BXN.PR.B Partial Call for Redemption

May 20th, 2008

B Split 2 Corporation has announced:

that it has called 84,808 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on May 30, 2008 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 8.920% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 177,808 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on May 29, 2008 will have approximately 8.920% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $9.75 per share.

The last partial redemption of BXN.PR.B was noted by PrefBlog last May.

BXN.PR.B is not tracked by HIMIPref™

SNP.PR.V Partial Call for Redemption

May 20th, 2008

SNP Split Corp has announced:

that it has called 220,819 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on June 4, 2008 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 12.091% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 578,638 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on June 3, 2008 will have approximately 12.091% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be US$10.25 per share.

SNP.PR.V is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Critchley of Financial Post: Fixed-Resets Good!

May 20th, 2008

Barry Critchley of the Financial Post had a piece in today’s Financial Post – Ruggins a Master of Tier 1, in which he comes out in favour of the currently fashionable fixed-reset structure:

If a bank was interested in raising Tier 1 capital and wanted to demonstrate that it was investor friendly, a useful starting point would be to call Len Ruggins, the former executive in charge of capital market funding for BCE and Bell Canada.

During his career, Ruggins raised more than $30-billion of capital, or more than any other non-bank executive in the country. Ruggins, now based in Calgary, had a rule: Don’t bag investors. He interpreted that rule by opting never to issue fixedrate perpetual preferred shares. The reason: They aren’t in the best interests of investors. Instead, they serve the interests of issuers that have all the power to let the prefs stay out there forever — and forever is a long time.

In five years when the so-called subsequent fixed-rate period comes around, investors have a choice: They can opt to receive other fixedrate pref shares that have a yield equal to the rate on five-year Canada bonds plus 205 basis points. In this way, the spread becomes a permanent part of the formula and means investors won’t be harmed by any improvement in Scotiabank’s credit spread over the period. If in five years the yield on Canada bonds is above 2.95%, then investors will receive a higher nominal yield; if the yield is lower, investors will receive a lower nominal yield.

In five years, investors have another choice: They can opt to convert to non-cumulative floating-rate preferred shares. The floating-rate pref shares will pay a dividend equal to the three-month T-bill rate plus 2.05%. However, the floating-rate pref is available only if there is a minimum-sized float.

From Scotia’s perspective, the issue was attractive: It gets Tier 1 capital, given that OSFI, the federal regulator, signed off on the transaction, and it still gets to control most of the shots. As well, the structure allowed the bank to raise more capital — at a lower yield — than a traditional perpetual.

Since Scotia’s deal — on which it’s understood Desjardins Securities played a key structuring role — Fortis raised $200-million via a similar offering.

The Fortis new issue and the Scotia new issue have both been previously discussed.

There are some critical flaws in Mr. Critchley’s analysis:

  • Credit risk has a high degree of importance in fixed income investing … particularly with instruments that won’t ever just run off the books. Due to the risk that bad times may come, investors must increase their expected returns in the event that good times continue.
  • Contrary to If in five years the yield on Canada bonds is above 2.95%, then investors will receive a higher nominal yield, there is no assurance that the bonds will not be called at such a time.
  • There is an inherent contradiction within As well, the structure allowed the bank to raise more capital — at a lower yield — than a traditional perpetual. Issuers and investors are at war with each other. A lower yield – good for the issuer – can be justified only to the extent that risk is transferred … in this case, there is some show of transferring interest rate risk. The fact that these issues are callable in five years at par means that the transfer inherent in these prefs is minimal.

Incidentally … the portfolio strategy of one major dealer advises investors to retain cash for investment in new, “defensive”, fixed-reset issues … so I suspect that there are a lot of deals in the pipeline waiting for an opportune moment.

BCE / Teachers' Deal: Banks Rattle Their Sabres

May 19th, 2008

The New York Times has reported:

The $51.8 billion takeover of Bell Canada, the largest leveraged buyout ever proposed, appeared to be in trouble over the weekend as the Wall Street banks that committed to finance the deal sought to renegotiate the lending terms, people on both sides of the transaction said on Sunday.

The negotiations over the Bell Canada buyout began to fray late Friday, said people on both sides of the deal, who were in closed-door discussions all weekend.

The banks backing the deal, led by Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland, sent revised terms to the consortium of buyers. The new terms included higher interest rates, tighter loan restrictions and stronger protections for the banks, far exceeding the original terms, these people said.

Members of the buyers’ group — the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan; the buyout firms Providence Equity Partners, Madison Dearborn Partners and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity; and Toronto-Dominion Bank — held several conference calls over the weekend to discuss their options. Among the possibilities is filing a lawsuit against the banks to force them to complete the deal on its original terms, these people said.

“It’s patently obvious that the banks have no intention of closing the deal,” one executive who read the revised terms said.

The story was picked up by the Globe & Mail and discussed on Financial Webring Forum.

In the day’s most predictable story:

The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan said Monday it expects its lenders to honour their commitments to finance the $35-billion takeover of BCE Inc. after the company’s share price tumbled almost 6 per cent on reports the lending group is pushing for new financing terms.

BCE spokesman Bill Fox would not comment on whether BCE has been informed about any talks between the company’s buyers and their lenders.

“We have an agreement,” Mr. Fox said. “And we have been working since the deal was signed on all aspects of getting the transaction closed, on the basis of the terms set out in the agreement.”

Desjardins has predicted a repricing of the deal five to 8.16% lower, as reported on PrefBlog May 14. Syndication of the deal has started; the last major development was the loss in court by bondholders challenging the deal.

I simply have no idea what is going to happen here. The Clear Channel precedent is sometimes cited as evidence that the deal will succeed (albeit at a lower price) but in that case, the buyers could threaten the financers with a Texas jury – notorious for awarding crippling damages against whoever has the deepest pockets in the courtroom. I will opine, however, that the deal no longer makes any sense for either the buyers or the financiers … for all their confident, lawsuit-avoiding words, they must be rather eager to pass the billion-dollar-break-fee hot potato to the banks and have done with it.

I don’t have a clue what the implications for BCE’s preferred shares are. It’s possible that the deal could be proceed with the common repriced and the preferred shareholders taken out at the original price; it’s possible that the preferreds could be marked down proportionately to the common; it’s possible that the deal could proceed as a friendly takeover of the common only, leaving the preferred shares outstanding; it’s possible that the deal could collapse completely.

It’s all speculation, not investing, and I doubt whether any of the participants has any better idea than I do at this time.

BCE has the following preferred shares outstanding: BCE.PR.A, BCE.PR.C, BCE.PR.D, BCE.PR.E, BCE.PR.F, BCE.PR.G, BCE.PR.H, BCE.PR.I, BCE.PR.R, BCE.PR.S, BCE.PR.T, BCE.PR.Y & BCE.PR.Z

Update: There’s some calming commentary from the WSJ Deal Blog:

For weeks, chatter has held that, as goes the Clear Channel buyout, so will go the BCE deal. Insofar as both involve banks and money, that may be true.

But, now that some press outlets are reporting that the BCE deal is “in peril” because the banks are fighting on the lending terms, maybe we are all older and wiser enough to realize that asking for new terms — albeit tough terms — does not constitute the death of a deal. It may be time to look at key issues that will distinguish how BCE is different from Clear Channel.

It’s quite possible– and even probable — that BCE will play out just like Clear Channel, with a lot of huffing and puffing ending in a deal everyone can live with.

May 16, 2008

May 16th, 2008

Not much today, folks!

Naked Capitalism republishes some of a piece by Gillian Tett of the Financial Times regarding the advisability of managers talking to each other; her recommendations echo those of the International Report on Risk Management Supervision and provide a little bit of psychological colour.

Iceland is in trouble! Their Central Bank has had to borrow EUR 1.5-billion to prop up the currency:

The krona has dropped as much as 26 percent against the euro this year on concern Iceland’s commercial banks have taken on too much foreign debt, prompting speculation the central bank may have to step in.

The offer of aid from neighbors “will help stabilize the financial markets, but not the basic imbalances of the Icelandic economy,” said Lars Christensen, senior emerging markets strategist at Danske Bank A/S in Copenhagen.

The country’s three biggest banks have combined assets of 11.4 trillion kronur, or nine times the size of the economy. At the biggest lender, Kaupthing Bank Hf, foreign currency holdings make up 87 percent of assets.

Meanwhile, the lines between “private equity funds” and “vulture funds” seem to be getting a little blurred:

McGoldrick, 49, was co-head of the Goldman group that buys corporate debt that is near default, lends to financially struggling businesses and trades shares of companies emerging from bankruptcy. His new firm, Mount Kellett Capital Management LP, will do transactions around the globe, said the people, who asked not to be identified because the venture is private.

Private-equity firms raised $163.5 billion in the first three months of 2008, the second-biggest quarter since London- based Private Equity Intelligence Ltd. started tracking the data in 2003. The money is coming from pension funds, endowments and sovereign wealth funds even as a shortage of credit has stopped most deal-making.

“There’s an appetite for serious distressed investors and he has a track record of having done a good job on those deals, so there will be some receptivity,” said Steven Kaplan, a finance professor at the University of Chicago’s business school.

“Private Equity” has a much nicer ring to it, doesn’t it?

Bloomberg has a good piece on the collapse of the Auction Rate Securities Markets. Amusingly – in a sick sort of way – is that the front-page link is “Auction-Rate Market Loses $1.7 Billion for Taxpayers Misled by Governments”, while the actual story headline is “Auction-Rate Collapse Costs Taxpayers $1.65 Billion”. There’s nothing that I can see in the story that would justify a charge that taxpayers were misled by governments … but in these days of heroic investor advocacy, it’s very fashionable to claim that anything not to one’s liking is unethical.

The story suggests:

Many issuers are getting out of auction-rate debt and say they will never use it again. State and local governments have already replaced or announced plans to replace at least $66 billion of the securities, according to Bloomberg data. Many are switching to variable-rate demand bonds, whose 2.25 percent average in the past month is about half the 4.56 percent for auction-rate bonds. Others are stuck, unable to issue new debt. Some investment banks, including Citigroup, say the market will never come back.

“It’s a damaged product, and I can’t imagine issuers using it again,” said Wisconsin’s Hoadley. “A lot of people will have to die and institutional memory go away before people will come back to it.”

Gallatin, the father of auction-rate securities, doesn’t hold out much hope. He expects auction-rate bonds will be replaced by other debt because too many investors and issuers lack confidence.

“The back of the market is broken,” he said. “I think the market’s problem started with credit, but now credit isn’t the problem.”

Who knows? The doomsayers may well be right, and I must be very cautious when questioning Citigroup’s opinion regarding what they can sell … but it seems to me that the market could be resurrected in the same manner as Canadian (Bank Sponsored) ABCP … slap a global liquidity guarantee on the stuff and away you go! In other words, Citigroup could underwrite such an issue, with a guarantee that it will put in a permanent bid for the entire issue at, say BAs + 500 (guaranteeing a fixed rate for 40 years might be a little dicey!).

Again, who knows? Let’s wait for things to calm down and revisit the issue in, say, five years. The basic issuers’ Holy Grail of financing long term assets at short term rates, and the basic investors’ Holy Grail of getting an extra 20bp on pretend-short-term paper will never go out of style!

The drive to get authority for the Fed to pay interest on reserve balances (discussed on May 7 and April 29) continues with Bernanke writing Pelosi:

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke asked Congress to immediately give the central bank authority to pay interest on commercial-bank reserves, according to a letter from the Fed chief to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

“Congress recognized that payment of interest on reserves would contribute to the efficiency of the financial system,” Bernanke, 54, said in a letter sent to Pelosi, a California Democrat. The central bank isn’t authorized by Congress to begin making such payments until October 2011.

“We recommend that the date be changed to make the legislation effective immediately,” Bernanke wrote in a letter dated May 13.

Performance was again nicely positive today, but volume was awful.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.78% 4.81% 48,108 15.90 1 +0.1614% 1,083.7
Fixed-Floater 4.65% 4.56% 63,598 16.15 7 +0.6011% 1,076.0
Floater 4.10% 4.15% 61,758 17.08 2 +0.8720% 919.6
Op. Retract 4.82% 2.49% 88,473 2.40 15 +0.1049% 1,056.8
Split-Share 5.25% 5.50% 70,409 4.16 13 +0.3483% 1,056.7
Interest Bearing 6.12% 6.12% 53,109 3.82 3 +0.1686% 1,107.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.89% 5.71% 135,944 4.51 9 -0.1700% 1,021.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.65% 5.69% 300,213 14.10 63 +0.1146% 927.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.6409% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.49% based on a bid of 20.38 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount (for now!) -1.1444% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.85% based on a bid of 25.05 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.0165% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 20.87 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.0526% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.89% based on a bid of 24.00 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.B Floater +1.0951%  
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.2077% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 20.95 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.2585% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 20.49 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.4851% Asset coverage of 2.0+:1 as of April 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.87% based on a bid of 10.25 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat +1.8025%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 133,020 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.76% based on a bid of 21.97 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.L PerpetualDiscount (for now!) 61,850 RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.86% based on a bid of 25.10 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount (for now!) 53,100 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.08. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 25.08 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 38,140 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 24.12 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 17,800 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.70% based on a bid of 25.00 and a limitMaturity.

There were seven other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

BNA.PR.A, BNA.PR.B, BNA.PR.C Dividends Declared

May 16th, 2008

I wouldn’t normally post on such a routine matter as dividend declarations, but having made an issue of the matter I will note that dividends for these issues have been declared.

ex-Date: 5/20
record-Date: 5/22
pay-Date: 6/7

IIAC 1Q08 Issuance Report

May 16th, 2008

The IIAC has issued its 1Q08 Review of Equity New Issues and Trading, noting:

Preferred share issues were one of the brighter spots in the quarter – increasing by 17% from last quarter and raising $1.1 billion in capital on just seven offerings. This is attributed to financial institutions re-strengthening their capital base (Chart 4).

They report that the $1.1-billion in seven issues is down 56.5% by dollar value and 50% by number from 1Q07. I have previously suggested that heavy issuance in 1H07 was at least partly responsible for 2007’s horrible performance.

Hat tip: Streetwise Blog.

Canadian ABCP : Almost, But Campbell Procrastinates

May 16th, 2008

The Globe and Mail reports:

Ontario Superior Court Justice Colin Campbell had promised this week after two days of hearings to rule as soon as possible, but said in an endorsement issued Friday afternoon that he is not prepared to make a decision without further information.

“I am not satisfied that the release proposed as part of the plan, which is broad enough to encompass release from fraud, is in the circumstances of this case at this time properly authorized by the CCAA, or is necessarily fair and reasonable,” he wrote. “I simply do not have sufficient facts at this time on which to reach a conclusion one way or another.”

The delay puts at risk the nine-month-long restructuring process, because banks that are backing the plan to swap the frozen notes for new bonds have said they will walk away without the releases.

But the judge said that if he lets the plan go ahead with the releases there’s a chance it will fall apart later because it may not “stand up to the scrutiny of being within the jurisdiction of the court within the CCAA.” Because of that, he wants the parties to come up with a solution for the fraud issue by May 30.

“In my view, within the spirit of the CCAA there is an urgent need for, and there can be a solution by which, the plan can be approved,” he wrote.

There’s a lot going on here that I don’t understand. If the Canadian banks are threatening to walk away without the release, what has the committee done to line up other banks? I was under the – possibly mistaken – impression that the advisor to the Committee, Morgan Stanley, was willing to backstop the lines all along. Surely, for a sufficient fee, a few major world banks would be willing to extend the required line of credit.

DBRS Affirms GWO Ratings After Lengthy Review

May 16th, 2008

DBRS has announced:

has today confirmed the ratings on Great-West Lifeco (GWO or the Company) and its affiliated operating subsidiaries at current levels with Stable trends. The ratings on GWO are no longer Under Review with Developing Implications where they were placed on February 1, 2007 with the announcement that GWO was making a largely debt-financed US$3.9 billion acquisition of Putnam Investments Trust (Putnam).

Over the past year, the Company has made significant progress in reducing the debt incurred to acquire Putnam. Most notably, in November 2007, GWO announced the sale, which closed on April 1, of its U.S. health-care business with almost $1.6 billion in cash proceeds being made available to pay down outstanding credit facilities. In addition, the Company has also issued $1 billion of innovative subordinated debentures, the proceeds of which have been used to retire the bridge financing facilities. Giving some equity treatment to the hybrid subordinated debt issues, DBRS calculates a reported double leverage, pro forma the sale of the U.S. health care segment, which is not significantly higher than that of its peers. While Great-West Lifeco continues to be more aggressively capitalized than its peers at the holding company level, debt-service coverage remains adequate for the rating on a consolidated basis and on a cash flow basis at the holding company level. However, DBRS observes that the Company’s financial flexibility is currently impaired by relatively high financial leverage and the intense use of innovative debt instruments. Should financial leverage increase from current levels, the ratings on the Company are likely to come under downward pressure.

The existing ratings for the Company and its operating subsidiaries reflect the contribution from a diversified portfolio of businesses, including leading market shares across the Canadian insurance industry and attractive market niches in Europe, in the U.S. financial services market and in reinsurance. Although it accounts for a relatively small portion of the total earnings, Putnam should, in the long run, represent an attractive opportunity in the wealth management space given its entrenched distribution network of independent financial advisors, even though current market developments and lagging fund performance has recently reduced Putnam’s level of assets under management (AUM) and reduced prospects for an early recovery. DBRS believes that the Putnam acquisition has better strategic fit and is more complementary with the Company’s chosen strategy than the U.S. healthcare platform.

As an integral component of the Power Financial group of companies, the Company benefits from its parent’s implicit financial support and its strong governance and risk management controls and procedures.

The financing of the Putnam purchase has been previously discussed, as was the DBRS response to the purchase itself.

GWO has the following direct issues outstanding: GWO.PR.E, GWO.PR.F, GWO.PR.G, GWO.PR.H, GWO.PR.I & GWO.PR.X, all of which remain at Pfd-1(low). S&P has rated them P-1(low) all along.

Related issuers are POW, PWF & CL.

May 15, 2008

May 15th, 2008

I’m becoming more and more convinced that the Credit Crunch has evolved from its fundamental role as Reducer of Excesses to a new position as Political Football.

My thoughts on this are influenced by many things. For instance, compare the sub-prime credit loss estimates of the Bank of England with those of the IMF. These estimates are, as has been noted, not just wildly at variance with each other, but prepared without even taking note of each other. For all my respect for these two institutions, this smacks of intellectual dishonesty – and in my book, there is no greater crime.

Quite frankly, I believe the methodology of the IMF report (which leaned heavily on the paper by Greenlaw et al.) to be deeply flawed; and not just deeply flawed but deliberately skewed. So why would the IMF adopt it? They have a lot of smart people on staff; I won’t be the only person in the world to have noticed the dicey bits; why was this methodology used holus-bolus instead of simply providing the top end of a range of estimates?

My hypothesis is that it’s simply politics. The two basic factions in the investment world are those who want lots of regulation to save us from the evil Bonfire of the Vanities and those who feel that over-regulation is simply promoting inefficiency of the capital markets. These opposing forces are not comprised exclusively of idealogically pure crusaders, either! In Canada, for instance, the banks can be counted upon to promote wise regulation, not too much, not too little …. as long as whatever happens favours capital markets players who have deep, deep pockets.

There will be members of both factions on staff at the IMF, and at any regulatory group or ultimately responsibile government. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose, in general things proceed in an ultimately half-way reasonable manner, albeit with one step back for each two steps forward. Forecasting the effects of regulation is no easier than forecasting markets … and at least when you attempt to forecast the market you have a pretty good idea of your ultimate objective!

The hard-liners in either faction are never satisfied, however – and the more cynical players, taking whatever position best serves their business will always be looking for more. Thus, every development in the capital markets is carefully examined to determine its value as a weapon in the struggle.

Canadian ABCP? It’s been used to justify a call for higher pay for regulators, to justify calls for the OSFI to expand its mandate to ensure nobody ever loses money on anything and to justify a federal regulator. The Bank of Canada has brought forth some rules to ensure that the banks never again have to worry about competition in the ABCP market from snot-nosed small corporation scum.

And so it is with Bear Stearns. I wrote about the Econbrowser post yesterday. The Econbrowser piece wanted Bernanke (i.e., the Fed) to Do Something about leverage in the brokerage industry … which is not the Fed’s purview at all, it’s in the SEC’s bailiwick. There was a note from Dave Altig of the Atlanta Fed in the Econbrowser comments, drawing attention to the Fed’s preventative measures … and still, not a word about the SEC. You can find inumerable instances of hand-wringing on the web, bewailing the fact that the Fed is (sort-of) forced to backstop a system over which it has no direct supervisory function – although, as I have pointed out, separation of lending/monetary functions and bank supervision functions are more standard throughout the world than otherwise.

The more I think about it, the more convinced I am that most of the discussion of Bear Stearns has absolutely nothing to do with a genuine desire for better regulation (you want more margin and less leverage? OK, how much more margin and how much less leverage? Let’s discuss it!) and a lot more to do with a desire to change the identities of the regulators. It’s a world-wide bureaucratic turf fight; the credit crunch, sub-prime and Bear Stearns are merely the latest weapons of convenience.

For the record, my position at the moment is that supervisory responsibility for the brokerage sector should remain with the SEC. Assiduous Readers will by now be sick and tired of reading this, but I believe the brokerages should represent a riskier and less constrained layer surrounding a banking core in the financial system. If the Central Bank has supervisory functions, there will be both a higher degree of expectation of emergency assistance in times of stress and a higher probability as well, since staff at the Central Bank – however upright and angelic their characters – will be somewhat more inclined to double-down with assistance from the discount window than to admit a possible failure of regulation and let an insolvent firm go bankrupt.

I might work this up into a formal article at some point. Remember, you read it on PrefBlog first!

As remarked by Accrued Interest, now that reports are increasing that the credit crunch is over and companies might actually be able to pay back some money, there are also growing concerns that the money we get might not be worth very much:

Bernanke and San Francisco Fed President Janet Yellen, in separate speeches yesterday, said markets remain “far from normal” after some improvement since March. Yellen, Cleveland Fed President Sandra Pianalto, Kansas City Fed President Thomas Hoenig and the Dallas Fed’s Richard Fisher said they’re concerned about rising prices.

Yellen, 61, who doesn’t vote on rates this year, also said she anticipates consumer prices will moderate as the labor market weakens and “commodity prices level off.”

The Fed can’t be “complacent about inflation,” she told the CFA Institute Annual Conference. Recent measures of price expectations “highlight the risk that our attempts to deal with problems in the real economy could lead to higher inflation expectations and an erosion of our credibility,” she said.

Fisher, speaking in Midland, Texas, said the U.S. may be in for a “prolonged” period of slow growth, which may end with faster-than-desirable inflation.

“How deep that slowdown will be is a question mark,” said Fisher, who voted against the last three rate cuts. “I am not sure it will be very deep at all, but it may be prolonged, because we have to correct the excesses of this credit crisis.”

Naked Capitalism notes a post by Willem Buiter, who burnishes his monetarist credentials:

In a fiat money world, central banks cause inflation, or, more precisely, only central banks are resposible for inflation. Other shocks, real and nominal, can influence the general price level if the central bank does not respond swiftly and determinedly, but these non-central bank-induced changes in the general price level can always be offset by the central bank, given enough time, freedom to act and courage.

But, in the medium and long term (at horizons of two years and over, say) central banks choose the average rate of inflation. Not globalisation; not indirect taxes; not bad harvests; not OPEC and the price of oil; not the Chinese and their exchange rate management. There is no oil inflation, food inflation or cost-push inflation. There is just inflation. Inflation may be accompanied by changes in key relative prices – in the real prices of oil, of food, of oil and of labour for instance – if other relative demand and supply shocks accompany the inflationary impulses created by the central bank. Large increases in the real price of food will be bad news to food importers (including most urban households) and good news to rural food producers and exporters. But don’t confuse it with inflation.

In the petty annoyances department, Andrew Willis discusses the Sprott IPO:

Brokers are using the “anonymous” function on the TSX to do much of their selling, with 1.5 million shares sold this way. Disguising orders by not disclosing the name of the brokerage house doing the transaction fits that segment of the hedge fund and dealer crowd that prefers to be discreet. Dealers are sensitive to the issue of flipping an IPO from a money manager who also counts as a major trading client.

Does Mr. Willis know or care that it would be grossly unethical for Sprott to allow annoyance with IPO selling to influence – in any way – its trading with client money?

From Prefblog’s Out-of-time-here’s-the-links Department:

Floaters finally had a bad day … they are now up a mere 8.26% on the month.

BNS issues did well:

BNS Straight Perpetuals
Prices & Performance
5/15
Issue Bid Yield Day’s Return
BNS.PR.L 20.70 5.49% +0.7299%
BNS.PR.M 20.80 5.46% +1.2165%
BNS.PR.K 21.91 5.53% +0.7356%
BNS.PR.N 24.01 5.51% +1.7373%
BNS.PR.J 24.42 5.34% +1.2858%
BNS.PR.O 25.12 5.61% 0.0000%

In general, volume dropped off a little, but it was a very strong day.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.83% 4.86% 48,893 15.81 1 0.0000% 1,081.9
Fixed-Floater 4.67% 4.61% 63,642 16.08 7 -0.0175% 1,069.6
Floater 4.14% 4.18% 61,665 17.01 2 -0.4926% 911.7
Op. Retract 4.82% 2.53% 89,447 2.59 15 +0.0724% 1,055.7
Split-Share 5.26% 5.55% 70,913 4.15 13 +0.0620% 1,053.1
Interest Bearing 6.13% 6.09% 52,905 3.81 3 0.0000% 1,105.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.88% 5.10% 139,428 4.38 9 +0.1151% 1,022.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.65% 5.69% 304,062 13.88 63 +0.3378% 926.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.0345%  
WFS.PR.A SplitShare +1.1000% Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of May 8, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.12% based on a bid of 10.11 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.1416% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 22.15 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +1.2165% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 20.80 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.2500% Asset coverage of just under 3.2:1 as of April 30, according to the company. The ex-date of the current dividend is not yet known. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.57% based on a bid of 21.06 cum dividend and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.2858% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 24.42 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.7373% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 24.42 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.3210% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 20.72 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
FTS.PR.E Scraps (Would be OpRet, but there are credit concerns) 200,000 CIBC crossed two lots of 100,000 shares each at 25.45. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.67% based on a bid of 25.38 and a softMaturity 2016-8-31 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 198,300 Nesbitt bought 77,100 from National Bank at 21.90, TD crossed 50,000 at 21.91, then TD crossed another 40,000 at 21.91. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.56% based on a bid of 21.90 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount 92,638 CIBC crossed 35,000 at 24.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 24.20 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 64,995 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 20.13 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 58,235 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 54,725 Desjardins crossed 15,000 at 20.85, then Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 21.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 20.86 and a limitMaturity.

There were nineteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.