Market Action

March 23, 2009

There was an interesting joint Treasury / Fed Press Release today that raised as many questions as it answered:

The Federal Reserve to avoid credit risk and credit allocation
The Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort responsibilities involve lending against collateral, secured to the satisfaction of the responsible Federal Reserve Bank. Actions taken by the Federal Reserve should also aim to improve financial or credit conditions broadly, not to allocate credit to narrowly-defined sectors or classes of borrowers. Government decisions to influence the allocation of credit are the province of the fiscal authorities.

This is eminently sensible – but why is it being repeated? There has been some concern expressed that the Fed is usurping fiscal functions (which I have disagreed with) – are these concerns gaining traction?

Need for a comprehensive resolution regime for systemically critical financial institutions
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve remain fully committed to preventing the disorderly failure of systemically critical financial institutions. To reduce the risk of future crises, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve will work with the Congress to develop a regime that will allow the U.S. government to address effectively at an early stage the potential failure of any systemically critical financial institution. As part of the framework set forth, the legislation should spell out to the extent possible the expected role of the Federal Reserve and other U.S. government agencies in such resolutions.

It looks like the Fiscal Stability Regulator plan is going to happen.

In the longer term and as its authorities permit, the Treasury will seek to remove from the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, or to liquidate, the so-called Maiden Lane facilities made by the Federal Reserve as part of efforts to stabilize systemically critical financial institutions.

Is this an admission that the Maiden Lane facilities were not, in fact, adequately collateralized?

Equities were on fire today:

Canadian stocks rose the most in three months after the U.S. Treasury said it will spend $1 trillion to purchase distressed assets and Petro-Canada agreed to be bought in the biggest deal for a Canadian oil company.

Manulife Financial Corp., Canada’s largest insurer, climbed 16 percent after the Treasury said it will provide capital and financing for private investors to buy illiquid loans and securities held by banks.

Royal Bank of Canada increased 7.6 percent to C$37.94. Toronto-Dominion Bank rose 10 percent to C$45.50. A gauge of financial shares surged 8.7 percent, the most of the 10 industries in the S&P/TSX.

The Treasury’s Public-Private Investment Program will use $75 billion to $100 billion from the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program enacted last year, giving the government “purchasing power” of $500 billion. The Treasury said the program may double “over time.”

Thoughts of imminent mass-bankruptcy disappeared (at least for today) and prefs did really well – in fact, the sub-investment grade split share preferreds did really, really well.

Split Share High Performers
March 23, 2009
Ticker Asset
Coverage
Day’s
Performance
FTU.PR.A 0.4+:1
3/13
+14.06%
FTN.PR.A 1.2-:1
3/13
+12.48%
LFE.PR.A 1.1-:1
3/13
+6.84%
FFN.PR.A 1.0+:1
3/13
+5.73%
ASC.PR.A 0.7-:1
3/20
+5.56%
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4666 % 843.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4666 % 1,364.5
Floater 4.69 % 5.65 % 59,072 14.44 3 0.4666 % 1,054.1
OpRet 5.26 % 4.84 % 129,999 3.89 15 0.0028 % 2,059.9
SplitShare 6.81 % 9.59 % 52,151 4.79 6 1.3986 % 1,631.6
Interest-Bearing 6.02 % 7.98 % 34,811 0.74 1 0.8089 % 1,951.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5297 % 1,506.7
Perpetual-Discount 7.18 % 7.27 % 152,275 12.13 71 0.5297 % 1,387.6
FixedReset 6.11 % 5.74 % 633,745 13.83 31 0.1316 % 1,813.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -3.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.62
Evaluated at bid price : 19.62
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 15.86
Evaluated at bid price : 15.86
Bid-YTW : 8.22 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.39
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.05
Evaluated at bid price : 19.05
Bid-YTW : 7.92 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 7.49 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 6.96 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 17.04
Evaluated at bid price : 17.04
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
GWO.PR.E OpRet -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 6.43 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.26
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.71
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 16.51
Evaluated at bid price : 16.51
Bid-YTW : 7.42 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 18.77
Evaluated at bid price : 18.77
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 15.64
Evaluated at bid price : 15.64
Bid-YTW : 7.35 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 17.22
Evaluated at bid price : 17.22
Bid-YTW : 7.80 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 13.20
Evaluated at bid price : 13.20
Bid-YTW : 9.26 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 22.68
Evaluated at bid price : 22.92
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 17.30
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 7.75 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 7.58 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 14.31
Evaluated at bid price : 14.31
Bid-YTW : 7.83 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.76
Evaluated at bid price : 19.76
Bid-YTW : 7.26 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.57
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 18.25
Evaluated at bid price : 18.25
Bid-YTW : 7.70 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 12.91
Evaluated at bid price : 12.91
Bid-YTW : 9.28 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare 2.00 % Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of March 12 according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.16
Bid-YTW : 9.59 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 21.75
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.45
Evaluated at bid price : 19.45
Bid-YTW : 7.24 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 16.45
Evaluated at bid price : 16.45
Bid-YTW : 7.63 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 15.90
Evaluated at bid price : 15.90
Bid-YTW : 7.38 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 20.68
Evaluated at bid price : 20.68
Bid-YTW : 7.41 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 2.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 22.46
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 2.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 8.98 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 18.74
Evaluated at bid price : 18.74
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 2.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 24.40
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 3.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 19.05
Evaluated at bid price : 19.05
Bid-YTW : 7.64 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare 6.84 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of March 13, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.50
Bid-YTW : 14.43 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 211,656 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 25.03
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 193,421 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 24.50
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 109,077 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 63,743 National crossed 12,000 at 25.61.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 60,924 National bought 10,000 from RBC at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 60,333 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-23
Maturity Price : 25.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Late Update: Andrew Cuomo proudly announced the success of his extortion racket:

New York state’s attorney general, Andrew Cuomo, said late Monday that 15 of the top 20 recipients of $165 million in retention bonuses from American International Group Inc.’s Financial Products unit have agreed to give back their bonuses — amounting to in excess of $30 million in cash.

He added that he sees no public interest in disclosing the names of people who return their bonuses, and he acknowledged that returning the money is a difficult decision for many people in the unit who weren’t involved in devising the problematic transactions that helped topple AIG.

I like to think I’d hang on to the money and force Congress to illustrate the depths of their moral bankruptcy by taxing it all way. I also like to think I’d quit – CEO Liddy threw his people to the wolves rather than stand up for them. CEO Liddy is not a leader.

New Issues

New Issue: HSBC FixedReset 6.60%+485

Issue: HSBC Bank Canada Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class 1 Preferred Shares Series E

Size: 5-million shares (=$125-million) + greenshoe 3-million shares (=$75-million)

Dividends: $1.65 p.a. (=6.60%); reset every Exchange Date to 5-Year GOC + 485bp. First dividend payable 2009-6-30 for $0.4125 based on Closing Date.

Closing Date: 2009-3-31

Exchange Dates: 2014-6-30 and every five years thereafter

Exchange: To and from Series F (“Floaters”), which pay 90-day bills + 485bp, reset quarterly

Redemption: Every Exchange Date at $25.00. Floaters are also redeemable at $25.50 at any other valid time; it is not clear to me whether they may be redeemed in the period 2014-6-30 to 2019-6-30:

The Series F Preferred Shares will not be redeemable prior to June 30, 2019.

$25.50 in the case of redemptions on any other date on or after June 30, 2014 …

Update: Press Release. I am advised that the issue size has been bumped to 7-million shares + 3-million greenshoe.

Update: Press release on size increase

Update, 2009-4-10: Greenshoe exercised in full, issue size 10-million shares = $250-million.

Market Action

March 20, 2009

Assiduous Readers will remember I am following the Lyondell bankruptcy – the last mention was on February 24 … there’s more news today:

LyondellBasell Industries AF SCA missed an interest payment on bonds that will trigger payouts on credit-default swaps guaranteeing as much as $1.5 billion of the company’s debt.

Dealers and investors in the market will start the process of settling contracts linked to Netherlands-based LyondellBasell after it failed to pay interest on 500 million euros ($679 million) of bonds maturing in 2015, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association said in a statement today.

Traders had bought or sold a net $744 million in protection on LyondellBasell debt through credit swaps as of March 13, according to data from the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., which runs a central registry for the market. Another $786 million of protection was bought through index contracts that include LyondellBasell among a group of 50 companies.

The net figures don’t include contracts covering a gross amount of about $16.6 billion that economically offset each other and typically wouldn’t be paid as long as there are no defaults by the firms selling the protection, DTCC data show.

Credit-default swaps on LyondellBasell, one of the world’s largest closely held chemical producers, cost 94 percent upfront and 5 percent a year, according to CMA Datavision prices at 5 p.m. in London. That means it costs 9.4 million euros in advance and 500,000 euros a year to protect 10 million euros of the company’s bonds from default for five years.

That’s a nice price for protection, eh? I wonder if anybody paid it!

Good volume and fine performance from the Fixed-Resets today, probably inspired by some portfolio reshuffling with the closing of BMO.PR.O. PerpetualDiscounts continued their recovery from their recent dip.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.2723 % 839.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.2723 % 1,358.2
Floater 4.71 % 5.69 % 58,415 14.38 3 1.2723 % 1,049.2
OpRet 5.26 % 4.86 % 128,732 3.90 15 0.0248 % 2,059.8
SplitShare 6.90 % 10.01 % 52,512 4.79 6 -0.3167 % 1,609.1
Interest-Bearing 6.07 % 8.99 % 34,920 0.75 1 -0.4028 % 1,935.5
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2366 % 1,498.7
Perpetual-Discount 7.21 % 7.33 % 152,809 12.13 71 0.2366 % 1,380.3
FixedReset 6.12 % 5.70 % 643,437 13.84 31 0.5914 % 1,811.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -3.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 13.05
Evaluated at bid price : 13.05
Bid-YTW : 9.36 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.84 % Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of March 12, according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.00
Bid-YTW : 10.01 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 20.07
Evaluated at bid price : 20.07
Bid-YTW : 7.33 %
ACO.PR.A OpRet -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 7.90 %
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -1.25 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2016-03-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.60
Bid-YTW : 8.41 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 17.55
Evaluated at bid price : 17.55
Bid-YTW : 7.31 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 20.33
Evaluated at bid price : 20.33
Bid-YTW : 6.61 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 24.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 14.71
Evaluated at bid price : 14.71
Bid-YTW : 7.70 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 19.85
Evaluated at bid price : 19.85
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 16.91
Evaluated at bid price : 16.91
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 19.44
Evaluated at bid price : 19.44
Bid-YTW : 7.37 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 20.51
Evaluated at bid price : 20.51
Bid-YTW : 7.25 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 12.66
Evaluated at bid price : 12.66
Bid-YTW : 9.46 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 19.32
Evaluated at bid price : 19.32
Bid-YTW : 7.69 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 16.41
Evaluated at bid price : 16.41
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 21.21
Evaluated at bid price : 21.21
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 19.90
Evaluated at bid price : 19.90
Bid-YTW : 7.37 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 16.98
Evaluated at bid price : 16.98
Bid-YTW : 6.86 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 12.70
Evaluated at bid price : 12.70
Bid-YTW : 9.43 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 14.91
Evaluated at bid price : 14.91
Bid-YTW : 7.62 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 22.71
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 1.72 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 10.54 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 17.16
Evaluated at bid price : 17.16
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 19.35
Evaluated at bid price : 19.35
Bid-YTW : 7.78 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 7.65
Evaluated at bid price : 7.65
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 23.71
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 2.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 21.53
Evaluated at bid price : 21.53
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 2.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 7.70
Evaluated at bid price : 7.70
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 3.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 550,271 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 25.10
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 145,316 RBC crossed 122,500 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 108,096 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 24.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 107,255 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 63,013 TD bought 11,000 from Scotia at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 25.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 61,458 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-20
Maturity Price : 25.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
There were 24 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

BMO.PR.O Settles at Premium on Heavy Volume

BMO.PR.O, the 6.50%+458 Fixed-Reset announced on March 11 has settled successfully, trading 550,271 shares in a range of 24.90-20 before closing at 25.15-20, 8×50.

Issue size was $150-million plus a greenshoe for $75-million. No announcement has yet been made regarding take-up of the underwriters’ option; but with such heavy volume I’ll bet a nickel it was exercised in full.

Five-Year Canadas have come in considerably since the announcement and are now at 1.58%. This means that the yield-to-Perpetuity of the issue is now a more modest than expected 6.27%, based on a bid of 25.15 and a limitMaturity price of 25.10.

This issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ Fixed-Reset sub-index.

Interesting External Papers

FDIC Releases Revised 4Q08 Quarterly Banking Profile

The FDIC has release a Revised 4Q08 QBP with the explanation:

Shortly after the original release of the Fourth Quarter 2008 Quarterly Banking Profile, amended financial reports were received that significantly changed aggregate fourth quarter and full year earnings. Accordingly, this issue has been updated from the original release to reflect the changes. Updated results include substantially higher charges for goodwill impairment in the fourth quarter, which affected the industry’s aggregate net income and total equity capital. As a result of the amended reports, the industry’s fourth quarter net loss widened from $26.2 billion to $32.1 billion, and net income for all of 2008 was revised from $16.1 billion to $10.2 billion.

The cheery headlines are:

  • Industry Reports First Quarterly Loss Since 1990
  • Provisions for Loan Losses Are More than Double Year-Earlier Total
  • Average Net Interest Margin at Community Banks Falls to 20-Year Low
  • Full-Year Earnings Fall to Lowest Level in 19 Years
  • Quarterly Net Charge-Off Rate Matches Previous High
  • Noncurrent Loans Register Sizable Increase in the Fourth Quarter
  • Reserve Coverage Ratio Slips to 16-Year Low
  • Goodwill Writedowns Produce Drop in Total Equity Capital
  • Balances at Federal Reserve Banks Increased by $342 Billion in the Quarter
  • Deposit Share of Asset Funding Rises
  • Trust Activities Receded in 2008
  • Failures and Assistance Transactions Rose to 15-Year High in 2008

The breakdowns by type of bank are fascinating. For instance, almost all of the industry’s (8,305 institutions, assets $13,847-billion) profits were made by 26 credit card banks (assets $513-billion) and 5 international banks (assets $3,410-billion).

Seminars

Reminder: SplitShares Seminar Thursday March 26

Just a reminder! The next seminar in the series on the theory and practice of preferred share investing will be held a week from today on Thursday March 26.

These seminars are aimed at active and potential preferred share investors who wish to review relative valuation techniques in preferred share analysis.

All seminars will be presented by James Hymas, who has written extensively on the subject of preferred share investment and has been referred to as a "top expert" on the subject.

Questions are encouraged throughout the seminars, as well as in informal discussion at the end of the session.

Each seminar is two hours in length; coffee and tea will be served. The cost of attendance is $100, but a discount of $50 will be given to participants who have an annual subscription to PrefLetter with at least one issue remaining at the time of the seminar.

All seminars will be video-recorded for future distribution.

Thursday, March 26

SplitShares: Theory & Practice

"SplitShares" are popular with investors who:

  • wish to obtain tax-advantaged income
  • want an investment with a fixed-term

These issues are characterized by:

  • Fund owns portfolio of stocks (usually financials)
  • Fund finances portfolio with two classes of stock
    • Capital Units get increased expected returns at expense of safety
    • Preferred shares get increased safety at the expense of expected return
  • Cumulative Dividends
  • There is a set wind-up date for the fund

This seminar will review the theory of SplitShare Preferred evaluation, including:

  • Credit Quality
  • Embedded calls
  • Embedded puts
  • The importance of ex-Dividend dates
  • Investment characteristics relative to bonds

Examples of relative valuation in current markets will be supplied and discussed.

Attendence is limited; a reservation will avoid disappointment.

Location: Days Hotel & Conference Center, (at Carlton & College, downtown Toronto) Yorkville Room (see map).

Time: March 26, 2009, 6pm-8pm.

Reservations: Please visit the PrefLetter Seminar Page.

Market Action

March 19, 2009

A correlation has been found between fails-to-deliver (associated with naked shorts) and the demised of Bear Stearns & Lehman:

As Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. struggled to survive last year, as many as 32.8 million shares in the company were sold and not delivered to buyers on time as of Sept. 11, according to data compiled by the Securities and Exchange Commission and Bloomberg. That was a more than 57-fold increase over the prior year’s peak of 567,518 failed trades on July 30.

The SEC has linked such so-called fails-to-deliver to naked short selling, a strategy that can be used to manipulate markets. A fail-to-deliver is a trade that doesn’t settle within three days.

Twice last year, hundreds of thousands of failed trades coincided with widespread rumors about Lehman Brothers. Speculation that the company was being acquired at a discount and later that it was losing two trading partners both proved untrue.

After the 158-year-old investment bank collapsed in bankruptcy on Sept. 15, listing $613 billion in debt, former Chief Executive Officer Richard Fuld told a congressional panel on Oct. 6 that naked short sellers had midwifed his firm’s demise.

The Fed has announced:

that the set of eligible collateral for loans extended by the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) is being expanded to include four additional categories of asset-backed securities (ABS):

  • ABS backed by mortgage servicing advances
  • ABS backed by loans or leases relating to business equipment
  • ABS backed by leases of vehicle fleets
  • ABS backed by floorplan loans

“Floorplan loans”, by the way, are loans made to auto dealers to finance inventory, secured by that inventory.

Another good day for prefs – PerpetualDiscounts are now up 1.89% Year-to-Date and up 5.20% from the low on March 10, but still down 5.36% from the high on January 13.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.5879 % 829.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.5879 % 1,341.1
Floater 4.77 % 5.85 % 56,960 14.15 3 1.5879 % 1,036.0
OpRet 5.26 % 4.88 % 128,434 3.90 15 0.0939 % 2,059.3
SplitShare 6.88 % 9.60 % 52,927 4.80 6 0.2734 % 1,614.3
Interest-Bearing 6.04 % 8.41 % 35,122 0.75 1 2.2657 % 1,943.4
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6417 % 1,495.2
Perpetual-Discount 7.23 % 7.38 % 152,993 12.02 71 0.6417 % 1,377.1
FixedReset 6.14 % 5.82 % 596,548 13.76 30 0.4466 % 1,800.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -3.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 22.18
Evaluated at bid price : 22.46
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 14.71
Evaluated at bid price : 14.71
Bid-YTW : 7.72 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 8.78 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 23.97
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare -1.13 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of March 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.02
Bid-YTW : 16.55 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 16.11
Evaluated at bid price : 16.11
Bid-YTW : 7.44 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 18.58
Evaluated at bid price : 18.58
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 22.37
Evaluated at bid price : 22.41
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.63
Evaluated at bid price : 19.63
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 21.21
Evaluated at bid price : 21.21
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 17.90
Evaluated at bid price : 17.90
Bid-YTW : 8.21 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 17.25
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 7.14 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 20.56
Evaluated at bid price : 20.56
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 21.02
Evaluated at bid price : 21.02
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 23.86
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 15.10
Evaluated at bid price : 15.10
Bid-YTW : 8.38 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 20.26
Evaluated at bid price : 20.26
Bid-YTW : 7.56 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 17.34
Evaluated at bid price : 17.34
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 21.20
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.06
Evaluated at bid price : 19.06
Bid-YTW : 7.39 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 7.50
Evaluated at bid price : 7.50
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 2.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.70
Bid-YTW : 8.96 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 6.91 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 2.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 17.75
Evaluated at bid price : 17.75
Bid-YTW : 7.91 %
STW.PR.A Interest-Bearing 2.27 % Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of March 12, based on Capital Unit NAV of 2.14. and 1.99 Capital Units per Preferred.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2009-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.93
Bid-YTW : 8.41 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 2.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.65
Evaluated at bid price : 19.65
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 2.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 14.55
Evaluated at bid price : 14.55
Bid-YTW : 7.78 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 17.11
Evaluated at bid price : 17.11
Bid-YTW : 6.67 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 2.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 13.50
Evaluated at bid price : 13.50
Bid-YTW : 9.04 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 17.75
Evaluated at bid price : 17.75
Bid-YTW : 7.23 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 16.45
Evaluated at bid price : 16.45
Bid-YTW : 7.79 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 7.21 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 2.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 15.05
Evaluated at bid price : 15.05
Bid-YTW : 7.52 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 2.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 21.10
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 3.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 3.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 8.02 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 3.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 7.50
Evaluated at bid price : 7.50
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.E FixedReset 98,825 TD crossed 73,800 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 98,510 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.08
Evaluated at bid price : 25.13
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 61,299 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 57,102 RBC crossed 18,400 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 55,775 National Bank crosse 45,000 at 18.93.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 19.04
Evaluated at bid price : 19.04
Bid-YTW : 7.50 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 48,545 Nesbitt bought 19,300 from National at 25.22.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Banking Crisis 2008

UK FSA Publishes Turner Report on Bank Regulation

The UK Financial Services Authority has announced that it has published:

Lord Turner’s Review and the supporting FSA Discussion Paper. These take an in-depth look at the causes of the financial crisis and recommend steps that the international community needs to take to enhance regulatory standards, supervisory approaches and international cooperation and coordination.

The Turner Review, as the report is called, starts with a very good review of ‘How did we get here from there?’, with a particular emphasis, of course, on the UK situation. For those interested in the US MMF initiatives, there is the comment:

The development of mutual-fund based maturity transformation was much less important in the UK than in the US: UK consumers do not to a significant extent hold mutual-fund investments as bank deposit substitutes. And while several UK banks set up SIVs and conduits, the scale was in general smaller than those of the big US banks. But US mutual funds and SIVs were very significant buyers of UK securitised credit: when they stopped buying, a large source of funding for UK credit extension disappeared.

There’s an attack on market efficiency … which is explicitly used as an argument for more wise and beneficial official influence of market prices:

  • Market efficiency does not imply market rationality.
  • Individual rationality does not ensure collective rationality.
  • Individual behaviour is not entirely rational.
  • Allocative efficiency benefits have limits.
  • Empirical evidence illustrates large scale herd effects and market overshoots.

There has been a recent, media-fueled resurgence of interest in financial models and their role in the crisis; the report contains a section on “Misplaced reliance on sophisticated maths”:

Four categories of problem can be distinguished:

  • Short observation periods…
  • Non-normal distributions…
  • Systemic versus idiosyncratic risk….
  • Non-independence of future events; distinguishing risk and uncertainty….

I suggest that these problems are not root causes, but symptoms. Believe me, the people who understood the models knew their limits very well. But in any large business, facts are used in the way the famous drunk uses a lamp-post: for support rather than illumination.

I have previously reviewed the problems inherent in estimating Loan Default Correlation. I suggest that the root cause of the problems in this process is the bigness of banks; there are too many layers of management eagerly telling their superiors what they want to hear, rather than making a Career Limiting Move and playing Cassandra. It is for this reason that there should be a surcharge on Risk Weighted Assets for size.

In fact, however, Lord Turner makes an almost sacreligious attack on market discipline – the Third Pillar of Basel II that I have attempted to defend from OSFI’s depredations. Lord Turner claims:

A reasonable conclusion is that market discipline expressed via market prices cannot be expected to play a major role in constraining bank risk taking, and that the primary constraint needs to come from regulation and supervision.

I suggest a more reasonable thing to try is disclosure … not disclosure from the banks, which is currently ignored, but disclosure by portfolio managers. Anybody with a licence to make discretionary trades for clients should be publishing returns – full and complete returns, which should then be published by the regulators (with spot checks for verification, same as with everything else that gets filed). In this way, we can hope to decrease the influence of salesmen in the industry; portfolio management is largely regarded primarily as an unfortunate regulatory cost to be minimized.

For purposes of this review, I’ve only skimmed over the first section. However, there is a section (2.9) of the more meaty sections of the report that brought tears of joy to my eyes:

Several commentators have argued for a clear separation of roles in which:
• Banks which perform classic retail and commercial banking functions, and which enjoy the benefits of retail deposit insurance and access to lender of last resort facilities, would be severely restricted in their ability to conduct risky trading activities.
• Financial institutions which are significantly involved in risky trading activities would be clearly excluded from access to retail deposit insurance and from [Lender of Last Resort] facilities, and would therefore face the market discipline of going bankrupt if they ran into difficulties.
The theoretical clarity of this argument has attracted considerable support.

The key tools to achieve [elimination of Too Big To Fail status] will include:
• A regulatory regime for trading book capital (discussed in Sections 2.2 (ii) and (vi)) that combines significantly increased capital requirements with a gross leverage ratio rule which constrains total balance sheet size. Such a regime could include very major variation in capital requirements as between different types of trading activity, effectively achieving a distinction between market making to support customer service and proprietary position taking. The fundamental review of the trading book capital regime, proposed in Section 2.2 (ii), should consider the potential to achieve such distinction.

Issue Comments

YPG.PR.A / YPG.PR.B : Wildly Divergent Yields

Assiduous Reader prefhound commented:

May I be baffled at the relative prices/yields of the two Yellow Pages Prefs?:

YPG.PR.A closing $19.80; Dividend $1.0625; Retractible Dec 31, 2012 for a YTM = 11.1%.

YPG.PR.B closing $11.75; Dividend $1.25; Retractible Jun 30, 2017 for a YTM = 17.1%

We are used to flaky pref prices when the lower priced issue has a smaller dividend, but here the Pref A has a lower dividend and lower current yield than the Pref B (5.4 vs 10.7%) — and that is before its lower capital gains potential!

If it is a yield curve difference (due to the extra 4.5 years for the pref B), then YPG.PR.B yields 11.1% through Dec 31, 2012 and 26.5% for the period 2013-retraction. Should we conclude that the company will be fine for 3 years and then fall apart in the subsequent five?

BAM and BPO retractible prefs of different maturity dates often have very similar yields to maturity, but not YPG. The YPG.PR.B yield is often more than PR.A, but the current 6 points seems absurd. If both Pref A and Pref B had the same yields to retraction, the Pref B should be $16.82 — more than 40% higher!

I smell arbitrage potential here, but am not sure how long it would take to sort out. Do you have any special insight into this pair?

… and I responded

I think it all comes down to mortgages.

There is a very real preferred habitat amongst retail investors for short-term bonds, which are usually defined as bonds with five years or less to maturity, which just happens to be the term of most Canadian mortgages.

When you add in the fact that the number of watchers is reduced dramatically by the Pfd-3(high) rating, I think you have an explanation.

You are quite right that BPO retractibles all yield in the same ballpark – but that ballpark is the “penalty yield” ballpark … it is, perhaps, best thought of as a company that is not getting the benefit of the five-year cliff.

And BAM’s just plain wierd.

I suspect that any rationalization of the YPG.PR.B yield will have to wait until 2011-12, when retail will start thinking of it as something with a maturity instead of one of them never get yer money back things.

As I have previously disclosed, the fund holds a position in YPG.PR.B, taken as an optimization trade after the downgrade of BCE.PR.I made me uncomfortable with the fund’s weighting in that name. It’s a relatively small position, with a portfolio weight within the bounds I consider prudent. Barring an increase in credit concern, I’ll hold the damn thing to maturity at a yield of 17+%!

Yellow Pages recently announced that:

it has extended the term of the $500 million tranche of its core revolving credit facility by an additional year to May 2012. Combined with the $200 million revolving tranche, the full amount of the $700 million core revolving credit facility now matures in May 2012. This facility can be used for general corporate purposes and serves as back-up to the commercial paper program.

With the combination of the core revolving credit facility and the $450 million credit facility established in 2008, Yellow Pages Income Fund has access to $1.150 billion in long term committed bank lines, providing ample liquidity to fund its operations and to refinance the Series 1 Medium Term Notes maturing in April 2009.

I note from their most recent Management Discussion and Analysis:

In April 2009, YPG will be repaying at maturity the series 1 medium term notes issued in April 2004 ($450 million) and currently intends to draw under the New Revolving Facility to refinance these notes. We will also continue to monitor conditions in the fixed income market.

YPG Holdings Inc. has a total of $300 million of Exchangeable Unsecured Subordinated Debentures outstanding (the Exchangeable Debentures). The Exchangeable Debentures have a maturity date of August 1, 2011 and are exchangeable at any time, at the option of the holder, for units of the Fund at an exchange price of $20.00 per unit.

So the exchangeable-ha-ha debs mature in 2011 – prior to retraction for YPG.PR.A, so fears regarding these two refinancings is not the issue.

The supplemental disclosures provide a breakdown of the maturities:

Yellow Pages
Debt Term Structure
Date Amount Market
Yield
2009-4-21 $450-million  
2011-2-28 $150-million  
2011-8-1 $300-million  
2012-12-31
Retraction
YPG.PR.A
$300-million 11.21%
(Dividend)
2014-4-21 $300-million 8.36%
2016-2-25 $550-million 8.57%
2017-6-30
Retraction
YPG.PR.B
$200-million 17.67%
(Dividend)
2019-11-18 $250-million 9.25%
2036-2-15 $350-million  

The revolving credit line (of which $359-million is drawn) has maturities:

Yellow Pages
Credit Line Maturities
Date Amount
2011-5-8 $450-million
2012-5-25 $200-million
2011-5-21 $500-million

There is a significant refunding due between the two pref series … but it’s not as if the entire debt matures between the two issues’ maturities, at least! If they can refinance the April maturity (currently being refunded via the credit line) with a ten-year term, that will remove at least a little uncertainty.

I should note that a significant proportion of the YPG.PR.B yield is back-end-loaded; that is, dependent upon maturity at par. It’s only yield if you actually get the money!

Finally, I will note the DBRS Press Release of 2008-11-6:

The rating remains underpinned by the Company’s dominance as the incumbent directories publisher in Canada, a market which continues to maintain high usage rates in traditional print directories, and supports a meaningful and growing online directories and vertical media platform.

The rating is further supported by YPG’s industry leading EBITDA margins of roughly 55% and the Company’s strong liquidity position, as evidenced by good free cash flow generation (approximately $130 million for the latest twelve months ending September 30, 2008), over $600 million of undrawn availability under its $950 million committed bank facilities at the end of the third quarter of 2008, and capability and flexibility to refinance upcoming maturities (including $450 million in notes which mature in April 2009).

YPG’s free cash flow is expected to continue to demonstrate solid growth through 2010 as a result of the Company’s limited capital requirements and a gradual reduction in the distribution payout ratio as YPG prepares to become fully taxable on January 1, 2011.

Through the end of 2008, DBRS expects YPG’s credit metrics to remain stable on a year-over-year basis, with DBRS-adjusted gross debt-to-EBITDA ranging between 2.90 times and 3.00 times. This is also expected to continue through 2009.

YPG is expected to continue to manage its balance sheet in a conservative manner, balancing strategic acquisitions and unit repurchases in line with its long-term unadjusted leverage targets, maintaining net debt-to-EBITDA between 2.80 times and 3.20 times (at September 30, 2008, this metric stood at roughly 2.90 times). These targets remain within the context of a strong investment grade rating when considering the Company’s favourable business risk profile and free cash flow capacity.

Both issues are tracked by HIMIPref™ and both are incorporated in the “Scraps” index due to credit concerns. The last mention of YPG.PR.A discussed its issue price and the last mention of YPG.PR.B commented on its hostile reception on its opening day in June 2007.