Powell got hawkish at Jackson’s Hole:
Jerome H. Powell, the chair of the Federal Reserve, delivered a sobering message on Friday, saying the Fed must continue to raise interest rates — and keep them elevated for a while — to bring the fastest inflation in decades back under control.
The central bank’s campaign is likely to come at a cost to workers and overall growth, he acknowledged; but he argued that not acting would allow price increases to become a more permanent feature of the economy and prove even more painful down the road.
Stock prices plunged in the wake of Mr. Powell’s comments, as investors digested his stern commitment to raising rates and choking back inflation even if doing so damages growth and causes unemployment to rise. The S&P 500 fell 3.4 percent, its worst daily showing since mid-June, and investors in bonds began to bet that the central bank will raise rates by more than they had been expecting.
Mr. Powell’s full-throated commitment to defeating inflation began to put to rest an idea that had been percolating among investors: that the central bank might lift rates slightly more this year but then begin to lower them again next year. Instead, the Fed chair echoed many of his colleagues in arguing that rates will need to go higher, and will need to stay in economy-restricting territory for a while, until inflation is consistently coming down.
So the streets were filled with hard-nosed, tough-as-nails, whip-smart financial specialists wondering in bewilderment why inflation couldn’t be licked by the Fed waving its magic wand. Perhaps some of them were contemplating standing on a building ledge to admire the view:
The sell-off capped a week of choppy trading that left major indexes down 4% or more for the week.
All told, the S&P 500 fell 141.46 points to 4,057.66. The benchmark index is now down almost 15% for the year.
The Dow lost 1,008.38 points to close at 32,283.40. The last time the blue-chip average had a 1,000-point drop was in May.
The Nasdaq slid 497.56 points to 12,141.71, its biggest drop since June.
The Russell 2000 index of smaller companies fell 64.81 points, or 3.3%, to finish at 1,899.83.
…
The Toronto Stock Exchange’s S&P/TSX composite index ended down 299.05 points, or 1.5%, at 19,873.29, its biggest decline since July 14 and its lowest closing level since Aug. 9.For the week, the index was down 1.2%, its second straight weekly decline.
Here’s another straw in the wind for those following the effects of monetary tightening:
The veterinary sector has seen some of the most intense buying by large corporations in the past few years, with industry figures reporting purchase prices sometimes reaching nearly 30 times EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization) at its peak. That is far beyond the four- or five-times multiple a practice may have fetched in years past.
…
Consolidators in health fields typically take on large debts to purchase the practices, and industry leaders in other markets have said the increasing cost of borrowing is putting pressure on that business model.“With interest rates expected to increase, we may start to see multiples soften,” Michelle Kellaway, chief operating officer of Australia’s Greencross, told industry publication VIN News in June.
Brent Matthew, an Ontario veterinarian who consults others on how to run their practices, said he is aware of some practice owners who say their offers from VetStrategy have been put on hold but he has not heard from the company directly.
Dr. Matthew helps to value practices and says he has seen the market soften after witnessing intense bidding wars earlier in the pandemic.
Assiduous Readers will remember that I have often ranted about Marginal Effective Tax Rates on the poor, most recently on August 31, 2020. There are now indications that the problem will get some political attention:
Mr. Poilievre cites as an example a single mother with three children, earning $55,000 a year. If she were to earn an additional dollar, he says, clawbacks and taxes would eat up 80 cents – creating a marginal effective tax rate (METR) of 80 per cent.
Interestingly, the Conservative candidate makes the case for tax and benefit reform not on the typical right-wing terrain of economic efficiency but rather through an appeal to equity. Olivier Rancourt, economist with the Montreal Economic Institute, said that framing is more effective political marketing and more likely to directly appeal to the middle class. “It’s a message that conservatives are trying to embrace more and more,” he said.
…
Mr. Poilievre’s solution is broad-based tax reform: cuts to income and payroll taxes, what he describes as a cap on government spending, simplification of the tax code and a joint federal-provincial effort to reduce clawback rates in order to lower METRs. (And, of course, he says he will scrap the current federal fuel charge.)That joint effort is an acknowledgment that much of the problem is at a provincial level, and is particularly acute for Canadians who face clawbacks of social assistance payments once they start to earn income. The Finance Department analysis found that one-third of social assistance recipients had a marginal effective tax rate of 70 per cent or more – far beyond what even the highest earning Canadians pay.
I can’t say I’m a big fan of Poilievre or the hillbilly base to which he is in thrall, but it’s nice to see the issue get some political attention. On a brighter note, I was pleased to learn of a Department of Finance examination of the subject, which was even linked in the Globe article on-line (God, I love the Internet!):
Among non-SA [Social Assistance] recipient workers, the average EMTR [Effective Marginal Tax Rate] was 33% in 2017. The largest proportion (63.4%) faced EMTRs that were in the 30-49.9% range. About 29.3% faced EMTRs that were below 30% and 7.3% faced EMTRs of 50% or more.
The distribution of EMTRs is different among workers who also rely on SA income. Workers with SA income in their family are more likely to face a 50% EMTR or more. Among them, the proportion facing such a high EMTR varies between 22.7% and 44.9% – depending on the assumption used for estimating SA claw back ratesFootnote3 – compared with 7.3% among non-SA recipients.
I’ve said it before, I’ll say it again: universality is the way to go. A Universal Basic Income. Give every Canadian $X per year, include this $X in their income and adjust the tax rates accordingly to pay for it (reductions in entitlement programmes will also help). Start off small; X=1000. Increase gradually until marginal tax rates for recipients of government assistance do not discourage these people from taking part-time jobs, or picking up an extra shift, or moving to take a better job. Bang. Done.
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
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Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0383 % | 2,508.3 |
FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0383 % | 4,810.9 |
Floater | 6.30 % | 6.41 % | 51,868 | 13.22 | 2 | 0.0383 % | 2,772.6 |
OpRet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1161 % | 3,469.9 |
SplitShare | 4.90 % | 5.36 % | 37,762 | 3.03 | 8 | 0.1161 % | 4,143.8 |
Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1161 % | 3,233.2 |
Perpetual-Premium | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.2618 % | 2,833.4 |
Perpetual-Discount | 6.01 % | 6.16 % | 68,632 | 13.60 | 35 | -0.2618 % | 3,089.7 |
FixedReset Disc | 4.71 % | 6.19 % | 101,612 | 13.44 | 58 | 0.0419 % | 2,515.5 |
Insurance Straight | 5.98 % | 6.05 % | 79,816 | 13.73 | 19 | -0.6202 % | 3,008.7 |
FloatingReset | 7.40 % | 7.66 % | 39,130 | 11.66 | 2 | 0.4658 % | 2,625.7 |
FixedReset Prem | 5.07 % | 4.43 % | 109,487 | 1.83 | 6 | 0.0131 % | 2,612.8 |
FixedReset Bank Non | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0419 % | 2,571.3 |
FixedReset Ins Non | 4.74 % | 6.57 % | 58,226 | 13.43 | 14 | -0.1768 % | 2,570.1 |
Performance Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
NA.PR.S | FixedReset Disc | -9.34 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 20.00 Evaluated at bid price : 20.00 Bid-YTW : 6.83 % |
MIC.PR.A | Perpetual-Discount | -4.12 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 20.71 Evaluated at bid price : 20.71 Bid-YTW : 6.65 % |
IFC.PR.F | Insurance Straight | -3.05 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 21.98 Evaluated at bid price : 22.25 Bid-YTW : 6.05 % |
IFC.PR.G | FixedReset Ins Non | -2.87 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 21.61 Evaluated at bid price : 22.00 Bid-YTW : 6.57 % |
BAM.PR.X | FixedReset Disc | -1.78 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 17.70 Evaluated at bid price : 17.70 Bid-YTW : 7.01 % |
GWO.PR.S | Insurance Straight | -1.60 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 21.50 Evaluated at bid price : 21.50 Bid-YTW : 6.22 % |
SLF.PR.D | Insurance Straight | -1.41 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 18.90 Evaluated at bid price : 18.90 Bid-YTW : 5.89 % |
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CU.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | -1.32 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 21.76 Evaluated at bid price : 21.76 Bid-YTW : 6.07 % |
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GWO.PR.P | Insurance Straight | -1.12 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 21.75 Evaluated at bid price : 22.00 Bid-YTW : 6.24 % |
PWF.PR.T | FixedReset Disc | -1.09 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 19.14 Evaluated at bid price : 19.14 Bid-YTW : 7.18 % |
CU.PR.G | Perpetual-Discount | -1.08 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 19.15 Evaluated at bid price : 19.15 Bid-YTW : 5.91 % |
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GWO.PR.I | Insurance Straight | -1.04 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 19.10 Evaluated at bid price : 19.10 Bid-YTW : 6.00 % |
CM.PR.Q | FixedReset Disc | 1.00 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 21.92 Evaluated at bid price : 22.22 Bid-YTW : 6.15 % |
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TRP.PR.B | FixedReset Disc | 1.03 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 12.70 Evaluated at bid price : 12.70 Bid-YTW : 7.80 % |
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NA.PR.G | FixedReset Disc | 1.62 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 23.97 Evaluated at bid price : 24.40 Bid-YTW : 6.06 % |
CU.PR.E | Perpetual-Discount | 1.91 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 21.35 Evaluated at bid price : 21.35 Bid-YTW : 5.77 % |
TRP.PR.A | FixedReset Disc | 3.36 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 16.30 Evaluated at bid price : 16.30 Bid-YTW : 7.51 % |
FTS.PR.H | FixedReset Disc | 3.42 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 14.50 Evaluated at bid price : 14.50 Bid-YTW : 7.14 % |
Volume Highlights | |||
Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
PWF.PR.Z | Perpetual-Discount | 15,800 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 21.31 Evaluated at bid price : 21.31 Bid-YTW : 6.12 % |
SLF.PR.D | Insurance Straight | 13,597 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 18.90 Evaluated at bid price : 18.90 Bid-YTW : 5.89 % |
PWF.PF.A | Perpetual-Discount | 12,700 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2052-08-26 Maturity Price : 19.00 Evaluated at bid price : 19.00 Bid-YTW : 5.99 % |
PVS.PR.K | SplitShare | 11,070 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2029-05-31 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 22.90 Bid-YTW : 5.99 % |
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There were 0 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. |
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Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
MFC.PR.B | Insurance Straight | Quote: 19.69 – 22.50 Spot Rate : 2.8100 Average : 1.7432 YTW SCENARIO |
NA.PR.S | FixedReset Disc | Quote: 20.00 – 22.46 Spot Rate : 2.4600 Average : 1.5088 YTW SCENARIO |
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MIC.PR.A | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 20.71 – 21.90 Spot Rate : 1.1900 Average : 0.8180 YTW SCENARIO |
TRP.PR.D | FixedReset Disc | Quote: 18.00 – 18.99 Spot Rate : 0.9900 Average : 0.6374 YTW SCENARIO |
“If she were to earn an additional dollar, he says, clawbacks and taxes would eat up 80 cents – creating a marginal effective tax rate (METR) of 80 per cent.”
This is primarily the result of means testing of social benefits, which does go away with UBI which is clearly a mark in the positive column for the latter.
However, I such that Mr. Poilievre is being disingenuous in his example. That single mother’s METR is not 80%, it is 36% (if she were in Alberta in 2022 using combined provincial and federal rates). She loses 36 cents on that additional dollar to tax and 44 cents to the loss in government assistance. BUT this is the point of means testing, she doesn’t need it (in theory anyway if the means testing is anywhere close to reality).
This is like seniors moaning about OAS “clawbacks”. It isn’t deserved income to have taken away, it is a social benefit for those that need it.
So yes, it is a harsh happenstance for our single mother but also something to celebrate – greater financial independence. The Great Generation understood all of this implicitly.
She loses 36 cents on that additional dollar to tax and 44 cents to the loss in government assistance. BUT this is the point of means testing, she doesn’t need it (in theory anyway if the means testing is anywhere close to reality).
We are often told (without much, if any, supporting evidence) that a 50%+ tax rate destroys incentive. This is often used with reference to the fabled 1% who, let’s face it, aren’t really working for money any more. They’re working because they like it and they want the status and bragging rights that come with accomplishment, not to put bread on the table and make rent. Like many things, I’m sure that there is some truth to the assertion for the 1%, but I’m dubious about the magnitude of the effect.
It’s different for those who are a lot closer to the edge, who are just trying to eat well, make rent and hey, maybe even buy themselves a luxury item like a new TV. What’s the incentive to pick up an extra shift, take on additional responsibility, move to a location where a better job is available? With an 80% METR, not much. That’s where clawbacks are not just cruel, they are completely counter-productive in terms of getting people to improve their lives through increased effort. Clawbacks exist only to pander to the moral aspirations of the smug middle class.
I remember the trials and tribulations of a friend who was putting herself through school while working an almost-full-time job. As year-end approached, she would do increasingly meticulous calculations regarding how much she could work before she lost so many benefits it became a complete waste of time and effort. She wasn’t lazy – she was a hard-nosed capitalist, ideologically purer than most self-proclaimed conservatives, responding in a rational way to the bizarre and self-contradictory incentives in our economy.
To me the solution is to make sure benefits aren’t completely cut off above a certain income level but only gradually clawed back. Most government programs such as OAS are designed this way. I’ve had many people tell me that when their income increases to the point they reach a higher bracket that their take home after federal+provincial tax decreases, but that isn’t how marginal tax brackets work.
I am in a situation with OAS where it simply isn’t worth my time to apply for it because most of it will be clawed back (most of my income is dividends). I’m fine with that, obviously I really don’t need the money.
I am against UBI, it solves nothing. The way CERB was designed to give money to almost everyone was in some ways UBI. The resulting inflation from the money printing required to support this level of public spending was entirely predictable. I want just the basics from government – health care, police, fire… I don’t want them to pay me a basic income with money that ultimately has to come from me.
I do believe tax rates significantly over 50% are counterproductive. After retirement I was offered contracting work that would have pushed me into the top marginal tax rate. When I realized that I would also be paying 12% pst+gst on anything I treated myself to buying with the consulting earnings, for a total marginal rate of around 60%, I turned the contract down.
Forgot to mention – the government program(s) your friend was part of were poorly designed if she was suddenly cut off or almost cut off above a certain income threshold. To me the solution is to redesign the cut offs for those programs, not to give up on the idea of means testing.
Hi again James!
I realize that this is not a politically-oriented blog site; however, I felt that it would be remiss of me not to thank you for defining me!
I am a graduate – with an M.Sc. with Distinction – of a reputable Ontario university (at least it was reputable back in the pre-woke era); I worked and lived in various African countries with a UN agency for nearly 25 years; I married internationally and interculturally twice in my lifetime (my first wife was killed in a car accident); before departing Canada to begin my international sojourn, I strongly supported a women’s right to choose (i.e., pro-choice) and the right for gay people to receive equal treatment under the laws of Canada.
Now I learn from you that just because I am a supporter of Pierre P. – in fact I joined a political party for the first time in my life primarily to support his bid for the leadership – I am a part of his “hillbilly base”. My Thai wife, also an M.Sc. grad and who whole-heartedly shares my opinion of Pierre P., must therefore also be classified by you as part of said “hillbilly base”.
Of one thing I am certain, my wife and I must constitute the most unorthodox hillbillies in the history of hillbillyism … and I doubt that a true hillbilly would feel very sympatico with us!!!
Anyway, thanks again for helping to define us on a single issue like this, and keep on providing your excellent insights – into the preferred share universe!
Cheers!
“I remember the trials and tribulations of a friend who was putting herself through school while working an almost-full-time job. As year-end approached, she would do increasingly meticulous calculations regarding how much she could work before she lost so many benefits it became a complete waste of time and effort. She wasn’t lazy – she was a hard-nosed capitalist, ideologically purer than most self-proclaimed conservatives, responding in a rational way to the bizarre and self-contradictory incentives in our economy.”
The dilemmas of the not-lazy, hard-nosed capitalist student/worker, the aforementioned single mother, and Malcolmm (i.e. the futility of earning the extra dollar) all would be eliminated by a tax system that targeted wealth (or Net Worth, more precisely) instead of income. Taxing income is a proxy for taxing Net Worth, since the latter has historically suffered from measurement problems that don’t exist to the same degree today.
Income and wealth are two sides of the same coin since wealth can produce income directly or be converted to income through annuitization (e.g. pensions, annuities).
The student/worker and the single Mom have little wealth and would face little or no (if there is a threshold) tax so the incremental dollar would cause no angst. Malcolmm would take that consulting gig, perhaps in part to help meet his wealth-related tax burden.
Means-tested income support systems and/or UBI are both compatible with a wealth tax, although like Malcolmm, the COVID cheque-writing experience makes me less inclined to support UBI than before.
Technical note: a commuted value can be calculated for all pensions. This is part of a person’s wealth. For illustration, a $50K annual pension is worth in the ballpark of $1M. Adding a fully owned modest home of $500K, this person would have taxable net worth (ignoring other “stuff”) of $1.5M. This modest pensioner would currently pay about $10K per year in income tax. A wealth tax should not cost him/her/them more, therefore the wealth tax could start around 0.67% of Net Worth (with some threshold facing no tax) and be progressive from there.
The flaw in the thinking is that most people behave like readers here would – ie we would maximize return for the amount of effort we contribute!
If my kids’ friends are any indication, that belief is fatally flawed. Instead of working part time to maximize their income (alongside CERB), they simply decided that CERB was enough and spent a year pooling their funds and camping, travelling and generally having a good time.
Now perhaps you could argue that UBI needs to be set below survival rates to discourage this type of behaviour but that is not what advocates are looking for.
To me the solution is to make sure benefits aren’t completely cut off above a certain income level but only gradually clawed back.
Yes, but you’re caught between two fires there: if the clawback rate is small, then people will be getting benefits even when they have a six-figure income; if too large, then you’re increasing the METR problem.
Take, for example, what I think are probably the biggest programmes, rent geared to income. Toronto has a voluminous instruction book:
AFNI is the Adjusted Family Net Income, mostly taken from the Revenue Canada Notice of Assessment (so if little Johnny gets a part-time job washing dishes after school, his income is subject to this indirect tax). and the employment deduction is:
So right there you’ve got a 30% excess marginal tax rate. Add that to other programmes and you can get higher very quickly.
The way CERB was designed to give money to almost everyone was in some ways UBI. The resulting inflation from the money printing required to support this level of public spending was entirely predictable.
CERB was a temporary solution to a temporary problem. It was thought of in a rush and I am certainly not going to defend it as a particularly well thought out programme. There was also no thought given to how it was going to be paid for – you will recall that I advocate:
‘How to pay for it’ is the critical question and I have answered it. Obviously, printing money or deficit financing are not viable in the long term.
the government program(s) your friend was part of were poorly designed if she was suddenly cut off or almost cut off above a certain income threshold.
I think the critical one was OSAP, but this was a fair time ago that I discussed this with her and I didn’t pry for details. However, my point is that any clawback programme at all will have an impact on the recipients’ Effective Marginal Tax Rate and, in the case of the working poor, will adversely affect the incentive to work more (or better, or smarter, or whatever you like).
Taxing income is a proxy for taxing Net Worth, since the latter has historically suffered from measurement problems that don’t exist to the same degree today.
I haven’t really studied wealth taxes, but have some concerns about measurement. How do you value art, or even a private business? The OECD has some discussion of the issues.
Income has a GINI in Canada of about 0.3, whereas the wealth GINI is much higher (over 0.8) at least in the States.
The problem is, of course, that capital is mobile. Any significant level of taxation on wealth will have to be accompanied by capital controls, and those don’t work very well.
If my kids’ friends are any indication, that belief is fatally flawed. Instead of working part time to maximize their income (alongside CERB), they simply decided that CERB was enough and spent a year pooling their funds and camping, travelling and generally having a good time.
Youth must have its fling. In my twenties, I became unemployed in May one year. Looking back through the years, I have to admit that my search for employment over the summer could have been more diligent.
But how much of a problem will it be? I’ve heard that argument applied to Unemployment Insurance, Welfare and even the Canada Pension Plan.
I have a relative who is convinced that immigrants come to Canada for the sole purpose of siphoning away his money. Not ‘government money’, his personal money, just so they can spend their lives drinking booze, taking drugs, having wild sex at parties and, in general, do all the awful things that he’s not allowed to do, and all the while laughing at him for being such a sucker. “No, you’ve got that wrong.” I tell him. “They respect you very much and raise a toast to you in the finest champagne when they transfer from their private helicopters onto one of their private yachts.” But he doesn’t believe me.
There will, of course, be some individuals who will take a UBI, devote their lives to doing nothing, while thinking they’re just the cleverest critters in creation. So what? Do you really think this very small minority of those content to live at the very bottom of society as long as they don’t have to work makes very good employees anyway? These scammers will always be with us and it would be a very great mistake to allow their behaviour to dictate policy.
On a practical note, I will remind you that I advocate starting small and applying gradual increases, as we get more data on behavioural responses to this change. Nobody can afford to drop out on the initial $1,000 p.a.
I don’t support UBI as a Utopian measure that will bring us all into a paradise of sweetness and light; I support it as being the best available solution to various problems. Apart from the specific problem of EMTR, there is also a much more serious, if remote, problem: revolution. Inequality is growing, given impetus by technological advances in computerization and automation. There are innumerable articles in the media about young people today being locked out of the real-estate market unless they have parental support. They could also qualify by having excellent technical or sales prowess, but such good fortune is restricted to the favoured few, not Johnny Lunchbucket. If inequality grows enough, then society will be reformed at gunpoint.
“How do you value art, or even a private business?”
This is done every day for purposes of insurance, collateral, and a myriad of other purposes outside of buy/sell liquidity events. There are professionals who do this with a high level of expertise. If we were to be serious about wealth taxes, we would need a lot more of them.
There would be no end of scammers trying workarounds (just like with income taxes) but CRA could develop effective methods. For example, someone who buys a $1M hockey card, then insures it a year later for $1.5M is not going to get away with claiming it is worth only $50.
“The problem is, of course, that capital is mobile. Any significant level of taxation on wealth will have to be accompanied by capital controls, and those don’t work very well.”
Yes capital is mobile but the exact problem exists with income – make income taxes too high and the capital that produces it flees (along with the income). Capital and income (interest, dividends and capital gains are income) are two sides of the same coin.
I was going to post something, but the all the comments are so good I don’t think I can top them !!
I was going to post something, but the all the comments are so good I don’t think I can top them !!
Taxing net worth (wealth) instead of income will only encourage the “live for today” mentality that many people have adopted. It also encourages consumption rather than investing for the future.
Governments should be focused on closing tax loopholes. If I pay all the taxes I legally should, spend conservatively and invest the rest, should I be taxed more heavily than someone who earns the same as me but spends it all? Guess who is going to ultimately cost the government more when they retire.
“Taxing net worth (wealth) instead of income will only encourage the “live for today” mentality that many people have adopted. It also encourages consumption rather than investing for the future.”
Actually, taxing net worth will drive money to productive rather than frivolous use. Some people may conclude that having nothing left over is the way to go to beat this system (some of the same people who would decide to live off UBI and do nothing) but most people saving for retirement or the already wealthy would not.
Taxing wealth will drive the allocation of wealth to higher and better uses than today. Under the income tax regime, monster homes and luxury cars can be justified in some minds because they don’t provide those incremental income dollars (if they were otherwise invested) that are subject to high tax brackets. Under a wealth taxation regime, capital will need to earn the rate of taxation (e.g. 1%) plus inflation just to stay even. This will force capital into productive use rather than idle income-tax-avoiding parking.
Like James with his go slow start for UBI, wealth taxes should start slow also. Perhaps with a small wealth tax on fortunes above some number (e.g. as proposed by Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren in their nomination runs). Many of the problems (and there would be problems) could be sorted out years ahead of pushing it down the wealth ladder.