Archive for August, 2015

August 6, 2015

Thursday, August 6th, 2015

Walmart’s run into a little labour trouble after raising their in-house minimum wage because the tier above wants to keep their increment:

When Wal-Mart Stores Inc. chief Doug McMillon announced plans to boost store workers’ minimum wage earlier this year, he said the move was intended to improve morale and retain employees.

Yet for some of the hundreds of thousands of workers getting no raise, the policy is having the opposite effect.

In interviews and in hundreds of comments on Facebook, Wal-Mart employees are calling the move unfair to senior workers who got no increase and now make the same or close to what newer, less experienced colleagues earn. New workers started making a minimum of $9 an hour in April and will get at least $10 an hour in February.

“It is pitting people against each other,” said Charmaine Givens-Thomas, a 10-year veteran who makes $12 an hour at a store near Chicago and belongs to OUR Walmart, a union-backed group that has lobbied for better working conditions. “It hurts morale when people feel like they aren’t being appreciated. I hear people every day talking about looking for other jobs and wanting to remove themselves from Wal-Mart and a job that will make them feel like that.”

And, perhaps not very coincidentally, there are murmurings of disquiet about a US national $15 minimum wage:

As the proposed federal minimum wage goes up and up, economists support it less and less. In January 2014, seven Nobel laureates and eight ex-presidents of the American Economic Association signed a letter backing a federal minimum wage of $10.10 an hour by 2016, up from $7.25. They said it would “provide a much-needed boost” to low-income workers while causing “little or no” job loss. Fifteen dollars an hour is another story. None of those luminaries signed the letter in July that endorsed a Senate bill introduced by presidential candidate Bernie Sanders (D-Vt.) to raise the federal minimum to $15 an hour by 2020.

Regional economic differences are one reason a lot of economists are nervous about jumping to $15: A wage floor that’s right for New York or San Francisco could be too high for Brownsville, Texas; Gadsden, Ala.; or Ponce, Puerto Rico. In such places, $15 an hour “may have large negative employment effects,” Ronald Ehrenberg, a Cornell University labor economist, wrote in an e-mail. He was one of about 600 economists who signed the $10.10 letter last year. He says he wasn’t approached to sign the $15 letter but would have said no if asked.

A $15 minimum is just 67 percent of the median wage in high-cost Alaska, so it would have a modest effect if implemented today, lifting pay of people at the bottom but not affecting the middle rungs of the income ladder. In Puerto Rico, though, $15 is 155 percent of the median wage. If the federal minimum were raised to $15 today (rather than in 2020, as Sanders proposes), it would be 55 percent higher than the midpoint of what all Puerto Ricans earn. That would cause severe stress in a financially struggling territory already squeezed by the $7.25 minimum. Even within a single state, it’s hard to come up with a minimum that works everywhere. In California, the median wage varies from more than $28 an hour in Silicon Valley (technically San Benito and Santa Clara counties) to less than $14 in Visalia-Porterville, a farm town 190 miles away by car.

A portion of the justification cited in the Bernie Saunders endorsement letter is the 50-year trend in productivity:

The real, inflation-adjusted, value of the federal minimum wage has fallen dramatically over time. The real value of the federal minimum wage peaked in 1968 at 10.85 an hour, 50 percent above the current level. Moreover, since 1968, average U.S. labor productivity has risen by roughly 140 percent. This means that, if the federal minimum wage had risen in step with both inflation and average labor productivity since 1968, the federal minimum wage today would be $26.00 an hour. (References for all data cited in this petition can be found here: LINK)

So we can take a look at the link and see how their productivity increase was derived:

Labor productivity over time is measured by the BLS Labor Productivity and Costs program (LPC). The specific index used here is for the Business Sector. The index value (base year=2009) in 1968 is 43.503 and 105.998 for 2014, indicating a 143 percent increase in productivity (105.998 /43.503).

They didn’t go into any more detail than that, so we’ll ask FRED and see what the inflation-adjusted minimum wage looks like:

realMinimumWage
Click for Big

So the real minimum wage in the States is currently at its 1950 value and has been for the last twenty-five years. There was a significant peak in 1968, as the endorsement letter writers state; I assume this is because all the kids were hippies then (LAZY, SMELLY hippies) or were in Vietnam. But I will leave that to historians and content myself with pointing out that the selection of a starting point for their claim is not representative of long-term conditions.

It’s much the same in Ontario Livio Di Matteo on the Worthwhile Canadian Initiative blog:

ontarioMinimumWage
Click for Big

But the other thing they’re doing is sticking productivity into the mix as well. Now, according to the Pew Research Center:

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, last year 1.532 million hourly workers earned the federal minimum of $7.25 an hour; nearly 1.8 million more earned less than that because they fell under one of several exemptions (tipped employees, full-time students, certain disabled workers and others), for a total of 3.3 million hourly workers at or below the federal minimum.

That group represents 4.3% of the nation’s 75.9 million hourly-paid workers and 2.6% of all wage and salary workers. In 1979, when the BLS began regularly studying minimum-wage workers, they represented 13.4% of hourly workers and 7.9% of all wage and salary workers. (Bear in mind that the 3.3 million figure doesn’t include salaried workers, although BLS says relatively few salaried workers are paid at what would translate into below-minimum hourly rates. Also, 23 states, as well as the District of Columbia, have higher minimum wages than the federal standard; people who earned the state minimum wage in those jurisdictions aren’t included in the 3.3 million total.)

… and …

minimumWageEarners
Click for Big

So – freely interpreting here – minimum wage earners are potato peelers, pizza makers, waitresses, store cashiers, manicurists, office cleaners and gardeners.

And my point is: how has the productivity of employees in these occupations increased over the last fifty years? There may have been some marginal improvement – gardeners can now use leaf-blowers and make far louder noises than they used to – but I’ll suggest that, by and large, the productivity in these occupations has not moved much and certainly has not increased by the 143% figure used to derive the justification for the $26.00 figure given in the Sanders endorsement letter.

In fact, I’ll go further and suggest that the uneven distribution of productivity gains over the past fifty years is what is causing income inequality in the first place. Or at least a chunk of it, the chunk that you see when you work at McDonalds and the guy across the street is a systems administrator for a medium sized company.

Now don’t get me wrong! I support an increased minimum wage and I would even like it to be indexed not to inflation, but to inflation +50bp (say), so that we can increase the incentive to modernize all these marginal jobs. If we want to redistribute the fruits of productivity gains – and I will not dismiss the idea outright – that is something we should be doing through the tax system, in what is usually referred to as a guaranteed annual income:

According to several Queen’s University professors, the cost of replacing social assistance (which includes welfare and disability support) and Old Age Security (which includes a top-up for low-income seniors), plus providing every adult with an annual income of $20,000 and children with an income guarantee of $6,000, would be $40-billion. The Fraser Institute calculates the total cost of Canada’s current income support system (payout plus administrative costs) at $185-billion in 2013.

Our own estimates, which build on existing social programs, range from a gross annual cost of $17-billion for a program that (in today’s dollars) is slightly more generous than was offered in Dauphin, to a “Cadillac” version costing $58-billion that would guarantee everyone a minimum income equal to the low-income cutoff and pay at least some benefits to people earning well above the low-income cutoff.

The cost of a GAI depends on how generous it is, how quickly benefits are phased out with additional income and how existing social programs are affected.

Sadly, however, the political trend is in the other direction – with some idiots touting narrowly targeted tax credits in order to create jobs for tax lawyers and CRA auditors, while other idiots tout means-tested benefits in order to impose ludicrous effective marginal tax rates on recipients to ensure they remain dependent and don’t get uppity. I’m sure I’ve discussed means-testing of benefits and marginal tax rates on PrefBlog, and referred to a Congressional Budget Office study on the matter, but can’t find the reference! [Update: try Illustrative Examples of Effective Marginal Tax Rates Faced by Married and Single Taxpayers: Supplemental Material for Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, which isn’t exactly the one I remember, but it’s close!]

Meanwhile, cord-cutters are cutting prices:

Cord-cutting millennials who shun cable TV have long plagued the entertainment industry. Now they’re wreaking havoc on Wall Street.

Media companies led by Walt Disney Co. lost more than $60 billion in market capitalization in two days on mounting evidence of shrinking demand for cable TV and networks like ESPN that make money from ads. So-called cord cutters, who quit paying for pay-TV packages of hundreds of channels and favor online streaming services like Netflix Inc., are undermining a business model that has sustained the TV industry for decades.

It took Disney, a company with a stellar record of sales and profit, to deliver the wake-up call and end Wall Street’s 6 1/2 year love affair with traditional media. Disney’s disappointing results Tuesday night led to what long-time cable analyst Craig Moffett called swift and unprecedented carnage. The S&P 500 Media Index has since dropped 11 percent — on pace to be the worst two-day slump since 2008.

… and Treasuries are jumpy:

For the past six years, a Federal Reserve rate interest-rate hike wasn’t on anyone’s radar screen. Now, even minor data points are provoking outsized reactions given a real possibility the central bank may raise rates next month for the first time in almost a decade.

The weak employment cost index report on July 31 sent Treasury 10-year yields tumbling four basis points in five minutes, more than six times the average move after the past year’s reports. On Wednesday, yields slid three basis points in 10 minutes on disappointing data on private-sector job creation, reversed course, then continued to climb after a strong reading on service-sector growth.

There was an interesting piece in the Globe regarding the potential for corporate ownership of law firms:

Australia’s Slater & Gordon Ltd. became the first law firm in the world to be listed on a stock exchange in 2007. And despite its critics, it has since been busy growing revenue at a rapid clip, gobbling up rivals at home and in Britain. It now has its eyes on Canada.

The concept was an issue in Law Society of Upper Canada elections earlier this year. The Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA), which represents personal injury lawyers likely to face competitive pressure if Slater & Gordon enters Canada, endorsed a list of candidates opposed to the idea. Twenty-seven of the 40 lawyers who won what are known as “bencher” seats on the law society’s governing body were OTLA-approved. A follow-up report on the idea is expected to come before the law society this fall.

Proponents say allowing law firms to attract capital from non-lawyers means they can use it to expand and provide innovative new legal services, such as those offered in kiosks in department stores or via the Web. They say these new services will help deal with the “access to justice” problem, which sees many Canadians unable to afford a lawyer.

But naysayers warn the reforms would force lawyers to answer to bottom-line-focused shareholders, instead of just to their clients and the greater good. They say this would create new ethical and conflict-of-interest land mines, if the interests of a law firm’s owners and its clients clash. Critics also charge that there is no evidence these new structures help those who cannot afford a lawyer to hire one.

Of the naysayer’s points, only the second, regarding ethics and conflict-of-interest, carries much weight with me. To suggest that practitioner-owned firms think only of their clients and the greater good is to put these firms on rather a higher pedestal than I think is warranted; the third point is irrelevant because the onus is on the regulators to prove that harm is likely, rather than on innovators to prove that improvement is likely.

The Law Society of Upper Canada has published Alternative Business Structures and the Legal Profession in Ontario: A Discussion Paper in which is stated:

Legal service regulation ensures that clients have competent, independent legal representation provided with candour and confidentiality. It also protects society by ensuring that legal services are provided with fidelity to the cause of justice, the rule of law and the administration of justice. These professional values would have to be safeguarded in any move to liberalize ownership or structure including ABS.

Many of those who are sceptical of ABS express particular concern about protection of these professional values.[22] On the other hand, ABS proponents do not dismiss the importance of these professional values, but rather believe that these values can be properly protected in an ABS model.[23]

Footnote 22 refers to a paper by Nick Robinson of Harvard Law School titled When Lawyers Don’t Get All the Profits: Non-Lawyer Ownership of Legal Services, Access, and Professionalism:

With multiple countries now allowing for non-lawyer ownership of legal services, and other jurisdictions considering a similar shift, the legal profession is in the midst of a global regulatory moment. Where non-lawyer ownership has been allowed, personal injury firms have listed on stock exchanges, major insurance companies have bought law firms, and brands best known for their grocery stores have started offering legal services. Proponents argue that these developments will spur investment and innovation, promoting access to justice by making legal services more affordable and reliable. However, there has been little empirical research to test this proposition.

This article draws on case studies and quantitative data from the United Kingdom and Australia, where non-lawyer ownership has been allowed, as well as the United States – where parallels to such ownership have emerged in online and administrative law legal services. Based on this evidence, it argues that the benefits of non-lawyer ownership have been oversold with respect to access to civil legal services for poor and moderate-income populations and it identifies serious new professionalism challenges such ownership can create. While some form of non-lawyer ownership is likely to continue to spread, these conclusions cast doubt on the ability of non-lawyer ownership to substantially improve access to legal services, suggesting that alternative access strategies should be prioritized. They also point towards the need to carefully regulate non-lawyer ownership in some contexts.

Traditionally, academics have been wary that lawyers will capture the regulation of legal services, but non-lawyer ownership, which allows for others to profit from legal services as well, raises the likelihood that new actors may also capture the profession’s regulation. Given this environment, the article recommends that going forward a diverse set of stakeholders, drawing on as much empirical data as possible, develop a tailored approach to the regulation of non-lawyer ownership.

It’s an interesting debate and not much different, as far as I can tell, from the question of whether corporations should be allowed to own Portfolio Management companies. I think the disputing lawyers would be well advised to look at some of the bank-owned asset managers as a case study; I suspect that corporate ownership of law firms will lead to:

  • increased access to
  • plain vanilla, cookie-cutter legal advice

It was another poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 38bp, FixedResets losing 46bp and DeemedRetractibles off 2bp. Enbridge issues were particularly notable on the unfortunate side of the lengthy Performance Highlights table. Volume was average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150806
Click for Big

TRP.PR.A, which resets 2019-12-31 at +192, is bid at 18.55 to be $0.71 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +154, is $1.17 cheap at its bid price of 14.10.

impVol_MFC_150806
Click for Big

Another good fit today!

Most expensive is MFC.PR.F, resetting at +141bp on 2016-6-19, bid at 17.13 to be 0.44 rich, while MFC.PR.M, resetting at +236bp on 2019-122-19, is bid at 21.85 to be $0.46 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150806
Click for Big

The fit on the BAM issues continues to be horrible.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 18.00 to be $1.22 cheap. BAM.PF.X, resetting at +180bp on 2017-6-30 is bid at 17.25 and appears to be $1.19 rich.

impVol_FTS_150806
Click for Big

FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 20.63, looks $0.42 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 19.75 and is $0.99 cheap.

pairs_FR_150806
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -0.04%, with one outlier above 1.00%. There is one junk outlier above +1.00%.

pairs_FF_150806
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.9964 % 2,036.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.9964 % 3,560.3
Floater 3.60 % 3.63 % 55,481 18.20 3 1.9964 % 2,164.7
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4585 % 2,767.0
SplitShare 4.60 % 4.80 % 59,880 3.15 3 0.4585 % 3,242.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4585 % 2,530.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.72 % 5.38 % 65,117 2.09 9 -0.1762 % 2,484.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.42 % 5.41 % 81,761 14.70 28 -0.3768 % 2,602.0
FixedReset 4.71 % 3.83 % 209,406 16.00 87 -0.4633 % 2,231.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.12 % 5.15 % 106,205 5.47 34 -0.0207 % 2,579.1
FloatingReset 2.32 % 3.29 % 45,782 6.02 9 -0.0099 % 2,256.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -7.95 % Looks like completely inadequate market-making on this issue, since the incredible volume of 6,480 shares appears to have overwhelmed the market making arrangements at the Exchange. The VWAP was 24.24; at 3:51pm there was a trade of 400 shares at 24.25; at 3:57, 100 shares at 23.88; at 3:59, 100 shares at 22.84; and again at 3:59, 200 shares at 22.83. So, while I have not checked whether this lamentable state of affairs is due to inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange reporting or inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange supervision of market-makers, I’ll bet a nickel the market-maker is just plain lazy, with a stupid supervisor.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 22.18
Evaluated at bid price : 22.46
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -3.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 14.06
Evaluated at bid price : 14.06
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
ENB.PR.D FixedReset -3.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 15.63
Evaluated at bid price : 15.63
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset -2.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 16.26
Evaluated at bid price : 16.26
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset -2.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset -2.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.63
Evaluated at bid price : 20.63
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset -2.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 17.86
Evaluated at bid price : 17.86
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
HSE.PR.C FixedReset -2.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
ENB.PF.E FixedReset -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 17.91
Evaluated at bid price : 17.91
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset -1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.70
Evaluated at bid price : 20.70
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
ENB.PF.A FixedReset -1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 17.74
Evaluated at bid price : 17.74
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
ENB.PR.T FixedReset -1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 16.88
Evaluated at bid price : 16.88
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %
BMO.PR.W FixedReset -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.37
Evaluated at bid price : 21.67
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 15.02
Evaluated at bid price : 15.02
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.29
Evaluated at bid price : 21.58
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 18.15
Evaluated at bid price : 18.15
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 17.05
Evaluated at bid price : 17.05
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 13.90
Evaluated at bid price : 13.90
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 22.03
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Premium -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 24.41
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 16.97
Evaluated at bid price : 16.97
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
PVS.PR.D SplitShare 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.24
Bid-YTW : 5.25 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 13.25
Evaluated at bid price : 13.25
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
RY.PR.K FloatingReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset 1.99 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.01
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 12.97
Evaluated at bid price : 12.97
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 13.12
Evaluated at bid price : 13.12
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 140,630 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 25.40; TD crossed 100,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-11-25
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.37
Bid-YTW : 2.74 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset 117,700 RBC crossed blocks of 40,000 and 65,000, both at 23.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.48
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 100,600 Scotia crossed 100,000 at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-04-27
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
BNS.PR.B FloatingReset 78,897 TD crossed 77,200 at 23.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.15
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 55,425 RBC crossed 21,900 at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 53,339 RBC crossed 40,000 at 19.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.46 – 24.25
Spot Rate : 1.7900
Average : 1.0132

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 22.18
Evaluated at bid price : 22.46
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 13.25 – 14.25
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.5912

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 13.25
Evaluated at bid price : 13.25
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %

BMO.PR.W FixedReset Quote: 21.67 – 22.26
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.3650

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.37
Evaluated at bid price : 21.67
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 14.06 – 14.69
Spot Rate : 0.6300
Average : 0.4129

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 14.06
Evaluated at bid price : 14.06
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %

MFC.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 21.88 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 1.1200
Average : 0.9053

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.88
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %

TRP.PR.F FloatingReset Quote: 16.85 – 17.50
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.4432

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-06
Maturity Price : 16.85
Evaluated at bid price : 16.85
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %

August 5, 2015

Thursday, August 6th, 2015

There is more muttering about a September Fed hike:

Traders have never been more convinced of a September rate hike by the Federal Reserve.

The chances of an interest-rate increase next month reached 52 percent Wednesday, up from just 38 percent just two days earlier. What’s fueled the change of heart? Hawkish comments from Fed Bank of Atlanta President Dennis Lockhart on Tuesday, and a surprisingly strong report on U.S. service-sector growth Wednesday morning.

Yields on Treasury one-month bills rose Wednesday to the highest since November, while those on two-year notes touched the highest since 2011. Longer maturities slumped as well. Benchmark 10-year yields added five basis points to 2.27 percent.

But historical rules may not apply in this peculiar world:

Treasury two-year yields of just 0.73 percent are low historically, yet they’re looking better and better compared with the alternatives.

The U.S. yield is almost 1 percentage point more than its German counterpart, which is negative 0.25 percent. The premium reached the most this week since 2007. Against Canada, the spread was as much as 33 basis points on Aug. 4, also the most in eight years.

While the Fed is getting ready to raise rates, the European Central Bank is buying government bonds to support the economy by putting downward pressure on borrowing costs. The Bank of Canada cut interest rates twice this year.

Yesterday I reported on SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher’s harsh words reporting Dodd-Frank. Today there’s some more Dodd-Frank idiocy:

The Securities and Exchange Commission today adopted a final rule that requires a public company to disclose the ratio of the compensation of its chief executive officer (CEO) to the median compensation of its employees. The new rule, mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, provides companies with flexibility in calculating this pay ratio, and helps inform shareholders when voting on “say on pay.”

This social engineering was endorsed by Commissioner Kara M. Stein, Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar and Chair Mary Jo White, who noted:

To say that the views on the pay ratio disclosure requirement are divided is an obvious understatement. Since it was mandated by Congress, the pay ratio rule has been controversial, spurring a contentious and, at times, heated dialogue. The Commission has received more than 287,400 comment letters, including over 1,500 unique letters, with some asserting the importance of the rule to shareholders as they consider the issue of appropriate CEO compensation and investment decisions, and others asserting that the rule has no benefits and will needlessly cause issuers to incur significant costs.

These differences in views were evident at the time the Commission voted to propose the pay ratio rule. That the Commission was even considering the rule proposal was, for example, criticized as contrary to our mission. We may hear similar thoughts today.

So the three Democrats supported the measure, but the two Republicans opposed it; our friend Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher stated:

The release does an impressive job of creating out of whole cloth a rationale for this rule: that it could help inform investors in their oversight of executive compensation, including say-on-pay votes.[1] But, to steal a line from Justice Scalia, this is pure applesauce.[2] The purpose of this rule is not to inform a reasonable investor’s voting or investment decision.[3] The AFL-CIO, which lobbied for the rule’s inclusion in Dodd-Frank, has explained for us its true purpose: “Disclosing this pay ratio will shame companies into lowering C.E.O. pay.”[4] And, “They will be embarrassed, and that’s the whole point.”[5] But addressing perceived income inequality is not the province of the securities laws or the Commission. And yet here we are, on the cusp of adopting a nakedly political rule that hijacks the SEC’s disclosure regime to once again effect social change desired by ideologues and special interest groups.

* * *

As an initial matter, we did not have to take up this rule today. Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank does not have a statutory deadline. There are other, more pressing matters for the Commission, including policymaking with respect to matters actually involving the SEC’s core mission. On the occasion of Dodd-Frank’s fifth anniversary, many have spoken about the law as a fait accompli. But that is far from the truth at the SEC.[6] For example, we have not completed our implementation of Title VII,[7] and we are way past the statutory deadline for adopting mandated rules on stock lending transparency. This rulemaking may well be the most useless of all our Dodd-Frank mandates — that really says something — and it warranted the “caboose” treatment.

and Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar said:

Today’s rulemaking implements a provision of the highly partisan Dodd-Frank Act[2] that pandered to politically-connected special interest groups and, independent of the Act, could not stand on its own merits.[3] I am incredibly disappointed the Commission is stepping into that fray.

Section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank simply has nothing to do with protecting investors, ensuring fair, orderly, and efficient markets, or facilitating capital formation. The proposing release is candid about the fact that “neither the statute nor the related legislative history directly states the objectives or intended benefits of the provision or of a specific market failure, if any, that is intended to be remedied.”[4]

The timing of this vote is quite peculiar given the recent moves by Congress to repeal the pay-ratio provision. Last week, six more co-sponsors signed on to a bill introduced in the House by Representative Bill Huizenga of Michigan to repeal Section 953(b), bringing the total number of co-sponsors to 23 members.[32] Less than a month ago, Senator Mike Rounds of South Dakota introduced a pay-ratio repeal bill in the Senate, which added a co-sponsor two days ago.[33] It does not seem coincidental that our open meeting was scheduled for the week after the House of Representatives adjourned for August recess and one day before the Senate is expected to do the same.[34]

But it ain’t over ’til it’s over … and that might be a while:

Even so, Republicans and business groups still oppose the requirement and said the SEC ignored some of their recommendations to improve it. Groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce or the Business Roundtable are expected to sue the agency over the rule.

“We will continue to review the rule and explore our options for how best to clean up the mess it has created,” the chamber’s David Hirschmann said in a statement Wednesday.

The whole thing is as crazy as it would be to get the securities regulators to encourage greater representation by women on boards and in positions of senior management … oh, wait … we’ve done that … it was a request of the Ontario government. Well, at least it reassures us that everything is perfect in InvestmentLand!

Wonder of wonders, it was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, something I haven’t had much opportunity to say in he past three months! PerpetualDiscounts gained 29bp, FixedResets won 62bp and DeemedRetractibles were up 32bp. The Performance Highlights table is lengthy and very heavily tilted towards winners. Volume was below average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.43%, equivalent to 7.06% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.0%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 305bp, a significant increase from the 295bp reported July 29.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150805
Click for Big

TRP.PR.B, which resets 2020-6-30 at +128, is bid at 14.06 to be $0.46 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +154, is $0.81 cheap at its bid price of 14.36.

impVol_MFC_150805
Click for Big

Another good fit today!

Most expensive is MFC.PR.I, resetting at +286bp on 2017-9-19, bid at 24.85 to be 0.59 rich, while MFC.PR.K, resetting at +222bp on 2018-9-19, is bid at 21.20 to be $0.42 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150805
Click for Big

The fit on the BAM issues continues to be horrible.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.Z, resetting at +296bp on 2017-12-31, bid at 21.83 to be $1.04 cheap. BAM.PF.G, resetting at +284bp on 2020-6-30 is bid at 23.40 and appears to be $1.17 rich.

impVol_FTS_150805
Click for Big

FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 21.18, looks $0.70 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 19.96 and is $1.03 cheap.

pairs_FR_150805
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of -0.03%, with one outlier above 1.00%. There is one junk outlier above +1.00%.

pairs_FF_150805
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4166 % 1,996.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4166 % 3,490.6
Floater 3.68 % 3.73 % 55,743 17.97 3 0.4166 % 2,122.3
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.7363 % 2,754.4
SplitShare 4.62 % 4.98 % 60,650 3.15 3 -0.7363 % 3,228.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.7363 % 2,518.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.71 % 5.37 % 66,049 2.09 9 0.1765 % 2,489.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.40 % 5.43 % 83,874 14.66 28 0.2884 % 2,611.8
FixedReset 4.69 % 3.80 % 210,220 15.97 87 0.6218 % 2,241.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.12 % 5.17 % 104,287 5.48 34 0.3192 % 2,579.6
FloatingReset 2.32 % 3.29 % 46,800 6.02 9 0.1789 % 2,257.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PVS.PR.D SplitShare -2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 20.60
Evaluated at bid price : 20.60
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 21.18
Evaluated at bid price : 21.18
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
HSE.PR.G FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.01
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %
GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 24.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.72
Evaluated at bid price : 23.04
Bid-YTW : 5.40 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 15.62
Evaluated at bid price : 15.62
Bid-YTW : 4.75 %
HSE.PR.C FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.16
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 23.42
Evaluated at bid price : 23.78
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 18.41
Evaluated at bid price : 18.41
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 21.39
Evaluated at bid price : 21.72
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 18.22
Evaluated at bid price : 18.22
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
TD.PR.Z FloatingReset 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.11
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.19
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.03
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 15.64
Evaluated at bid price : 15.64
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.05
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.51 %
NA.PR.W FixedReset 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 21.57
Evaluated at bid price : 21.88
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.29
Evaluated at bid price : 22.88
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 18.40
Evaluated at bid price : 18.40
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 16.45
Evaluated at bid price : 16.45
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.03
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 17.21
Evaluated at bid price : 17.21
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
TD.PF.C FixedReset 1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 21.66
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.77
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
IFC.PR.C FixedReset 2.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %
BMO.PR.W FixedReset 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 21.73
Evaluated at bid price : 22.09
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 2.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 14.62
Evaluated at bid price : 14.62
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.30
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
HSE.PR.E FixedReset 2.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.39
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %
PWF.PR.T FixedReset 2.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 17.25
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 2.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 3.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 17.15
Evaluated at bid price : 17.15
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 3.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 20.77
Evaluated at bid price : 20.77
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 164,280 TD crossed 160,000 at 16.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.77
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset 121,200 Desjardins crossed 113,100 at 23.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
PWF.PR.T FixedReset 103,109 RBC crossd 100,000 at 24.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
BMO.PR.Y FixedReset 78,718 Desjardins crossed 74,300 at 24.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.77
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 67,500 RBC crossed 49,800 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 51,933 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.07.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.93 – 23.90
Spot Rate : 0.9700
Average : 0.6488

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.68
Evaluated at bid price : 22.93
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %

ENB.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 17.58 – 18.28
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.4452

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 17.58
Evaluated at bid price : 17.58
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %

MFC.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 21.88 – 22.80
Spot Rate : 0.9200
Average : 0.6700

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.88
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %

HSE.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 22.55 – 23.25
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.4504

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 22.01
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %

TRP.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 14.06 – 14.75
Spot Rate : 0.6900
Average : 0.4812

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-05
Maturity Price : 14.06
Evaluated at bid price : 14.06
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %

PVS.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 24.00 – 24.50
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3164

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %

August 4, 2015

Tuesday, August 4th, 2015

There are new indications of a September Fed hike:

Traders are seeing virtually even odds on a September interest-rate increase in the U.S., pushing a gauge of the dollar to a four-month high.

The greenback rallied versus most major peers Tuesday as Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Dennis Lockhart said in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that the central bank is close to raising rates next month for the first time since 2006. A report Friday is forecast to show U.S. employers added more than 200,000 jobs again in July.

Traders are pricing in a 48 percent probability that the Fed will raise borrowing costs in September, based on the assumption that the effective fed funds rate will average 0.375 percent after the first increase.

So I don’t know how this fits in:

Investor demand for longer-maturity Treasuries means they’re willing to accept a smaller yield premium to get the securities. Fidelity Investments says the trend has further to go.

The extra yield on 10-year notes over two-year securities shrank to 147 basis points Tuesday, the narrowest spread in three months. Traders in the world’s biggest bond market call this a flattening of the yield curve. The figure is less than the average of almost 2 percentage points for the past five years.

The difference between one-year U.S. yields and those for similar-maturity Treasury Inflation Protected Securities, a gauge of trader expectations for consumer prices over the life of the debt, was negative 0.67 percent. It has been below zero for two weeks.

SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher gave an entertaining speech on Dodd-Frank:

Last month marked the fifth anniversary of the Dodd-Frank Act,[1] meaning that my entire tenure as a Commissioner has occurred in the midst of the first Five-Year Plan for our national economy. And, as is always the case with grandiose central plans, Dodd-Frank has backfired, strangling our economy, increasing the fragility of the financial system, and politicizing our independent financial regulators.

Prudential regulation is an important tool for bank regulators to use in supervising banks’ risk-taking activities, so as to ensure that risks are limited to an acceptable level and avoid posing an undue strain on the government insurance backstop — despite the moral hazard and expectations of “no losses” that the insurance itself creates. But in practice, “prudential” regulation can and has evolved into an opaque regulatory system in which the government’s invisible hand replaces the market’s, transcending rule enforcement and becoming the decision maker for ostensibly private enterprises.

The attempts by our prudential regulators and their international counterparts to de-risk the U.S. capital markets and make them look like the banking markets are not just philosophically wrong — they are an attack on U.S. competitiveness. As I have stated before, piling more regulatory burdens on our capital markets will only cause more activity to move overseas, where up-and-coming jurisdictions in Asia and elsewhere would be more than happy to gain market share.[7] And it will stifle domestic economic activity, as companies will be forced to line up for bank loans made scarce by new bank regulations rather than pursuing capital formation opportunities in the market.

It was another rotten day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts and FixedResets both down 27bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 39bp. TRP, ENB and SLF issues are notable on the bad side of the Performance Highlights table. Volume was average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150804
Click for Big

TRP.PR.B, which resets 2020-6-30 at +128, is bid at 14.15 to be $0.84 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-1-30 at +154, is $0.85 cheap at its bid price of 14.30.

impVol_MFC_150804
Click for Big

Another good fit today!

Most expensive is MFC.PR.F, resetting at +141bp on 2016-6-19, bid at 16.78 to be 0.36 rich, while MFC.PR.K, resetting at +222bp on 2018-9-19, is bid at 21.12 to be $0.44 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150804
Click for Big

The fit on the BAM issues continues to be horrible.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.Z, resetting at +296bp on 2017-12-31, bid at 21.78 to be $1.21 cheap. BAM.PF.G, resetting at +284bp on 2020-6-30 is bid at 23.25 and appears to be $0.95 rich.

impVol_FTS_150804
Click for Big

FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 21.40, looks $0.91 expensive and resets 2019-3-1. FTS.PR.G, with a spread of +213bp and resetting 2018-9-1, is bid at 20.14 and is $0.88 cheap.

pairs_FR_150804
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs predict an average three-month bill yield over the next five-odd years of +0.03%, with one outlier above 1.00% and one below -1.00%. There is one junk outlier above +1.00%.

pairs_FF_150804
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.8774 % 1,988.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.8774 % 3,476.1
Floater 3.69 % 3.73 % 56,089 17.98 3 -0.8774 % 2,113.5
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0669 % 2,774.8
SplitShare 4.59 % 4.95 % 60,699 3.15 3 -0.0669 % 3,251.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0669 % 2,537.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.72 % 4.49 % 68,288 0.08 9 -0.2817 % 2,484.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.41 % 5.46 % 84,389 14.62 28 -0.2738 % 2,604.3
FixedReset 4.72 % 3.87 % 211,653 15.77 87 -0.2673 % 2,227.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.13 % 5.19 % 105,051 5.47 34 -0.3934 % 2,571.4
FloatingReset 2.33 % 3.38 % 47,702 6.02 9 -0.5781 % 2,253.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ENB.PR.B FixedReset -3.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 15.41
Evaluated at bid price : 15.41
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -3.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 14.30
Evaluated at bid price : 14.30
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -2.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 14.15
Evaluated at bid price : 14.15
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -2.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 18.09
Evaluated at bid price : 18.09
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset -2.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 15.45
Evaluated at bid price : 15.45
Bid-YTW : 4.81 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset -2.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.50
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -2.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.80
Evaluated at bid price : 20.80
Bid-YTW : 5.51 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible -2.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
TD.PR.Z FloatingReset -2.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.82
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
ENB.PF.G FixedReset -2.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 18.25
Evaluated at bid price : 18.25
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.65
Evaluated at bid price : 22.91
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.56
Evaluated at bid price : 23.81
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -2.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.88
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.07
Bid-YTW : 6.82 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 18.16
Evaluated at bid price : 18.16
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 16.17
Evaluated at bid price : 16.17
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
HSE.PR.E FixedReset -1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.06
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.48
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
MFC.PR.N FixedReset -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.36
Bid-YTW : 6.69 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.53
Evaluated at bid price : 21.85
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 24.49
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 12.60
Evaluated at bid price : 12.60
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 16.80
Evaluated at bid price : 16.80
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 16.80
Evaluated at bid price : 16.80
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 12.76
Evaluated at bid price : 12.76
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.67
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 17.20
Evaluated at bid price : 17.20
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %
ENB.PF.A FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 18.14
Evaluated at bid price : 18.14
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %
GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
BNS.PR.A FloatingReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.85
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.91
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 23.13
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.78
Bid-YTW : 7.11 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.48
Evaluated at bid price : 22.77
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.92
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.12
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
TD.PF.F Perpetual-Discount 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.81
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 17.32
Evaluated at bid price : 17.32
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset 1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 21.78
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
HSE.PR.C FixedReset 2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.01
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 2.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.40
Evaluated at bid price : 21.40
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 2.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 16.61
Evaluated at bid price : 16.61
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 3.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.P FixedReset 144,674 Desjardins crossed 130,900 at 21.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.81
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 79,500 Scotia crossed 74,000 at 22.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.98
Evaluated at bid price : 22.43
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
BMO.PR.Y FixedReset 78,561 Desjardins crossed 75,000 at 24.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.76
Evaluated at bid price : 23.96
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
HSE.PR.G FixedReset 71,650 Haywood (who?) crossed 70,000 at 22.83.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.15
Evaluated at bid price : 22.78
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 69,403 Scotia crossed 56,000 at 22.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 22.12
Evaluated at bid price : 22.63
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset 66,075 Scotia crossed 56,000 at 21.83.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 21.78
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRP.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 20.50 – 21.27
Spot Rate : 0.7700
Average : 0.4808

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.50
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %

ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.35 – 24.90
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3375

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.88
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %

MFC.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 20.92 – 21.50
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.3781

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.92
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %

GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.62 – 25.12
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3204

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %

MFC.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 21.95 – 22.50
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3959

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.81 – 24.24
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2860

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-08-04
Maturity Price : 23.56
Evaluated at bid price : 23.81
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %

MAPF Performance: July 2015

Monday, August 3rd, 2015

The fund underperformed the TXPR index in July (results for the BMO-CM “50” index are not yet available), weighed down by its heavy weighting in FixedResets, particularly those with a low Issue Reset Spread.

ZPR, is an ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues and a very high proportion of junk issues, returned -XX%, -XX% and -XX% over the past one-, three- and twelve-month periods, respectively (according to the fund’s data), versus returns for the TXPL index of -5.31%, -9.07% and -17.26% respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $1,004-million since inception in November 2012; AUM increased by $16.4-million in June; given an index return of -5.31% a decrease of about $52-million was expected, so there was a very significant cash inflow over the month. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents … although for this month it appears that buying from this ETF was swamped by other sellers!

TXPR had returns over one-, three- and twelve-months of -4.10%, -7.53% and -11.47% respectively with CPD performance within expectations.

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for the month were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to July 31, 2015
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat N/A N/A
Floater -10.78% -11.82%
OpRet N/A N/A
SplitShare +0.07% +0.69%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium -0.84% -1.05%
PerpetualDiscount -2.01% -5.98%
FixedReset -4.09% -6.69%
DeemedRetractible -1.47% -2.48%
FloatingReset -2.71% -2.45%

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close July 31, 2015, was $8.9795.

Returns to July 31, 2015
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month -4.66% -3.84% -4.10% N/A
Three Months -8.39% -6.95% -7.53% N/A
One Year -10.64% -11.00% -11.47% -11.66%
Two Years (annualized) -1.14% -3.83% -3.69% N/A
Three Years (annualized) -0.12% -2.00% -2.33% -2.72%
Four Years (annualized) +0.61% -0.42% -0.73% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +3.48% +2.15% +1.42% +0.91%
Six Years (annualized) +5.38% +3.40% +2.48%  
Seven Years (annualized) +11.52% +3.83% +2.96%  
Eight Years (annualized) +9.00% +2.33% +1.48%  
Nine Years (annualized) +8.61% +2.15%    
Ten Years (annualized) +8.20% +2.24%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +8.13% +2.50%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +9.01% +2.79%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +9.34% +3.05%    
Fourteen Years (annualized) +9.48% +3.12%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -3.78%, -6.10% and -8.08%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is -0.72%; five year is +2.36%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Class Adv [into which was merged Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund)] (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -4.13%, -7.99% & N/A, respectively.
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -3.33%, -6.16% & -9.25%, respectively. Three year performance is -1.04%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are -3.62%, -6.59% and -10.70% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is -5.32%, -9.08% and -17.51% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively. Two year performance is -7.67%.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund (Dividend Tax Credit Class, the best performing) are -3.3%, -7.2% and -4.7% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are -6.63% and -10.25% for the past three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for PowerShares Canadian Preferred Share Index Class, Series Fare -3.94%, -7.46% and -12.64% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The two-, three- and five-year figures are -4.98%, -4.01% and -0.31%, respectively.
Figures for the First Asset Preferred Share Investment Trust (PSF.UN) are -5.74%, -9.21 and -14.77 for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The two-, three-, four- and five-year figures are -6.79%, -4.44%, -3.09% and -1.45%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past four years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. Until the market became so grossly segmented, there were many comparables for any given issue – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio was, in effect ‘locked in’ to the low coupon DeemedRetractibles due to projected long-term gains from a future OSFI decision to the detriment of trading gains, particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index, and in June, 2013, when the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles behaved like PerpetualDiscounts in a sharply negative market. Nowadays, the fund is ‘locked-in’ to the low-spread FixedResets from these companies: GWO.PR.N, MFC.PR.F, and SLF.PR.G.

In May, insurance DeemedRetractibles performed worse than bank DeemedRetractibles:

DR_1MoPerf_150731
Click for Big

… and slightly worse than Unregulated Straight Perpetuals.

insUnreg_perf_150731
Click for Big

Correlations were OK for banks (26%), good for insurance (59%) but not very good for unregulated issues (14%; not shown).

A lingering effect of the downdraft of 2013 has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility but given my recent updates in recent daily market reports, I will not discuss them further in this post.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles; something that dismays me, particularly given that the market does not yet agree with me regarding the insurance issues! There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
September 10.4601 5.28% 0.997 5.296% 1.0000 $0.5540
December, 2014 10.5701 4.83% 1.009 4.787% 1.0000 $0.5060
March, 2015 9.9573 4.99% 1.001 4.985% 1.0000 $0.4964
June, 2015 9.4181 5.55% 1.002 5.539% 1.0000 $0.5217
July, 2015 8.9795 5.61% 0.995 5.638% 1.0000 $0.5063
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The same reasoning is also applied to FixedResets from these issuers, other than explicitly defined NVCC from banks.

Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.
Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates. For June 30, 2015, yields of 0.91% and 0.52%, respectively, were assumed; base rates in July were 0.62% and 0.40%, respectively.

The 29bp drop in GOC-5 did not help the sustainable yield calculation!

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on June 30; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a small position in these issues.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Dividend Yield” of 4.5% as of August 29, 2014, but this is the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF was 4.89% as of August 29, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s a little higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to discuss it in the context of portfolio reporting is misleading.

However, BMO has taken a significant step forward in that they are no longer reporting the “Portfolio Yield” directly on their website; the information is taken from the “Enhanced Fund Profile” which is available only as a PDF link. CPD doesn’t report this metric on the CPD fact sheet or on their website. I may have one less thing to mock the fundcos about!

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance has generally been due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

Low-Spread FixedResets: July 2015

Monday, August 3rd, 2015

As noted in MAPF Portfolio Composition: July 2015, the fund now has a large allocation to FixedResets, mostly of relatively low spread.

Many of these were largely purchased with proceeds of sales of DeemedRetractibles from the same issuer; it is interesting to look at the price trend of some of the Straight/FixedReset pairs. We’ll start with GWO.PR.N / GWO.PR.I; the fund sold the latter to buy the former at a takeout of about $1.00 in mid-June, 2014; relative prices over the past year are plotted as:

GWOPRN_GWOPRI_bidDiff_150731
Click for Big

Given that the June month-end take-out was $5.70, this is clearly a trade that has not worked out very well.

In July, 2014, I reported sales of SLF.PR.D to purchase SLF.PR.G at a take-out of about $0.15:

SLFPRG_SLFPRD_bidDiff_150731
Click for Big

There were similar trades in August, 2014 (from SLF.PR.C) at a take-out of $0.35. The June month-end take-out (bid price SLF.PR.D less bid price SLF.PR.G) was $5.01, so that hasn’t worked very well either.

November saw the third insurer-based sector swap, as the fund sold MFC.PR.C to buy the FixedReset MFC.PR.F at a post-dividend-adjusted take-out of about $0.85 … given a June month-end take-out of $4.46, that’s another regrettable trade, although another piece executed in December at a take-out of $1.57 has less badly.

MFCPRF_MFCPRC_bidDiff_150731
Click for Big

This trend is not restricted to the insurance sector, which I expect will become subject to NVCC rules in the relatively near future and are thus subject to the same redemption assumptions I make for DeemedRetractibles. Other pairs of interest are BAM.PR.X / BAM.PR.N:

BAMPRX_BAMPRN_bidDiff_150731
Click for Big

… and FTS.PR.H / FTS.PR.J:

FTSPRH_FTSPRJ_bidDiff_150731
Click for Big

Note that the last point in this graph, results from a nonsensical quote supplied by the Toronto Stock Exchange, as discussed on July 31. I have not checked whether this lamentable state of affairs is due to inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange reporting or inadequate Toronto Stock Exchange supervision of market-makers.

… and PWF.PR.P / PWF.PR.S:

PWFPRP_PWFPRS_bidDiff_150731
Click for Big

I will agree that the fund’s trades highlighted in this post may be decried as cases of monumental bad timing, but I should point out that in May, 2014, the fund was 63.9% Straight / 9.5% FixedReset while in May 2015 the fund was 12% Straight / 86% FixedReset, FloatingReset and FixedFloater (The latter figures include allocations from those usually grouped as ‘Scraps’). Given that the indices are roughly 30% Straight / 60% FixedReset & FloatingReset, it is apparent that the fund was extremely overweighted in Straights / underweighted in FixedResets in May 2014 but this situation has now reversed. HIMIPref™ analytics have been heavily favouring low-spread issues and the fund’s holdings are overwhelmingly of this type.

Summarizing the charts above in tabular form, we see:

FixedReset Straight Take-out
December 2013
Take-out
MAPF Trade
Take-out
December 2014
June 2015 July 2015
GWO.PR.N
3.65%+130
GWO.PR.I
4.5%
($0.04) $1.00 $2.95 5.84 5.70
SLF.PR.G
4.35%+141
SLF.PR.D
4.45%
($1.29) $0.25 $2.16 6.18 5.01
MFC.PR.F
4.20%+141
MFC.PR.C
4.50%
($1.29) $0.86 $1.20 5.10 4.46
BAM.PR.X
4.60%+180
BAM.PR.N
4.75%
($2.06)   $0.17 3.57 4.73
FTS.PR.H
4.25%+145
FTS.PR.J
4.75%
$0.60   $5.68 6.40 5.46
PWF.PR.P
4.40%+160
PWF.PR.S
4.80%
($0.67)   $3.00 5.96 5.55
The ‘Take-Out’ is the bid price of the Straight less the bid price of the FixedReset; approximate execution prices are used for the “MAPF Trade” column. Bracketted figures in the ‘Take-Out’ columns indicate a ‘Pay-Up’

Changes were varied from May month-end to June month-end.

In January, a slow decline due to fears of deflation got worse with Canada yields plummeting after the Bank of Canada rate cut with speculation rife about future cuts although this slowly died away.

And in late March / early April it got worse again, with one commenter attributing at least some of the blame to the John Heinzl piece in which I pointed out the expected reduction in dividend payouts! In May, a rise in the markets in the first half of the month was promptly followed by a slow decline in the latter half; perhaps due to increased fears that a lousy Canadian economy will delay a Canadian tightening. Changes in June varied as the markets were in an overall decline.

All in all, I take the view that we’ve seen this show before: during the Credit Crunch, Floaters got hit extremely badly (to the point at which their fifteen year total return was negative) because (as far as I can make out) their dividend rate was dropping (as it was linked to Prime) while the yields on other perpetual preferred instruments were skyrocketing (due to credit concerns). Thus, at least some investors insisted on getting long term corporate yields from rates based (indirectly and with a lag, in the case of FixedResets) on short-term government policy rates. And it’s happening again!

There is further discussion of the extremely poor YTD performance of FixedResets in the post eMail to a Client.

Here’s the June performance for FixedResets that had a YTW Scenario of ‘To Perptuity’ at mid-month.:

FR_1MoPerf_150731
Click for Big

The market continues to be rather disorderly; correlations between Issue Reset Spread and monthly performance for July are basically zero. Interestingly, the correlation for returns against term to reset was a little better, although still lousy at 8% and 15% for Pfd-2 and Pfd-3 issues respectively.

FR_1MoPerf_150731_term
Click for Big

MAPF Portfolio Composition: July, 2015

Monday, August 3rd, 2015

Turnover remained low in July at about 6%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to further footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on June 30 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2015-7-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 0% (-3.9) N/A N/A
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 2.6% (+0.7) 5.75% 14.27
Fixed-Reset 73.5% (+2.1) 5.64% 11.31
Deemed-Retractible 7.9% (-1.7) 6.47% 7.47
FloatingReset 6.1% (-0.3) 3.42% 18.69
Scraps (Various) 9.5% (-1.4) 6.39% 13.50
Cash +0.5% (+0.7) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.61% 11.69
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming a constant GOC-5 rate of 0.62% and a constant 3-Month Bill rate of 0.40%

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2015-7-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 19.1% (-0.7)
Pfd-2(high) 31.6% (+1.6)
Pfd-2 0%
Pfd-2(low) 38.6% (-0.9)
Pfd-3(high) 1.7% (-0.1)
Pfd-3 4.2% (-0.1)
Pfd-3(low) 3.1% (-1.1)
Pfd-4(high) 0% (0)
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0% (0)
Pfd-5(high) 0% (0)
Pfd-5 0.5% (-0.1)
Cash +0.5% (+0.7)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.C, which is rated P-5 by S&P and is unrated by DBRS
A position held in NPI.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3(high)” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3(high).
A position held in INE.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2015-7-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 2.4% (-8.7)
$50,000 – $100,000 17.8% (+13.7)
$100,000 – $200,000 56.2% (+0.5)
$200,000 – $300,000 16.0% (-6.4)
>$300,000 7.1% (+0.1)
Cash +0.5% (+0.7)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
    • MAPF is less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF is overweighted in FixedResets

eMail To A Client

Saturday, August 1st, 2015

There has been a very steep decline in the Canadian preferred share index in 2015 – so steep, in fact, that some investors are selling simply because their investment has lost value, which has to be one of the worst trade techniques ever (it imposes a form of negative convexity on your portfolio, among other bad things).

Still, it is unnerving. Look at the graph of the value of an investment in CPD, as published by Blackrock:

prefsYTD_150731
Click for big

This isn’t the smooth ride that some were expecting! The broad TXPR index was down 4.10% on the month and is down 11.47% over the past year. The FixedReset TXPL index has fared even worse, down 5.31% on the month and a horrific 17.26% on the year. I don’t have figures for the BMO-CM 50 at this time, but if I plug in the TXPR results for July, I can draw the following graph, which shows the rolling twelve month and twenty four month total returns from December 31, 1992:

prefIndexReturns_150731
Click for Big

So both the one- and two-year returns for the index now show losses exceeded only by the depths of the Credit Crunch in the 20+ years of data I have available. And, I will note, the four year total return for TXPR is now negative – in fact, you have to go back to January, 2011, to find a starting point that will give you a better than zero return through the period.

So I received an eMail from a client that said, in part:

But my real problem is that in trying to decide whether to stay in your fund or pull out, I do not know what I am betting on. The prospect of rising CDN interest rates (seems unlikely that would help), the overall Cdn economy? Something else?

What is your take on what it would take for preferred values to start moving in the right direction?

What follows is my answer, with minor edits to ensure anonymity and to reflect the medium of the message.

I can appreciate your concern.

Your first investment was valued on 2012-11-19; the second on 2013-1-21.

From the end of November, 2012, to June, 2015, the fund’s total return (reinvesting dividends, before fees) was -0.35%, compared to the BMO-CM “50” index return of -3.64%. TXPR (the broad S&P/TSX Preferred Share index) returned -4.04%, while TXPL (S&P/TSX, FixedResets only) returned -9.65%.

For the period beginning 2013-1-31 I find: Fund, -1.95%; BMO, -4.86%; TXPR, -5.56%; TXPL, -11.42%.

So the problem is not with the fund so much as it is with the market.

The indices are currently comprised of about 1/3 Straight Perpetuals, 2/3 FixedResets. For an idea of what has happened to Straights, see the attached Chart #22 from the July PrefLetter, which shows the interest-equivalent spread between Straight Perpetuals and long-term Corporate bonds (the “Seniority Spread”).

PL_150710_Body_Chart_22
Click for Big

Market Yields changed as follows, from November 28, 2012 to June 30 , 2015
Five Year Canadas: 1.31% … 0.81%
Long Canadas: 2.38% … 2.37%
Long Corporates: 4.2% … 4.0%
Straight Perpetuals: 4.88% … 5.20%
Interest-Equivalent Straight Perpetuals: 6.35% … 6.76%

These changes have had the effect of widening the Seniority Spread from 215bp to 276bp. I can think of two rationales for this widening:
i) the retail investors who dominate the preferred share space are demanding a higher spread to compensate for perceived risks of losses once “interest rates start to rise”; that is, they are reacting more than the institutional investors in the bond market to risks of loss. This could be due to higher risk-aversion (defining “risk” as chance of loss), less binding duration constraints on the portfolio, simple lack of sophistication, or any combination of these three considerations. Note that I have not made a formal study of the subject and there may be other factors, but those are the ones that occur to me through my experience talking to investors.
ii) Straight Perpetual yields are being pushed up (or at least supported) by FixedReset yields (see chart FR-44, below, from the extract from the July PrefLetter ). This would be due to a perception amongst investors that Straight Perpetuals are more “risky” (whatever that means!) than FixedResets and hence deserving of a positive spread; note that this effect is not observed when comparing sovereign inflation-indexed bonds to nominals (the Inflation Risk Premium).

PL_150710_App_FR_Chart_44
Click for Big
These spreads use Yield-To-Worst, not Current Yield
This is Chart FR-44

With respect to FixedResets, it is clear from the horrible performance of TXPL referenced above relative to that of the broader TXPR (which one can approximate as being comprised of about 2/3 TXPL throughout the period of interest, although it has, of course, varied, with FixedReset issuance slightly overcompensating for capital losses) that FixedResets have been whacked.

I have hypothesized a rationale for this underperformance in the attached extract from PrefLetter under the heading “An Experimental Data Series”, to wit: in the face of declines in the Five-Year Canada yield (which is the basis for the resets of of this type of preferred share), investors are attempting to maintain a constant yield irregardless of what is happening with other yields. This is hard to justify on rational grounds, but there has always been an element of irrationality in preferred share pricing! Thus, declines in the GOC-5 yield have been 100% compensated for by declines in price, without referencing yields of comparable long-term instruments; this contradicts one of the features of FixedResets that was used (perhaps inadvertently through indiscriminate use of the term “interest rates”) to help sell the issues when they were developed – that price would remain constant given parallel shifts in the yield curve (with credit spreads assumed, again implicitly, to be constant).

PL_150710_App_FR_Chart_48
Click for Big

This 100% dependence of FixedReset price on GOC-5 has a very large effect, as derived in the last equation on page 3 of the extract:
i) The base Modified Duration of FixedResets is equal to (1 / EFCY). The term EFCY (“Expected Future Current Yield”) is about 3.75%, implying a Modified Duration of about 27 – not only far higher than long bonds, but dependent upon more volatile five-year yields to boot!
ii) The term (25/P) in the equation implies negative convexity

So to summarize, I feel that the poor performance of the market since your initial investment is due to:
i) very high dependence of FixedReset prices on GOC-5 levels, which has contradicted prior assumptions of an equal and opposite co-dependence on long-term yield levels.
ii) maintenance of a spread to PerpetualDiscounts, which has prevented Straight Perpetuals from participating in price increases due to declines in long-term corporate yields.

PL_150710_App_FR_Chart_43
Click for Big
The “Bozo Spread” is the Current Yield of PerpetualDiscounts less the Current Yield of FixedResets
It is not yet clear whether the market pays more attention to these Current Yields, or to the Yields-to-Worst, when relating FixedResets to PerpetualDiscounts

I will also note that to a certain extent, we’ve seen this movie before: during the Credit Crunch Floating Rate issues performed appallingly poorly, since their dividends were linked to contemporary (as opposed to expected!) Canada Prime while their yields were linked to PerpetualDiscounts (see my contemporary article and the next chart)

floaterTotalReturn
Click for Big
Negative Total Return Over Fifteen Years!

So, while I can appreciate your dismay regarding the performance of your investment, I will point out that:
i) the key consideration is not past performance but how the characteristics of the asset class may be expected to fit into your portfolio requirements going forward.

ii) Expected income per unit in the fund has actually increased over the period, from $0.4643 in December 2012 to $0.5217 in June 2015 (see MAPF Performance: June 2015 ). This calculation is dependent upon various assumptions which you may or may not accept, but it represents my best guess!

iii) The increase in spreads over the period implies a significant reduction in expected income should you switch to another Fixed Income type of investment at this time.

iv) Expected future performance of FixedResets is highly geared to GOC-5, insofar as we can accept that the last equation on page 3 of the July PrefLetter extract reflects market reality. While I agree that we might be waiting a while for GOC-5 to increase substantially, I will suggest that current levels must be at or near a bottom. Mind you, I’ve been suggesting that continually for several years now and been wrong every time, so you may wish to disregard that particular exercise in market timing!

v) Expected future performance of Straights should be better than that of corporate long bonds over the medium term; and corporate long bonds should in turn outperform long Canadas; in both cases due to moderation of current high (by historical standards) spreads

I hope all this helps. I realize that I have used a fair bit of jargon in this eMail (and, what’s worse, jargon that I’ve developed myself!) so if there is anything in the above that makes no sense, feel free to ask for clarification. And, of course, if you would like to discuss this further prior to making an investment decision, that’s fine too – whether by eMail or telephone.

Sincerely,