TXPR closed at 542.00, down 0.72% on the day. Volume today was 1.19-million, slightly above the median of the past 21 trading days.
CPD closed at 10.82, down 0.28% on the day. Volume was 54,850, below the median of the past 21 trading days.
ZPR closed at 8.88, down 0.45% on the day. Volume was 92,420, third-lowest of the past 21 trading days.
Five-year Canada yields down slightly to 2.90% today.
The Globe claims this is all due to recession fears:
The TSX, S&P 500 and the Nasdaq ended lower on Wednesday after a growing wave of weak economic data deepened worries that the Federal Reserve’s rapid interest rate hikes might tip the U.S. economy into a recession.
…
Driving the recession fears, the ADP National Employment report showed U.S. private employers hired far fewer workers than expected in March. That followed Tuesday’s weak job openings data.As well, the Institute for Supply Management’s survey showed the services sector slowed more than expected last month on cooling demand, while a measure of prices paid by services businesses fell to a near three-year low.
Earlier this week data showed falling factory orders and soft manufacturing activity.
…
Reflecting worries about the economy and recent turmoil in the banking sector, interest rate futures imply 61% odds that the Fed will cut interest rates from current levels by the end of its July meeting, according to CME Group’s Fedwatch tool.Money markets are currently pricing in only a 16% chance the Bank of Canada will cut interest rates at its April 12 meeting, but they are fully pricing in at least a quarter-point cut by September, according to Refinitiv Eikon data late Wednesday.
Gabriel Makhlouf, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland and Member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, gave a speech titled Staying the course: monetary policy to avoid persistentinflation:
To achieve this, the Governing Council decided last month to increase the three key ECB interest rates by 50 basis points. The interest rate applied to our Deposit Facility is now at 3 per cent, up from minus 0.5 per cent last July. This represents a significant tightening of the monetary policy stance, commensurate with the challenges to price stability we have been facing.
The scale and pace of interest rate increases – up 3.5 percentage points in just nine months – is unprecedented. For comparison, previous rate hiking cycles in the euro area in 1999-2000 and 2005-07 saw rates rise by 2.25 and 2 percentage points over a 13 and 21 month period, respectively.
…
The euro area economy slowed in the fourth quarter of 2022, with economic growth stagnant in the face of falling private domestic demand. High inflation, prevailing uncertainties and tighter financing conditions dented private consumption and investment, which fell by 0.9 per cent and 3.6 per cent respectively. However, the ECB staff March macroeconomic projections envisage a recovery in the next few quarters as supply conditions improve further, confidence recovers, and firms work off large order backlogs. Rising nominal wages and falling energy prices will partly offset the loss of purchasing power that many households are experiencing as a result of high inflation. This, in turn, will support consumer spending.Looking ahead, with record low unemployment expected to hold steady at 6.7 per cent, the ECB staff’s current projections embed a significant degree of real wage catch-up, with wages returning to 2022 levels in real terms by end2025. Nominal wage growth projections of 5.0, 4.4 and 3.6 per cent in 2023, 2024 and 2025 are significantly above historic averages.
For wage developments, much will depend on ongoing levels of labour market tightness. While the number of job vacancies in the euro area have started to recede gradually since the turn of this year, the number of job openings relative to unemployed remains at a historic high. Meanwhile, despite the weaker PMI (Purchasing Managers’ Index) data we saw towards the end of 2022, employment expectations remained in significant positive territory (Chart 2, left panel). This suggests that some degree of labour hoarding is taking place, likely reflecting firms’ expectations of a transitory weakness in demand, as well as their ability to absorb higher costs through increased mark-ups (a point I will return to).
…
There is potential for profit margins to absorb some of this near-term higher wage growth. As Chart 3 shows, labour costs have not risen by anything close to the same extent as profits in most sectors. For some sectors, the gap between growth in unit profits and unit labour costs during 2022 is very large, for example in agriculture, manufacturing and contact intensive services.
…
While price and wage-setting will contain a backward-looking element, especially after a supply-driven surge in inflation, it is important that the forward-looking component remains close to our inflation target in order to avoid an entrenchment of higher inflation in expectations amongst the public. So far, there has been no indication that expectations have become de-anchored from our inflation target. This is true for both survey and market-based measures of longer-term inflation expectations.
Huw Pill, Chief Economist and Executive Director for Monetary Analysis of the Bank of England, gave a speech titled Inflation persistence and monetary policy:
In this speech Huw Pill discusses the outlook for the economy, including how lower energy prices might push down on inflation in the short term, but could also boost demand and therefore impact inflation in the medium term. He stresses that the MPC must continue to monitor how these external shocks to inflation might become embedded in the economy, and therefore risk persistently high domestically driven inflation. He goes into detail about the Monetary Policy Committee’s role in controlling inflation, and the potential impact of its recent significant increases to interest rates. He outlines how the Monetary Policy Committee carefully assesses the impact of interest rate rises that have yet to feed through, with the need to address current inflationary pressures.
…
Let me start with some stark and uncomfortable facts. Annual UK CPI inflation was 10.4% in February. That is unacceptably high. The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is committed to returning inflation to its 2% target on a sustainable basis.
…
The MPC has tightened monetary policy over the past eighteen months to achieve the 2% inflation target. Bank Rate has been increased from its effective lower bound of 0.1% to today’s level of 4.25%. Quantitative easing (QE) has been halted and replaced with a programme of quantitative tightening (QT), involving the sale of gilts and corporate bonds held as a result of the Bank’s earlier asset purchase schemes.[1] And the MPC’s communication about the outlook for monetary policy has shifted significantly.
…
For data series that exhibit ‘mean reversion’ – in other words series that return to some average level after being shocked away from it – persistence is typically understood in terms of how long it takes to get back to that average level.[7]Given the MPC’s mandate, CPI inflation will revert to 2% over time. But it is taking longer to return to target than was originally expected, and longer than is desirable. From a policy perspective, we want to understand why this persistence in inflation has emerged. In thinking about that, it is helpful to distinguish between different sources of persistence.[8]
One reason for inflation to have risen above target is that there have been a series of inflationary shocks to the economy, each of which was transitory in itself but – by dint of coming one after the other and operating in the same direction – led to greater persistence in headline inflation overall.
I label this a form of extrinsic inflation persistence.
Such an account resonates with the way the MPC has described the inflation process over the past couple of years.[9] Inflation first rose on account of bottlenecks in international goods markets that emerged from the interaction of disruption to global supply chains and changes in the pattern of consumer demand, both stemming from the lockdowns triggered by the onset of the Covid pandemic. Then, just as these bottlenecks were easing as the pandemic receded, UK energy prices rose dramatically following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting dramatic increase in wholesale European natural gas prices. And now, just as those wholesale gas prices have fallen substantially in recent months, we are seeing another inflationary impulse coming from rises in food prices driven, at least in part, by unexpectedly weak crop yields in southern Europe and north Africa.[10]
Understood in this way, the persistence of UK inflation is largely a manifestation of ‘bad luck’ – a ‘series of unfortunate events’. It reflects a sequence of fundamentally transitory shocks – each of which monetary policy can do little about, for reasons I have already explained – that have cumulated through time into a more long-lasting elevation of headline inflation.
There is much truth in that narrative. But we have to guard against complacency in interpreting recent inflation developments in this way. I recognise that this is potentially both a self-serving and an incomplete view of recent inflation developments in the UK.
For one thing, we need to assess whether the surprises we have been confronted with over recent years could have been anticipated by better analysis and research: for example, could we have forecast the vulnerabilities in global supply chains once the pandemic had struck? Or could we have foreseen the dynamics in food prices given agricultural
ommodity prices? These challenges deserve further research – although it is naïve to believe that there are easy solutions to such formidable analytical problems.And – in particular, from today’s perspective – we should recognise that persistent deviations of inflation from target, even if stemming from what are fundamentally a series of transitory inflation shocks, might prompt changes in behaviour that generate more long lasting inflationary dynamics.
For example, we might see a shift in long-term inflation expectations or the emergence of ‘second round effects’ in price setting behaviour that threaten to create momentum in inflation even after the original impulse has receded.[11]
This naturally leads to what I label intrinsic persistence in headline inflation. Rather than being driven by a series of external shocks, greater intrinsic inflation persistence emerges when the economy’s response to the same fundamental inflationary shock changes in a way that implies headline inflation takes longer to return to target.
…
Of course, the evolution of inflation persistence against the background of the terms of trade
shock stemming from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is only one of many challenges facing monetary policy makers at present. It needs to be seen in the context of other economic disturbances, not least the recent turmoil in the financial sector. We have been told by our colleagues in the Financial Policy Committee that the UK financial system remains robust and resilient. Nonetheless, those of us on the MPC need to remain vigilant to signs of tightening financial conditions and be prepared to respond to the macro implications of any dislocation to credit markets to the extent that they influence the outlook for inflation.
And Rogers got downgraded two notches:
DBRS Limited (DBRS Morningstar) resolved the Under Review with Negative Implications status of Rogers Communications Inc.’s (Rogers or the Company) by downgrading the Issuer Rating and Senior Unsecured Notes rating to BBB (low) from BBB (high). All trends are Stable. The resolution of the Under Review status reflects the completion of the $26 billion acquisition of Shaw Communications Inc. (the Shaw transaction) concurrently with the divestiture of Shaw’s Freedom Mobile to Videotron Ltd. (the Freedom transaction), a wholly owned subsidiary of Quebecor Media Inc. (not rated by DBRS Morningstar). The rating downgrades reflect the increase in gross leverage required to finance the Shaw transaction and anticipated challenges related to network, cultural, and operations integration amid an intensely competitive landscape, while acknowledging the long-term competitive benefits for Rogers as it enhances its national footprint and competitive positioning, particularly in Western Canada. The Stable trends reflect DBRS Morningstar’s expectation of a multiyear deleveraging path toward the Company’s long-term leverage target, as earnings are expected to benefit from a strong market position of the combined entity.
PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.22%, equivalent to 8.09% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates yielded 5.06% on 2023-3-31 and since then the closing price has changed from 15.14 to 15.19, an increase of 33bp in price, with a Duration of 12.36 (BMO doesn’t specify whether this is Macaulay or Modified Duration; I will assume Modified) which implies a decrease in yield of about 3bp since 3/31 to 5.03%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) has remained constant at about 305bp since reported March 29.
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 2.2250 % | 2,340.1 |
| FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 2.2250 % | 4,488.4 |
| Floater | 9.63 % | 9.62 % | 59,092 | 9.88 | 2 | 2.2250 % | 2,586.7 |
| OpRet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.0245 % | 3,353.1 |
| SplitShare | 5.01 % | 7.11 % | 48,038 | 2.66 | 7 | -0.0245 % | 4,004.4 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.0245 % | 3,124.4 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.9982 % | 2,758.3 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 6.19 % | 6.22 % | 57,275 | 13.62 | 34 | -0.9982 % | 3,007.8 |
| FixedReset Disc | 5.80 % | 7.53 % | 91,501 | 12.24 | 63 | -0.6327 % | 2,123.5 |
| Insurance Straight | 6.08 % | 6.12 % | 70,640 | 13.76 | 19 | -0.2906 % | 2,957.4 |
| FloatingReset | 10.36 % | 10.77 % | 29,719 | 8.99 | 2 | -0.3707 % | 2,399.3 |
| FixedReset Prem | 6.99 % | 6.46 % | 280,583 | 12.96 | 1 | -0.5929 % | 2,313.6 |
| FixedReset Bank Non | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.6327 % | 2,170.7 |
| FixedReset Ins Non | 5.98 % | 7.24 % | 71,272 | 12.27 | 11 | -0.9475 % | 2,302.2 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| BN.PF.D | Perpetual-Discount | -7.21 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 17.77 Evaluated at bid price : 17.77 Bid-YTW : 6.96 % |
| BN.PF.H | FixedReset Disc | -5.98 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 20.61 Evaluated at bid price : 20.61 Bid-YTW : 8.25 % |
| CU.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | -4.31 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 17.99 Evaluated at bid price : 17.99 Bid-YTW : 6.35 % |
| BIP.PR.F | FixedReset Disc | -3.26 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 19.01 Evaluated at bid price : 19.01 Bid-YTW : 7.81 % |
| CU.PR.I | FixedReset Disc | -2.58 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 22.25 Evaluated at bid price : 22.65 Bid-YTW : 7.03 % |
| GWO.PR.N | FixedReset Ins Non | -2.53 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 11.94 Evaluated at bid price : 11.94 Bid-YTW : 8.02 % |
| IFC.PR.G | FixedReset Ins Non | -2.51 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 19.40 Evaluated at bid price : 19.40 Bid-YTW : 7.21 % |
| BN.PF.A | FixedReset Disc | -2.40 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 18.30 Evaluated at bid price : 18.30 Bid-YTW : 8.11 % |
| MIC.PR.A | Perpetual-Discount | -2.37 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 20.60 Evaluated at bid price : 20.60 Bid-YTW : 6.61 % |
| NA.PR.S | FixedReset Disc | -2.36 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 16.99 Evaluated at bid price : 16.99 Bid-YTW : 7.80 % |
| PWF.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | -2.20 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 21.05 Evaluated at bid price : 21.05 Bid-YTW : 6.25 % |
| BIP.PR.B | FixedReset Disc | -2.05 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 21.45 Evaluated at bid price : 21.45 Bid-YTW : 8.38 % |
| BN.PF.B | FixedReset Disc | -1.70 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 16.15 Evaluated at bid price : 16.15 Bid-YTW : 8.68 % |
| BN.PF.I | FixedReset Disc | -1.46 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 19.56 Evaluated at bid price : 19.56 Bid-YTW : 8.30 % |
| GWO.PR.T | Insurance Straight | -1.42 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 20.90 Evaluated at bid price : 20.90 Bid-YTW : 6.21 % |
| PWF.PR.T | FixedReset Disc | -1.34 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 17.15 Evaluated at bid price : 17.15 Bid-YTW : 7.74 % |
| PWF.PR.P | FixedReset Disc | -1.28 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 12.62 Evaluated at bid price : 12.62 Bid-YTW : 8.01 % |
| GWO.PR.S | Insurance Straight | -1.26 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 21.21 Evaluated at bid price : 21.21 Bid-YTW : 6.24 % |
| NA.PR.E | FixedReset Disc | -1.20 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 19.71 Evaluated at bid price : 19.71 Bid-YTW : 7.06 % |
| MFC.PR.J | FixedReset Ins Non | -1.18 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 21.52 Evaluated at bid price : 21.84 Bid-YTW : 6.47 % |
| BN.PR.Z | FixedReset Disc | -1.15 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 19.70 Evaluated at bid price : 19.70 Bid-YTW : 7.69 % |
| GWO.PR.M | Insurance Straight | -1.15 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 23.04 Evaluated at bid price : 23.31 Bid-YTW : 6.26 % |
| MFC.PR.I | FixedReset Ins Non | -1.13 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 22.12 Evaluated at bid price : 22.69 Bid-YTW : 6.53 % |
| MFC.PR.Q | FixedReset Ins Non | -1.12 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 18.55 Evaluated at bid price : 18.55 Bid-YTW : 7.56 % |
| CM.PR.Q | FixedReset Disc | -1.10 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 17.91 Evaluated at bid price : 17.91 Bid-YTW : 7.46 % |
| CM.PR.T | FixedReset Disc | -1.08 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 22.46 Evaluated at bid price : 22.95 Bid-YTW : 6.77 % |
| PWF.PR.O | Perpetual-Discount | -1.01 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 22.66 Evaluated at bid price : 22.90 Bid-YTW : 6.34 % |
| BN.PR.B | Floater | 1.06 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 12.35 Evaluated at bid price : 12.35 Bid-YTW : 9.62 % |
| GWO.PR.R | Insurance Straight | 1.07 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 19.85 Evaluated at bid price : 19.85 Bid-YTW : 6.10 % |
| TRP.PR.D | FixedReset Disc | 1.31 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 15.45 Evaluated at bid price : 15.45 Bid-YTW : 8.57 % |
| TD.PF.M | FixedReset Disc | 1.33 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 23.49 Evaluated at bid price : 23.95 Bid-YTW : 6.70 % |
| TRP.PR.B | FixedReset Disc | 1.42 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 10.68 Evaluated at bid price : 10.68 Bid-YTW : 9.05 % |
| BN.PR.K | Floater | 3.45 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 12.00 Evaluated at bid price : 12.00 Bid-YTW : 9.90 % |
| CU.PR.C | FixedReset Disc | 5.56 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 19.00 Evaluated at bid price : 19.00 Bid-YTW : 7.14 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| TD.PF.C | FixedReset Disc | 125,725 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 16.77 Evaluated at bid price : 16.77 Bid-YTW : 7.56 % |
| BMO.PR.T | FixedReset Disc | 47,000 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 16.96 Evaluated at bid price : 16.96 Bid-YTW : 7.61 % |
| NA.PR.S | FixedReset Disc | 31,850 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 16.99 Evaluated at bid price : 16.99 Bid-YTW : 7.80 % |
| RY.PR.J | FixedReset Disc | 31,434 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 18.05 Evaluated at bid price : 18.05 Bid-YTW : 7.53 % |
| TD.PF.K | FixedReset Disc | 31,203 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 19.65 Evaluated at bid price : 19.65 Bid-YTW : 7.08 % |
| PWF.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | 24,800 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-04-05 Maturity Price : 22.66 Evaluated at bid price : 22.90 Bid-YTW : 6.28 % |
| There were 13 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||
| Wide Spread Highlights | ||
| Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
| TRP.PR.E | FixedReset Disc | Quote: 14.95 – 17.45 Spot Rate : 2.5000 Average : 1.4127 YTW SCENARIO |
| BN.PF.D | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 17.77 – 19.25 Spot Rate : 1.4800 Average : 0.8602 YTW SCENARIO |
| BN.PF.H | FixedReset Disc | Quote: 20.61 – 21.80 Spot Rate : 1.1900 Average : 0.8565 YTW SCENARIO |
| CU.PR.E | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 19.97 – 23.72 Spot Rate : 3.7500 Average : 3.4827 YTW SCENARIO |
| BIP.PR.F | FixedReset Disc | Quote: 19.01 – 19.84 Spot Rate : 0.8300 Average : 0.5667 YTW SCENARIO |
| PWF.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 21.05 – 21.67 Spot Rate : 0.6200 Average : 0.3970 YTW SCENARIO |
[…] PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.24%, equivalent to 8.11% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates yielded 4.95% on 2023-4-6 and since then the closing price has changed from 15.32 to 15.25, a decrease of 46bp in price, with a Duration of 12.42 (BMO doesn’t specify whether this is Macaulay or Modified Duration; I will assume Modified) which implies an increase in yield of about 4bp since 3/31 to 4.99%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) has widened slightly (and perhaps spuriously) to about 310bp from the 305bp reported April 5. […]