educated students at sufficient performance levels to supply the labor market?
How large is the flow of guestworkers into the STEM workforce and into the information technology (IT) workforce in particular? And what are the characteristics of these workers?

What are the dynamics of the STEM labor market, and what are the employment and wage trends in the IT labor market?

Analysis of these issues provides the basis for assessing the extent of demand for STEM workers and the impact of guestworker flows on the STEM and IT workforces.

The IT industry was able to attract increasing numbers of domestic graduates during periods of rising wages and employment, leading to a peak in wages and numbers of computer science graduates in the early 2000s. Since that time, the IT industry appears to be functioning with two distinct market patterns: a domestic supply (of workers and students) that responds to wage signals (and other aspects of working conditions such as future career prospects), and a guestworker supply that appears to be abundantly available even in times of relatively weak demand and even when wages decline or are stagnant.

Workers from countries with low wages and limited career opportunities will find the U.S. IT labor market attractive even when wages are too low and career opportunities too limited to increase the IT supply from domestic students and workers. In other words, the data suggest that current U.S. immigration policies that facilitate large flows of guestworkers appear to provide firms with access to labor that will be in plentiful supply at wages that are too low to induce a significantly increased supply from the domestic workforce.

Very interesting, but there are some policy questions left unaddressed. The first is a question of equilibrium – one would hope, from economic theory, that supply and demand for professionals of a given type will result in an equilibrium, as high wages increase supply (of people entering undergraduate studies in the field) and decrease demand (as projects become less profitable due to higher wages.

So question #1 is: given that programming is a well-paid sector (average salary in excess of $80,000, according to Figure K of the paper), and given that the end-product is so easily transported, does it not make sense to grant visas in order to increase the global market share of the US? This isn’t a “TFWs at Timmy’s” issue, these are services that are exported and have major spin-off benefits.

Question #2 (which is actually more relevant to the paper as written) is: is the population of IT guest-workers equivalent in any rough kind o way to the population of domestic workers? There is a huge variation of skill among professional programmers, with what I call ‘teeny-bopper programmers’ at the low end … they can do a competent job of coding as long as you give them their assignments in small chunks … but if they design a large project, you end up with spaghetti code that after a few iterations becomes undebuggable and unimprovable (it is my understanding that that is what happened to dBase). Designing a programme, determining how it will be broken down into modules, which talk to each other this way and rely on these common underlying functions … that’s a very highly skilled job.

So what’s the salary distribution of guest-workers compared to the salary distribution of domestic workers? If guest-workers are all in – say – the top tercile of domestic salaries, then the paper’s argument loses a lot of its validity.

Speaking of equilibrium labour markets, it’s good times for retailers:

Workers are facing the most favorable job market for seasonal work since the 18-month recession that started in December 2007, getting hired with fewer interviews and in some cases with higher pay.

About 821,000 workers will be hired for retail seasonal jobs this year, up 11 percent from a year ago and the highest since records were started in 1990, estimates Michael Niemira, former director of research for the International Council of Shopping Centers Inc. and now founder of economic forecasting firm The Retail Economist LLC in Tucson, Arizona.

“I don’t want to say there is pressure on wages but there is an alignment of wages with demand,” said Jack Kleinhenz, chief economist with the National Retail Federation in Washington, who is estimating as many as 800,000 workers will be added. “There is some tightening” in the job market.

The unemployment rate for the retail and wholesale trade sector fell to 5.1 percent in October, the lowest since early 2008 in the initial months of the recession, Labor Department figures show. Wages and salaries for retail workers rose 2.5 percent in the third quarter from the same period in 2013, the biggest increase in more than four years, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

Seasonal job seekers using the website Snagajob.com are finding work in an average of 28 days this year compared with 45 days last year, company Chief Executive Officer Peter Harrison said. The Richmond, Virginia-based online matching service focuses on part-time and hourly positions.

Investment grade new issues have set a new record:

Investment-grade corporate debt sales have surged to a record $1.15 trillion this year as the most creditworthy borrowers flocked to the U.S. bond market to take advantage of historically low interest rates.

Apple Inc. (AAPL), Verizon Communications Inc. and Oracle Corp. were among borrowers that helped swell issuance this year. JPMorgan Chase & Co. was the the top underwriter for the fifth-straight year, grabbing 12.7 percent of the deals, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Alibaba Group Holdings Ltd., Asia’s biggest Internet company, led borrowings of more than $126 billion this month that helped sales breach last year’s record of $1.13 trillion. Companies have raced to the market to lock in borrowing costs that remain within 0.5 percentage point of the all-time low of 2.65 percent reached in 2013, Bank of America Merrill Lynch index data show.

Investors purchasing the debt have reaped 7.3 percent gains in 2014, overcoming the 1.5 percent loss last year, index data show. Investment-grade bonds are rated above Ba1 by Moody’s Investors Service and BB+ at Standard & Poor’s.

But it’s not good news all ’round:

Leveraged loan issuance plummeted in the U.S. this month as investors punished borrowers in an increasingly volatile market for high-yield, high-risk debt.

Borrowers including TransFirst Inc. and Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd. have sold $6.5 billion of U.S leveraged loans to institutional investors in what’s poised to be the slowest November since 2008, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Volume was almost $30 billion in October. Fewer deals are getting done after loan prices plunged more than 3 percent last month from a July peak and yields rose to 6.2 percent, the highest in more than two years.

The drop-off in issuance comes as regulators scrutinize Wall Street’s lending practices and demand for the speculative-grade debt fades. Leveraged loans are typically issued by companies that have ratings of less than Baa3 by Moody’s Investors Service and below BBB- by Standard & Poor’s.

Remember how the Competition Ha-Ha Board (the guys who made the discovery that not all on-line reviews are legitimate) gave the banks permission to extend their hegemony on financial services as long as they paid sufficient money to their regulatory buddies? Well, it’s going to get even better!

The chair of the Ontario Securities Commission has inked a new deal to co-operate on investigations with his former employer, the federal Competition Bureau, which he headed in the early 1990s.

While the two regulatory bodies have far different mandates, they say there are enough areas of mutual interest to work on fraud investigations, exchange “information and intelligence,” and undertake joint education initiatives.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 20bp, FixedResets off 9bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 13bp. Volatility was good, with a preponderance of FixedReset losers. Volume was above average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.01%, equivalent to 6.51% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield a little under 4.15%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 235bp, unchanged from the November 19 report.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6070 % 2,527.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6070 % 4,000.9
Floater 2.98 % 3.08 % 64,796 19.47 4 -0.6070 % 2,686.5
OpRet 4.04 % -3.83 % 99,130 0.08 1 -0.2361 % 2,760.1
SplitShare 4.27 % 3.98 % 51,943 3.76 5 -0.1858 % 3,195.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2361 % 2,523.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.43 % -10.12 % 69,854 0.09 19 0.0965 % 2,487.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.12 % 5.01 % 109,700 15.39 16 -0.2000 % 2,676.4
FixedReset 4.15 % 3.55 % 190,660 4.90 73 -0.0900 % 2,591.7
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % -0.58 % 99,808 0.10 40 0.1334 % 2,615.6
FloatingReset 2.55 % -5.17 % 59,792 0.08 6 -0.1432 % 2,554.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -3.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 16.68
Evaluated at bid price : 16.68
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount -1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 23.78
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 5.00 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 22.11
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 21.51
Evaluated at bid price : 21.87
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.48
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 249,639 Scotia crossed blocks of 100,000 and 45,500, both at 22.01. RBC crossed 55,900 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 168,406 Scotia crossed blocks of 52,600 and 30,500 at 25.20; RBC crossed 75,000 at the same price. MFC.PR.K resets at +222bp in 2018, so this is probably some portfolio rejigging related to the new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset 109,722 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.98. Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 25,000 each at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset 53,709 Scotia crossed 41,400 at 24.73.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 23.35
Evaluated at bid price : 24.69
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 38,887 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 38,354 TD crossed 30,000 at 25.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-26
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.79
Bid-YTW : -5.48 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 16.68 – 17.20
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.2814

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 16.68
Evaluated at bid price : 16.68
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %

PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.16 – 24.62
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.2929

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 23.78
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 5.00 %

PVS.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 25.60 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1893

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.30 – 24.55
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1750

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-11-26
Maturity Price : 23.90
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %

GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.92 – 26.18
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1920

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %

BNS.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 25.66 – 25.88
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1562

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.66
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %