ABK.PR.C Upgraded to Pfd-2 By DBRS

March 7th, 2014

DBRS has announced that it:

has today upgraded the rating of the Class C Preferred Shares, Series 1 (the Class C Preferred Shares), issued by AllBanc Split Corp. (the Company) to Pfd-2 from Pfd-2 (low). On March 8, 2013, the Company issued 1,177,652 Class C Preferred Shares and 560,000 Class A Capital Shares (the Capital Shares) as part of a share capital reorganization, where all previously outstanding Class B Preferred Shares, Series 1 were fully redeemed. The final redemption date for the both classes of shares is March 8, 2018.

Net proceeds of the offering were used to purchase additional common shares of Bank of Montreal, The Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada and The Toronto-Dominion Bank (the Portfolio). Dividends received on the Portfolio are used to pay a fixed cumulative quarterly distribution to holders of the Class C Preferred Shares, yielding 4.00% annually on the initial issue price of $31.64. Increases in the dividend distribution policies of the underlying banks in the past year have boosted the dividend coverage ratio to 2.6 times. Holders of the Capital Shares are expected to receive all excess dividend income after the Class C Preferred Share distributions and other expenses of the Company have been paid.

The net asset value of the Company initially fell shortly after issuance, but has been generally increasing since the end of June 2013. Downside protection rose from 51.5% on June 20, 2013, to 60.2% on November 21, 2013, and has been fluctuating around 59% since then. As a result, the rating of the Class C Preferred Shares has been upgraded to Pfd-2 from Pfd-2 (low).

ABK.PR.C was last mentioned at the end of February when it announced a partial call for redemption. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps index on volume concerns.

March 7, 2014

March 7th, 2014

Last mentioned on January 31, 2013, the Litvak case has been brought to an appalling new development:

Litvak, 39, of New York, was found guilty by a federal jury today of all counts including securities fraud and making false statements as well as fraud connected to the U.S. government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program following a trial before U.S. District Judge Janet C. Hall in New Haven, Connecticut. He is scheduled to be sentenced May 30.

Prosecutors accused Litvak of defrauding investors of $2 million by misrepresenting how much sellers were asking for the securities, or what customers would pay, and keeping the difference for New York-based Jefferies. Richard Khaleel, a spokesman for Jefferies, declined to comment on the verdict.

Litvak was also accused of defrauding investors by telling some buyers that the bonds in the Jefferies inventory were being offered for sale by a third-party seller that didn’t exist. Prosecutors said the claim allowed Litvak to charge an extra commission and increase the profitability of his trades as his trading revenue declined.

Smith said the judge didn’t allow the testimony of expert witnesses who would have testified about the mortgage-backed securities markets and would have shown Litvak’s “good faith state of mind,” and also made several evidentiary rulings limiting the amount of evidence about similar behavior of other Jefferies traders and employees.

So the US is trying to make markets safe for grossly incompetent professional traders. I don’t know where this will end. Trying to pretend that negotiating 9-figure financial deals as principal is not a jungle will lead to more problems than it solves – the world needs fewer “cooperative games” and more recognition of reality:

knockKnock
Click for Big

On the Crimean issue (I think the French and British should arrange for support from Turkey and invade again), the markets are doing a better job than the Boo-Hoo-Hoo Brigade.

Dudley reiterated that tapering is not the same as tightening:

Federal Reserve Bank of New York President William C. Dudley said he sees a “reasonably favorable” outlook for the U.S. economy, even as elevated joblessness and too-low inflation warrant a high level of stimulus for a “considerable time.”

“I would very much prefer faster economic growth and more rapid progress towards our dual mandate objectives of maximum sustainable employment and price stability,” Dudley said today in the text of remarks given at Brooklyn College in New York. “Hence, the continued need for monetary policy to remain highly accommodative to support the economic recovery to the fullest.”

Dudley said a decline in the jobless rate “significantly overstates the degree of improvement in the labor market” because much of the decrease has been caused by people dropping out of the job market. Unemployment fell to 6.7 percent in December, close to Fed’s threshold for considering an increase in the benchmark interest rate, from 7.5 percent last June.

There are stirrings of long overdue competition in US health care:

In the changing world of health care, patients are finding that the best care may be several hundred miles away.

When Travis Bumbaugh needed heart surgery, the Pennsylvania general contractor chose the cheapest option in the Lowe’s Cos. (LOW) health plan. He flew to Cleveland, to one of the top-rated heart hospitals in the nation.

By bundling all costs for the surgery under one negotiated price and offering expertise that lowers the odds of complications, the Cleveland Clinic gave Bumbaugh and his employer a better deal than the hospital close to his home. In some cases, hospitals will drop their prices as much as 40 percent to guarantee a steady stream of patients they wouldn’t have otherwise, said Terry White, president of the BridgeHealth Medical Inc., a Denver-based benefit manager.

To encourage employees, Lowe’s covers the full cost of surgery, as well as travel and lodging for the worker and a relative. The company health plan won’t cover thousands of dollars of unbundled costs at local hospitals.

It was an off day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 1bp, FixedResets down 5bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 10bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was on the high side of average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2144 % 2,416.8
FixedFloater 4.60 % 3.86 % 27,376 17.67 1 0.0000 % 3,692.4
Floater 2.99 % 3.14 % 55,278 19.30 4 0.2144 % 2,609.5
OpRet 4.64 % 0.11 % 76,662 0.24 3 -0.0515 % 2,682.5
SplitShare 4.84 % 4.49 % 54,871 4.35 5 0.1041 % 3,060.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0515 % 2,452.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.64 % -1.84 % 92,649 0.08 11 -0.0822 % 2,350.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.48 % 5.58 % 135,300 14.40 26 -0.0117 % 2,418.6
FixedReset 4.72 % 3.53 % 229,440 6.84 77 -0.0537 % 2,503.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 2.95 % 165,406 0.31 42 -0.0994 % 2,460.8
FloatingReset 2.59 % 2.60 % 198,528 7.12 5 -0.1284 % 2,441.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-07
Maturity Price : 21.38
Evaluated at bid price : 21.38
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 169,062 RBC crossed four blocks, 49,400 shares, 49,100 shares, 40,800 and 11,100, all at 22.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-07
Maturity Price : 21.74
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 148,502 RBC crossed blocks of 49,900 and 50,000, both at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-07
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset 137,160 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 82,460 RBC crossed 36,500 at 25.35; TD crossed 40,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 2.61 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 76,545 RBC crossed blocks of 25,000 and 40,000, both at 25.34.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.33
Bid-YTW : 0.74 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 53,829 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-06
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 0.60 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.41 – 21.97
Spot Rate : 0.5600
Average : 0.4456

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-07
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %

PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.08 – 24.35
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1895

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-07
Maturity Price : 23.83
Evaluated at bid price : 24.08
Bid-YTW : 5.51 %

NA.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.26 – 25.47
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1468

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 0.74 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 19.69 – 20.09
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3426

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-07
Maturity Price : 19.69
Evaluated at bid price : 19.69
Bid-YTW : 2.68 %

GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.05 – 24.22
Spot Rate : 0.1700
Average : 0.1160

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %

TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.45 – 25.61
Spot Rate : 0.1600
Average : 0.1095

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-06
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 0.60 %

March 6, 2014

March 6th, 2014

Nothing happened today, but I must say that I am astonished at the UofO hockey-team / facebook chat kerfuffle:

As the University of Ottawa wrestles with its response to a week of sexually charged scandals, its leaders promised a new task force to help the school “face up” to issues of violence within the campus culture.

The university’s president, Allan Rock, announced a task force on respect and equality in his first public comments since his school revealed on Monday that police are investigating an alleged sexual assault involving some players from its men’s hockey team. At a Thursday news conference with Michaëlle Jean, the U of O’s chancellor and a former Governor-General, he pledged to “take fearless inventory of our practices and our assumptions.”

The university is still staggering from another revelation, days earlier, of a sexually graphic online chat that several student leaders had about a colleague. In response, many at the school have decried a “rape culture” they say is quietly pervasive on and off campus. Now, public attention is focusing on whether universities are willing and able to drive changes to social attitudes that minimize the real impact of sexual violence.

I simply cannot understand why “changes to social attitudes” are any of the universities’ business; I have come up with a few explanations:

  • Young people are being infantilized – 35 is the new 20, as far as maturity goes. Used to be that at age 20, most people would get a job, get married, buy a house … all that grown-up stuff. Now, there’s a longer period of adolescence before adulthood, and the universities are responding to that (while under pressure).
  • University administrations are being feminized … when I was of university age, the fact that more than half of all undergrads were female was front page news. Now the proportion is pushing 60% in the US and I’ll guess it’s the same here. So administrations are responding to that and they’re also responding to (what I assume is, without any data at all) an increasing female component of influential administrative staff. A male will – stereotypically – respond to nastiness on his own, while females will – stereotypically – seek to organize a clique to punish the offender properly; this is what the universities are now doing
  • Normal bureaucratic mission creep. “We’re in a position to do so much good! Therefore we must promote proper behaviour!”
  • It’s all marketting. All the universities now have MBAs in their admissions department who don’t care about much other than getting lots of admission applications through a Positive Public Image. The potential for bequests and alumni donations is important too.

That’s the best I can do; feel free to respond in the comments, even if it’s only to tell me you’re here for the preferred shares and I should shut the hell up (if male) or that you have brought my views to the attention of the appropriate authorities (if female). But one implication of all these precious bureaucrats having earnest discussions with each other about Proper Standards Of Behaviour, and sitting in tribunals to Enforce Promote Community Expectations Of A Safe Learning Environment is increased costs. This type of non-academic activity at universities is one reason why the price keeps going up; and why student debt increases in lockstep.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 6bp, FixedResets off 3bp and DeemedRetractibles up 22bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3276 % 2,411.6
FixedFloater 4.60 % 3.86 % 27,733 17.67 1 -0.2894 % 3,692.4
Floater 3.00 % 3.16 % 54,779 19.25 4 -0.3276 % 2,603.9
OpRet 4.63 % -0.16 % 72,287 0.24 3 -0.3080 % 2,683.9
SplitShare 4.84 % 4.58 % 54,100 4.34 5 0.1925 % 3,057.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3080 % 2,454.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % -0.75 % 93,262 0.08 11 0.1175 % 2,352.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.48 % 5.56 % 136,953 14.39 26 0.0570 % 2,418.9
FixedReset 4.71 % 3.54 % 230,173 6.79 77 -0.0274 % 2,504.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 2.19 % 166,953 0.22 42 0.2234 % 2,463.2
FloatingReset 2.58 % 2.55 % 189,224 7.12 5 0.0803 % 2,444.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-06
Maturity Price : 21.31
Evaluated at bid price : 21.61
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 158,484 RBC crossed 148,300 at 21.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-06
Maturity Price : 21.47
Evaluated at bid price : 21.47
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
BMO.PR.R FloatingReset 138,360 Scotia crossed 136,600 at 24.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 127,195 Desjardins bought 100,000 from RBC at 22.20, and crossed 12,700 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-06
Maturity Price : 21.73
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 102,385 RBC crossed blocks of 68,100 and 24,700, both at 25.31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 1.48 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 90,695 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 40,000 and 45,000, both at 21.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.71
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 80,424 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 25,000 and 50,000, both at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 1.74 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 21.65 – 21.88
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1590

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %

RY.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 25.50 – 25.68
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1095

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %

BAM.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 25.87 – 26.06
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1220

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.87
Bid-YTW : 3.06 %

POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.05 – 24.25
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1341

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-06
Maturity Price : 23.74
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.52 – 21.90
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.3202

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-06
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.52
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %

BNA.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 25.22 – 25.39
Spot Rate : 0.1700
Average : 0.1104

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 4.58 %

New Issue: BAM FixedReset 4.40%+255

March 6th, 2014

Brookfield Asset Management Inc. has announced:

that it has agreed to issue 8,000,000 Class A Preferred Shares, Series 38 on a bought deal basis to a syndicate of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc., CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank for distribution to the public. The Preferred Shares, Series 38 will be issued at a price of C$25.00 per share, for gross proceeds of C$200,000,000. Holders of the Preferred Shares, Series 38 will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.40% annually for the initial period ending March 31, 2020. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.55%.

Brookfield has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable until 48 hours prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional 2,000,000 Preferred Shares, Series 38 which, if exercised, would increase the gross offering size to C$250,000,000. The Preferred Shares, Series 38 will be offered in all provinces of Canada by way of a supplement to Brookfield’s existing short form base shelf prospectus.

Brookfield intends to use the net proceeds of the issue of Preferred Shares, Series 38 to redeem its Preferred Shares, Series 12 and for general corporate purposes. The offering of Preferred Shares, Series 38 is expected to close on or about March 13, 2014.

Brookfield is up to its usual tricks – taking a very long initial fixed rate period (just over six years) in order to choose a higher yielding Canada bond as the basis for the reset.

The issue appears reasonably fairly priced against its peers, when examined with Implied Volatility Theory – but the implied volatility of 40% renders the conclusion a little suspect. Make of it what you will.

ImpVol_BAM_140306
Click for Big

BAM.PR.J To Be Redeemed

March 6th, 2014

Brookfield Asset Management Inc. has announced (as part of a new issue announcement):

its intention to redeem all of its outstanding Class A Preferred Shares, Series 12 (TSX:BAM.PR.J) for cash on April 6, 2014. The redemption price for each Preferred Share, Series 12 will be C$26.00 plus accrued and unpaid dividends thereon (for greater certainty, excluding declared dividends with a record date prior to the redemption date).

You gotta love the redemption date. It’s a Sunday.

One should always be wary of investment managers cherry-picking their past recommendations, but I will admit that I have a certain fondness for BAM.PR.J which was a long-time favourite recommendation in PrefLetter in the ‘Operating Retractible’ category. BAM issues weakened immediately following the Canadian ABCP collapse in August, 2007, and stayed very weak for a long time. For instance, I recommended it in December, 2008, near the bottom of the market at 14.00-25. I hope everybody loaded up!

It should also be noted that this issue is being redeemed at a premium ($26 vs. issue price of $25) and the premium is taxable as a Deemed Dividend, rather than as a capital gain. If we may assume that the issue will trade marginally below the total Future Value if held to redemption until it is actually redeemed, investors will want to think carefully about the choice between selling the issue in the market (incurring commission and getting slightly less than the full redemption amount, but being taxed on the premium as a capital gain) or holding to redemption (and being taxed on the premium as a dividend).

March 5, 2014

March 6th, 2014

There is confusion at the Bank of England:

The Bank of England suspended a member of staff as it conducts a probe into allegations that officials condoned practices behind the currency-manipulation scandal.

While the BOE said it has found no evidence to date of collusion, it requires staff “to follow rigorous internal control processes and has today suspended a member of staff, pending investigation.” No decision has been taken on disciplinary action against any employees, it said.

Bloomberg News reported on Feb. 7 that senior currency dealers at banks including Citigroup Inc. and UBS AG told BOE officials at an April 2012 meeting that they discussed positions ahead of key benchmarks and matched buyers and sellers ahead of the fix to avoid trading then. Central bank representatives said they viewed the practices as positive to reduce market volatility and banks should formulate their own policies, according to three people with knowledge of the matter.

The Bank of Canada claims our economy’s not getting any worse:

In Canada, economic growth in the fourth quarter of 2013 was slightly stronger than the Bank anticipated, and upward revisions earlier in the year further raised the level of GDP. The Bank still expects underlying growth of around 2 1/2 per cent in 2014, with the current quarter likely to be softer. Exports have been a little stronger than previously thought but continue to underperform, and overall business investment has yet to pick up. Meanwhile, recent data support the Bank’s expectation of a soft landing in the housing market and stabilizing debt-to-income ratios for households.

On the whole, the fundamental drivers of growth and inflation in Canada continue to strengthen gradually, as anticipated. With inflation expected to be well below target for some time, the downside risks to inflation remain important. At the same time, the risks associated with elevated household imbalances have not materially changed. The Bank judges that the balance of risks remains within the zone for which the current stance of monetary policy is appropriate and therefore has decided to maintain the target for the overnight rate at 1 per cent. The timing and direction of the next change to the policy rate will depend on how new information influences this balance of risks.

If there’s one thing welfare bums hate, it’s answering questions:

Chrysler Group LLC walked away from talks with the federal and Ontario governments after they asked how much of its proposed $3.6-billion investment would be spent in Ontario – a request that was likely to draw out negotiations and delay the company’s effort to bring a new minivan to market.

The federal government and the province sent Chrysler a joint letter and term sheets that offered to put up money as a percentage of the investment the company would be spending in Ontario, a source with knowledge of the talks said.

But those terms didn’t appear to sit well with Chrysler chief executive officer Sergio Marchionne.

It was a modestly positive day for the Canadian preferred shares market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 4bp, FixedResets gaining 1bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 5bp. Volatility was very low. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.53%, equivalent to 7.19% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.5%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 270bp, unchanged from the February 26 report.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4579 % 2,419.6
FixedFloater 4.58 % 3.85 % 27,855 17.70 1 1.0234 % 3,703.2
Floater 2.99 % 3.14 % 54,653 19.31 4 0.4579 % 2,612.5
OpRet 4.62 % -0.66 % 67,889 0.24 3 0.0257 % 2,692.2
SplitShare 4.85 % 4.54 % 54,288 4.34 5 0.0482 % 3,051.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0257 % 2,461.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % -0.94 % 94,015 0.09 12 0.0230 % 2,349.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.49 % 5.53 % 137,568 14.57 26 0.0352 % 2,417.5
FixedReset 4.71 % 3.53 % 229,591 6.80 77 0.0084 % 2,505.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.08 % 3.28 % 167,171 0.39 42 0.0484 % 2,457.8
FloatingReset 2.59 % 2.58 % 192,174 7.13 5 0.0402 % 2,442.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-05
Maturity Price : 21.46
Evaluated at bid price : 20.73
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 193,168 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.31; RBC crossed 50,000 and TD crossed 35,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 1.72 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 89,977 TD crossed 75,000 at 23.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.76
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 82,735 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.31; Scotia crossed 32,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.33
Bid-YTW : 1.20 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 80,616 TD crossed 75,000 at 23.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.77
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 67,153 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-05
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset 63,750 recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.21 – 26.48
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1561

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-04
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : -10.11 %

MFC.PR.A OpRet Quote: 25.53 – 25.74
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1274

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : -0.29 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 19.70 – 20.15
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3889

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-05
Maturity Price : 19.70
Evaluated at bid price : 19.70
Bid-YTW : 2.68 %

ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.00 – 24.20
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1399

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-05
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.43 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.2100

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %

CGI.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 24.67 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2671

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.67
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %

AQN.PR.D Smacked on Light Volume

March 5th, 2014

Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. has announced:

the closing of the previously announced offering of Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series D (the “Series D Shares”). APUC issued a total of 4,000,000 Series D Shares at $25.00 per share for aggregate gross proceeds of $100 million.

The holders of the Series D Shares will be entitled to receive fixed cumulative dividends at an annual rate of $1.25 per share, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the board of directors of APUC. The Series D Shares will yield 5.00% per cent annually, for the initial period ending on March 31, 2019.

The offering was made on a bought deal basis through a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC and TD Securities Inc.

The Series D Shares will commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today, March 5, 2014, under the symbol AQN.PR.D.

The net proceeds of the offering will be used to partially finance certain of APUC’s previously disclosed growth opportunities, reduce amounts outstanding on APUC’s credit facilities and for general corporate purposes.

AQN.PR.D is a FixedReset, 5.00%+328, announced February 24. It will be tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

The issue traded 86,910 shares today in a range of 24.25-64 before closing at 24.26-38, 10×3. Vital statistics are:

AQN.PR.D FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-05
Maturity Price : 22.88
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %

Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation

March 5th, 2014

Assiduous Reader DR sent me the following query:

Today’s Financial Posts has an article “A better Basel mousetrap to protect taxpayers”, by Finn Poschmann regarding NVCC.

What is your opinion?

A short search brought up the article in question, A Better Basel Mousetrap to Protect Taxpayers, which in turn led me to the proposal by Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer titled Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation:

Today’s regulatory rules, especially the easily-manipulated measures of regulatory capital, have led to costly bank failures. We design a robust regulatory system such that (i) bank losses are credibly borne by the private sector (ii) systemically important institutions cannot collapse suddenly; (iii) bank investment is counter-cyclical; and (iv) regulatory actions depend upon market signals (because the simplicity and clarity of such rules prevents gaming by firms, and forbearance by regulators, as well as because of the efficiency role of prices). One key innovation is “ERNs” (equity recourse notes — superficially similar to, but importantly distinct from, “cocos”) which gradually “bail in” equity when needed. Importantly, although our system uses market information, it does not rely on markets being “right.”

Our solution is based on two rules. First, any systemically important financial institution (SIFI) that cannot be quickly wound down must limit the recourse of non-guaranteed creditors to assets posted as collateral plus equity plus unsecured debt that can itself be converted into equity–so these creditors have some recourse but cannot force the institution into re-organization. Second, any debt guaranteed by the government, such as deposit accounts, must be backed by government-guaranteed securities. This second rule can only realistically be thought of as a very long-run ambition – our interim objective would involve a tight ring-fence of government-guaranteed deposits collateralized by assets that are haircut at rates similar to those applied by lenders (including central banks3 and the commercial banks themselves!) to secured borrowers.

Specifically: first, we would have banks replace all (non-deposit) existing unsecured debt with “equity recourse notes” (ERNs). ERNs are superficially similar to contingent convertible debt (“cocos”) but have important differences. ERNs would be long-term bonds, subject to certain term-structure requirements, with the feature that any interest or principal payments payable on a date when the stock price is lower than a pre-specified price would be paid in stock at that pre-specified price. The pre-specified price would be required to be no less than (say) 25 percent of the share price on the date the bond was issued. For example, if the stock were selling at $100 on the day a bond was issued and then fell below $25 by the time a payment of $1000 was due, the firm would be required to pay the creditor (1000/25) = 40 shares of stock in lieu of the payment. If the stock rebounded in price, future payments could again be in cash.

Crucially, for ERNs, unlike cocos:

  • any payments in shares are at a pre-set share price, not at the current share price or at a discount to it—so ERNs are stabilizing because that price will always be at a premium to the market
  • conversion is triggered by market prices, not regulatory values—removing incentives to manipulate regulatory measures, and making it harder for regulators to relax requirements
  • conversion is payment-at-a-time, not the entire bond at once (because ERNs become equity in the states that matter to taxpayers, they are, for regulatory purposes, like equity from their date of issuance so there is no reason for faster conversion)–further reducing pressures for “regulatory forbearance” and also largely solving a “multiple equilibria” problem raised in the academic literature
  • we would replace all existing unsecured debt with ERNs, not merely a fraction of it—ensuring, as we show below, that ERNs become cheaper to issue when the stock price falls, creating counter-cyclical investment incentives when they are most needed.

OK, so I have difficulties with all this. Their first point is that non-guaranteed creditors “cannot force the institution into re-organization.” Obviously there are many differences of opinion in this, but I take the view that being able to force a company into re-organization – which may include bankruptcy – is one of the hallmarks of a bond. For example, I consider preferred shares to be fixed income – as they have a cap on their total return and they have first-loss protection – but I do not consider them bonds – as they cannot force bankruptcy. The elimination of bankruptcy, although very popular among politicians (who refer to bankruptcy as a form of terrorism) is a very big step; bankruptcy is a very big stick that serves to concentrate the minds of management and directors.

Secondly, they want insured deposits to be offset by government securities. There’s an immediate problem about this in Canada, because insured deposits total $646-billion while government of Canada marketable debt totals $639-billion. You could get around this by saying the CMHC-guaranteed mortgages are OK, but even after years of Spend-Every-Penny pouring fuel on the housing fire, CMHC insurance totals only $559.8-billion (out of a total of $915-billion. At present, Canadian Chartered Banks hold only about $160-billion of government debt. So it would appear that, at the very least, this part of the plan would essentially force the government to continue to insure a ridiculous proportion of Canadian residential mortgages.

And, specifically, they want all (non-deposit) existing unsecured debt with “equity recourse notes”. OK, so how much is that? Looking at recent figures from RBC:

RBCBalanceSheet
Click for Big

So roughly a quarter of Royal Bank’s liabilities would become ERNs …. and who’s going to buy it? It’s forcibly convertible into equity long before the point of non-viability – that’s the whole point – so for risk management purposes it is equity. If held by another bank, it will attract a whopping capital charge (or if it doesn’t, it should) and it can’t be held by institutional bond portfolios (or if it is, it shouldn’t be). I have real problems with this.

The paper makes several entertaining points about bank regulation:

The regulatory system distorts incentives in several ways. One of the motivations for Citigroup to sell out of Smith, Barney at what was generally believed to be a low price, was that it allowed Citi to book an increase in regulatory capital. Conversely, selling risky “toxic assets” with a regulatory value greater than market is discouraged because doing so raises capital requirements even while reducing risk.[footnote].

[Footnote reads] : Liquidity reduction is another consequence of the current regulatory system, as firms will avoid price-discovery by avoiding buying as well as selling over-marked assets. For example, Goldman Sachs stood ready to sell assets at marks that AIG protested were too low, but AIG did not take up these offers. See Goldman Sachs (2009). For an example of traders not buying even though they claimed the price was too low, see the FCIC transcript of a July 30, 2007 telephone call between AIG executives. “We can’t mark any of our positions, and obviously that’s what saves us having this enormous mark to market. If we start buying the physical bonds back … then any accountant is going to turn around and say, well, John, you know you traded at 90, you must be able to mark your bonds then.” Duarte (2012) discusses the recent trend of European banks to meet their requirements to raise regulatory capital by repurchasing their own junk bonds, arguably increasing the exposure of government insurers.

However, don’t get me wrong on this: the basic idea – of conversion to a pre-set value of stock once the market breaches that pre-set value – is one that I’ve been advocating for a long time. They are similar in spirit to McDonald CoCos, which were first discussed on PrefBlog under the heading Contingent Capital with a Dual Price Trigger (regrettably, the authors did not discuss McDonald’s proposal in their paper). ERNs are ‘high-trigger’ instruments, and therefore will help serve to avert a crisis, rather than merely mitigate one, as is the case with OSFI’s NVCC rules; I have long advocated high triggers.

My basic problem is simply that the authors:

  • Require too many ERNs as a proportion of capital, and
  • Seek to Ban the Bond

However, it may easily be argued that these objections are mere matters of detail.

March 4, 2014

March 4th, 2014

There’s a bit of a move forward with the Danish question:

Denmark’s biggest mortgage bank said about a fifth of covered bonds in the nation’s $550 billion market can be excluded from the top liquidity status, opening up for compromise in talks with Europe.

Nykredit Realkredit A/S said it would be willing to back down from earlier industry demands that all covered bonds be given the top liquidity designation as the Danish government talks with other European Union member states in an effort to reach an agreement.

The comments mark the first time industry representatives have shown willingness to accept a compromise after condemning a proposal last year by the European Banking Authority to give all covered bonds second-class liquidity status. Denmark is home to the world’s biggest mortgage-backed covered bond market per capita and its banks use the securities to meet more than 70 percent of their liquidity needs.

The London-based EBA, which is made up of European regulatory heads, published a recommendation in December that would cap banks’ covered bond usage at 40 percent and force lenders to book the bonds at only 85 percent of their market value. It also said all government bonds should get the highest liquidity status, including debt sold by bailed out nations like Greece.

An empirical study by the EBA last year found that covered bonds sold in issues of 500 million euros ($689 million) or more in principle have the characteristics needed to have an “extremely high liquidity and credit quality.”

Danish covered bonds were last discussed on February 7.

Some welfare bums are whimpering that there’s not enough swill in the trough:

Chrysler Group LLC is withdrawing its request for funding from the federal and Ontario governments, but says it could begin making new investments for a new minivan assembly line at its Windsor, Ont. factory.

The auto giant had asked for some $700-million in public funds to expand its operations in the province, most crucially at a minivan plant in Windsor. Chrysler had been willing to sink $3.6-billion into Windsor and Brampton, Ont.

But the company has now walked away from that request.

“It is clear to us that our projects were being used as a political football, a process that, in our view apart from being unnecessary and ill-advised, will ultimately not benefit Chrysler,” the company said in a statement.

Some pension plans are getting smarter:

Canada has seen its first major deal for a company to outsource its pension plan risk by buying about $500-million worth of annuities from an insurer.

Pension consulting firm Towers Watson revealed the transaction Tuesday, saying Canada’s first “jumbo” pension annuity deal occurred in the fourth quarter of 2013 and involved a Towers Watson client firm.

While many U.S. and U.K. companies have been structuring deals for years to shift the risk of their pension obligations to a third-party insurer, the trend has been slow to come to Canada. But Towers Watson said 2013 was a record-breaking year for group annuity purchases by companies, suggesting deals may be picking up speed as firms look for ways to shift pension risk off their books.

A total of $2.2-billion in group annuities were sold in Canada last year – including $1.3-billion in the fourth quarter alone – an increase from $1.05-billion in all of 2012.

Here’s a recent paper of interest by Ranadeb Chaudhuri, Zoran Ivkovich, Joshua Matthew Pollet and Charles Trzcinka :

Several hundred individuals who hold a Ph.D. in economics, finance, or others fields work for institutional money management companies. The gross performance of domestic equity investment products managed by individuals with a Ph.D. (Ph.D. products) is superior to the performance of non-Ph.D. products matched by objective, size, and past performance for one-year returns, Sharpe Ratios, alphas, information ratios, and the manipulation-proof measure MPPM. Fees for Ph.D. products are lower than those for non-Ph.D. products. Investment flows to Ph.D. products substantially exceed the flows to the matched non-Ph.D. products. Ph.D.s’ publications in leading economics and finance journals further enhance the performance gap.

The existing literature has explored some aspects of the link between managerial talent and both ability and education in the context of money management. For instance, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find that mutual fund performance is related to certain educational characteristics of mutual fund managers. In particular, mutual fund managers graduating from undergraduate institutions with higher average SAT scores achieve higher raw fund returns. Similarly, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) also find that raw fund returns achieved by managers with an MBA outperform those without an MBA by 63 basis points per year. However, upon adjustments for risk, only the differential in risk-adjusted performance between the managers graduating from undergraduate institutions with higher average SAT scores and those graduating from undergraduate institutions with lower average SAT scores persists, whereas the risk-adjusted performance differential between funds managed by MBAs and non-MBAs disappears.

It may well be that PhDs and ‘institutions with higher average SAT scores’ both correlate well with ‘not a salesman’. I would be interested to get data based on field of specialization, but it’s not there yet – and isn’t likely to be, as long as business school profs have specializations in finance, economics and other mumbo-jumbo.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 26bp, FixedResets off 13bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 14bp. Volatility was average. Volume was on the high side of average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1290 % 2,408.5
FixedFloater 4.63 % 3.90 % 27,830 17.62 1 1.5339 % 3,665.6
Floater 3.01 % 3.15 % 54,712 19.28 4 0.1290 % 2,600.6
OpRet 4.62 % -0.66 % 68,557 0.24 3 0.0128 % 2,691.5
SplitShare 4.86 % 4.51 % 55,168 4.35 5 0.0562 % 3,050.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0128 % 2,461.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % -1.45 % 94,870 0.09 12 0.0987 % 2,348.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.49 % 5.58 % 138,932 14.46 26 0.2573 % 2,416.7
FixedReset 4.71 % 3.54 % 223,656 6.80 77 -0.1266 % 2,504.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.08 % 3.59 % 163,983 0.96 42 0.1366 % 2,456.6
FloatingReset 2.59 % 2.59 % 199,161 7.13 5 0.0161 % 2,441.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ENB.PR.B FixedReset -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-04
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.29
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-04
Maturity Price : 20.88
Evaluated at bid price : 20.88
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-04
Maturity Price : 23.35
Evaluated at bid price : 23.85
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-04
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 20.52
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 149,196 Scotia crossed 25,500 at 25.08. Nesbitt crossed a block of 50,000 shares and two of 25,000, all at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-04
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 148,626 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.33. RBC crossed 30,000 at 25.34.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : -1.45 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 107,141 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-03
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : -5.16 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 77,776 Desjardins crossed 75,000 at 25.49.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.48
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %
BNS.PR.A FloatingReset 73,300 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 66,916 TD crossed 50,000 at 22.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.64
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
There were 38 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.25 – 23.60
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2423

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-04
Maturity Price : 22.95
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 21.62 – 21.89
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1808

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.62
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %

TRP.PR.D FixedReset Quote: 24.90 – 25.10
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1241

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-04
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.50 – 25.73
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1751

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %

TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.03 – 26.15
Spot Rate : 0.1200
Average : 0.0735

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-03
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.03
Bid-YTW : -2.83 %

CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.19 – 23.44
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.2064

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-04
Maturity Price : 22.89
Evaluated at bid price : 23.19
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %

New Issue: ENB FixedReset, 4.40%+266

March 4th, 2014

Enbridge Inc. has announced:

that it has entered into an agreement with a group of underwriters to sell eight million Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares, Series 9 (the “Series 9 Preferred Shares”) at a price of $25.00 per share for distribution to the public. Closing of the offering is expected on March 13, 2014.

The holders of Series 9 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed cumulative dividends at an annual rate of $1.10 per share, payable quarterly on the first day of March, June, September and December, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Enbridge, yielding 4.40 per cent per annum, for the initial fixed rate period to but excluding December 1, 2019. The first quarterly dividend payment date is scheduled for June 1, 2014. The dividend rate will reset on December 1, 2019 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Canadian Government bond yield plus 2.66 per cent. The Series 9 Preferred Shares are redeemable by Enbridge, at its option, on December 1, 2019 and on December 1 of every fifth year thereafter.

The holders of Series 9 Preferred Shares will have the right to convert their shares into Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares, Series 10 (the “Series 10 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on December 1, 2019 and on December 1 of every fifth year thereafter. The holders of Series 10 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating rate cumulative dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Enbridge, at a rate equal to the sum of the 90-day Government of Canada Treasury bill rate plus 2.66 per cent.

Enbridge has granted to the underwriters an option, exercisable at any time up to 48 hours prior to the closing of the offering, to purchase up to an additional 2 million Series 9 Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per share.

The offering is being made only in Canada by means of a prospectus supplement to the base shelf prospectus of the Corporation dated June 6, 2013. Proceeds will be used to partially fund capital projects, to reduce existing indebtedness and for other general corporate purposes of the Corporation and its affiliates.

The syndicate of underwriters is led by TD Securities Inc., CIBC, RBC Capital Markets, and Scotiabank.

Later, they further announced:

that as a result of strong investor demand for its previously announced offering of Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares, Series 9 (the “Series 9 Preferred Shares”), the size of the offering has been increased to 11 million shares. The aggregate gross proceeds will be C$275 million. Closing of the offering is expected on March 13, 2014.

This issue is extremely comparable to ENB.PR.N, a FixedReset 4.00%+265, which settled July 17, 2012, and was announced July 9, 2012. Not surprisingly, ENB.PR.N was down significantly on the day on good volume of 34,966 shares, closing at 24.66-68, 8×1, which makes it roughly equivalent to the new issue priced at $25.00 since there will be an extra $0.10 dividends per year for the new issue … until reset!

Update, 2014-3-7: Pfd-2(low) from DBRS.

It is also of interest to note that ENB issued 500-million in thirty-year notes at 4.57%.