New Issue: FN FixedReset 4.65%+207

January 5th, 2011

First National Financial Corporation has announced:

a Canadian public offering of Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class A Preference Shares, Series 1 (“Series 1 Preferred Shares”). First National will issue 4 million Series 1 Preferred Shares priced at $25 per share to raise gross proceeds of C$100 million. The offering will be underwritten by a syndicate of investment dealers led by RBC Capital Markets and Scotia Capital Inc.

The offering is being made in all the provinces of Canada by means of a prospectus and the expected closing date is on or about January 25, 2011. The net proceeds of the offering will be used to repay current indebtedness as well as for general corporate purposes.

Holders of the Series 1 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.65% annually for the initial period ending March 31, 2016. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada yield plus 2.07%.

Holders of Series 1 Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Cumulative, Floating Rate Class A Preference Shares, Series 2 (“Series 2 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on March 31, 2016 and on March 31 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series 2 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the 3-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.07%.

This is interesting because First National is a shadow-bank:

First National is Canada’s largest non-bank lender, offering both commercial and residential mortgage solutions.

Through a combination of our innovative mortgage solutions, Merlin our industry leading mortgage approval and tracking system, and the experts we have on our team, First National has earned trust with Mortgage Brokers, Commercial Clients as well as Residential Customers.

These strong relationships are thanks to an unwavering commitment to delivering excellent service. A Commitment shared by Senior Management and every member of the First National team

Since it’s not regulated as a bank, FN doesn’t have to worry about formal definitions of Tier 1 Capital, so it can make its preferred shares cumulative. Theoretically, this should result in less “equity credit” for the shares and hence detract from the credit quality of issues senior to it. Theoretically.

Update, 2011-1-19: DBRS rates Pfd-3

January 4, 2010

January 4th, 2011

European bank regulation may become far more intrusive:

National regulators of cross-border banks may be able to require “changes to legal or operational structures” if the lender would need “extraordinary public financial support” during a crisis, according to draft proposals obtained by Bloomberg News.

The plan also envisages measures “requiring the credit institution to limit its maximum individual and aggregate exposures” or forcing banks to “limit or cease” some activities, according to the document, dated December 2010.

Regulators should assess lenders and “satisfy themselves that critical functions could be legally and economically separated from other functions” during a crisis, according to the draft proposals.

I can’t think of a better way to reinforce structural groupthink.

Japan has interesting bond sales methods:

Japan will sell a record 144.9 trillion yen ($1.8 trillion) of debt in the fiscal year starting April 1, it said in a budget plan on Dec. 24 that also detailed the changes in its retail bonds. The Ministry of Finance tried to find new buyers for the debt last year with magazine advertisements saying, “Men who hold JGBs are popular with women!”

An investor who decided to buy floating-rate retail notes after reading the ads would have seen yields shrink to a range of 0.25 percent to 0.53 percent at the twice-yearly coupon payouts for the 10-year securities.

I mentioned the Greg Walsh kerfuffle briefly on December 30 – he’s the Peterborough hockey coach who had hysterics when one of his players was called a nasty name. The blog dahn batchelor’s opinions also posted on the topic in a post titled A foul-mouthed brat caused this problem; I left a comment on the moderated blog, but it hasn’t appeared yet, possibly due to a technical problem. So I’ll publish it here:

I am surprised that someone with such a lengthy profile would publish such a shoddy analysis.

You acknowledge that the players were in an on-ice confrontation and that they heckled each other in the penalty box. You profess dismay at the idea that the heckling included the word “nigger” and substitute “brat” as your own politically correct childish insult of choice – both in the headline and the text.

These kids are 16-17 years old – more balls than brains if my own recollections of adolescence can be trusted. Sometimes they say stupid things. Surprise! Not everybody invariably chooses their words as carefully as a retired lawyer tapping away at his keyboard in his surroundings of choice.

What should the punishment be for such a breach of public dignity in the context of a schoolyard yelling match? A three game suspension sounds harsh to me, but it’s not so harsh that I care much one way or the other.

What should the punishment be? Walsh seems to think it should involve a public apology – at best a lesson in hypocrisy, at worst a public humiliation of the kind civilized nations have eliminated from the criminal code.

Your own rather incoherent response seems to include coaches – the ones who should support their players – imposing extra-judicial punishment, benching them for the rest of the game. Unable to find any other support in today’s world for your thesis, you are forced to dredge up a case from thirty-seven years ago, and the recollections of a 54-year old man speculating on what he thinks he would have done differently.

The PMHA seems to think that penalties should include a criminal record.

In a year or two, these kids will be eligible to go to Afghanistan, where the Taliban may well call them nasty names and even – gasp! – hit them with sticks. It really is too bad that Greg Walsh, Dahn Batchelor and others are attempting to prepare them for the rigors and conflicts of adulthood by telling them that the way to deal with adversity is to run home crying to mommy.

Jackie Robinson would never even have been able to watch major league baseball with that attitude.

I hadn’t known that the PMHA had gone to the police about this. My lord, don’t they realize that when there are horrific penalties for minor transgressions, you simply get selective reporting? Or don’t they care? Or do they, in their heart of hearts, believe that this shouting match is worthy of police time and a possible criminal record? But then, we live in a world with some very strange priorities – or, at least, one in which very strange rationales are given credence by the press.

The Canadian preferred share market had a good day as volume returned to more normal levels. PerpetualDiscounts gained 15bp and FixedResets lost 3bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0247 % 2,306.7
FixedFloater 4.81 % 3.54 % 29,863 18.93 1 0.3107 % 3,495.6
Floater 2.59 % 2.39 % 47,834 21.24 4 0.0247 % 2,490.6
OpRet 4.77 % 3.14 % 60,796 2.34 8 0.2442 % 2,403.6
SplitShare 5.36 % 1.29 % 719,531 0.92 4 -0.3930 % 2,437.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2442 % 2,197.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.64 % 5.29 % 126,768 5.30 20 -0.0255 % 2,018.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.43 % 5.49 % 235,000 14.69 57 0.1544 % 2,032.4
FixedReset 5.22 % 3.42 % 310,251 3.08 52 -0.0302 % 2,270.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.X FixedReset -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.32
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.01
Bid-YTW : 2.48 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-01-04
Maturity Price : 23.42
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
GWO.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-02-03
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : -4.90 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-01-04
Maturity Price : 21.85
Evaluated at bid price : 21.85
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-01-04
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.84
Bid-YTW : 4.55 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 3.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-01-04
Maturity Price : 20.54
Evaluated at bid price : 20.54
Bid-YTW : 5.52 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 93,800 National bought blocks of 15,000 and 10,000 from Nesbitt, both at 27.00; then crossed 45,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 63,526 RBC crossed 39,500 at 22.07.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-01-04
Maturity Price : 21.92
Evaluated at bid price : 22.04
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 54,930 RBC crossed 25,500 at 22.00, then crossed 15,000 at 22.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-01-04
Maturity Price : 21.97
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 34,000 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 31,230 Desjardins crossed 16,000 at 21.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-01-04
Maturity Price : 21.85
Evaluated at bid price : 21.85
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 29,924 rBC crossed 25,000 at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.27
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MAPF Performance: December 2010

January 3rd, 2011

The fund had a sub-par, but hardly disastrous, month in December, due mostly to its large holdings in deeply discounted Straight Perpetuals, which underperformed. Results for the quarter and the year look pretty good.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close December 31 was $10.7659 after a Capital Gains distribution of $0.882239 and a Dividend Distribution of $0.159708.

Returns to December 31, 2010
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month -0.35% -0.04% -0.02%
Three Months +3.66% +2.64% +1.63%
One Year +16.30% +10.11% +6.58%
Two Years (annualized) +39.07% +19.37% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +22.97% +6.00% +3.66%
Four Years (annualized) +16.30% +2.81%  
Five Years (annualized) +14.35% +3.10%  
Six Years (annualized) +12.90% +3.23%  
Seven Years (annualized) +12.98% +3.62%  
Eight Years (annualized) +15.36% +4.08%  
Nine Years (annualized) +13.69% +4.11%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.19%, +1.94% and +8.96%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +5.04%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -1.27%, -0.24% & +4.83% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.12%, +1.11% & +4.38%, respectively
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF are not yet available (inception date 2010-11-23)

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

The fund’s returns were diminished this month by the overweighting in deeply discounted PerpetualDiscounts in which the fund is still overweighted (see MAPF Portfolio Composition: December 2010) although not as overweighted as it has been for much of the year.


Click for Big

The relative performances are interesting. SLF.PR.E had the worst performance of the selected issues (in fact, it had the worst performance of all the HIMIPref™ index constituents), clocking in at -4.05% – and the fund had a 7.0% weighting in this issue as of November 30. The position was not traded during the month, so we can estimate that all by itself this position cost the fund 28bp of performance. Even if we say the position “should have” returned -2.00%, in line with comparable issues, that’s still 14bp of underperformance, a significant chunk of the fund’s relative performance.

Even worse, the last bid price on this issue declined from 20.52 on December 30 to 19.91 on December 31, a decline of 2.97% on the day; and the last quote was 19.91-20.60. Its bid yield on 12/31 was significantly above its peers, so this is is almost certainly a glitch – albeith not certainly enough and not significant enough for me to take the rather awesome step of substituting a different price for fund valuation purposes.

It’s not really a big deal – the issue still pays 1.125 and still has exactly the same credit quality as the other SLF issues. Its undervaluation relative to its peers provides the fund with something of a tailwind for January!

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.2857 0.3628
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.2857 0.3885
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.2857 0.4112
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.2857 0.4672
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.2857 $0.4112
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.2857 $0.4672
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.2857 $0.5737
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.2857 $0.6046
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.2857 $0.6029
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.2857 $0.5802
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0819 $0.5714
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0819 $0.5759
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0819 $0.5850
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.0819 $0.5832
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0000 $0.5822
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.

Significant positions were held in Fixed-Reset issues on December 31; all of which (with the exception of YLO.PR.C) currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position in a SplitShare (BNA.PR.C) which also has its yield calculated with the expectation of a maturity.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.60% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: December 2010 analysis (which is in excess of the 5.46% index yield on December 31). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $10.7659 * 0.0560 = $0.6029, basically unchanged from the (adjusted for capital gains) $0.6034 reported last month.

Note that there will be a drag on the calculation in up-markets due to presence of shorter-term issues (or, at least, presumed shorter term issues!); the question is whether the positive effect of these issues in down markets will outweight their negative effect in up-markets – all I can say is … it has in the past!

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

Update: The SLF.PR.E is a legitimate closing quote, although it does mean that the market-maker fell down on the job.

SLF.PR.E, 2010-12-31 (partial)
Time Quote Size Trade
3:54:21     200 @ 20.55
3:54:21     50 @ 20.55
3:54:21 20.50-55 5×8  
3:54:34 20.50-55 5×6  
3:54:34     300 @ 20.50
3:54:34 20.50-55 2×3  
3:54:34 20.50-60 2×28  
3:54:34 20.50-59 2×3  
3:59:40 20.50-60 2×28  
3:59:51     100 @ 20.60
3:59:53 20.50-60 2×27  
3:59;53 20.39-60 5×27  
3:59:53 19.91-60 2×27  

I have sent the following eMail to info@tsx.com:

According to information reported by DataLinx for December 31, the closing quotation for SLF.PR.E was 19.91-60, 2×27.

I have four questions that arise from the closing quotation:

i) Who is the market-maker for this security?

ii) Will the TMX be investigating the circumstances that led to the wide spread on this closing quotation?

iii) Will the TMX be announcing the results of such an investigation?

iv) Will the TMX be implementing any sanctions against the market maker for this security?

Update, 2011-01-13: The TMX response to the eMail, and my follow-up, are reported in the post TMX: Close, Schmose!.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: December 2010

January 3rd, 2011

Turnover remained fairly constant in December, at about 27%.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may be thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2010-12-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 2.1% (-0.1) 6.47% 6.58
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 8.7% (-10.2) 5.82% 10.50
PerpetualDiscount 72.3% (+7.2) 5.60% 14.54
Fixed-Reset 12.6% (+2.4) 3.44% 3.10
Scraps (FixedReset) 3.6% (0) 6.90% 12.62
Cash 0.7% (+0.5) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.37% 12.41
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The increase in PerpetualDiscount holdings at the expense of PerpetualPremiums is largely due to migration of two positions, CM.PR.P and GWO.PR.M, from the latter class to the former. Both accrued dividends during the month.

Analysis of the data using the Straight Perpetual Implied Volatility Calculator produces the following table:

Fits to Implied Volatility
Issuer 2010-12-31 2010-11-30
Yield Volatility Yield Volatility
PWF 4.75% 21% 4.45% 25%
CM 4.90% 18% 4.13% 24%
GWO 4.40% 25% 3.60% 30%
Calculations are performed with a time horizon of three years for all issues

The decline in volatility is interesting and probably reflects a market view on the future direction of market yields. Given the high level of uninformed emotion in the preferred share market – particularly the Straight Preferred sector – this could be a fruitful area of research.

Graphs from the Straight Perpetual Volatility Calculator for December 31 are:


Click for Big
 

Click for Big
 

Click for Big

The yield pick-up for holding high-coupon Straights remains such that one should no longer automatically buy the deepest-discount issue in a series!

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2010-12-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 55.2% (+0.7)
Pfd-2(high) 21.0% (-0.9)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 19.6% (-0.3)
Pfd-3(high) 3.6% (0)
Cash 0.7% (+0.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2010-12-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.0% (0)
$50,000 – $100,000 11.5% (-0.1)
$100,000 – $200,000 18.8% (-0.1)
$200,000 – $300,000 31.6% (+11.3)
>$300,000 37.4% (-11.7)
Cash 0.7% (+0.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end.

As was the case with the sector distribution, the large shift from the $300,000+ liquidity bucket to the $200,000-$300,000 was not due to trading, but rather to migration, as positions were held in BAM.PR.N, SLF.PR.B and YLO.PR.C which all experienced declines in Average Trading Value over the month.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2010, and published in the September, 2010, PrefLetter. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to Straight Perpetuals
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is slightly more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: December 2010

January 2nd, 2011
HIMI Index Changes, December 31, 2010
Issue From To Because
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
GWO.PR.L PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CM.PR.P PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CM.PR.E PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
IGM.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
GWO.PR.M PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
GWO.PR.M PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CL.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
TCA.PR.Y PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
TCA.PR.X PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price

Note that CL.PR.B has been called for redemption.

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during December 2010
Issue Action Index Because
CIU.PR.C Add FixedReset New Issue
BNA.PR.E Add SplitShare New Issue
TA.PR.D Add Scraps New Issue
CPX.PR.A Add Scraps New Issue
EN.PR.A Delete Scraps Redeemed
DGS.PR.A Add
(Backdate to 2007-12-3)
Scraps Got Bigger

Best & Worst Performers: December 2010

January 2nd, 2011

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

December 2010
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “December 31”)
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -4.05% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.69% based on a bid of 24.26 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) -3.81% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 20.73 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare Pfd-2(low) -2.71% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.47% based on a bid of 21.85 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Not Rated
(P-2(high) by S&P)
-2.30% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.08% based on a bid o 21.90 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -2.10% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 22.81 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +2.43% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 23.51 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.I OpRet Pfd-2(low) +2.63% The second-worst performer in November, so this is largely bounce-back. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -20.83% based on a bid of 26.08 and a call 2011-1-30 at 25.50.
BAM.PR.O OpRet Pfd-2(low) +3.20% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.67% based on a bid of 26.41 and optionCertainty 2013-6-30 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) +4.66% Also the second-best performer in November.
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) +5.36% Also the best performer in November.

December 31, 2010

December 31st, 2010

It was an extremely slow and boring day on the Canadian preferred share market to end the year, with PerpetualDiscounts up about half a beep and FixedResets losing 6bp.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.48%, equivalent to 7.67% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.4%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 225bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) widening from the 220bp reported December 29

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has had another good year – I’ll put a little cinnamon in my coffee tonight, to celebrate – but I’ll have the final report out on that in the near future.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1726 % 2,306.1
FixedFloater 4.83 % 3.55 % 30,055 18.92 1 -0.2656 % 3,484.8
Floater 2.59 % 2.39 % 49,815 21.23 4 -0.1726 % 2,490.0
OpRet 4.78 % 3.31 % 61,323 2.35 8 -0.0287 % 2,397.8
SplitShare 5.34 % 1.28 % 749,483 0.94 4 0.0807 % 2,446.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0287 % 2,192.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 5.48 % 147,666 5.40 27 0.0198 % 2,019.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.40 % 5.46 % 263,803 14.74 51 0.0052 % 2,029.3
FixedReset 5.22 % 3.33 % 320,324 3.10 52 -0.0625 % 2,271.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -2.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-31
Maturity Price : 19.91
Evaluated at bid price : 19.91
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Premium 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-31
Maturity Price : 23.54
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-31
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 23.57
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 15,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-01-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.87
Bid-YTW : -25.77 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 15,250 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-31
Maturity Price : 21.59
Evaluated at bid price : 21.94
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 13,353 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-31
Maturity Price : 23.75
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
There were 0 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

CBU.PR.A: Normal Course Issuer Bid Renewed

December 31st, 2010

First Asset CanBanc Split Corp. has announced:

acceptance by the Toronto Stock Exchange (the “TSX”) of the Corporation’s Notice of Intention to make a Normal Course Issuer Bid (the “NCIB”) to permit the Corporation to acquire its Preferred Shares and Class A Shares (collectively, the “Securities”).

Pursuant to the NCIB, the Corporation proposes to purchase through the facilities of the TSX, from time to time, if it is considered advisable, up to 65,998 Preferred Shares and up to 65,998 Class A Shares of the Corporation, representing approximately 10% of the public float which is the same number as the Corporation’s issued and outstanding Securities, being 659,982 Preferred Shares and 659,982 Class A Shares as of the date hereof. The Corporation will not purchase in any given 30-day period, in the aggregate, more than 13,199 Preferred Shares and 13,199 Class A Shares, being 2% of the issued and outstanding Securities as of the date hereof. Purchases of Securities under the NCIB may commence on January 5, 2011. The Board of Directors of First Asset Investment Management Inc., the manager of the Corporation, believes that such purchases are in the best interests of the Corporation and are a desirable use of the Corporation’s funds. All purchases will be made through the facilities of the TSX in accordance with its rules and policies. All Securities purchased by the Corporation pursuant to the NCIB will be cancelled. The NCIB will expire on January 4, 2012.

On December 30, 2009, the Corporation announced that it was making a Normal Course Issuer Bid, which commenced January 5, 2010, to purchase up to 122,735 Preferred Shares and up to 122,735 Class A Shares through the facilities of the TSX. Under the bid, which expires on January 4, 2011, an aggregate of 7,600 Class A Shares were repurchased at an average price of $20.16 per Class A Share including commissions. No Preferred Shares were repurchased.

This is an interesting issue, since the NAV was 38.09 as of November 30 while the capital units were last quoted at 23.10-39, 3×20, and the preferred shares at 12.76-08, 5×20. The securities are trading at a huge discount to NAV!

These numbers are even more dramatic than the ones last discussed on PrefBlog, in the post Why is CBU.PR.A priced so high?.

The annual retraction date is in January and it will be most interesting to see what happens. Given the discount from NAV, it is clear that the retraction feature is valuable. On the other hand, exercising the whole unit retraction feature necessarily involves “selling” the preferred share at its $10 book value rather than the $13-odd market price … and a $13.00 indicates a yield to maturity 2016-1-15 of 0.43%.

One might therefore wish to purchase the capital units in the low $23 area, which is well below their intrinsic value of $28-ish and hold them as a speculation … but then of course one has to start worrying about the effect of MER, etc. Still, MER considerations don’t usually inhibit players from holding the capital units of other vehicles!

CBU.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

December 30, 2010

December 31st, 2010

It has been a great year for corporate debt issuance:

Rabobank Nederland, the world’s largest agricultural lender, and Fairfield, Connecticut-based General Electric Co.’s finance unit led $3.19 trillion of offerings, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Ally Financial Inc., Ford Motor Credit Co. and 509 other speculative-grade companies sold $287 billion of debt in the U.S., smashing the previous record of $162.7 billion in 2009.

Signs the global economic recovery is gaining strength encouraged investors to lend money to borrowers at lower interest rates, allowing Johnson & Johnson and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. to sell bonds at what were then record-low coupons. In the U.S., bond funds took in $234.8 billion this year through October, while investors withdrew money from stock funds, according to the Investment Company Institute in Washington.

Sales still declined 18 percent from last year’s $3.88 trillion as governments withdrew bond guarantees for financial companies trying to weather the credit crisis. Concern that Europe’s sovereign debt crisis would worsen slowed sales in the region.

BIS has released a working paper by Marc Flandreau, Norbert Gaillard and Frank Packer titled To err is human: rating agencies and the interwar foreign government debt crisis:

During the 1930s, rating agencies took up a central role in regulatory supervision that they still have today. The proximate cause for this changeover was the economic shock of the Great Depression. Exploring the performance of rating agencies in assessing the risks of sovereign debt, an important segment of the bond market, we do not find that superior forecasting capacities can explain the agencies’ growing importance.

This paper makes a contribution to this emerging literature on the history of ratings by focusing on the assessment of foreign government debt by US rating agencies during the interwar period. There are two reasons for this focus. … Second, looking at the government debt crisis may add a useful perspective on what remains one of the most (perhaps the most) violent foreign debt disaster in financial history. Between 1931 and 1939, more than half of sovereign borrowers who had issued in New York during 1920–29 defaulted. The episode, an integral part of the catastrophic interwar financial system dislocation, has not yet been studied from this vantage point, although many other aspects of the crisis have been discussed in detail.

We document a large degree of procyclicality of ratings over the period. Perhaps more surprisingly, rating agencies do not appear to have performed particularly well relative to financial markets in forecasting the approaching mess: when we compare the predictive power of agency ratings with that of synthetic ratings based on market yields, we find little that suggests strongly superior performance. Our results leave open the reasons for the emergence of ratings as regulators’ preferred instrument, for superior performance does not appear to have motivated the initial regulatory use of ratings.

Gee, it’s a good thing we’re so much smarter now than they were in the thirties, eh? Imagine, sovereign defaults, depression, the rise of authoritarianism … thank God that could never happen again.

Spain has cut its financing requirements:

Spain’s Treasury said it had managed to cut borrowing from markets in 2010 and would do so again in 2011 because of austerity measures adopted by the government.

For the year ahead, the Treasury estimated net financing needs of &eur;47.2-billion ($62.4-billion) — a decline of 24%from 2010.

But the figure was slightly higher than previously announced because of the country’s &eur;3.588-billion contribution to a European financial rescue for Greece.

Net bond issues in 2010 amounted to €62.1-billion, compared to the &eur;76.8-million forecast at the start of the year, the Treasury said. It was a sharp decline from the &eur;116.7-billion in net bond issues for 2009.

Financing needs declined in 2010 “because of the fiscal austerity measures put in place by the government mid-year to strengthen the stabilization of public accounts.”

PrefBlog doesn’t have a very long list of favourite politicians, but Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell comes close:

His latest pronouncement came on Sunday after the National Football League’s rare postponement of a game due to a forecast of snow. In Rendell’s world, real men live to make a touchdown in the snow.

“This is football. Football’s played in bad weather,” Rendell said before the storm struck his city on Sunday but after the NFL had postponed the Sunday-night game.

“We’ve become a nation of wusses,” Rendell declared. “The Chinese are kicking our butt in everything. If this was in China do you think the Chinese would have called off the game? People would have been marching down to the stadium, they would have walked and they would have been doing calculus on the way down.”

It’s a good column. Later on, the author states:

Pre-wussification, we were an economic powerhouse, and our children were the best-educated in the world, until we decided to sheathe our little princes and princesses in bubble wrap. We give them graduation ceremonies for getting through nursery school, a trophy just for showing up at soccer. We’ve removed play from the playground to keep them from scraping a knee. We intervene like lawyers in every dispute.

For sure. Look at the recent case of Greg Walsh. He was coaching a team of 16-year-olds when:

At the game in question, [black player Andrew] McCullum and a player on the opposing Austin Trophies team were sent to the penalty box after a confrontation. There, two game officials witnessed the player call McCullum “the N-word.”

The other boy’s coach benched him for the rest of the second period, but when he rejoined the ice at the beginning of the third period without anyone coming over to apologize or offer an explanation, Walsh was outraged.

The whole team agreed to forfeit the game they were winning in support of McCullum.

Walsh was suspended for a year by the OMHA, amidst controversy – the Star made this a cause celebre, canonizing the coach for ‘standing by his player’..

Think about it. These were two 16-17 year old boys, more balls than brains if my memories of adolescence can be trusted, they had been in a “confrontation” on the ice for which they had been penalized, they were jawing back and forth at each other in the penalty box … It certainly doesn’t sound like anything was either organized or premeditated. What message is the Star sending here? “If you’re involved in an activity and somebody calls you a nasty name, then what you should do is run home crying to mommy”, that’s what it sounds like to me.

Jackie Robinson wouldn’t have been able to even watch a major league game with that attitude.

It was another very slow day in the Canadian preferred share market, but the rally was hot enough, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 18bp and FixedResets were up 11bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1852 % 2,310.1
FixedFloater 4.81 % 3.53 % 30,162 18.94 1 0.3554 % 3,494.1
Floater 2.59 % 2.37 % 51,881 21.28 4 0.1852 % 2,494.3
OpRet 4.78 % 3.31 % 63,828 2.35 8 0.1438 % 2,398.4
SplitShare 5.34 % 1.28 % 779,820 0.94 4 0.0050 % 2,444.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1438 % 2,193.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 5.54 % 148,542 5.40 27 0.1172 % 2,019.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.40 % 5.45 % 274,135 14.75 51 0.1759 % 2,029.2
FixedReset 5.22 % 3.32 % 330,199 3.10 52 0.1084 % 2,273.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-30
Maturity Price : 24.67
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-30
Maturity Price : 21.85
Evaluated at bid price : 21.85
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-30
Maturity Price : 21.72
Evaluated at bid price : 22.03
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.01
Bid-YTW : 2.47 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-30
Maturity Price : 23.34
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Premium 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.38
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 86,220 Nesbitt crossed 80,000 at 27.59.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 29,567 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-30
Maturity Price : 22.34
Evaluated at bid price : 22.52
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 13,521 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-30
Maturity Price : 21.93
Evaluated at bid price : 22.05
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 12,591 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-30
Maturity Price : 21.89
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 12,589 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-30
Maturity Price : 22.61
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.51 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 12,337 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-30
Maturity Price : 21.62
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
There were 3 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

December 29, 2010

December 30th, 2010

There’s an interesting, albeit badly in need of editing, paper by Alessandro Fontana titled The persistent negative CDS-bond basis during the 2007/08 financial crisis:

I study the behavior of the CDS-bond basis – the difference between the CDS and the bond spread – for a sample of investment-graded US firms. I document that, since the onset of the 2007/08 financial crisis it has become persistently negative, and I investigate the role played by the cost of trading the basis and its underlying risks. To exploit the negative basis an arbitrageur must finance the purchase of the underlying bond and buy protection. The idea is that, during the crisis, because of the funding liquidity shortage and the increased risk in the financial sector, which exposes protection buyers to counter-party risk, the negative basis trade is risky. In fact, I find that basis dynamics is driven by economic variables that are proxies for funding liquidity (cost of capital and hair cuts), credit markets liquidity and risk in the inter-bank lending market such as the Libor-OIS spread, the VIX , bid-asks spreads and the OIS-T-Bill spread. Results support the evidence that during stress times asset prices depart form frictionless ideals due to funding liquidity risk faced by financial intermediaries and investors; hence, deviations from parity do not imply presence of arbitrage opportunities.

The Basel Committee continued its attempts to deflect public attention from its incompetence with the release of Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for remuneration. The financial crisis had a lot more to do with tranche retention and the lack of minimum turnover standards for securities designated Available For Sale than any compensation packages.

Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton discusses the 2010 changes in the yield curve in his post Changes in the Yield Curve:

One goal of the Fed’s second round of quantitative easing begun at the start of November was to flatten the yield curve. That obviously didn’t happen, and I discussed some of the reasons why a few weeks ago. A second goal was to increase inflationary expectations, which was achieved.

Even so, all we’ve done is moved back to about where we were a year ago. And a year ago, if you recall, things really weren’t that great.

But at least now we’re moving in the right direction.

The Globe & Mail ran a story on insurance fraud on Monday that I confess I don’t fully understand:

Again, the real money was made through a clinic, by submitting stacks of claims for false treatments under Ontario’s no-fault insurance system that averaged more than $250,000 per accident.

For an initial fee of $500, any person – not necessarily a doctor – can register as the owner of a clinic, hire practitioners and bill insurers for claims. In order to file those claims, a doctor or registered practitioner’s name, signature, and other billing information is needed, but this is sometimes forged.

Using confidential documents obtained from U.S. investigators, which were then cross-referenced with information gathered from court and corporate searches in Canada, The Globe and Mail has learned that at least one person indicted in the biggest auto insurance crackdown ever seen in the United States has since opened a rehabilitation business in Ontario, operating under the noses of regulators and lawmakers.

I don’t get it. OK, I understand the bit about since the regulators basically allow cost-plus charging of premiums, there’s very little incentive to show any initiative in checking out possible fraud. But honestly, when a clinic you’ve never heard of sends you a bill for $250,000 … don’t you send some clerk to go check them out? Call the practitioners involved? Ask for some back-up? and flag the clinic for a higher rate of spot checks until they’ve been in business for a year? This seems to me to be such a basic part of good business practice that I am astounded it’s not standard, especially considering that cashing a $500 cheque requires a rectal probe.

The Globe published my letter regarding the Mordecai Richler tempest.

The Canadian preferred share market rally continued today on unsurprisingly very low volume, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 15bp and FixedResets up 3bp.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.43%, equivalent to 7.60% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.4%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 220bp, with all figures basically unchanged from December 22.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1603 % 2,305.8
FixedFloater 4.83 % 3.55 % 31,393 18.93 1 -0.4423 % 3,481.7
Floater 2.59 % 2.39 % 54,023 21.23 4 -0.1603 % 2,489.7
OpRet 4.79 % 3.30 % 65,994 2.36 8 0.1488 % 2,395.0
SplitShare 5.34 % 1.38 % 812,288 0.94 4 0.0101 % 2,444.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1488 % 2,190.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.70 % 5.54 % 154,023 5.37 27 0.1470 % 2,016.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.40 % 5.43 % 278,145 14.72 51 0.1459 % 2,025.6
FixedReset 5.22 % 3.42 % 337,843 3.10 52 0.0348 % 2,270.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 24.90
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 20.37
Evaluated at bid price : 20.37
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 21.59
Evaluated at bid price : 21.85
Bid-YTW : 2.39 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 24.27
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 46.64
Evaluated at bid price : 49.90
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 23.56
Evaluated at bid price : 23.83
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 21.91
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 23.74
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 24.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.32
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-01-28
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : -11.69 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.17
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 4.58 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 36,706 TD crossed 25,000 at 26.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 28,555 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 25.06
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 19,622 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 21.36
Evaluated at bid price : 21.36
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 19,002 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 22.04
Evaluated at bid price : 22.16
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 18,787 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 21.55
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 17,176 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-29
Maturity Price : 22.02
Evaluated at bid price : 22.14
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
There were 8 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.