Archive for August, 2011

August 5, 2011

Saturday, August 6th, 2011

Since the politicians won’t bail out Ireland and Portugal, the central bank is doing it:

European Central Bank President Jean- Claude Trichet said the ECB has resumed bond purchases and will offer banks more cash to stop the region’s debt crisis from engulfing Italy and Spain and hurting the economy.

ECB purchases of Irish and Portuguese bonds during the press briefing haven’t stamped out investor concern on the 21- month crisis spreading to Italy and Spain, whose yields soared to euro-era highs this week. European officials are trying to put a firewall around Europe’s third and fourth-largest economies to avoid them being forced into seeking external aid.

Italian and Spanish 10-year bonds declined, pushing the yields as high as 6.23 percent and 6.33 percent respectively. Irish and Portuguese bonds rose as people with knowledge of today’s transactions said the ECB bought those securities after being absent from the market for 18 weeks. That debt was at 10.4 percent and 11.3 percent as of 5 p.m. in London.

Gee, isn’t it great when a central bank takes on credit risk?

But don’t lose faith in Europe! It’s all America’s fault:

And Mr. Trichet pointed the finger at the U.S. debt ceiling showdown for stoking market tensions in Europe.

“It’s clear the world is intertwined,” he told reporters after the bank opted to leave its key interest unchanged at 1.5 per cent. “What happens in the U.S. influences the rest of the world.”

There are indications Italy is serious about austerity:

The Italian government, seeking to earn the confidence of investors who have driven its bond yields to euro-era highs, will speed up austerity measures and will target a balanced budget a year earlier than planned.

The country will adopt a balanced-budget amendment, liberalize its labor market, and speed asset sales, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti said in a joint Rome press conference today.

While yields on Italian and Spanish debt fell today, borrowing costs have surged since a July 21 European Union summit aimed at heading off contagion from Europe’s debt crisis to the euro zone’s third- and fourth-largest economies. Italian 10-year bond yields are up 76 basis points since the summit, while Spanish yields are up 33 basis points.

Berlusconi said the government now won’t wait until 2013-2014 to eliminate tax loopholes and deductions worth 25 billion euros ($36 billion), though he didn’t say when they would be enacted. He also said he agreed with French President Nicolas Sarkozy to hold a meeting of Group of Seven finance ministers within days.

Spanish borrowing costs are below those of Italy for the first time since May 2010 on speculation Italy’s higher debt load makes it less able to withstand contagion from the region’s fiscal crisis. The nation’s debt is set to reach 120 percent of gross domestic product this year, second highest in the euro region after Greece.

S&P downgraded USA:

The U.S. had its AAA credit rating downgraded for the first time by Standard & Poor’s, which slammed the nation’s political process and said lawmakers failed to cut spending enough to reduce record deficits.

S&P dropped the ranking one level to AA+, after warning on July 14 that it would reduce the rating in the absence of a “credible” plan to lower deficits even if the nation’s $14.3 trillion debt limit was lifted. The U.S. was awarded the top credit ranking by New York-based S&P in 1941. It kept the outlook at “negative.”

S&P said it may lower the long-term rating to AA within the next two years if spending reductions are lower than agreed to, interest rates rise or “new fiscal pressures” during the period result in higher general government debt.

S&P also changed its assumption that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts would expire by the end of 2012 “because the majority of Republicans in Congress continue to resist any measure that would raise revenues.”

“More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating,” S&P said.

The downgrade process was, apparently, enlivened by a $2-trillion arithmetical error that you can be sure the politicians will harp on (Treasury’s started already). The S&P release highlights:

  • We have lowered our long-term sovereign credit rating on the United States of America to ‘AA+’ from ‘AAA’ and affirmed the ‘A-1+’ short-term rating.
  • We have also removed both the short- and long-term ratings from CreditWatch negative.The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government’s medium-term debt dynamics.
  • More broadly, the downgrade reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of American policymaking and political institutions have weakened at a time of ongoing fiscal and economic challenges to a degree more than we envisioned when we assigned a negative outlook to the rating on April 18, 2011.
  • Since then, we have changed our view of the difficulties in bridging the gulf between the political parties over fiscal policy, which makes us pessimistic about the capacity of Congress and the Administration to be able to leverage their agreement this week into a broader fiscal consolidation plan that stabilizes the government’s debt dynamics any time soon.
  • The outlook on the long-term rating is negative. We could lower the long-term rating to ‘AA’ within the next two years if we see that less reduction in spending than agreed to, higher interest rates, or new fiscal pressures during the period result in a higher general government debt trajectory than we currently assume in our base case.

The Fed has issued guidance to banks:

Earlier today, Standard & Poor’s rating agency lowered the long-term rating of the U.S. government and federal agencies from AAA to AA+. With regard to this action, the federal banking agencies are providing the following guidance to banks, savings associations, credit unions, and bank and savings and loan holding companies (collectively, banking organizations).

For risk-based capital purposes, the risk weights for Treasury securities and other securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, government agencies, and government-sponsored entities will not change. The treatment of Treasury securities and other securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, government agencies, and government-sponsored entities under other federal banking agency regulations, including, for example, the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation W, will also be unaffected.

That’s how Europe can solve its banking problems! Just allow loans-gone-bad to be risk-weighted at their original rates!

I remember the DBRS downgrade of Canada in Spring, 1994, which the ancients among us will remember as a horrible bear market for bonds, full of nervousness. The downgrade was announced at about 5pm; we were getting pricing data from two brokerages, one of which prepared their run prior to the announcment, the other after. Only a few minutes, but there were literally dollars of difference in the long bond prices! Bids just disappeared as the dealers went short in preparation for overnight selling.

Yellow Media’s sell-side analysts continue to follow the stock:

Canaccord Genuity believes the carnage isn’t over yet. In a new research report today, analyst Aravinda Galappatthige cut his price target to a mere 60 cents, a far cry from his previous guess of $2.75. Not surprisingly, he downgraded Yellow Media to a “sell” from a “hold.”

“The steep decline in our target is due to common equity at now only 20 per cent of the enterprise value of the company,” Mr. Galappatthige explained. “Consequently, even moderate cuts to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization and free cash flow, which lowers enterprise value, have the potential to have a magnified impact on equity.”

“Yellow Media is in the midst of transforming its business from a directory publisher to a broader, online-centric, marketing solutions company serving mainly small and medium enterprises. While we do expect to see some success for the company in this process, we believe print declines will hit double-digit rates starting fiscal 2011 and more than offset online growth, given that print currently makes up approximately 75 per cent of revenues. Moreover, if the print declines worsen – to 15-20 per cent levels, as we are seeing in most international markets, we believe Yellow Media’s EBITDA and FCF could be impacted significantly.”

CIBC World Markets Inc. analyst Robert Bek today also took a knife to his price estimate, slashing it to $1.25 from $5.50.

“Though the Band-Aid has been ripped off this story, we still believe investors should watch on the sidelines as an equity recovery is tenuous, at best,” he wrote. “Our (new price target) is probably half way to fair value, but downside risks are material, including the potential for a restructuring if conditions worsen.”

In the comments to the recent YLO post, newbiepref instructs me on a feature of the TSX website: Insider Trades by Symbol, through which I see that YLO (almost certainly YLO, but it could be some other insider) bought all four of its preferred share issues today. The total value was only $160,000 (about 2/3 of it in YLO.PR.A) but even so they’re taking these things off the balance sheet at about half-price, on average. Nice work if you can get it!

These are small quantities, to be sure, but it will be remembered that quantities are restricted under the terms of their Normal Course Issuer Bid:

In accordance with the rules of the Toronto Stock Exchange, the maximum numbers of securities that can be purchased on a daily basis by Yellow Media Inc. are 641,849 common shares, 5,248 first preferred shares, series 1, 3,134 first preferred shares, series 2, 3,068 first preferred shares, series 3 and 1,385 first preferred shares, series 5, subject to the block purchase exception

They hit the limits precisely – to the very share! – for three of the four issues; they were sloppy with YLO.PR.B and bought only 3,100 of the allowable 3,134. As discussed in the commented post, they’re not buying the common any more, probably because of bank loan covenants.

It was a weak day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 4bp, FixedResets off 3bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 18bp. Good volatility; let’s hope things heat up a little more next week! Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4129 % 2,357.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4129 % 3,544.9
Floater 2.57 % 2.33 % 33,461 21.45 4 -1.4129 % 2,544.9
OpRet 4.85 % 2.36 % 54,724 0.15 9 0.2096 % 2,454.4
SplitShare 5.30 % 5.63 % 65,658 2.60 4 -0.6105 % 2,496.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2096 % 2,244.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.68 % 5.29 % 138,886 1.19 14 -0.1030 % 2,096.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.38 % 5.41 % 116,119 14.74 16 -0.0368 % 2,215.0
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.15 % 212,595 2.61 58 -0.0320 % 2,325.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.74 % 273,955 8.04 46 -0.1829 % 2,176.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -3.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-05
Maturity Price : 17.99
Evaluated at bid price : 17.99
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -2.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-05
Maturity Price : 18.14
Evaluated at bid price : 18.14
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.77
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-05
Maturity Price : 23.44
Evaluated at bid price : 25.79
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-05
Maturity Price : 23.46
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-05
Maturity Price : 23.46
Evaluated at bid price : 23.73
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 3.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.25
Bid-YTW : 0.98 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 238,663 Nesbitt crossed three blocks of 50,000 each, all at 24.75; RBC crossed 50,000 and 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.68
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 125,260 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 24.73 and two blocks of 25,000 each, both at 24.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.66
Bid-YTW : 4.61 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 86,600 RBC crossed 10,000 at 22.75 and 64,300 at 22.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 75,298 TD crossed 44,700 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.14
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 61,000 National crossed 60,000 at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-05
Maturity Price : 24.55
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 54,900 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from RBC at 27.45, then crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.41
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.70 – 26.79
Spot Rate : 1.0900
Average : 0.7000

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %

GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.25 – 25.80
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3069

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.80 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.4234

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %

SLF.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 26.77 – 27.29
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3184

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.77
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 50.51 – 51.00
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3407

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 50.51
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %

NA.PR.O FixedReset Quote: 27.51 – 27.94
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3109

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.51
Bid-YTW : 2.43 %

August 4, 2011

Thursday, August 4th, 2011

Here’s a sign of the times:

Bank of New York Mellon Corp., the world’s largest custody bank, said it will charge clients a 13 basis point fee for “extraordinarily high” cash deposits.

“We have seen a growing level of deposits on our balance sheet from clients seeking a safe haven in light of the global interest rate and credit environment,” the company said today in an e-mailed statement.

It’s not clear whether this means the net yield to clients will be negative. But negative yields are quite fashionable:

Money market rates, which surged during the debate to raise the federal borrowing cap, dropped below zero percent as Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis bolstered U.S. government securities’ appeal as the world’s safest assets.

Demand for short-term government debt instruments is rising as Treasury bills are expected to remain in short supply after the U.S. signaled yesterday it won’t increase sales of the securities even following lawmakers’ agreement to raise the debt ceiling.

European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet said today the ECB has resumed bond purchases and will offer banks more cash to stop the region’s sovereign-debt crisis from engulfing Italy and Spain.

One-month Treasury bill rates traded at zero percent today after earlier falling to negative 0.0102 percent. They closed yesterday at 0.0051 percent yesterday and reached 0.1825 percent on July 29, the highest since February 2009.

Equities were interesting today:

A global rout in equities drove the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index to its worst slump since February 2009, while two-year Treasury yields plunged to a record low amid concern the economy is weakening. The yen pared losses, recovering from the biggest drop versus the dollar since 2008 that was triggered by Japan selling its currency.

The S&P 500 tumbled 4.8 percent to 1,200.07 at 4 p.m. in New York with futures on the gauge slipping 0.2 percent as of 6:17 p.m. The S&P 500 has dropped 11 percent since July 22, the biggest loss over the same amount of time since March 2009. The MSCI All-Country World Index slid 4.1 percent as Brazil’s stocks slumped to a two-year low and Switzerland’s entered a bear market. Two-year yields declined as low as 0.25 percent. The yen sank 4.1 percent against the dollar before trimming its loss almost in half. Oil sank 5.8 percent to help the Thomson Reuters/Jefferies CRB Index of materials erase its 2011 gain.

The Canadian preferred share market was also affected, but not to nearly the same degree (unless you own YLO preferreds), as PerpetualDiscounts lost 17bp, FixedResets were down 10bp and DeemedRetractibles were off 10bp. Volatility was high, comprised entirely of losers. Volume was good.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.44%, equivalent to 7.07% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 4.9% (!), so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread is now about 215bp, a sharp increase from the 185bp reported on July 29 as PerpetualDiscounts have remained stable while long corporate yields plummetted.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.8263 % 2,390.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.8263 % 3,595.7
Floater 2.54 % 2.33 % 33,703 21.46 4 -0.8263 % 2,581.4
OpRet 4.86 % 2.76 % 55,090 0.15 9 -0.2688 % 2,449.3
SplitShare 5.27 % 3.13 % 66,428 0.56 4 -0.1219 % 2,512.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2688 % 2,239.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.67 % 5.14 % 140,500 0.79 14 -0.0733 % 2,098.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.38 % 5.44 % 116,037 14.71 16 -0.1681 % 2,215.8
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.13 % 212,983 2.61 58 -0.1031 % 2,326.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 4.69 % 273,623 8.01 46 -0.0988 % 2,180.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-04
Maturity Price : 18.65
Evaluated at bid price : 18.65
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-04
Maturity Price : 18.65
Evaluated at bid price : 18.65
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.37
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.69
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
RY.PR.G Deemed-Retractible -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.52
Bid-YTW : 4.73 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 266,064 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 26.10; RBC crossed 200,000 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 259,690 Desjardins crossed 55,700 at 27.20; RBC crossed 200,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
RY.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 43,125 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.52
Bid-YTW : 4.73 %
RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 41,038 Anonymous crossed (?) 16,500 at 24.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.66
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 40,960 Desjardins crossed 27,600 at 22.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 38,754 RBC crossed 20,000 at 24.62.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.52
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 27.30 – 30.78
Spot Rate : 3.4800
Average : 1.8930

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 2.51 %

PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.26 – 23.75
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.2893

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.58 – 26.05
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3097

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.37
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.10 – 26.67
Spot Rate : 0.5700
Average : 0.4224

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.52
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.69 – 26.22
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3971

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.69
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.82 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2480

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.57
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %

New Issue: SLF FixedReset 3.90%+217

Thursday, August 4th, 2011

Sun Life Financial has announced:

a Canadian public offering of $200 million of Class A Non-Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares Series 10R (the “Series 10R Shares”). The Series 10R Shares will be issued to the public at a price of $25.00 per share and holders will be entitled to receive non-cumulative preferential fixed quarterly dividends for the initial period ending September 30, 2016, as and when declared by the Company’s board of directors, payable in the amount of $0.24375 per Preferred Share, to yield 3.90 per cent annually.

On September 30, 2016, and every five years thereafter, the dividend rate will reset at a rate equal to the 5-Year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.17 per cent. Subject to certain conditions, holders may elect to convert any or all of their Series 10R Shares into an equal number of Class A Non-Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares Series 11QR (the “Series 11QR Shares”) on September 30, 2016 and on the 30th of September every fifth year thereafter. Holders of the Series 11QR Shares will be entitled to receive non-cumulative preferential floating rate quarterly dividends, as and when declared by the Company’s board of directors, equal to the then 3-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.17 per cent.

The net proceeds of the offering will be used for general corporate purposes. The offering will be underwritten by a syndicate led by Scotia Capital Inc., BMO Capital Markets and RBC Dominion Securities on a bought deal basis, and is expected to close on August 12, 2011. The proceeds from this domestic public offering are expected to qualify as Tier 1 capital of Sun Life Financial Inc. under current capital adequacy guidelines established by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI).

Subject to regulatory approval, Sun Life Financial Inc. may redeem the Series 10R Shares in whole or in part on September 30, 2016 and on the 30th of September every five years thereafter.

An application is being made to list the Series 10R Shares as of the closing date on the Toronto Stock Exchange.

This issue does not appear to have a NVCC clause, so I have added a DeemedMaturity for 2022-1-31 at 25.00 to the call schedule for analytical purposes.

YLO Preferreds Downgraded to Pfd-3 by DBRS; P-4(high) S&P

Thursday, August 4th, 2011

Yellow Media’s earnings release today contained a lot of interesting news!

In order to improve the financial risk profile and capital position of the Company, the Board of Yellow Media Inc. (Yellow Media) has decided to reduce cash dividends to common shareholders from $0.65 to $0.15 annually

For the quarter ended June 30, 2011, the Company recorded a net loss from continuing operations of $20.7 million compared to net earnings of $53.0 million for the same quarter in 2010, resulting primarily from a loss of $50.5 million related to the investment in Ziplocal. The Company reported a net loss of $14.3 million for the quarter compared to earnings of $52.0 million for the prior year.

Revenues decreased 4.8% from $360.1 million to $342.7 million resulting from lower print revenues as well as lower revenues associated with our US operations. This was partly offset by higher organic online revenues and revenues generated from Mediative and Canpages. Online revenues for the second quarter of 2011 were $85.9 million or approximately $345 million on an annualized basis, representing growth of 33% versus last year. Online revenues now represent more than 25% of total revenues compared to 18% in the second quarter of 2010.
Income from operations was $110.6 million for the quarter compared to $143.8 million in the second quarter of 2010. EBITDA for the quarter declined from $204.0 million to $176.5 million and EBITDA margin for the second quarter was 51.5% compared to 56.6% for the same period last year. The decrease is mainly attributable to print revenue pressure, higher costs associated with Mediative and Canpages as well as investment in the launch of our 360° Solution. The Company also recorded an unusual bad debt expense of $5 million during the quarter.

In response, DBRS downgraded the preferreds to Pfd-3 with a negative trend:

DBRS continues to believe that given the uncertainty regarding Yellow Media’s digital transition and the higher business risk associated with becoming more dependent on digital revenue, it remains prudent for Yellow Media to strengthen its financial risk profile. As such, DBRS notes that the proceeds from the recent close of the sale of Trader ($708 million net, closed July 28, 2011), along with the additional free cash flow from today’s substantial reduction in the Company’s dividend (more than $200 million per year after the dividend was reduced by 77% to $0.15 per share on an annual basis from the previous rate of $0.65 per share), should position the Company well to achieve a reduction of leverage, with debt-to-EBITDA of approximately 2.0 times (currently at the upper end of the 2.0 times to 3.0 times range), which is now a formalized target.

S&P downgraded to P-4(high):

  • Accelerating print revenue declines, increasing margin pressure, and the prospect of increased earnings volatility have led Standard & Poor’s to reassess Montreal-based Yellow Media Inc.’s business risk profile to fair from satisfactory.
  • To mitigate rising industry and competitive risks, Yellow Media has articulated more conservative financial policies, including a 77% reduction in dividends and plans to deleverage to 2.0x (reported net debt basis) from 2.9x at June 30, 2011.
  • The company’s balance sheet improvement does not sufficiently mitigate rising business risks, in our opinion; therefore, we are lowering the ratings on Yellow Media, including our long-term corporate rating to
    ‘BB+’ from ‘BBB-‘.

  • The stable outlook is based on our view that Yellow Media should be able to manage an adjusted debt leverage of 3x in the next couple of years given its plans to repay more than C$1 billion in debt in the near term as well as generate meaningful discretionary cash from its still-sizeable directory operations while it continues to transition its business to online channels.

YLO has four series of publicly traded preferred shares: YLO.PR.A & YLO.PR.B (OperatingRetractible) and YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™; all are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Update: DBRS conference call:

DBRS will be holding a teleconference at 4 p.m. today to discuss its recent downgrade of Yellow Media Inc. (Yellow Media or the Company) to BBB and R-2 (high), with Negative trends. The downgrade reflects DBRS’s concern that the business risk of Yellow Media continues to increase as it accelerates its transition from print to digital, even though there is an expectation of a strengthened financial risk profile going forward as a result of recent actions and the ongoing underlying free cash flow that the Company continues to generate.

The teleconference, hosted by Kam Hon, Managing Director, and Chris Diceman, Senior Vice President, will cover the key analytical considerations in the DBRS rating action and allow for a question-and-answer period.

To participate, please dial the appropriate numbers listed below five minutes before the 4:00 p.m. EDT start time.

CALL-IN DETAILS
Telephone: +1 416 695 7806 or toll-free at +1 888 789 9572
Pass Code: 5637701

A replay will be available immediately after the teleconference until August 18, 2011, at the following numbers:

REPLAY CALL-IN DETAILS
Available until 11:59 p.m. on August 18, 2011
Telephone: +1 905 694 9451 or toll-free at +1 800 408 3053
Pass Code: 6233388

Update: There was speculation in March that the loss of an investment-grade debt rating (which is what S&P has done) would trigger a dividend cut through covenants on bank lines:

The “hold” camp includes TD Securities analyst Scott Cuthbertson, who published a note this week examining whether Yellow Media’s 65-cent annualized dividend is sustainable.

His conclusion after poring over the financials: Probably, but it’s not a slam dunk.

“Based on our estimates for 2011 and 2012 (which are in line with consensus), YLO should be able to continue to pay its $0.65 dividend from free cash flow in both years,” he wrote.

“With that said, non-operational items such as acquisitions, divestitures, one-time cash charges etc., could potentially put pressure on both the company’s ability to completely fund its dividends through free cash flow and the achievement of recently articulated debt-reduction goals.”

Maintaining Yellow Media’s investment-grade debt rating is critical to sustaining the dividend at current levels, he said. Losing the rating would trigger more restrictive covenants in Yellow Media’s loan agreements, which would put the dividend in jeopardy because the company would be permitted to pay out a maximum of 50 per cent of distributable cash as dividends.

Note that Mr. Cuthbertson changed his views on the company on July 8.

Update: Marc Tellier, the CEO was interviewed on BNN after the close. He was very, very determined to stay on message and very vague on specifics.

Update: What a day for the preferreds. I can’t remember ever seeing anything like it.

YLO Issues, 2011-8-4
Ticker Quote
8/3
Quote
8/4
Bid YTW
8/4
YTW
Scenario
8/4
Performance
8/3 – 8/4
(bid/bid)
YLO.PR.A 20.34-74 18.26-60 29.5% Soft Maturity
2012-12-30
-10.23%
YLO.PR.B 13.00-10 8.35-23 30.18% Soft Maturity
2017-06-29
-35.77%
YLO.PR.C 12.05-08 8.50-79 19.23% Limit Maturity -29.46%
YLO.PR.D 12.32-50 8.72-9.78 19.29% Limit Maturity -29.22%

Note that the yield figures for YLO.PR.A and YLO.PR.B assume that the retraction right implies a redemption for $25 cash immediately prior to the right becoming effective. Since the minimum conversion price is $2 on the common, and the common now trades for a little over $1.00, many will feel that this is … somewhat optomistic.

However, I note from SEDI that on July 31, the company:

  • Cancelled 77,580 YLO.PR.A, average price 22.43 (about 50,000 bought in July)
  • Cancelled 32,172 YLO.PR.B, average price 15.12 (about 19,000 bought in July)
  • Cancelled 30,644 YLO.PR.C, average price 15.04 (about 18,000 bought in July)
  • Cancelled 14,980 YLO.PR.D, average price 15.17 (about 8,000 bought in July)

August 3, 2011

Wednesday, August 3rd, 2011

Dealbreaker has a surprisingly thoughtful piece on the US credit rating:

That’s probably the best way to interpret market reactions. Rates on the $10 trillion of publicly held Treasuries couldn’t be tighter, suggesting that there’s no real market worry about the U.S.’s ability to pay off its debts. But CDS notionals keep increasing (albeit in a still small and illiquid market) and CDS levels are wide of AA corporates because the U.S. is actually more likely to default than Colgate Palmolive is. Because it would not occur to anyone at Colgate Palmolive to just stop paying its debts. But we’re going to have to keep rasing the debt ceiling, and every time we do, half of Congress is going to say that they prefer to default.

The idiotic Federal Aviation Administration crisis is symptiomatic:

The U.S. House of Representatives and Senate finished voting on legislation this week and recessed for the month of August without extending the FAA’s funding authority, which expired at midnight July 22. That idled about 70,000 construction-related workers and furloughed 4,000 FAA employees. The FAA also is forgoing $28.6 million in aviation taxes each day the deadlock continues. That would add up to $1.3 billion by the time Congress resumes legislative business on Sept. 7.

Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood said legislators should return to Washington and pass an extension without cutting subsidies for flights to 13 rural airports. The cuts were in a House-passed bill to extend the FAA’s authority through Sept. 16 that was introduced by Representative John Mica, the Florida Republican who chairs the transportation committee in that body.

Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, a Nevada Democrat, said yesterday he was prepared to accept the House bill. Other Senate Democrats refused, said Adam Jentleson, a spokesman for Reid.

The FAA’s last multi-year funding bill expired in 2007. Congress has passed 20 limited extensions since then without adopting a new long-term authorization measure.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 21bp, FixedResets gaining 9bp and DeemedRetractibles up 14bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was average.

Yellow Media reports on 11Q2 tomorrow before the opening, so YLO preferreds could have an interesting day!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0479 % 2,410.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0479 % 3,625.7
Floater 2.51 % 2.33 % 33,951 21.45 4 -0.0479 % 2,602.9
OpRet 4.84 % 2.05 % 54,382 0.16 9 0.1282 % 2,455.9
SplitShare 5.26 % 3.11 % 69,186 0.56 4 0.0804 % 2,515.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1282 % 2,245.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.67 % 4.95 % 130,491 0.80 14 0.0169 % 2,099.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.37 % 5.42 % 112,349 14.74 16 0.2132 % 2,219.6
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.14 % 214,005 2.65 58 0.0934 % 2,328.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 4.64 % 270,990 7.85 46 0.1383 % 2,182.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 2.80 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-03
Maturity Price : 24.62
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 107,561 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 100,990 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 71,606 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.64
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 60,318 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.92
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 36,712 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.46
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 35,606 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
There were 28 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
NA.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.92 – 27.43
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3699

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.92
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.25 – 26.56
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1859

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 22.25 – 23.60
Spot Rate : 1.3500
Average : 1.2412

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-03
Maturity Price : 22.01
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 2.33 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 27.03 – 27.58
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.4502

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 27.03
Bid-YTW : 2.44 %

SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.36 – 23.69
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2418

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.36
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.35 – 26.05
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.6157

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.38
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %

August 2, 2011

Tuesday, August 2nd, 2011

Christophe Chamley, a professor of economics at Boston University, writes an interesting piece on Bloomberg about the Spanish default of 1575:

At that time of costly communications, periodic commercial fairs were essential events for the economic activity throughout Europe. Credit was rolled over from fair to fair by bankers, and lending agreements were renegotiated. With the Spanish commercial credit market frozen, the fairs couldn’t be held. Indeed, the main fair that was held twice a year at Medina del Campo was canceled. In short, the default caused a banking collapse, which led to a severe recession.

After two years, in November 1577, the cities caved, agreeing to a very large tax increase. The king resumed debt payments to the bankers. As the king explained in the settlement agreement, called Medio General, the bankers were joined in their demands “by the petition of the delegates of the cities with particular urgency about the same business.” In other words, the cities were begging the king to restore the business of trade. The fairs at Medina del Campo resumed late in the next year, but they had lost their preeminence forever.

It was a quiet day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 1bp, FixedResets winning 3bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. Volatility was minimal. Volume was pathetic.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3697 % 2,411.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3697 % 3,627.4
Floater 2.51 % 2.34 % 34,103 21.41 4 -0.3697 % 2,604.2
OpRet 4.85 % 2.29 % 55,107 0.16 9 -0.0726 % 2,452.7
SplitShare 5.26 % 4.16 % 72,058 0.56 4 0.0287 % 2,513.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0726 % 2,242.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.67 % 4.87 % 132,069 0.80 14 0.1653 % 2,099.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.38 % 5.42 % 110,486 14.76 16 0.0079 % 2,214.8
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.13 % 215,758 2.62 58 0.0307 % 2,326.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 4.71 % 274,049 7.86 46 0.0035 % 2,179.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 4.69 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 57,847 RBC crossed 50,000 at 27.39.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.36
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 52,106 Nesbitt crossed 24,000 at 26.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 44,727 RBC crossed 25,000 at 24.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 42,475 RBC bought 24,800 from anonymous and 12,300 from Nesbitt, all at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 38,467 RBC crossed 37,800 at 24.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.78
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 38,278 Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 27.25; RBC crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
There were 15 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 22.11 – 23.60
Spot Rate : 1.4900
Average : 1.1218

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-02
Maturity Price : 21.87
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 2.34 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.26 – 24.96
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.4801

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.98
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %

GWO.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 26.60 – 27.21
Spot Rate : 0.6100
Average : 0.3922

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.35 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.5233

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.38
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %

RY.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 26.98 – 27.33
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2254

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.98
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.00 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.9000
Average : 0.7784

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %

Squam Lake Group on Money Market Fund Regulation

Monday, August 1st, 2011

Christopher Condon and Robert Schmidt of Bloomberg report that:

Money-market mutual funds would be forced to create capital buffers equaling 1 percent to 3 percent of assets to protect against losses under a plan now favored by staff at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, according to three people briefed on the regulator’s deliberations.

Top SEC officials, seeking to make money funds safer, prefer the plan over another capital buffer idea crafted by Fidelity Investments and calls to eliminate the funds’ stable share price, said the people, who asked not to be identified because they weren’t authorized to speak publicly. The concept is based on recommendations submitted to the agency in January by university economists known as the Squam Lake Group.

Readers will remember the Squam Lake proposal on contingent capital, which I didn’t like, but was a whole lot better than OSFI’s idiotic approach.

I reported in May that the SEC was grinding ahead on MMF regulation; readers will remember that I have a long-standing interest in the topic.

The Squam Lake Proposal for MMF regulation points out:

In the past, without the prospect of government guarantees, whenever money market funds threatened to break the buck, it had been common for their managers to bail them out in order to preserve the franchise values of their fund management businesses. Between August 2007 and December 31, 2009, at least 36 U.S. and 26 European money market funds received support from their sponsor or parent [footnote] because of losses incurred on their holdings of distressed or defaulted assets, as well as the costs of meeting the redemption demands of investors through sales of assets. Going forward, if sponsors believe that their funds will receive government support, their incentive to bail out their own funds may be substantially reduced, particularly given the squeeze on profitability associated with exceptionally low money-market interest rates.

Footnote: See “Sponsor Report to Key Money Market Funds,” by Henry Shilling, Moody’s Investor Service, !ugust 9, 2010; The forms of support included capital contributions, purchases of distressed securities at par, letters of credit, capital support agreements, and letters of indemnity or performance guarantees.

They propose a capital buffer:

Thus, as an alternative to floating NAV, a second broad approach, which we focus on below, preserves the stable NAV structure but enhances its safety by requiring sponsors to establish contractually secure buffers that could absorb at least moderate investment losses to their money market fund investors. This is akin to a capital requirement for stable-N!V funds; The President’s Working Group Report (2010) describes various alternatives, including some forms of liquidity facility or insurance that are consistent in spirit with this approach, but it does not make a specific recommendation. [footnote]

Footnote: See “Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets: Money Market Fund Reform Options,” October 2010, [published by the Treasury] which suggests that money market funds continue to pose systemic risk. Among the alternative policies described in the President’s Working Group Report are: conversion of all funds to floating NAV; a private or public insurance scheme for stable-NAV funds; a rule by which large redemptions would be paid in kind (that is, with a portfolio of assets held by the fund); a two-tier system of both floating-NAV and stable-NAV funds under which stable-NAV funds would be required to have some support mechanism; a two-tier system under which stable-NAV funds are only available to retail investors; a rule forcing stable-NAV funds to convert to special purpose banks, holding capital and having access to lender of last resort facilities, and for which depositors would have some insurance coverage.

The Squam Lake group proposes:

The manager of a stable-NAV money market fund must provide dedicated liquid financial resources that, in combination with those represented by the assets of the fund class investors, are sufficient to achieve a net buffer of “X” per dollar of net asset value. These additional resources are to be drawn upon as needed to support fund redemptions at one dollar per share until the fund converts to a floating-NAV or until the buffer resources are exhausted. That is, at the end of each business day, the combined resources available to fund investors represented by the sum of dedicated additional sources and the previous day’s marked-to-market per-share value of the fund’s assets must exceed 1+X per share held as of the end of the current day. The fund must convert to a floating-NAV fund within a regulatory transition period, such as 60 days, in the event that the fund manager falls out of compliance with this buffer requirement.

They do not formally recommend a buffer size (that is, the value of X in the proposal) but indicate that 3% is a good place to start discussion:

When setting the size “X” of a required buffer, regulators may wish to consider the amounts by which money market funds have broken the buck in the past, or the amounts per share that fund sponsors have contributed in order to prevent them from breaking the buck. In the two-day period following Lehman’s bankruptcy, the Reserve Primary Fund reported a minimum share price of 97 cents.9 Had redemptions not been halted by the Reserve Fund’s sponsors, a fire sale of additional assets could have caused significant additional losses. A buffer of at least $0.03 per share would therefore have been necessary to prevent the Reserve Fund from breaking the buck.

Another consideration in determining the size of a buffer requirement is the concentration of fund assets among the debt instruments of a small number of borrowers. As of June 2010, for example, the top 5 exposures of U.S. prime money market fund assets, were all to European banks, with each of the 5 banks representing an exposure of at least 2.5% of aggregate fund assets.

Frankly, I think this is unnecessarily complex and specialized. Money market funds are, essentially, banks. They should be regulated as banks.

Update, 2011-8-3: The Fidelity plan is a little different:

Given that tepid response, the SEC is discussing other ideas such as those suggested by Fidelity Investments, which opposed the notion of a liquidity bank in its comment letters to the President’s Working Group.

Under the Fidelity proposal, money market funds would create a capital reserve or an “NAV buffer” by charging investors more over a period of time, said Norman Lind, head of trading for the taxable- and municipal-money-market desks at Fidelity Management and Research Co., the investment adviser for Fidelity’s family of mutual funds.

The SEC would work with fund boards to determine a range that a fund should keep for capital reserve, he said during a panel discussion.

“Let’s say you retain five basis points per year and you accrue that over time,” Mr. Lind said. “The idea is that once you have a buffer in place … you stop charging that fee.”

Unlike the ICI’s proposal, Fidelity thinks that its idea is simple to implement and doesn’t require regulatory changes, Mr. Lind said.

I don’t get it, frankly. Who owns the buffer?