Nanex & Themis Respond to Flash Crash Report

October 4th, 2010

Nanex, whose initial report on the Flash Crash was discussed on August 9, has published a new and improved timeline and summary of their version of events. According to them:

It appears that the event that sparked the rapid sell off at 14:42:44:075 was an immediate sale of approximately $125 million worth of June 2010 CME eMini futures contracts followed 25ms later by the immediate sale of over $100 million worth of the top ETF’s such as SPY, DIA, QQQQ, IVV, IWM, SDS, XLE, and EEM. Both the eMini and ETF sales were sudden and executed at prevailing bid prices. The orders appeared to hit the bids.

Quote Saturation (see item 1 on chart)

Approximately 400ms before the eMini sale, the quote traffic rate for all NYSE, NYSE Arca, and Nasdaq stocks surged to saturation levels within 75ms. This is a new and surprising discovery. Previouisly, when we looked at time frames below 1 second, we thought the increase in quote traffic coincided with the heavy sales, but we now know that the surge in quotes preceded the trades by about 400ms. The discovery is surprising, because nearly all the trades in the eMini and ETFs occurred at prevailing bid prices (a liquidity removing event).

While searching previous days for similarities to the time period at the start of the May 6th drop, we found a very close match starting at 11:27:46.100 on April 28, 2010 — just a week and a day before May 6th. We observed it had the same pattern — high, saturating quote traffic, then approximately 500ms later a sudden burst of trades on the eMini and the top ETF’s at the prevailing bid prices, leading to a delay in the NYSE quote and a sudden collapse in prices. The drop only lasted a minute, but the parallels between the start of the drop and the one on May 6th are many. Details on April 28, 2010

The quote traffic surged again during the ETF sell event and remained at saturation levels for nearly 500ms. Additional selling waves began seconds later sending quote traffic rates back to saturation levels. This tidal wave of data caused delays in many feed processing systems and networks. We discovered two notable delays: the NYSE network that feeds into CQS (the "NYSE-CQS Delay"), and the calculation and dissemination of the Dow Jones Indexes (DOW Delay).

Now, this is interesting, because according to the SEC / CFTC Report:

At 2:32 p.m., against this backdrop of unusually high volatility and thinning liquidity, a large fundamental5 trader (a mutual fund complex) initiated a sell program to sell a total of 75,000 E-Mini contracts (valued at approximately $4.1 billion) as a hedge to an existing equity position.

However, on May 6, when markets were already under stress, the Sell Algorithm chosen by the large trader to only target trading volume, and neither price nor time, executed the sell program extremely rapidly in just 20 minutes.

Notice that? The time designated by Nanex as the start of the alleged hanky-panky is slap bang in the middle of the execution of the large trade. What’s more:

HFTs and intermediaries were the likely buyers of the initial batch of orders submitted by the Sell Algorithm, and, as a result, these buyers built up temporary long positions. Specifically, HFTs accumulated a net long position of about 3,300 contracts. However, between 2:41 p.m. and 2:44 p.m., HFTs aggressively sold about 2,000 E-Mini contracts in order to reduce their temporary long positions.

In the four-and-one-half minutes from 2:41 p.m. through 2:45:27 p.m., prices of the E-Mini had fallen by more than 5% and prices of SPY suffered a decline of over 6%.

The second liquidity crisis occurred in the equities markets at about 2:45 p.m. Based on interviews with a variety of large market participants, automated trading systems used by many liquidity providers temporarily paused in reaction to the sudden price declines observed during the first liquidity crisis. These built-in pauses are designed to prevent automated systems from trading when prices move beyond pre-defined thresholds in order to allow traders and risk managers to fully assess market conditions before trading is resumed.

So here’s something for the conspiracy theorists to chew on (this is me here, not Nanex): We can take the existence of Waddell Reed’s sell order for 75,000 contracts ($4.1-billion notional) as a fact, and we can take the start time of 2:32 as a fact. It also seems reasonable to suppose that there was a change in the tone of the market at 2:42, about the time that the HFTs filled up to their position limit of about 3,000 contracts – but that’s speculation which must be investigated. We know that they started selling aggressively – presumably willing to take a loss on their trade rather than keep the exposure – at 2:41: the SEC says so and we can take their statements of fact as accurate (although there will be some who disagree).

So here’s the conspiracy theory: was there quote-stuffing by a predatory algorithm? It seems likely that it is possible to determine that there is a single large, simple algorithm selling contracts; by 2:42 it had been operating for ten minutes, which is a lifetime. Since the algo was provided by Barclays, it is probably quite widespread and has probably been taken apart by a large number of HFTs – maybe even by looking at the source code, perhaps by reverse engineering. But there are a lot of predatory algos that look for signatures of herbivorous algos and eat them alive – that’s common knowledge.

So here’s the hypothetical structure of a hypothetical predatory algo:

  • Identify a large selling algo
  • Boost surveillance of the market and identify the exhaustion point of the major liquidity providers
  • Quote-stuff to drive out the remaining liquidity providers
  • Take advantage of the large selling algo with no competition. Do it right and you can max out your position limit on this just a hair above the CME circuit-breaker point

While the SEC / CFTC report dismissed quote-stuffing as the actual cause of the Flash Crash, a careful reading of what they said shows it cannot be ruled out as a possible deliberate accellerator of the decline. It will be most interesting to see how this plays out. I think the critical thing to examine is who bought the contracts in between the onset of order saturation and the tripping of the CME circuit-breaker.

One way or another, Eric Hunsader of Nanex is sticking to his guns:

But Hunsader said regulators largely ignored his ‘quote-stuffing’ theory which argued that high-frequency traders had contributed to the crash by flooding the market with so many orders that it delayed the posting of prices to the consolidated quote system.

‘It just seemed to me too much ink was devoted to try to discredit theories without any evidence, without any basis, other than just, ‘We looked at it, we talked to these people, and now, we dismissed it,” Hunsader said.

‘Obviously they didn’t follow up. I felt everything I sent to them went into a black hole,’ said Hunsader, who runs Nanex, a four-person data provider shop in Chicago.

Not only did regulators dismiss his observations, Hunsader said, they made a hash of trading data that exchanges provided them because they relied on one-minute intervals — a far too simplistic approach to understanding the market, he said.

‘When we first did this, we did it on a one-second basis and we didn’t really see the relationship between the trades and the quote rates until we went under a second,’ Hunsader said.

‘Clearly they didn’t have the dataset to do it in the first place. One-minute snapshot data, you can’t tell what happened inside of that minute,’ he said.

Themis doesn’t have much to say:

We had anticipated in our previously released paper that the core of their fix would be coordinated circuit breakers with a limit up/limit down feature, and that is in fact where they are leaning in this report. We see no mention at all of order cancellation fees, addressing the validity of rebate maker/taker model, or fiduciary language. We see little language in the way of criticizing a system that involves fifty-plus destinations connected at insane speeds, with different speeds for the public information and the co-located bought-and-paid for information.

We see nothing outside the circuit breakers addressed meaningfully. We were hoping for more in the way of solutions, rather than just post-mortems. Having said that, we have faith in Chairman Schapiro, and realize that this must be the first step, and that we all must be patient. This is a report presented to the advisory committee; recommendations are to come from them.

Update: One totally fascinating snippet I didn’t mention above is detailed with cool charts by Nanex:


Click for big

The chart above shows the frequency and intensity of the delay in NYSE’s quote sent to CQS grouped by the symbol’s first character. Stocks beginning with letters A through M, except for I and J saturate to higher levels, and more quickly than stocks beginning with other letters. The stock symbol GE was found to have reached a delay of 24 seconds.

It would be fascinating to learn whether the bifurcation was due to the NYSE’s inputs, or due to their internal computer systems.

October 4, 2010

October 4th, 2010

Yankee Bonds are surging in popularity:

Foreign borrowers are claiming the biggest share of the U.S. corporate bond market in at least a decade, taking advantage of record investor demand for dollar- denominated debt.

The overseas issuers, known as Yankee borrowers, account for 43 percent of sales this year, compared with 37 percent in 2009 and an average 23 percent from 1999 to 2009, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Reliance Industries Ltd, India’s biggest company by market value, plans to sell at least $1 billion of bonds in its first benchmark offering in dollars.

U.S. bond mutual funds have taken in $181 billion this year through September, compared with $7.3 billion for European bond funds, according to EPFR Global in Cambridge, Massachusetts. In the first nine months of 2009, U.S. fund inflows were $134.8 billion compared with $2.4 billion in Europe.

More divergence in the Canadian preferred share market today, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 14bp while FixedResets were basically flat, with continued heavy volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4046 % 2,167.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4046 % 3,283.5
Floater 2.88 % 3.20 % 76,398 19.25 3 0.4046 % 2,340.3
OpRet 4.91 % 3.32 % 75,453 0.15 9 -0.1763 % 2,364.7
SplitShare 5.95 % -30.61 % 67,830 0.09 2 -0.1842 % 2,367.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1763 % 2,162.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.71 % 5.26 % 123,289 5.48 19 0.0599 % 1,998.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.48 % 5.52 % 217,454 14.63 58 0.1419 % 1,986.3
FixedReset 5.28 % 3.24 % 318,483 3.29 47 -0.0055 % 2,258.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-04
Maturity Price : 24.82
Evaluated at bid price : 25.04
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.01
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-04
Maturity Price : 23.55
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-11-03
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 1.76 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.42
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-04
Maturity Price : 16.46
Evaluated at bid price : 16.46
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-04
Maturity Price : 20.49
Evaluated at bid price : 20.49
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 143,500 RBC bought two blocks of 11,000 each from anonymous, at 27.95 and 27.96; RBC bought 15,000 from TD at 27.96 and 10,000 from anonymous, both at 27.96; RBC crossed 50,000 at 27.96.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.95
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 97,085 RBC crossed 38,700 at 28.00 and sold 13,800 to Scotia at the same price. Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 81,643 RBC bought 12,400 from anonymous at 27.59, and crossed 16,000 at the same price. TD crossed 20,000 at the same price again. RBC crossed 11,100 at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 64,638 TD crossed 15,000 at 27.90 and 30,000 at 27.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.88
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 59,727 RBC crossed 25,000 at 26.58.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 57,030 RBC crossed 45,100 at 26.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.46
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
There were 51 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

MAPF Performance: September 2010

October 4th, 2010

The fund had a very good month in September.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close September 30 was $11.3901, after a dividend distribution of $0.151525.

Returns to September 30, 2010
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +4.32% +2.41% +2.12%
Three Months +9.12% +5.69% +4.85%
One Year +15.49% +9.92% +7.90%
Two Years (annualized) +36.73% +10.07% +8.15% *
Three Years (annualized) +21.64% +4.19% +2.34%
Four Years (annualized) +16.17% +2.60%  
Five Years (annualized) +14.05% +2.89%  
Six Years (annualized) +12.86% +3.27%  
Seven Years (annualized) +13.23% +3.52%  
Eight Years (annualized) +15.41% +3.98%  
Nine Years (annualized) +12.97% +3.90%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns. The figure shown is the square root of product of the current one-year return and the similar figure reported for September 2009.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +2.06%, +5.25% and +9.39%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.18%, +4.00% & +6.35% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.84%, +3.91% & +6.66%, respectively

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

My personal benchmark for a “good year” is index+500bp before fees; a glance at the annualized performance to September, 2010 shows that I’ve been able to meet that goal four times out of nine attempts, when measured to September month-ends.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There have been a lot of strongly motivated market participants in the past year, generating a lot of noise! The conditions of the past two years may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

The fund’s returns were helped along by the overweighting in deeply discounted PerpetualDiscounts; as discussed in MAPF Portfolio Composition: September 2010, volatility has been rising while yields have been falling, which resulted in this type of issue strongly outperforming.


Click for Big

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.1883 0.3926
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.1883 0.4203
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.1883 0.4448
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.1883 0.4389
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.1883 $0.4449
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.1883 $0.5054
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.1883 $0.6206
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.1883 $0.6423
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.1883 $0.6524
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.1883 $0.6278
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0000 $0.6182
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0000 $0.6231
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0000 $0.6329
September 2010 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.0000 $0.6310
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.

Significant positions were held in Fixed-Reset issues on June 30; all of which (with the exception of YPG.PR.C) currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par at the first possible opportunity. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.65% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: September 2010 analysis (which is in excess of the 5.53% index yield on September 30). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $11.3901 * 0.565 = 0.6435, down from the 0.6463 reported in June 2010 (the best comparator due to the influence of dividends earned but not yet distributed).

It is no surprise that this estimate is down, since there will be a drag on the calculation in up-markets due to presence of shorter-term issues (or, at least, presumed shorter term issues!); the question is whether the positive effect of these issues in down markets will outweight their negative effect in up-markets – all I can say is … it has in the past!

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: September 2010

October 4th, 2010

Turnover picked up in September to 23%

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may be thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2010-9-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 0.6% (0) 6.48% 6.75
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 5.4% (+5.4) 5.88% 13.99
PerpetualDiscount 79.8% (-6.9) 5.65% 14.45
Fixed-Reset 8.2% (-0.7) 3.55% 3.37
Scraps (FixedReset) 4.0% (0) 6.72% 12.78
Cash 2.0% (+2.2) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.43% 13.11
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

September marked a distinct change in the market: with the increasing price and implied volatility of PerpetualDiscount preferred shares (see MAPF Performance: August 2010) the fund not only took a position in PerpetualPremium Preferred Shares, but also increased its holdings of PerpetualDiscounts priced in the 24.00-25.00 range.

Following last month’s performance report, analysis of the data using the Straight Perpetual Implied Volatility Calculator produces the following table:

Fits to Implied Volatility
Issuer 2010-09-30 2010-08-31 2010-07-30
Yield Volatility Yield Volatility Yield Volatility
PWF 5.35% 14% 5.85% 9% 5.89% 9%
CM 5.10% 16% 5.46% 11% 5.77% 0.01%
GWO 5.50% 12% 5.77% 10% 5.82% 10%

Graphs from the Straight Perpetual Volatility Calculator for September 30 are:


Click for big


Click for big


Click for big

It is very clear that Implied Volatility has increased dramatically over the past two months – so dramatically, in fact, that the percentage of the portfolio comprised of PerpetualDiscounts priced between 24.00 and 25.00 has increased to 6.2% in September, from 4.9% in August and 0% in July; this is in addition to the more dramatic inclusion of PerpetualPremiums in the portfolio.

The yield pick-up for holding high-coupon Straights is such that the fund is starting to toy with the idea of selling the more deeply discounted PerpetualDiscounts to buy the higher priced ones; only nibbles as yet, but it has been a long, long time since the fund has “sold volatility”.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2010-9-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 59.2% (-2.8)
Pfd-2(high) 22.2% (+2.8)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 12.6% (-2.2)
Pfd-3(high) 4.0% (0)
Cash 2.0% (+2.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2010-9-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.0% (0)
$50,000 – $100,000 9.0% (-2.9)
$100,000 – $200,000 20.2% (-5.3)
$200,000 – $300,000 23.6% (-7.5)
>$300,000 45.1% (+13.4)
Cash 2.0% (+2.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from August month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2010, and published in the September, 2010, PrefLetter. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to PerpetualDiscounts
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is now about equally exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

FTS: DBRS Upgrades to Pfd-2(low)

October 4th, 2010

DBRS has announced that it:

has today upgraded the ratings of Fortis Inc. (Fortis or the Company) to A (low) and Pfd-2 (low) from BBB (high) and Pfd-3 (high), respectively. The trends have been changed to Stable from Positive.

The upgrade is driven by the Company’s low business risk profile (benefiting from its ownership of a diversified basket of utility businesses, which provide over 90% of consolidated EBITDA), its reasonable credit metrics (which have improved modestly over the years), the significant reduction in external debt at subsidiary Terasen Inc., and the Company’s demonstrated ability to acquire and integrate stable utility businesses financed on a conservative basis.

At the time of our last review in June 2010, when the trends were changed to Positive, DBRS stated that it would consider an upgrade of Fortis’s ratings if the Company continued to exhibit strong financial and operating performance and as long as its operating subsidiaries would not suffer any material negative regulatory action in the near future or pursue any mergers and acquisitions activity financed on an aggressive basis.

There are the following issues outstanding: FTS.PR.C & FTS.PR.E (OpRet); FTS.PR.F (PerpetualDiscount); and FTS.PR.G & FTS.PR.H (FixedReset). These will be moved (volume permitting) to their appropriate HIMIPref™ rebalancing, as of October 31.

FTS was last mentioned on PrefBlog when DBRS assigned the positive trend.

Gensler: Regulate Everything Stupidly!

October 4th, 2010

The thing about the United States and its institutions, I’ve found, is that the research is excellent. When Congress or a government agency want to know what’s going on or how something works – they hire some really good people, give them a decent budget, a reasonable time-frame and good authority to get answers and the final product is generally good.

Unfortunately, once the regulators and politicians get ahold of this report, they ignore it and pursue their own idiotic agendae; or the agendae of those who appointed them.

And so it is with the Flash Crash. The Flash Crash report was really good, but now Gary Gensler, a political hack who knows which side his bread’s buttered on, has given a ridiculous speech about possible new rules:

Gensler, speaking today at a conference in Washington, said brokers using computer algorithms might need to face limits on price or the size of orders they can execute for clients. He also questioned whether market participants might benefit from “fuller visibility” of exchanges’ order books.

The CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission said in a report last week that a large trader’s attempt to hedge against losses helped set off a chain of events that sent the Dow Jones Industrial Average down 998.50 points on May 6. The trader, who tried to sell 75,000 futures contracts worth $4.1 billion, used an algorithm that gave no regard to price or time.

“The large customer did not execute the trade itself, but used an executing broker,” Gensler said at the Wholesale Markers Brokers’ Association meeting. The event raises questions about whether brokers should “have to adopt certain trading practices when executing a large order,” he said.

Participants in the futures market can only “see up to the tenth offer or bid in an order book,” Gensler said. Liquidity might not have been so “overwhelmed” by a single, large sell order on May 6 if traders had more transparency, he said.

This is insane. The last paragraph is contrary to everything we know about markets. There have been countless studies on the effect of TRACE and of opening access to order books that show that increased tranparency leads to a thinner, more brittle market. Making the order book more accessible will increase the chance that a single dumb order can overwhelm the market, not less.

Additionally, setting the brokers up to police whether portfolio managers’ orders are good enough is just a dumb idea. In the first place, it assumes that brokers are smarter than portfolio managers – a highly dubious assumption – in the second place it adds another layer of red tape to the investment industry, leading to decreased efficiency.

The Flash Crash was caused by a bozo trader taking a huge market impact cost. A few tweaks to the rules seem indicated, but market impact happens every single time an order is executed. Given that there is far more “real money” in the markets than “hot money”, there will, from time to time, be market paroxysms that don’t make much sense. The Flash Crash was unusula only in its size – but Gensler wants to make life safe for the incompetent.

GWO To Take Hit on Lawsuit Loss

October 3rd, 2010

Details are pretty skimpy, but I’ll do what I can …

In their 2009 Annual Report, GWO disclosed:

The trial of the class proceedings in Ontario regarding the participation of the London Life and Great-West Life participating accounts in the financing of the acquisition of London Insurance Group Inc. (LIG) in 1997 by Great-West Life concluded on January 15, 2010. The Court reserved and a decision is expected later in 2010. Based on information presently known, these proceedings are not expected to have a material adverse effect on the consolidated financial position of the Company.

Now, however, is reported:

A group of disgruntled life insurance policyholders has won a class-action lawsuit against Great-West Life Assurance Co. and London Life Insurance Co., with an Ontario court ruling Friday the companies must pay $455.7 million in one of the largest contested class-action payouts to date in Canada.

The suit originates from parent Great-West Lifeco Inc.’s 1997 takeover of London Insurance Group Inc. for $2.9 billion, outbidding Royal Bank of Canada at the time.

The plaintiffs had claimed in the 45-day trial in London, Ont. that the two insurance companies transferred $220 million from participating accounts with London Life and Great-West Life to help finance about 7.5 per cent of the takeover. The cash was replaced by an accounting instrument called a “prepaid expense asset” (PPEA) — but the cash was never repaid.

In her ruling dated Oct. 1, Ontario Superior Court Justice Johanne Morissette declared the actions of Great-West and London Life as unlawful and in violation of the Insurance Companies Act.

“By creating the (participating account transactions) the defendants have done indirectly what was prohibited from being done directly,” the ruling said. “The PPEA could be characterized as ‘creative accounting,’ however they are not assets recognized by GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles).”

As a result, Morissette has ordered the two companies repay the par accounts the $220 million taken, plus $172.7 million in foregone investment income and $63 million of gross-up for taxes. This works out to $372.2 million to the London Life account and $83.5 million to the Great-West Life account.

The company states:

Although the decision confirms in many respects the Companies’ position, there are significant aspects of the decision which the Companies believe are in error. Accordingly, the Companies intend to appeal the decision.

The decision, if sustained on appeal, would require that the Companies pay an amount of $456 million to the participating accounts for distribution ($372 million in respect of London Life and $84 million in respect of Great-West Life). These amounts include both capital and interest items.

Regardless of the ultimate outcome of this case, all of the participating policy contract terms and conditions will continue to be honoured. As well, the decision, if sustained on appeal, is not expected to have a material impact on the capital position of the Companies.

Class action opportunists legal counsel crowed:

The court held that the defendant companies breached s. 462, and other sections of the Insurance Companies Act (“ICA”) which prohibits transfers from the participating accounts of federally incorporated life insurers. The court conducted an analysis of the facts underlying the transaction and concluded at paragraph 105 of the judgment:

“This Court, therefore finds that the $220 million payment involved a transfer of cash in contravention of s. 462 of the ICA”.

The court reviewed the conduct of the companies, their auditors and external advisors and concluded that the accounting for the par account transactions failed to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) contrary to s. 331(4) of the Insurance Companies Act.

It’s rather difficult to tell what the implications might be for the books …. the GWO press release refers to capital and interest portions, which implies that some of the amount is on the books already and therefore won’t be a hit to profit. Additionally, GWO claims that “the decision, if sustained on appeal, is not expected to have a material impact on the capital position of the Companies.”, but, naturally enough, do not specify what the benchmark for materiality might be.

Stay tuned!

The last mention of GWO in the “Issue Comments” category was GWO Warns of Higher Seg-Fund Capital Requirements.

October 1, 2010

October 1st, 2010

Towers Watson has released a series of promotional reports:Pension Finance Watch:

Long bond yields plunged in August, pushing liability values up dramatically. Equity values also declined significantly during the month. This rather unfortunate combination of capital market events means bad news for pension plan funded ratios. The Towers Watson Pension Index declined by 7.4% for the month to 60.0. This is the lowest recorded funded ratio in our data series extending back to 1990.

P&I / TW 300 Analysis:

Research conducted by Pensions & Investments and Towers Watson has found that total assets of the world’s largest 300 pension funds grew by over 8% in 2009, to US$11.3 trillion, up by around US$1 trillion from last year’s figure.

Some cheerful news from the States: the California 2010 Debt Affordability Report:

Because debt service is considered a fixed part of a State’s budget, credit analysts compare a state’s General Fund-supported debt service to its General Fund revenues as a measure of the state’s fiscal flexibility. California’s ratio of debt service to General Fund revenues was 6.69 percent in 2009-10, based on $5.790 billion in GO, lease revenue and Proposition 1A Receivables debt service payments versus $86.521 billion in General Fund revenues. This ratio is projected to be 7.17 percent in 2010-11, based on $6.558 billion5 in debt service payments versus $91.451 billion in General Fund revenues as projected by the Department of Finance.

The EU has an interesting approach to their sovereign debt crisis: make rating sovereigns a risky business:

Ministers are “ready to discuss” fines for ratings companies who mislead investors with poor quality ratings for securities, Swedish Finance Minister Anders Borg said in Brussels, while Didier Reynders, the Belgian finance minister, said “we do need a regulation on that, it’s very clear.”

“Concern has been expressed on whether the ratings of sovereign debt are necessary at all given the fact that there is already a large degree of transparency in the markets as regards the situation of government finance,” according to the commission document, dated Sept. 15.

The European Union approved rules for credit-rating companies last year, requiring them to adhere to a code of conduct to reduce conflicts of interest between issuers and rating firms.

These are the guys, remember, who were willfully blind to the falsification of Greek debt data. as discussed on March 1.

The Canadian preferred share market started the quarter with another day of mixed results on heavy volume, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 24bp and FixedResets lost 9bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5919 % 2,156.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5919 % 3,267.2
Floater 2.90 % 3.25 % 79,463 19.14 3 0.5919 % 2,328.7
OpRet 4.90 % 2.98 % 76,077 0.16 9 -0.1203 % 2,368.8
SplitShare 5.94 % -30.82 % 67,322 0.09 2 0.4730 % 2,371.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1203 % 2,166.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.71 % 5.25 % 124,356 5.32 19 0.1115 % 1,996.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.49 % 5.50 % 208,895 14.62 58 0.2352 % 1,983.5
FixedReset 5.28 % 3.22 % 319,704 3.30 47 -0.0908 % 2,258.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.I OpRet -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : -13.83 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-01
Maturity Price : 20.02
Evaluated at bid price : 20.02
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-01
Maturity Price : 22.93
Evaluated at bid price : 23.15
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-01
Maturity Price : 23.47
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-01
Maturity Price : 16.21
Evaluated at bid price : 16.21
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-01
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 285,995 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 160,000 and 98,600, both at 20.02.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-01
Maturity Price : 19.92
Evaluated at bid price : 19.92
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Premium 116,560 Nesbitt crossed 108,200 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : -0.83 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 108,265 RBC crossed 60,000 at 28.00 and bought 15,000 from TD at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.95
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 82,943 RBC crossed blocks of 13,300 and 48,100, both at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.22
Bid-YTW : 3.40 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 59,435 RBC crossed two blocks of 20,000 each, both at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.47
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 57,300 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 15,000 and 32,900, both at 24.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-01
Maturity Price : 24.27
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Best & Worst Performers: September 2010

October 1st, 2010

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

September 2010
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “September 30”)
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Pfd-1-(low) -1.16% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -3.87% based on a bid of 25.46 and a call 2010-10-30 at 25.25.
TD.PR.M OpRet Pfd-1(low) -1.14% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.00% based on a bid of 26.00 and a call 2010-10-30 at 25.75.
CM.PR.K FixedReset Pfd-1(low) -1.13% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.52% based on a bid of 26.51 and a call 2014-8-30 at 25.00.
CM.PR.R OpRet Pfd-1(low) -1.03% Called for redemption.
PWF.PR.P FixedReset Pfd-1(low) -0.92% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.63% based on a bid of 25.81 and a call 2016-3-1 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +6.96% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.61% based on a bid of 21.52 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +7.07% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 19.99 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) +7.70% The third-worst performer in August so this is a bounce.
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) +8.07% The fourth-worst performer in August so this is a bounce.
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) +8.18% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 22.98 and a limitMaturity.

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: September 2010

October 1st, 2010
HIMI Index Changes, September 30, 2010
Issue From To Because
PWF.PR.A Scraps Floater Volume
GWL.PR.O PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
PWF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
ENB.PR.A PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
GWO.PR.F PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
PWF.PR.O PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
PWF.PR.H PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
IGM.PR.B PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
TRI.PR.B Floater Scraps Volume

It’s nice to see the continued meaningful migration into the PerpetualPremium index! The sole counter-flow issue, GWL.PR.O, has been called for redemption. The PWF.PR.A move reverses the adjustment for this issue performed in August.

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during September 2010
Issue Action Index Because
INE.PR.A Add Scraps New Issue