New Issue: FFH FixedReset 4.75%+216

January 21st, 2010

Fairfax Financial Holdings has announced:

that it will issue in Canada 8 million Preferred Shares, Series E at a price of $25.00 per share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $200 million, on a bought deal basis to a syndicate of Canadian underwriters.

Holders of the Preferred Shares, Series E will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.75% annually for the initial five year period ending March 31, 2015. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the then current 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.16%.

Holders of Preferred Shares, Series E will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Preferred Shares, Series F, subject to certain conditions, on March 31, 2015, and on March 31st every five years thereafter. Holders of the Preferred Shares, Series F will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the then current three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.16%.

Fairfax has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part at any time up to 48 hours prior to closing, to purchase an additional 2 million Preferred Shares, Series E at the same offering price for additional gross proceeds of $50 million.

Fairfax intends to use the net proceeds of the offering to augment its cash position, to increase short term investments and marketable securities held at the holding company level, to retire outstanding debt and other corporate obligations from time to time, and for general corporate purposes. The offering is expected to close on or about February 1, 2010.

The first dividend will be payable March 31 for $0.1887, assuming a 2010-2-1 closing.

Obama Proposes Flat Prohibitions on Banks' Activities

January 21st, 2010

The White House has published Remarks by the President on Financial Reform:

That’s why we are seeking reforms to protect consumers; we intend to close loopholes that allowed big financial firms to trade risky financial products like credit defaults swaps and other derivatives without oversight; to identify system-wide risks that could cause a meltdown; to strengthen capital and liquidity requirements to make the system more stable; and to ensure that the failure of any large firm does not take the entire economy down with it. Never again will the American taxpayer be held hostage by a bank that is “too big to fail.”

Now, limits on the risks major financial firms can take are central to the reforms that I’ve proposed. They are central to the legislation that has passed the House under the leadership of Chairman Barney Frank, and that we’re working to pass in the Senate under the leadership of Chairman Chris Dodd. As part of these efforts, today I’m proposing two additional reforms that I believe will strengthen the financial system while preventing future crises.

First, we should no longer allow banks to stray too far from their central mission of serving their customers. In recent years, too many financial firms have put taxpayer money at risk by operating hedge funds and private equity funds and making riskier investments to reap a quick reward. And these firms have taken these risks while benefiting from special financial privileges that are reserved only for banks.

I’m proposing a simple and common-sense reform, which we’re calling the “Volcker Rule” — after this tall guy behind me. Banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, or sponsor hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary trading operations for their own profit, unrelated to serving their customers. If financial firms want to trade for profit, that’s something they’re free to do. Indeed, doing so –- responsibly –- is a good thing for the markets and the economy. But these firms should not be allowed to run these hedge funds and private equities funds while running a bank backed by the American people.

In addition, as part of our efforts to protect against future crises, I’m also proposing that we prevent the further consolidation of our financial system. There has long been a deposit cap in place to guard against too much risk being concentrated in a single bank. The same principle should apply to wider forms of funding employed by large financial institutions in today’s economy. The American people will not be served by a financial system that comprises just a few massive firms. That’s not good for consumers; it’s not good for the economy. And through this policy, that is an outcome we will avoid.

Wow. This came out of the blue. But Comrade Peace-Prize needs to do something dramatic to regain the political momentum after his recent debacle.

We’re back to the days of Bush! Something this sweeping should have been announced multilaterally, and only if the world’s other big players (like, f’rinstance, the UK just for starters) agreed. Ideally it would have been done through BIS.

But it will get the political momentum back – who cares whether or not it’s unilateral?

Update: Bloomberg has picked up on the unilateralism aspect:

“This is absolutely unilateral,” said Simon Gleeson, a regulatory lawyer at Clifford Chance LLP in London. “This is Glass-Steagall Mark Two,” he added. “Banks can take just as much risk in commercial lending as they can in proprietary trading as Northern Rock and HBOS show,” he said referring to two lenders bailed out by the U.K. government.

Obama’s call “is moving a long way from the existing Basel recommendations on capital charges, which is another way of dealing with this issue,” said David Green, a former Bank of England and U.K. Financial Services Authority official who now advises regulators outside Britain.

The big problem is going to be defining “propietary”:

President Obama’s plan to curb risk- taking by banks hinges on how rigidly regulators define proprietary trading at firms such as Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co.

Goldman Sachs, which generated at least 76 percent of 2009 revenue from trading and principal investments, gets the “great majority” of transactions from customers, according to Chief Financial Officer David Viniar. About “10-ish percent” of the New York-based firm’s revenue comes from “walled-off proprietary business that has nothing to do with clients,” he said on a conference call yesterday.


The White House defines proprietary trades as those not done for the benefit of customers, according to a senior administration official. Regulators would have the power to ask banks whether certain trades are related to client business, the official said. If they’re not, the regulators could order firms to exit the positions.

At banks such as Goldman Sachs, drawing the line isn’t easy, Viniar said.

“If a client wants to sell us a security, we’ll buy the security,” Viniar said. “That risk, which is principal risk, ends up on our balance sheet. It’s the great bulk of what we do all day long in all of our products for all our clients.”

Update 2010-1-22: I didn’t stress this before, given my shock at the concrete proposals, but I will draw attention to the deprecating phrase:

These are rules that allowed firms to act contrary to the interests of customers

Why shouldn’t firms act contrary to the interests of their counterparties? There is no fiduciary duty in a counterparty relationship when trading as principal. Zip, Zero, Zilch. Those who expect otherwise should go back to kiddie school and play some nurturing non-competitive games.

January 20, 2010

January 20th, 2010

There was another big whack of retail-sized trades today in POW.PR.C, with Nesbitt buying 20,900 shares on the TMX (against total volume of 34,297) at an average price of 25.555. If CPD is behind the buying, this will almost certainly hurt performance.

Another day of good volume with the FixedResets scoring yet another shut-out on the volume table as – presumably – some players rejigged their portfolios with the closing of the AER.PR.A and BPO.PR.N issues.

PerpetualDiscounts lost 15bp on the day, while FixedResets lost 10bp.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.75%, equivalent to 8.05% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.9% (maybe a hair more), so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 215bp, a widening from the 205bp reported January 13.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3507 % 1,710.4
FixedFloater 5.78 % 3.86 % 34,732 19.20 1 0.0000 % 2,733.2
Floater 2.29 % 2.62 % 110,263 20.73 3 0.3507 % 2,136.8
OpRet 4.86 % -2.88 % 113,845 0.09 13 0.2225 % 2,312.7
SplitShare 6.35 % -1.51 % 177,622 0.08 2 0.1973 % 2,117.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2225 % 2,114.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.81 % 5.75 % 150,364 6.01 12 -0.1953 % 1,888.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.74 % 5.75 % 178,241 14.23 63 -0.1495 % 1,830.6
FixedReset 5.40 % 3.58 % 349,787 3.84 42 -0.0956 % 2,180.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Premium -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 22.28
Evaluated at bid price : 22.43
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 20.02
Evaluated at bid price : 20.02
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 22.11
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 23.81
Evaluated at bid price : 24.02
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.P FixedReset 205,052 Desjardins crossed two blocks of 100,000, at 28.10 and 28.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.02
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 131,634 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 101,315 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 95,248 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 28.20; TD crossed 30,000 at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 87,101 RBC crossed 50,000 at 28.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.18
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 77,100 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 28.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.92
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
There were 54 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

AER.PR.A Settles at Slight Premium on Good Volume

January 20th, 2010

Groupe Aeroplan has announced:

that it has closed its previously announced bought deal public offering of 6,000,000 cumulative rate reset preferred shares, Series 1 (the “Series 1 Preferred Shares”) for gross proceeds of C$150 million, purchased by a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Dominion Securities Inc. and TD Securities Inc., acting as co-Bookrunners.

Groupe Aeroplan Inc. has also granted the underwriters an option to purchase up to an additional 900,000 Series 1 Preferred Shares to cover over-allotments, exercisable in whole or in part at any time up to 30 days following closing of the offering. If the over-allotment option is exercised in full, the aggregate gross proceeds to Groupe Aeroplan Inc. will be C$172.5 million.

The net proceeds of the issue will be used by Groupe Aeroplan Inc. to repay indebtedness, and for general corporate purposes.

This is the FixedReset 6.50%+375 issue announced January 12.

The issue traded 279,498 shares on the TMX in a range of 24.86-22 before closing at 25.09-10, 4×9.

Vital statistics are:

AER.PR.A FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 25.04
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %

AER.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

BPO.PR.N Settles Flat on Good Volume

January 20th, 2010

Brookfield Properties announced a FixedReset 6.15%+307 issue on January 11.

It will not have escaped notice that the initial fixed-rate period on this issue is six and a half years, just as was the slightly earlier BAM.PR.R new issue. In distinction to other commenters, I feel that the longer term has a lot more to do with the reset rate than the initial rate lock-in period … by extending term the reset can be set against the longer term Canadas rather than the five-year (or five-and-a-half year, as most of the banks did).

This is becoming a much more important consideration now that the chances that this and future issues will indeed be perpetual are increasing.

There’s no necessity for this: the banks have to calculate their reset in such a way or else OSFI will determine that a step-up exists and possibly disallow the issue as Tier 1 Capital. OSFI’s rules do not apply to BPO or BAM – they could set the reset to negative 20bp if they felt like it and thought it would sell – but presumably the dealers are trying to maintain the integrity of the FixedReset structure.

One way or the other, BPO.PR.N traded 333,903 shares on the TMX in a range of 24.90-09 before closing at 24.95-01, 25×30. Vital Statistics are:

BPO.PR.N FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %

BPO.PR.N is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

Research: The Bond Portfolio Jigsaw Puzzle

January 20th, 2010

Bond portfolios should be constructed from the top-down, adding pieces with useful characteristics relative to the rest of the portfolio as the dealers and issuers make them available.

Look for the research link!

TXPR Rebalancing Effect on Market

January 20th, 2010

Yesterday I posted regarding the remarkable performance of POW.PR.C in the past two days and new commenter to_be_frank suggested that it might be due to the TXPR rebalancing.

So, I thought I’d have a look at the index changes in systematic manner:

TXPR Revision 2010/1
Additions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
Total
Return
12/31 – 1/19
Index
Return
12/31 – 1/19
ACO.PR.A OpRet +1.04% -1.12%
CZP.PR.B Scraps
(FixedReset)
-1.79% +0.24%
DC.PR.A Scraps
(OpRet)
+10.32% -1.12%
DC.PR.B Scraps
(FixedReset)
+3.78% +0.24%
DW.PR.A Scraps
(OpRet)
+4.31% -1.12%
FFH.PR.C Scraps
(FixedReset)
+5.29% +0.24%
GWO.PR.J FixedReset +2.31% +0.24%
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Premium +0.92% +0.03%
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Discount +2.06% +1.56%
NA.PR.O FixedReset +2.45% +0.24%
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount +6.37% +1.56%
TCL.PR.D Scraps
(FixedReset)
+1.09% +0.24%
TRP.PR.A FixedReset +3.02% +0.24%
YPG.PR.C Scraps
(FixedReset)
+1.46% +0.24%

TXPR Revision 2010/1
Deletions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
Total
Return
12/31 – 1/19
Index
Return
12/31 – 1/19
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Premium -3.79% +0.03%
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -2.82% +0.03%
NA.PR.N FixedReset -1.37% +0.24%
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount -2.28% +1.56%
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -3.04% +1.56%

So, for the year to date, all but one of the adds have outperformed their benchmark (note that lower quality issues are not included in their benchmark) and all of the deletions have underperformed.

This is a very interesting result: it is a reversal of the previously established pattern in which adds would outperform pre-rebalancing and underperform post-rebalancing (although I used a different methodology in the publication; I can’t use the prior method as a template until the current post-rebalancing period ends at the end of February).

While I must bow to the data, of course, I must say I am surprised and will not yet accept the hypothesis (that POW.PR.C et al. owe their relative performance to TXPR) as proven. The trading in POW.PR.C continues to be haywire today, with bazillions of small trades lifting the offer. This method is virtually guaranteed to be an expensive way to rebalance: normally an institutional buyer or seller would take a more gradual approach, adjusting an iceberg order by a nickel or so per day until the whole thing gets filled.

But there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in my philosophy! I’ve said it before – I’ll say it again: I find it quite challenging enough to determine what’s rich and what’s cheap … figuring out why is quite beyond me.

I just hope it actually is CPD doing the buying, though … these distortions will cost it money and make it easier to beat!

However, it must be borne in mind that while CPD is rapidly achieving gorilla status ($378-million AUM) this does not necessarily mean huge market impact. CPD’s holdings of POW.PR.C were 0.25% of assets on January 19, or a little less than $1-million, about 40,000 shares. It will be most interesting to check this tomorrow and compare with the day’s trading!

POW.PR.C Goes Haywire

January 19th, 2010

Assiduous Reader prefhound asks:

Any idea what is going on with POW.PR.C? It has gone up about $1 in the past two days. Is there some possibility of a call at $25.50?

If POW.PR.C, what about PWF.PR.I (currently callable at $25.75; $25.50 in April)? Is there a holding company vs sub difference here?

Both of these are nicely under the call price (unlike GWO.PR.X recently called while above the call price).

This is very strange. If we look at the POW PerpetualDiscount issues outstanding:

POW PerpetualDiscount Issues
Close, 2010-1-19
Ticker Dividend Quote Bid YTW Current Call Price
POW.PR.A 1.40 23.59-75 5.97% 25.00
POW.PR.B 1.3375 22.62-72 5.94% 25.25
POW.PR.C 1.45 25.16-50 5.54% 25.50
POW.PR.D 1.25 21.92-08 5.73% 26.00
Commencing
2010-10-31

The yields don’t show a pattern – there should normally be an increase in yields with proximity to par to counterbalance negative convexity. POW.PR.A is somewhat less liquid than the others, but not by so much as to warrant more than a beep or two in yield.

Today’s trading is kind of interesting. Between 12:29 and and 13:09 there were ten trades on the TSX with total volume of 7,500 shares, starting with the low price of 25.38 and ending with the high price of 25.45, all with RBC as the buyer.

Then Nesbitt went nuts. Nesbitt was on the buy side for thirty-eight of the last forty trades of the day, taking the price up to 25.53 before it closed with a quote of 25.16-50. All of these trades were retail size – the biggest single transaction was 400 shares and Nesbitt bought a total of 11,600 shares on the day at an average price of $25.446 (data from PC Quote Canada Inc.).

Trading on Pure was relatively inoccuous, trading 5,100 shares with an afternoon high of 25.53 (100 shares, bought by Nesbitt) before closing at the aren’t-you-glad-there-are-market-makers-on-the-TSX quote of 25.30-27.99, 5×20.

To me, it looks like some retail broker has had a brilliant idea and executed it. But you’ll have to ask him what the idea was!

Update, 2010-1-20: New commenter to_be_frank reminds me that POW.PR.C was recently added to TXPR and suggests:

For the same reason, W.PR.J and ENB.PR.A have recently declined by a substantial amount, because those issues were removed from the index. These positions take time to unwind in a relatively illiquid market.

I have examined this hypothesis in the post TXPR Rebalaning Effect on Market.

January 19, 2009

January 19th, 2010

The repo market for mortgage-backed securities is looking a lot healthier:

Wall Street firms are loosening the terms of their lending to mortgage-bond investors as markets heal, an RBS Securities Inc. executive said.

Repurchase agreement, or repo, lending against the debt has expanded so much since freezing in late 2008 that some banks now offer as much as 10-to-1 leverage and terms as long as one year on certain securities backed by prime-jumbo home loans, said Scott Eichel, the Royal Bank of Scotland unit’s global co-head of asset- and mortgage-backed securities.

As asset values dropped during 2007 and 2008, leverage boosted losses, wiping out hedge funds run by London-based Peloton Partners LLP and New York-based Bears Stearns Cos., and damaged markets by leading to forced sales by firms including Santa Fe, New Mexico-based Thornburg Mortgage Inc., which filed for bankruptcy.

This is of particular interest because MBS have embedded put options reflecting the homeowner’s ability to refinance. This means that when yields on MBS – best reflected by the 10-year treasury – increase, the calculated average term of the mortgage increases, since nobody’s going to refinance a loan with a below-market coupon. To offset this, holders of MBS will short 10-year Treasuries … and the more prices go down, the more they have to short. During the bond market crash of 1994, 10-years behaved an awful lot more like long-term bonds than medium term!

The SEC has found something that is not regulated and is proposing forceful action to address the issue:

The requirement that a brokerdealer’s financial and regulatory risk management controls and procedures be reasonably designed to prevent the entry of orders that fail to comply with the specified conditions would necessarily require the controls be applied on an automated, pre-trade basis before orders route to an exchange or ATS, thereby effectively prohibiting the practice of “unfiltered” or “naked” access to an exchange or ATS.

Volume was heavy today and FixedResets recorded another shut-out on the volume tables, probably related to tomorrow’s closing of the AER 6.50%+375 and BPO 6.15%+307 FixedReset issues. Price action was muted, with PerpetualDiscounts up 2bp and FixedResets down 2bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2344 % 1,704.4
FixedFloater 5.78 % 3.86 % 34,923 19.20 1 0.0000 % 2,733.2
Floater 2.30 % 2.63 % 108,219 20.71 3 0.2344 % 2,129.3
OpRet 4.87 % -0.72 % 114,398 0.09 13 -0.4518 % 2,307.5
SplitShare 6.36 % -1.74 % 184,069 0.08 2 0.0878 % 2,113.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4518 % 2,110.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 5.69 % 148,317 6.94 12 -0.0695 % 1,891.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.73 % 5.73 % 177,565 14.24 63 0.0173 % 1,833.3
FixedReset 5.39 % 3.56 % 334,499 3.84 42 -0.0156 % 2,182.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet -2.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.13
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-19
Maturity Price : 24.52
Evaluated at bid price : 24.77
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-19
Maturity Price : 20.42
Evaluated at bid price : 20.42
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.31
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-19
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 184,700 Scotia sold 18,500 to anonymous at 26.77.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.63
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 134,985 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 28.13.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.90
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 122,050 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-19
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 121,200 Nesbit crossed blocks of 65,000 and 10,000, both at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 114,141 Desjardins crossed 19,900 at 28.00; Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at the same price; RBC crossed 50,000 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 99,451 RBC crossed 20,000 at 28.00, bought 10,000 from anonymous at the same price and crossed 12,000 at 28.01. Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.95
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
There were 58 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BCE.PR.E / BCE.PR.F Conversion Results

January 19th, 2010

BCE Inc. has announced:

that 592,772 of its 14,085,782 Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AF (series AF preferred shares) have been tendered for conversion, on a one-for-one basis, into Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AE (series AE preferred shares). In addition, 1,084,090 of its 1,914,218 series AE preferred shares have been tendered for conversion, on a one-for-one basis, into series AF preferred shares. Consequently, on February 1, 2010, BCE will have 1,422,900 series AE preferred shares and 14,577,100 series AF preferred shares issued and outstanding. The series AE preferred shares and the series AF preferred shares will continue to be listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols BCE.PR.E and BCE.PR.F respectively.

The series AE preferred shares will continue to pay a monthly floating adjustable cash dividend for the five-year period beginning on February 1, 2010, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE. The monthly floating adjustable dividend for any particular month will continue to be calculated using the Designated Percentage for such month representing the sum of an adjustment factor (based on the market price of the series AE preferred shares in the preceding month) and the Designated Percentage for the preceding month. The series AF preferred shares will pay on a quarterly basis, for the five-year period beginning on February 1, 2010, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE, a fixed dividend based on an annual dividend rate of 4.541%.

This is a logical result (I recommended BCE.PR.F as the better of the pair), but is nevertheless unfortunate. The decline in BCE.PR.E outstanding will reduce its liquidity from already low levels and make swaps between them even harder to execute.

BCE.PR.F is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns. BCE.PR.E is not tracked by HIMIPref™.