Archive for February, 2009

New Issue: MFC Fixed-Resets 6.60%+456

Tuesday, February 24th, 2009

Fresh from denying speculation regardng a common equity raise, Manulife Financial has entered into a bought-deal arrangement to issue Fixed-Resets:

Issue: Non-Cumulative Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series 4

Size: 8-million shares (=$200-million). Greenshoe for another 3-million shares (=$75-million) exercisable up to two days prior to closing.

Dividends: Fixed rate 6.60% (=$1.65 p.a.) until first Exchange Date; 5-Year Canadas +456bp thereafter, reset every Exchange Date. Floaters pay 3-month bills +456bp, reset quarterly. First Dividend $0.48370 payable 2009-6-19, based on Closing Date.

Exchange: Every Exchange Date to and from Series 5 (“Floaters”).

Exchange Date: June 19, 2014, and every five years thereafter.

Redemption: Every Exchange Data at $25.00. Floaters are also redeemable at $25.50 at all other times.

Closing Date: March 4, 2009

Update: MFC press release.

Update, 2009-2-26: Selling like hotcakes!

Manulife Financial Corporation (“Manulife”) today announced that as a result of strong investor demand for its previously announced Canadian public offering of Non-cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series 4 (“Series 4 Preferred Shares”), the size of the offering has been increased to 14 million shares. The gross proceeds of the offering will now be $350 million. The offering will be underwritten by a syndicate of investment dealers led by RBC Capital Markets and CIBC World Markets and is anticipated to qualify as Tier 1 capital for Manulife. The expected closing date for the offering is March 4, 2009.

Manulife has also granted the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part at any time up to 48 hours prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional four million Series 4 Preferred Shares. The maximum gross proceeds raised under the offering will be $450 million should this option be exercised in full. Manulife intends to file a prospectus supplement to its March 12, 2007 base shelf prospectus in respect of this issue.

The net proceeds of the offering will be used primarily for general corporate purposes and the balance will be used to reduce the amount outstanding under Manulife’s credit facility with Canadian banks.

ABK.PR.B: Miniscule Call for Redemption

Tuesday, February 24th, 2009

Allbanc Split Corp. has announced:

it has called 1,600 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on March 10, 2009 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 0.125% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 46,300 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on March 9, 2009 will have approximately 0.125% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $26.75 per share.

Holders of Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including March 10, 2009.

ABK.PR.B was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it revised the policy on Capital Unit dividends. ABK.PR.B is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

MFC.PR.A / MFC.PR.B / MFC.PR.C Downgraded to P-1(low) by S&P

Tuesday, February 24th, 2009

Standard & Poors has announced:

it lowered its ratings on Toronto-based Manulife Financial Corp. (TSX: MFC; Manulife Financial) and all of its rated operating companies by one notch.

All of these operating insurance companies now have long-term counterparty credit and financial strength ratings of ‘AA+’. The counterparty credit rating on Manulife Financial is ‘AA-‘. The outlook is stable.

“In our opinion, the downgrade reflects the decline and ongoing volatility of the global equity markets, the resultant impact on earnings, reserves, capital and financial leverage, and the company’s reduced level of financial flexibility,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Donald Chu. Currently, equity markets are down almost halfway from their peak in the major markets where Manulife competes. While we believe that Manulife Financial has done relatively well managing itself through an equity market tail event, we believe the increased earnings and capital volatility are not consistent with the previous ‘AAA’ rating.

The previous mention of these issues on PrefBlog was on Dec. 2, 2008, when S&P affirmed the ratings with a negative outlook. MFC’s 4Q08 Results were briefly reported on PrefBlog.

All three issues are tracked by HIMIPref™. MFC.PR.A is a member of the OperatingRetractible sub-index; MFC.PR.B & MFC.PR.C are members of the PerpetualDiscount index.

Research: Bond Characteristics

Monday, February 23rd, 2009

This is the inaugural essay in a new column for Canadian Moneysaver under the general heading of Gentlemen Prefer Bonds.

Look for the Research Link!

Remember … Bonds. James: Bonds.

February 23, 2009

Monday, February 23rd, 2009

The Fed has announced:

a new section of its website expanding the information provided about the policy tools the Federal Reserve has employed to address the financial crisis and simplifying access to that information.

The website section–“Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet”–presents a wide range of material, including a detailed explanation of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet; descriptions of all of the Federal Reserve’s liquidity and credit facilities; discussion of the Federal Reserve’s risk-management practices; information on the types and amounts of collateral being pledged at the various lending facilities; and an extensive set of links to congressional reports and other resources.

The new section of the Board’s website can be accessed at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst.htm.

There has also been a Treasury, FDIC, OCC, OTS & the Fed regarding yet another iteration of TARP:

“We announced on February 10, 2009, a Capital Assistance Program to ensure that our banking institutions are appropriately capitalized, with high-quality capital. Under this program, which will be initiated on February 25, the capital needs of the major U.S. banking institutions will be evaluated under a more challenging economic environment. Should that assessment indicate that an additional capital buffer is warranted, institutions will have an opportunity to turn first to private sources of capital. Otherwise, the temporary capital buffer will be made available from the government. This additional capital does not imply a new capital standard and it is not expected to be maintained on an ongoing basis. Instead, it is available to provide a cushion against larger than expected future losses, should they occur due to a more severe economic environment, and to support lending to creditworthy borrowers. Any government capital will be in the form of mandatory convertible preferred shares, which would be converted into common equity shares only as needed over time to keep banks in a well-capitalized position and can be retired under improved financial conditions before the conversion becomes mandatory. Previous capital injections under the Troubled Asset Relief Program will also be eligible to be exchanged for the mandatory convertible preferred shares. The conversion feature will enable institutions to maintain or enhance the quality of their capital.

Rather than the either/or choice envisaged in the release, I would rather see a system whereby Treasury backstopped a public offering of the securites. There’s a lot of private capital that would love to get involved if it could invest on the same terms as the government.

Yet another proposal for resolution of the credit crisis has come forward … but I don’t think it will find a lot of political support!

Creating a “bad bank” or “aggregator bank” that would use federal funds to acquire and warehouse the assets, as some have proposed, would be costly for taxpayers and require too much government interference, say two experts on distressed securities who have pitched an alternative plan to officials.

John Ryding, chief economist at RDQ Economics LLC in New York, and Matt Chasin, chief operating officer of Sorin Capital Management LLC, a Stamford, Connecticut-based hedge fund that manages about $1 billion, say the Treasury Department should provide loans at commercial rates to investors for up to 50 percent of the purchase price of securities. The financing would be for as long as the maturities of the assets being acquired.

“One of the problems the banks have been facing is that the markets have forced artificially low prices on these assets because there’s not enough financing available for buyers,” said Ryding, 51, a former Federal Reserve economist who advises hedge funds. “There’s a lot of capital looking for distressed assets, if hedge funds can get good financing.”

Along similar lines, the Bank of Canada is adding corporate bonds to the acceptable collateral list for Term PRAs. The lowest rated, longest term bonds accepted, A- & 10+ years, will be subject to a 15% haircut.

Whoosh! Prefs got hammered today – particularly PerpetualDiscounts and SplitShares – as common equity got hammered:

Canadian stocks fell, driving the Standard & Poor’s/TSX Composite Index to the lowest level since 2003, as worse-than-estimated retail sales signaled the recession is deepening while oil and metal prices retreated.

Canadian retail sales fell 5.4 percent in December, the most since January 1991 and twice the average economist estimate, as consumers curtailed spending on cars, building supplies and clothes, Statistics Canada said today in Ottawa. Bank of Canada Senior Deputy Governor Paul Jenkins said 2009 will be a difficult year for the Canadian economy, reiterating the central bank’s forecast that the economy will shrink 1.2 percent.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.25 % 3.67 % 23,725 18.02 2 -0.0766 % 858.6
FixedFloater 7.36 % 6.91 % 73,384 14.00 7 0.2235 % 1,364.6
Floater 5.08 % 4.24 % 27,462 16.95 4 0.0242 % 1,034.2
OpRet 5.24 % 4.96 % 138,801 3.97 15 -0.0203 % 2,051.8
SplitShare 6.95 % 12.99 % 67,097 3.97 15 -1.1647 % 1,609.3
Interest-Bearing 7.49 % 11.34 % 33,939 0.81 2 -3.7102 % 1,888.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.0310 % 1,519.5
Perpetual-Discount 7.09 % 7.17 % 179,201 12.31 71 -1.0310 % 1,399.5
FixedReset 6.09 % 5.76 % 568,683 13.86 27 -0.3924 % 1,807.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FIG.PR.A Interest-Bearing -7.59 % Asset coverage of 1.0+:1 as of February 20, based on Capital units at $0.39 and 0.53 Capital Units per preferred.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.70
Bid-YTW : 15.37 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -5.77 % It’s about time somebody noticed how expensive the Royal issues are! This is a real, albeit fragile, decline: 6,230 shares traded in a range of 20.07-21.74 before closing at 20.09-21.22 (!), 5×3.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 20.09
Evaluated at bid price : 20.09
Bid-YTW : 7.10 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -5.48 % This one is not quite so real; it was simply that the bids disappeared. Traded 1,975 shares in a range of 21.00-16 before closing at 20.01-21.70 (!), 11×3.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 20.01
Evaluated at bid price : 20.01
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare -5.03 % Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of February 13 according to the company. An absence of bids! Traded 1,000 shares in a range of 7.56-75 before closing at 7.36-74, 1×2.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.36
Bid-YTW : 14.89 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -5.00 % Vanishing bids! Traded 3,210 shares in a range of 16.50-17.26 before closing at 16.16-95, 3×5.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 16.16
Evaluated at bid price : 16.16
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -4.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 15.13
Evaluated at bid price : 15.13
Bid-YTW : 7.94 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -4.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 16.20
Evaluated at bid price : 16.20
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -4.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 16.08
Evaluated at bid price : 16.08
Bid-YTW : 7.81 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -3.34 % Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of February 12, according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.11
Bid-YTW : 9.70 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -3.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 7.70
Evaluated at bid price : 7.70
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -3.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 16.66
Evaluated at bid price : 16.66
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -2.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 14.32
Evaluated at bid price : 14.32
Bid-YTW : 7.86 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -2.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 16.52
Evaluated at bid price : 16.52
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -2.81 % Asset coverage of 1.9-:1 as of January 31, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 11.08
Bid-YTW : 15.66 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -2.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 13.66
Evaluated at bid price : 13.66
Bid-YTW : 8.88 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -2.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 15.05
Evaluated at bid price : 15.05
Bid-YTW : 7.50 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -2.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 18.51
Evaluated at bid price : 18.51
Bid-YTW : 7.54 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 7.50 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset -2.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 21.79
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -2.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 19.22
Evaluated at bid price : 19.22
Bid-YTW : 7.28 %
FTN.PR.A SplitShare -2.31 % Asset coverage of 1.2-:1 as of February 13, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.76
Bid-YTW : 12.72 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 15.22
Evaluated at bid price : 15.22
Bid-YTW : 7.81 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset -2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 16.79
Evaluated at bid price : 16.79
Bid-YTW : 7.58 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset -1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 20.78
Evaluated at bid price : 20.78
Bid-YTW : 7.30 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 17.40
Evaluated at bid price : 17.40
Bid-YTW : 7.04 %
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -1.74 % Asset coverage of 0.9+:1 as of February 19, according to TD Securities.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.20
Bid-YTW : 25.01 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 7.44 %
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.50 % Asset coverage of 1.0+:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 5.91
Bid-YTW : 16.85 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 12.71
Evaluated at bid price : 12.71
Bid-YTW : 9.60 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 20.41
Evaluated at bid price : 20.41
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 24.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
SBC.PR.A SplitShare -1.30 % Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of February 19, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-11-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.60
Bid-YTW : 13.95 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare -1.28 % Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of February 13, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.70
Bid-YTW : 13.06 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 16.06
Evaluated at bid price : 16.06
Bid-YTW : 7.72 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 23.54
Evaluated at bid price : 23.81
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.10
Bid-YTW : 10.37 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 14.55
Evaluated at bid price : 14.55
Bid-YTW : 7.65 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.57
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 16.01
Evaluated at bid price : 16.01
Bid-YTW : 7.09 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 23.71
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 19.55
Evaluated at bid price : 19.55
Bid-YTW : 7.46 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 17.75
Evaluated at bid price : 17.75
Bid-YTW : 7.68 %
BCE.PR.Z FixedFloater 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.99
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 45.12
Evaluated at bid price : 47.01
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %
BCE.PR.F FixedFloater 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.50
Bid-YTW : 7.13 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 7.34 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 13.20
Evaluated at bid price : 13.20
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 22.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
FTN.PR.A SplitShare 107,200 RBC bought twol lots from Nesbitt at 6.94; the first for 15,600 shares, the second for 25,000.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.76
Bid-YTW : 12.72 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 86,000 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 22.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 22.51
Evaluated at bid price : 22.71
Bid-YTW : 6.64 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 70,027 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 68,064 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 63,012 Nesbitt crossed 33,300 at 14.90; Scotia crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-23
Maturity Price : 14.71
Evaluated at bid price : 14.71
Bid-YTW : 7.57 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 48,895 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

US Corporate Bond Spreads: Taxation Effects

Saturday, February 21st, 2009

An interesting paper by Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber, Deepak Agrawal & Christoper Mann, Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds. The authors’ thesis is:

Spreads in rates between corporate and government bonds differ across rating classes and should be positive for each rating class for the following reasons:
1. Expected default loss—some corporate bonds will default and investors require a higher promised payment to compensate for the expected loss from defaults.
2. Tax premium—interest payments on corporate bonds are taxed at the state level whereas interest payments on government bonds are not.
3. Risk premium—The return on corporate bonds is riskier than the return on government bonds, and investors should require a premium for the higher risk. As we will show, this occurs because a large part of the risk on corporate bonds is systematic rather than diversifiable.

… and they conclude …

Several findings are of particular interest. The ratings of corporate bonds, whether provided by Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s, provide material information about spot rates. However, only a small part of the spread between corporate and treasuries and the difference in spreads on bonds with different ratings is explained by the expected default loss. For example, for 10-year A-rated industrials, expected loss from default accounts for only 17.8
percent of the spread.

Differential taxes are a more important influence on spreads. Taxes account for a significantly larger portion of the differential between corporate and treasuries than do expected losses. For example, for 10-year A-rated bonds, taxes accounted for 36.1 percent of the difference compared to the 17.8 percent accounted for by expected loss. State and local taxes are important because they are paid on the entire coupon of corporate bonds, not just on the difference in coupon between corporate and treasuries. Despite the importance of the state and local taxes in explaining return differentials, their impact has been ignored in almost all prior studies of corporate rates.

Even after we account for the impact of default and taxes, there still remains a large part of the differential between corporate and treasuries that remains unexplained. In the case of 10-year corporates, 46.17 percent of the difference is unexplained by taxes or expected default. We have shown that the vast majority of this difference is compensation for systematic risk and is affected by the same influences that affect systematic risks in the stock market. Making use of the Fama–French factors, we show that as much as 85 percent of that part of the spread that is not accounted for by taxes and expected default can be explained as a reward for bearing systematic risk.

The assumption embedded in their argument is that the marginal US corporate bond buyer is taxable.

The authors claim:

Because the marginal tax rate used to price bonds should be a weighted average of the active traders, we assume that a maximum marginal tax rate would be approximately the midpoint of the range of maximum state taxes, or 7.5 percent. In almost all states, state tax for financial institutions (the main holder of bonds) is paid on income subject to federal tax. Thus, if interest is subject to maximum state rates, it must also be subject to maximum federal tax, and we assume the maximum federal tax rate of 35 percent.

February 20, 2009

Friday, February 20th, 2009

Bernanke gave a speech to the National Press Club dismissing concerns about the Fed’s credit risk:

for the great bulk of Fed lending, the credit risks are extremely low. The provision of short-term credit to financial institutions–our traditional function–exposes the Federal Reserve to minimal credit risk, as the loans we make to financial institutions are generally short-term, overcollateralized, and made with recourse to the borrowing firm. In the case of the liquidity swaps, the foreign central banks are responsible for repaying the Federal Reserve, not the financial institutions that ultimately receive the funds, and the Fed receives an equivalent amount of foreign currency in exchange for the dollars it provides foreign central banks. The Treasury stands behind the debt and other securities issued by the GSEs.

Our special lending programs have also been set up to minimize our credit risk. The largest program, the commercial paper funding facility, accepts only the most highly rated paper. It also charges borrowers a premium, which is set aside against possible losses. And the TALF, the facility that will lend against securities backed by consumer and small business loans, is a joint Federal Reserve-Treasury program, as I mentioned, and capital provided by the Treasury will help insulate the Federal Reserve from credit losses.

The transactions we undertook to prevent the systemically destabilizing failures of Bear Stearns and AIG, which, as I noted, make up about 5 percent of our balance sheet, carry more risk than our traditional activities. But we intend, over time, to sell the assets acquired in those transactions in a way that maximizes the return to taxpayers, and we expect to recover the credit we have extended.

Not much meat on those bones, but at least he’s putting his name on the claims!

Biovail’s lawsuit against short sellers has been dismissed:

A federal judge threw out a Biovail Corp. shareholder lawsuit against a group of hedge funds including SAC Capital Advisors LP in which investors in the Canadian drugmaker accused them of driving down its share price.

The Biovail shareholders had accused SAC of helping “ghostwrite” negative and false analyst reports in 2003 and 2004 to lower the share price after the Stamford, Connecticut- based hedge fund manager took short positions in the stock. Short sellers borrow shares in anticipation of making a profit by paying for them after the price drops.

In March 2008 the company agreed to pay $10 million to settle Securities and Exchange Commission charges that it lied to investors to boost its share price in 2003 and 2004. In January the drugmaker agreed to pay $5.4 million to settle the same charges with the Ontario Securities Commission.

Biovail also pleaded guilty to criminal charges of paying doctors in 2002 and 2003 to buy Cardizem. It was fined $24.6 million.

Strong companies respond to criticism with a sigh and a press release. Adults too, for that matter.

Easy come, easy go:

As recently as October 2007, Barron’s magazine ranked Highland CDO Opportunity third among the top 50 hedge funds, with an average annual return of 44.12 percent during the three-year period ended that June. Its fortunes reversed last year, as the securities it invests in, known as collateralized debt obligations, plunged in value amid the credit crunch and downgrades by ratings firms.

The fund became insolvent after assets values were eroded by “the unprecedented market volatility and disruption to the financial system, and the market for structured products assets in particular,” Highland Capital said in the letter, a copy of which was provided by an investor to Bloomberg News. Assets were valued at $361.6 million, according to a June 2008 regulatory filing.

OSFI is increasing required derivatives disclosures:

Banks, authorized foreign banks in respect of their business in Canada – foreign bank branches (FBBs), bank holding companies, trust and loan companies, life insurance companies and insurance holding companies should disclose the positive replacement cost, credit equivalent amount and the risk-weighted equivalent by class of derivative instrument.

An improvement, but basically cosmetic. I consider disclosure by class of counterparty (credit strength, degree of collateralization) to be much more important.

I’m of two minds about the Olympics. On the one hand, they’re egregiously expensive and nowadays should be awarded for two successive events; so that at least the velodrome and bobsled track get used more than once. On the other had, the one in Vancouver is countercyclical with a vengeance:

DBRS has today downgraded the Long-Term Debt rating of the City of Vancouver (the City or Vancouver) to AA from AA (high). The trend is now Negative.

On February 18, 2009, the City announced it had secured a $400 million revolving line of credit, $90 million of which has so far been used to buy out the original lender to the project along with $240 million from reserves. Additionally, $134 million in construction advances have been made to the developer by the City since September 2008. This brings Vancouver’s total investment in the project to $464 million, leaving more than $400 million in additional funding required to complete the project by the November 2009 deadline.

Trouble is, it’s just dumb luck that we actually need stimulus right now – they made the committment in 2003 – five years after becoming the official Canadian contender.

HSBC Bank Canada has announced financials for the year ended 2008-12-31 that look pretty good:

The bank’s Tier 1 and overall capital ratios calculated in accordance with the new framework were 10.1 per cent and 12.5 per cent respectively

The total allowance for credit losses, as a percentage of loans and acceptances outstanding, was 1.24 per cent at 31 December 2008 compared with 1.09 per cent at 30 September 2008 and 1.03 per cent at 31 December 2007.

Full financials are not yet available.

Everybody sold preferreds to buy gold today:

Gold futures for April delivery rose $25.70, or 2.6 percent, to $1,002.20 an ounce on the New York Mercantile Exchange’s Comex division. Earlier the price touched $1,007.70, the highest since March 18. Gold, the only metal to advance in 2008, has rallied annually since 2000 and is up 13 percent this year.

Global stocks extended an eight-session slide, erasing 54 percent of their market value since the start of last year on concern that the economic slump may worsen and wipe out corporate earnings.

Splits got hit especially hard, not surprising because many of them now have direct downside exposure to the underlying equities and many others are getting close. It will be most interesting to check back in a few years and see what this episode has done to the split-share market.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.25 % 3.68 % 23,390 18.00 2 -0.1274 % 859.3
FixedFloater 7.37 % 6.87 % 74,082 13.97 7 -0.8676 % 1,361.6
Floater 5.08 % 4.24 % 28,662 16.96 4 0.0484 % 1,034.0
OpRet 5.24 % 4.96 % 140,036 3.98 15 -0.1948 % 2,052.3
SplitShare 6.87 % 12.62 % 67,338 3.98 15 -2.2029 % 1,628.3
Interest-Bearing 7.21 % 10.19 % 33,525 0.82 2 -1.3364 % 1,960.8
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.8543 % 1,535.4
Perpetual-Discount 7.01 % 7.13 % 180,202 12.37 71 -0.8543 % 1,414.0
FixedReset 6.06 % 5.72 % 575,520 13.94 27 -0.1935 % 1,814.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -7.80 % Traded 15,235 shares in a range of 8.14-10 before closing at 8.39-01, 5×1. Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of February 12 according to Mulvihill. YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.39
Bid-YTW : 8.96 %
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -5.21 % Traded 6,500 shares in a range of 6.25-31 before closing at 6.00-25, 10×9.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.00
Bid-YTW : 16.47 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -4.98 % Whoosh! Traded 18,040 shares in a range of 19.50-20.60 before settling at 19.46-00, 23×10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 19.46
Evaluated at bid price : 19.46
Bid-YTW : 7.52 %
BCE.PR.F FixedFloater -4.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.31
Bid-YTW : 7.25 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -4.36 % Asset coverage of 1.9+:1 as of January 31, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 11.40
Bid-YTW : 15.21 %
ALB.PR.A SplitShare -4.25 % Oopsy-daisy! Asset coverage of 1.0:1 as of February 19, according to Scotia. Looks like the capital unit holders dividend will be halted.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.91
Bid-YTW : 20.26 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -4.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 17.70
Evaluated at bid price : 17.70
Bid-YTW : 7.52 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -4.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 7.69 %
DFN.PR.A SplitShare -3.64 % Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.20
Bid-YTW : 9.51 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -3.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 17.93
Evaluated at bid price : 17.93
Bid-YTW : 7.59 %
DF.PR.A SplitShare -3.18 % Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.92
Bid-YTW : 10.26 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -3.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 19.07
Evaluated at bid price : 19.07
Bid-YTW : 7.31 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -3.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 17.27
Evaluated at bid price : 17.27
Bid-YTW : 7.39 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare -3.11 % Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.80
Bid-YTW : 12.62 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -2.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 17.15
Evaluated at bid price : 17.15
Bid-YTW : 7.42 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 19.47
Evaluated at bid price : 19.47
Bid-YTW : 7.32 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -2.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 17.25
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 6.61 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -2.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 7.34 %
FIG.PR.A Interest-Bearing -2.16 % Asset coverage of 1.0+:1 as of February 10, based on Capital units at $0.72 and 0.53 Capital Units per preferred.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.25
Bid-YTW : 13.52 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 16.03
Evaluated at bid price : 16.03
Bid-YTW : 7.44 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 16.18
Evaluated at bid price : 16.18
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 17.28
Evaluated at bid price : 17.28
Bid-YTW : 7.69 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare -1.85 % Asset coverage of 1.9+:1 as of January 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 9.14 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 21.37
Evaluated at bid price : 21.37
Bid-YTW : 7.47 %
BCE.PR.Z FixedFloater -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.81
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 15.75
Evaluated at bid price : 15.75
Bid-YTW : 7.31 %
FBS.PR.B SplitShare -1.56 % Crunch! Asset coverage of 0.9+:1 as of February 19 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.31
Bid-YTW : 24.15 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.17
Bid-YTW : 8.86 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 21.16
Evaluated at bid price : 21.16
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
FTN.PR.A SplitShare -1.28 % Asset coverage of 1.2-:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.92
Bid-YTW : 12.24 %
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 44.81
Evaluated at bid price : 46.41
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 17.06
Evaluated at bid price : 17.06
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 17.18
Evaluated at bid price : 17.18
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 21.51
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 6.67 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 19.11
Evaluated at bid price : 19.11
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
PWF.PR.D OpRet -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare -1.15 % Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of February 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.75
Bid-YTW : 13.20 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 21.80
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 7.93
Evaluated at bid price : 7.93
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 7.10 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 15.15
Evaluated at bid price : 15.15
Bid-YTW : 7.59 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 7.62 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 23.96
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 15.50
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 7.36 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 17.71
Evaluated at bid price : 17.71
Bid-YTW : 6.92 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 12.45
Evaluated at bid price : 12.45
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
BCE.PR.R FixedFloater 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.51
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 12.90
Evaluated at bid price : 12.90
Bid-YTW : 9.44 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-20
Maturity Price : 16.50
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
LBS.PR.A SplitShare 3.80 % Asset coverage of 1.1+:1 as of February 19 according to Brompton.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-11-29
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.37
Bid-YTW : 13.07 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
WFS.PR.A SplitShare 214,641 RBC crossed 187,500 at 7.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-06-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.62
Bid-YTW : 18.73 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 129,629 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 66,320 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 64,203 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 39,100 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
FBS.PR.B SplitShare 35,669 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.31
Bid-YTW : 24.15 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Seminar Registration Now On-Line

Friday, February 20th, 2009

I am pleased to announce an enhancement to the PrefLetter Website.

As previously announced, I will be presenting a series of seminars on Preferred Share investing; each seminar will focus on a particular kind of issue, presenting analytical techniques, indicators for potential trades and current examples. I’ll be looking for feedback regarding topics and approaches of interest … one puzzle, for instance, is what to do about credit analysis. You can’t talk about preferred shares without talking about credit, but how much overlap is acceptable? Will people be more irritated to sit through very similar material at each seminar, or to attend a seminar and then find out they have to attend another one devoted to credit?

Additionally, each seminar will be recorded to video for later distribution (which won’t be free, by the way!).

At any rate, it is now possible to to register and pay online, but note that I will also be taking cash and cheques (but not credit cards) at the door. Tell all your friends!

Shorting Prefs

Thursday, February 19th, 2009

What’s going on?

The other day I received an eMail from an Assiduous Reader who wrote in and said:

I follow your blog with great interest. I am a U.S. citizen who actively trades preferred securities, mainly of U.S. banks. I am interested in trading Canadian preferred stocks, but I am not sure of the implications of trading cross-country. Do you know of any resources (articles, online resources, etc) that could inform me of the issues of trading Canadian preferreds as a U.S. citizen?

… and now the thread on the BoC Review, of all things, has gone wild with discussion:

Assiduous Reader GAndreone:

Since I am familiar with the FX market I found the article very interesting. As a FX client if you trade above certain levels, order book and some limited flow information is available from your dealer.

I believe some of the same flow information is being used in the Pref market to set pricing even though volume information is available.
Short interest in pref shares appears to be the only information that is not readily available!

… to which I replied

I believe some of the same flow information is being used in the Pref market to set pricing even though volume information is available.

Definitely. This will often happen when a trader is working an order … if a client wants to sell 100,000 shares ‘sometime this week’ and there are no takers you’ll often see the market get taken down in stages until the dealer can find a buyer.

Short interest in pref shares appears to be the only information that is not readily available!

Shorting prefs is expensive since the dividend effects are large. Shorts exist, to be sure, but to nowhere near the same extent as in the equity and bond markets.

… and Assiduous Reader cowboylutrell:

Since we’re on the subject of shorting preferred shares, I’d like to know if other brokers are as restrictive as mine on that matter. Since about the beginning of October 2008, it’s been impossible for me to short any preferred share at all. This unavailability of prefs for shorting doesn’t apply only to my own account, but to all customers’ accounts at my broker.

For instance, of the roughly 4,700 stocks listed on the TSX, only 61 were shortable today at my broker’s. None of them are preferreds (they were all common stocks).

As I mentioned above, I’d be curious to find out if shorting preferred shares is still feasable at other brokers in Canada these days.

Many thanks.

… and back to A.R. GAndreone:

Cowboylutrell Says:
As I mentioned above, I’d be curious to find out if shorting preferred shares is still feasable at other brokers in Canada these days.

RBC Direct indicated they would be willing to short prefs if they held shares to short.

jiHymas Says:
Shorting prefs is expensive since the dividend effects are large.

Should the dividend charge only be applicable if you run passed the next ex-date?

And I’ll answer that one here: Yes, the expense (due to tax effects) directly applies only if you’re short over the ex-Date. However, there could be indirect effects if you were to be a forced (or strongly encouraged) buyer in the period immediately preceeding the ex-Date.

Also, I will note that I have been trying to find sponsors for a market-neutral preferred share hedge fund for years. Tax effects won’t apply if the beneficiaries are non-taxable … pension funds, for instance. All inquiries welcomed!

National Bank Honours Sub-Debt Pretend-Maturity

Thursday, February 19th, 2009

Assiduous Reader Louis writes in and says:

Thank you very much for the very interesting link to Bronte.

On a totally other note, I first thought that the following news concerning NA was a good sign:

“(Marketwire – Feb. 16, 2009) – National Bank of Canada
(TSX:NA) announced today its intention to redeem, for the purpose of
cancellation, all of its 5.70% debentures due April 16, 2014, on Thursday,
April 16, 2009, for 100% of the principal amount of the debentures.
The regular interest due in respect of the debentures on April 16, 2009 will
be paid in the normal course, leaving no accrued and unpaid interest on the
debentures at the time of their redemption.”

But could not then refrain being (again) cynical about it linking this news with the only 15 days earlier news of the closing of NA’s last fixed reset issuance:

“Jan 30, 2009: The Series 26 Preferred Shares will yield 6.60% annually, payable quarterly, for the initial period ending February 15, 2014…Therafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a level of 479 basis points over the then 5-year Government of Canada bond yield.”

I fear you are gonna think that I am just not bright enough to understand but, here I am again:

I understand that the above “moves” by the NA may make “capitalisation” sense and that people will say that I am mixing apples with oranges. However, money is money whether you call capital or a debenture and it “moneywise” does not make sense to me issuing prefs paying a non-tax deductible 6.6% dividend while using an equivalent amount of money (for the sake of the discussion here) to buy back debentures now which only cost a tax deductible 5.7% interest which does not mature until 2014.

Bearing in mind that NA was more than meeting its regulatory capital requirements anyway beore its last issuance of resetables, wouldn’t it have been wiser not to issue the costly resetable at this particular time (when they are so expensive to issue due to the prevailing market conditions) and wait a bit longer before redeeming the debentures?

I suspect you are going to say that capital is key since it allows the bank to lend “10″ times that figure while borrowed money by way of the debenture doesn’t have that effect. However, does the NA have so much quality borrowers cuing up at their counters to borrow highly profitable (for the bank) loans? Not that I know.

I also take it that it looks good to redeem debentures at the first opportunity and I recall the DB having been highly criticised for not having done so but its shareholders now appear to accept that it is what had to be done. I submit that the market is weel beyond the “if it looks good, it must be good” stage? We are going through extremely difficult times such that I don’t understand why should our bankers even feel guilty of having to get closer to the minimum required tier 1 capital ratio if adding a cushion doesn’t impress anyone anyway (unless, obviously, more write-offs are to come). We are in a confidence crisis and the only way to fix this is, in my opinion, by stopping playing games.

One should increase his capital cushion when things go well, not in times of troubles when you most need it. Doing the opposite makes longer, costier and more painful the recovery. You cannot fixing the under-capitalisation now, it is when time will get better that I hope we will remember.

Buying back all these resetable in five years or letting them reset is going to come up quite expensive (I doubt very much the 5years Canadas will be anywhere near what it is now). Inflation will be back making high returns expectations even higher.

So, what is wrong with my thinking here?

I don’t think anything is wrong with your thinking here.

You know about the Deutsche Bank situation. It’s possible you’re not drawing a fine enough distinction between Tier 1 Capital (the prefs), which counts towards NA’s Tier 1 Capital Ratio, and between Tier 2 Capital (the sub-debt) which counts towards its Total Capital Ratio, but I’m basically fine with your reasoning.

One thing you did not take explicit account of was the penalty rate that sub-debt usually has, set at issuance to convince the market that they will be called five years before maturity … but according to page 132 of the Annual Report PDF:

Bearing interest at a rate of 5.70% until April 16, 2009, and thereafter at an annual rate equal (1) to the 90-day bankers’ acceptance rate plus 1%

Not much of a penalty in this environment!

All I can suggest to you is that it’s a game of chicken. It makes all kinds of financial sense to let the issue extend past the pretend-maturity (although five years prior to actual maturity, the Tier 2 effect starts amortizing on a straight line basis; after April 19 they would only be able to claim 80% of the face value as Tier 2), but … the market might freak out on them.

NBC unable to redeem debentures! the headlines scream, and all of a sudden their stock price is halved and nobody wants to buy their debt. Banking – as this crisis amply demonstrates – is all about confidence.

The market should not freak out. The market should accept that they will do whatever makes financial sense for them. But there are no guarantees that the market will behave in a rational manner and I can’t find it in my heart much to blame them for not wanting to find out.

Maybe TD or Royal could get away with it…