DFN.PR.A 2013 Annual Report

July 13th, 2014

Dividend 15 Split Corp. has released its Annual Report to November 30, 2013.

DFN / DFN.PR.A Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Five
Years
Whole Unit +20.70% +10.88% +13.44%
DFN.PR.A +5.38% +5.38% +5.38%
DF +39.44% +17.09% 23.58%
S&P/TSX 60 Index +13.40% +4.36% +9.65%

Using the S&P TSX 60 index rather than “Dividend Aristocrats” seems a little odd to me – but we’ll let them choose their benchmark!

Figures of interest are:

MER: 1.49% of the whole unit value (As reported)0.

Average Net Assets: The average of the beginning and end of year figures is ($378.1-million + $307.8-million) / 2 = $343-million. Total preferred share dividends = $8,890,054 at 0.525 / share implies average of 16.93-million units outstanding, at an average NAVPU of ($18.22 + $18.45) / 2 = 18.34, implies average net assets of $310-million. Not very good agreement! But call it about $327-million

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Dividends received of $12.13-million divided by average net assets of 327-million is 3.7%

Income Coverage: Net Investment Income of 7.23-million divided by Preferred Share Distributions of 8.89-million is 81%.

July 11, 2014

July 11th, 2014

Tammy Schirle of Wilfrid Laurier writes a good piece titled Six questions Ontario must answer before it starts a pension plan (although the headline writer confused ‘exhortations’ with ‘questions’):

  • 1. Be clear about the market failures you are trying to address.
  • 2. Be precise about the policy target.
  • 3. Be clear about any redistribution that will occur.
  • 4. Notice that low-income families won’t benefit from a simple expansion of benefits
  • 5. How are you going to deal with interprovincial migration and interprovincial employment arrangements?
  • 6. Enhancing the CPP remains the Ontario government’s preferred solution.

It was mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 1bp, FixedResets off 7bp and DeemedRetractibles up 2bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was extremely low.

And now it’s time to start work on the July PrefLetter!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.14 % 3.13 % 21,886 19.40 1 0.0000 % 2,531.9
FixedFloater 4.17 % 3.40 % 27,277 18.66 1 0.4694 % 4,158.4
Floater 2.89 % 2.99 % 47,081 19.78 4 -0.8330 % 2,737.5
OpRet 4.02 % -5.85 % 83,269 0.08 1 0.0784 % 2,722.2
SplitShare 4.25 % 3.94 % 52,705 4.05 6 0.1397 % 3,119.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0784 % 2,489.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % -4.80 % 84,342 0.09 17 0.0671 % 2,427.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.25 % 5.11 % 109,101 15.23 20 0.0086 % 2,571.5
FixedReset 4.39 % 3.58 % 193,323 4.62 76 -0.0651 % 2,560.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.91 % 129,476 0.12 43 0.0222 % 2,547.8
FloatingReset 2.67 % 2.12 % 107,909 3.89 6 0.0658 % 2,516.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-11
Maturity Price : 21.84
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-11
Maturity Price : 17.43
Evaluated at bid price : 17.43
Bid-YTW : 3.03 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-11
Maturity Price : 17.65
Evaluated at bid price : 17.65
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 76,399 Scotia crossed two blocks of 30,000 each, both at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 75,221 RBC bought blocks of 11,400 and 10,400 from TD, both at 25.55. Desjardins crossed 16,000 at the same price; Scotia crossed 21,600 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 56,124 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.07.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
BNA.PR.F SplitShare 29,738 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 28,267 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.49
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 23,038 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 22.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-11
Maturity Price : 22.18
Evaluated at bid price : 22.47
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
There were 11 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.09 – 26.09
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.6089

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 0.38 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 22.11 – 22.51
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2474

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-11
Maturity Price : 21.84
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.87 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2693

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.87
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.52 – 25.88
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2688

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %

MFC.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 25.12 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2796

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.17 – 23.45
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1963

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.17
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %

Royal Bank Issues NVCC-Compliant Sub-Debt

July 11th, 2014

Royal Bank of Canada has announced:

an inaugural Basel III-compliant offering of $1 billion of subordinated debentures (“the Notes”) through its Canadian Medium Term Note Program.

The Notes bear interest at a fixed rate of 3.04 per cent per annum (paid semi-annually) until July 17, 2019, and at the three-month Banker’s Acceptance Rate plus 1.08 per cent thereafter until their maturity on July 17, 2024 (paid quarterly). The expected closing date is July 17, 2014 and RBC Capital Markets is acting as lead agent on the issue.

The bank may, at its option, with the prior approval of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada, redeem the Notes on or after July 17, 2019 at par, in whole at any time or in part from time to time, on not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days notice to registered holders.

We routinely undertake funding transactions to maintain strong capital ratios and a cost effective capital structure. Net proceeds from this transaction will be used for general business purposes.

It’s not clear to me how the floating rate of BAs+108bp was calculated. The Canada 10-year is trading at around 2.20%, the five year around 1.55% and three-month BAs a little above 1.20%. None of these values fits very well with the 3.04% initial rate to provide a 108bp increment.

However, the important thing – for some – is the fact that a clear demarcation exists between the five-year pretend-maturity and the ten-year actual maturity. This will make it easier for the sleazy to sell the debt to the stupid.

Not much meat on those bones. The heart of the matter is the conversion feature, as noted by Moody’s:

Moody’s assigned a rating of Baa1 (hyb) to Royal Bank of Canada’s (RBC, Aa3 Negative, C+/a2 Stable) 3.04% CAD1 billion Basel III compliant NVCC subordinated debt. Proceeds from the issuance will be added to the bank’s general funds and utilized for general banking purposes. The NVCC subordinated debt provides loss absorption as it is subject to automatic conversion into common shares, based on a predetermined conversion formula, at the point of non-viability, as defined by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI), subject to regulatory discretion. This incremental loss absorption feature is credit positive for holders of senior securities of RBC, as a layer of loss absorbing securities will reduce the risk of losses incurred higher in the capital hierarchy if the bank gets into financial distress.

This marks the first issuance in Canada of contractual non-viability subordinated debt. The rating is positioned 2 notches below the a2 adjusted baseline credit assessment (adjusted BCA) of RBC, in line with Moody’s standard notching guidance for contractual non-viability subordinated debt. An additional notch is added relative to the notching for “plain vanilla” subordinated debt with normal loss severity (currently 1 notch below adjusted BCA) to capture the potential uncertainty related to the timing of loss absorption.

By way of comparison, Moody’s has the NVCC-compliant Royal Bank preferreds at Baa3:

This marks the first issuance in Canada of contractual non-viability preferred securities. The rating is positioned 4 notches below the a2 adjusted baseline credit assessment (adjusted BCA) of RBC, in line with Moody’s standard notching guidance for contractual non-viability preferred securities. An additional notch is added relative to the notching for legacy Canadian non-cumulative preferred shares (currently 3 notches below adjusted BCA) to capture the potential uncertainty related to the timing of loss absorption.

Standard and Poor’s explains what makes them more creditworthy than preferreds (bolding added):

The ‘A-‘ rating is two notches below the stand-alone credit profile (SACP), incorporating:

  • •A deduction of one notch from the SACP for subordination, reflecting our belief that the Canadian legal and regulatory framework insulates senior debt from defaults on the subordinated debt; and
  • •The deduction of an additional notch to reflect that the subordinated notes feature a mandatory contingent conversion trigger provision. Should a trigger event occur (as defined by The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions’ [OSFI] guideline for Capital Adequacy Requirements, Chapter 2), each subordinated note outstanding will automatically and immediately be converted, without the holder’s consent, into a number of fully paid and freely tradable common shares of the bank, determined in accordance with a conversion formula.

The following constitute trigger events:

  • •OSFI publicly announces it has advised RBC that it believes the bank has ceased, or is about to cease, to be viable and that, after converting the preferred shares and all other contingent instruments RBC has issued, and taking into account any other relevant factors, it is reasonably likely that the bank’s viability will be restored or maintained; or
  • •The federal government or a provincial government in Canada publicly announces that RBC has accepted a capital injection, or equivalent support, from a government or agency, without which the bank would be nonviable, according to OFSI.

Because we expect this instrument’s conversion to occur at or near the point of the banks’ nonviability, we view this mechanism as a nonviability trigger.

We expect to assign “minimal” (as our criteria describe the term) equity content to these subordinated notes because we do not consider notes that have only nonviability features to be able to absorb losses prior to the bank’s point of nonviability.

By way of comparison, S&P has the NVCC-compliant preferreds at BBB+, one notch lower on the global scale than the Sub-Debts A-.

So OSFI gets a lot of discretion in determining conversion – surprise, surprise! Since bond management firms are typically much larger than preferred share management firms (I believe there’s only one of these in Canada!), and since bond investors are typically much bigger than preferred share investors (aka, “retail scum”) I believe that in a crisis there will be frenzied and successful lobbying of OSFI personnel by their future employers to convert preferreds but to ‘just wait a bit’ before forcing sub-debt conversion.

Blair Keefe, David Seville and Thomas Yeo of Tory’s Law Firm recently wrote an article titled The Preferred Share Market Finally Re-Opens For Canadian Banks:

The market is still waiting for the first offering of NVCC subordinated debt. There are a few reasons why the banks have remained hesitant to tap that market. One reason relates to changes in capital ratios mandated by Basel III, which reduce the need for subordinated debt on a bank’s balance sheet. Prior to the introduction of Basel III, subordinated debt could account for almost one-third of the total capital of a bank. With the new minimum total capital requirement of 10.5%2 (including a countercyclical capital buffer of 2.5%) of risk-weighted assets and a 8.5% minimum for tier 1 capital, effectively the most that can be satisfied with subordinated debt is 2% of the bank’s risk-weighted assets. As well, under Basel III, most deductions from capital must be made from common share equity, whereas in the past, certain deductions could be made from total capital. Effective January 1, 2015, the leverage or asset-to-capital ratio in Canada will be based on tier 1 capital as opposed to total capital. This requirement is particularly important for smaller deposit-taking institutions because they tend to be limited by their asset-to-capital multiples. As a result, we expect that subordinated debt will be eliminated from the capital structure of many smaller institutions—and will form a significantly smaller portion of the capital structure of larger institutions than it has historically.

Market uncertainty also remains over how the proposed “bail-in” debt regime will interact with NVCC instruments. In October 2011, the Financial Stability Board issued a paper providing that regulators should have the power to convert (or write off) all or part of the unsecured and uninsured creditor claims of a financial institution under resolution into equity or other ownership instruments. It was proposed that such a conversion would be done in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation. The 2013 Canadian federal government budget includes a proposed plan to implement a “bail-in” regime for systemically important banks3; Canadian banks and the market generally are still waiting for details as to how the federal government intends to implement this regime. The institutional investors that make up the vast majority of the market for subordinated debt are particularly concerned with how the bail-in regime will function and the effect of further dilution after NVCC instruments are converted, resulting in a “wait-and-see” approach to investor interest in NVCC subordinated debt offerings.

The precise conversion formula to be adopted by the banks for NVCC subordinated debt is not yet known. Under OSFI’s requirements, conversion formulas for both NVCC preferred shares and subordinated debt need to be set to ensure respect for the relative hierarchy of claims between the two types of instruments in the event of a triggering event. In other words, since debt ranks ahead of equity in the traditional capital structure, in the event of a triggering event, holders of subordinated debt should receive more common shares on conversion than holders of preferred shares on a dollar-for-dollar basis. The banks have put substantial effort in the development of a formula used in the preferred share offerings which addresses concerns about potential market manipulation and death spirals in situations where conversion appears to be a possibility. As of the date this article was written, all offerings of NVCC preferred shares have used the same formula based on the issue price of the preferred shares, plus declared and unpaid dividends, divided by the volume- weighted average trading price over the 10 trading days before a triggering event, subject to a $5.00 floor price. It is unlikely that other banks will depart from this formula. The preferred share formula would suggest that the conversion formula for subordinated debt will use some multiple of the principal amount of the debt, together with accrued interest, to achieve the hierarchy of claims desired by OSFI. Issuers of NVCC subordinated debt should consider obtaining an advance income tax ruling from the Canada Revenue Agency confirming the deductibility by the bank of the interest payments, although we anticipate no difficulty in banks obtaining that ruling.

So my guess is that not only will the sub-debt benefit by delayed conversion, but the floor on the conversion price to equity will be lower – say, $3-4 instead of the now-standard $5 floor for preferreds. Senior “debt”, presumably, will be lower still.

The next matter of interest is whether this non-debt gets included in the bond indices; given that they’re bank issues, and the banks own TMX, and TMX runs the standard index (this arrangement has been blessed by the regulators, in exchange for regular payments), I’d say it’s a slam-dunk. But I have no information yet.

Update, 2014-7-12: OK, so I found the term sheet on SEDAR. It’s not under Prospectus, it’s under “Marketing Materials”, dated July 9. The conversion is:

The “Contingent Conversion Formula” is (Multiplier x Note Value) ÷ Conversion Price = number of Common Shares into which each Note shall be converted.

The “Multiplier” is 1.5.

The “Note Value” of a Note is the Par Value plus accrued and unpaid interest on such Note.

The “Conversion Price” of each Note is the greater of (i) a floor price of $5, and (ii) the Current Market Price of the Common Shares. The floor price of $5 will be subject to adjustment in the event of (i) the issuance of Common Shares or securities exchangeable for or convertible into Common Shares to all holders of Common Shares as a stock dividend, (ii) the subdivision, redivision or change of the Common Shares into a greater number of Common Shares, or (iii) the reduction, combination or consolidation of the Common Shares into a lesser number of Common Shares. The adjustment shall be computed to the nearest one-tenth of one cent provided that no adjustment of the Conversion Price shall be required unless such adjustment would require an increase or decrease of at least 1% of the Conversion Price then in effect.

“Current Market Price” of the Common Shares means the volume weighted average trading price of the Common Shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange (the “TSX”), if such shares are then listed on the TSX, for the 10 consecutive trading days ending on the trading day preceding the date of the Trigger Event. If the Common Shares are not then listed on the TSX, for the purpose of the foregoing calculation reference shall be made to the principal securities exchange or market on which the Common Shares are then listed or quoted or, if no such trading prices are available, “Current Market Price” shall be the fair value of the Common Shares as reasonably determined by the board of directors of the Bank.

It’s interesting that they’re implementing this with a conversion factor, rather than changing the floor price. Just what the implications of that might be is something that will bear thinking about.

Update, 2014-7-18: DBRS rates at A(low) [Stable].

July 10, 2014

July 10th, 2014

Looks like Canadian shadow banking is picking up:

Canada’s banks developed their commercial banking arms over decades by lending to companies that typically generate annual revenue of $50-million or less, nurturing scores of client relationships. Since the financial crisis, however, private equity firms have been scooping up smaller companies, shaking up their historical banking relationships.

Anatol von Hahn, Bank of Nova Scotia’s head of personal and commercial banking, said he would be “be very surprised if we don’t have double, triple” the number of small Canadian companies that are owned by private equity firms twenty years from now. Because they are flush with cash that they simply can’t sit on, private equity firms are often willing to pay big multiples to buy small businesses. “They’re playing a huge role,” he said.

To adapt to the changing dynamics, Scotiabank has gone so far as to invest in certain private equity funds in order to get access to the companies they acquire, according to Mr. von Hahn, allowing the bank to pitch itself as a potential banking partner.

The trend isn’t playing out in Canada alone. U.S. firms are looking for mid-market acquisitions north of the border. In May, New Jersey-based private equity player Swander Pace Capital acquired Montreal’s Recochem, marking its 10th acquisition north of the border in the past decade. More acquisitions could come because the firm recently raised a brand new $350-million fund.

Could we be heading towards European banking crisis redux?

Shares in Banco Espírito Santo SA … were suspended from trading Thursday after falling an additional 17%. Shares of the lender’s controlling shareholder, Espírito Santo Financial Group SA, were also suspended because, it said, of “ongoing material difficulties” at its parent company, Espírito Santo International. “ESFG is currently assessing the financial impact of its exposure to ESI.”

A spokesman for Espírito Santo International declined to comment.

This week’s downward spiral has knocked 32% off the bank’s market value and has dragged down Portugal’s main stock index with it.

On Thursday, the turmoil spread elsewhere in Southern Europe, illustrating how investors remain nervous about the fragility of the continent’s financial system. In Spain, a bank and a construction company each called off planned bond sales. In Italy, a drug company pulled its stock offering. In Greece, a government-bond sale came in smaller than expected. And stock markets across the continent fell, along with the euro.

It has been more than a year since fears about the health of a European bank rattled markets. Lately, after years of crisis, investors, bankers and regulators have been growing more confident about the stability of the continent’s financial system. Regulators hoped the banking industry’s improving health would be on display in coming months as they conduct so-called stress tests on more than 120 large banks.

Instead, Espírito Santo’s rapid descent, and the collateral damage in other European markets, suggests that conditions remain precarious.

Critics of Espírito Santo’s complex corporate structure have worried for years about the linkages among companies within the conglomerate. Among the concerns: whether the group’s nonfinancial companies—including a hotel chain and a hospital operator—were using the bank and its customers to raise funds.

Here in Ontario, our wise masters are protecting us from lower prices:

Ontario’s governing Liberals say they want to remove barriers to interprovincial trade, but suggest they’re reluctant to lift some restrictions that give Ontario companies an advantage.

Finance Minister Charles Sousa says there are a number of sectors within Ontario’s economy that are strong because they’re protected.

Sousa says he’s open to talks on how to grow the economy, but he doesn’t want to jeopardize the livelihood of Ontario companies.

Sousa’s comments come after the leaders of three western provinces called for the removal of trade barriers to reduce the cost of doing business and help provincial economies grow.

As far as I can tell, Mr. Sousa did not explain why strong companies need protection.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 4bp, FixedResets gaining 14bp and DeemedRetractibles off 3bp. Volatility was average, but uniformly positive. Volume was below average overall, and concentrated in a handful of issues.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.14 % 3.13 % 22,179 19.40 1 0.0000 % 2,531.9
FixedFloater 4.15 % 3.43 % 28,342 18.45 1 -0.2179 % 4,138.9
Floater 2.87 % 2.95 % 46,425 19.86 4 0.1367 % 2,760.5
OpRet 4.02 % -5.05 % 86,525 0.08 1 0.0785 % 2,720.0
SplitShare 4.26 % 3.99 % 54,773 4.05 6 -0.0333 % 3,115.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0785 % 2,487.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % -4.30 % 85,467 0.09 17 0.0417 % 2,425.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.25 % 5.18 % 110,158 15.23 20 -0.0449 % 2,571.2
FixedReset 4.39 % 3.59 % 200,106 4.61 76 0.1436 % 2,562.2
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.94 % 131,236 0.12 43 -0.0278 % 2,547.2
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.15 % 109,597 3.89 6 -0.0723 % 2,514.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.C FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 2.65 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 2.77 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-10
Maturity Price : 22.24
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-10
Maturity Price : 17.85
Evaluated at bid price : 17.85
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.A FixedReset 318,878 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.50. TD crossed blocks of 14,700 and 84,900 at the same price. Desjardins crossed 100,000 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 212,720 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, both at 25.45. Scotia crossed blocks of 32,000 and 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 192,599 RBC crossed blocks of 10,000 and 11,600 at 25.60. TD crossed 25,000 at 25.70. Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 69,300, both at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.73
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 184,573 Called for redemption July 31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 181,858 Called for redemption July 31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 176,412 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 144,299 Called for redemption July 31..
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset 135,592 Scotia crossed blocks of 35,400 and 25,000, both at 25.56. National sold 28,400 to anonymous at 25.60. TD crossed 24,700 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-05-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 126,715 Desjardins crossed 26,500 at 25.50 and blocks of 25,000 and 15,000 at 25.55. Scotia crossed 30,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 125,406 RBC crossed 75,000 at 25.43; Desjardins crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.44
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.15 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2062

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 2.67 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 20.00 – 20.30
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2133

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-10
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.33 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1942

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.33
Bid-YTW : 2.49 %

SLF.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 26.13 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.2059

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.13
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 23.16 – 23.38
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1769

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-10
Maturity Price : 22.75
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 23.10 – 23.22
Spot Rate : 0.1200
Average : 0.0805

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-10
Maturity Price : 22.72
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %

DGS.PR.A To Get Bigger

July 10th, 2014

Brompton Group has announced:

Dividend Growth Split Corp. (the “Company”) is pleased to announce it has filed a preliminary short form prospectus with respect to a treasury offering of class A and preferred shares. The class A and preferred share offering prices will be set at levels that ensure that existing unitholders are not diluted.
Dividend Growth Split Corp. invests in a portfolio of common shares of high quality, large capitalization companies, which have among the highest dividend growth rates of those companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index. Currently, the portfolio consists of common shares of the following 20 companies:

Great-West Lifeco Inc. The Bank of Nova Scotia AGF Management Limited Shaw Communications Inc.
Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce IGM Financial Inc. TELUS Corporation
Manulife Financial Corporation National Bank of Canada Power Corporation of Canada Canadian Utilities Limited
Sun Life Financial Inc. Royal Bank of Canada Manitoba Telecom Services Limited Enbridge Inc.
Bank of Montreal The Toronto-Dominion Bank Rogers Communications Inc. TransCanada Corporation

The investment objectives for the class A shares are to provide holders with regular monthly cash distributions targeted to be $0.10 per class A share and to provide the opportunity for growth in the net asset value per class A share.

The investment objectives for the preferred shares are to provide holders with fixed cumulative preferential quarterly cash distributions, currently in the amount of $0.13125 per preferred share, representing a yield on the original issue price of 5.25% per annum, and to return the original issue price to holders of preferred shares on the original November 30, 2014 maturity date.

On October 1, 2013, the Company announced an extension of the maturity date of the class A and preferred shares of the Company for an additional 5 year term to November 28, 2019, subject to extension for successive terms of up to 5 years. The preferred share dividend rate for the extended term will be announced at least 60 days prior to the original November 30, 2014 maturity date. The new dividend rate will be determined based on then-current market yields for preferred shares with similar terms.

The syndicate of agents for the offering is being led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC, Scotiabank and TD Securities Inc. and includes BMO Capital Markets, National Bank Financial Inc., GMP Securities L.P., Raymond James Ltd., Canaccord Genuity Corp., Desjardins Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Ltd., Mackie Research Capital Corporation, and Manulife Securities Incorporated.

DGS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when there was a similar offering in January.

DGS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

July 9, 2014

July 10th, 2014

The National Securities Regulator has just gotten a little more national:

Two more provinces have agreed to join a voluntary national securities regulator expected to begin operations in the fall of 2015, bringing the total number on board to four and giving the upcoming capital markets watchdog a more pan-Canadian scope.

Sources say Saskatchewan and New Brunswick will sign on to the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulator Wednesday in a ceremony in Ottawa with federal Finance Minister Joe Oliver, embracing a plan backed by Ontario and British Columbia last September.

Marketwatch has a nice chart on market trends:

This chart shows how much money is flooding into investment vehicles — index mutual funds and exchange-traded funds — that track stock indexes. These two types of funds have grabbed about 24% of the U.S. mutual fund and ETF market, down from less than 5% in 1998, according to Deutsche Bank data.

Big full-service brokerages, “which control 50% of all invested household wealth in America, have successfully pushed the majority of their advisors’ practices toward more hands-off investing approaches,” said Josh Brown of The Reformed Broker in a recent blog post, referring to charging a flat percentage fee on assets, rather than commissions. “At the same time, do-it-yourselfers have made Vanguard, State Street and BlackRock’s iShares three of the world’s largest asset managers — and they are primarily purveyors of passive indexing products.”

cashFlows

There were modest gains for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 7bp, FixedResets gaining 1bp and DeemedRetractibles up 2bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.17%, equivalent to 6.72% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.3%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 240bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) narrowing from the 245bp reported July 2.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.14 % 3.13 % 22,987 19.41 1 -0.0418 % 2,531.9
FixedFloater 4.14 % 3.42 % 28,662 18.47 1 2.6846 % 4,148.0
Floater 2.87 % 2.98 % 46,793 19.80 4 0.2605 % 2,756.8
OpRet 4.02 % -4.25 % 87,763 0.08 1 -0.0392 % 2,717.9
SplitShare 4.26 % 4.01 % 56,618 4.05 6 0.0603 % 3,116.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0392 % 2,485.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % -2.41 % 85,341 0.09 17 -0.0231 % 2,424.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.25 % 5.17 % 111,585 15.23 20 0.0663 % 2,572.4
FixedReset 4.39 % 3.62 % 199,089 4.62 76 0.0076 % 2,558.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.63 % 136,042 0.13 43 0.0202 % 2,548.0
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.13 % 110,761 3.86 6 0.0526 % 2,516.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 22.95
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 334,546 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 100,000 each, both at 25.45. RBC crossed blocks of 10,000 shares, 12,300 and 50,000, all at 25.45. TD crossed 40,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.44
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 201,900 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 168,241 TD crossed 100,000 at 25.47. Desjardins crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 164,150 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.45. TD crossed 30,000 at the same price; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price. CIBC sold 10,000 to anonymous at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 133,597 Scotia crossed 75,400 at 25.12. RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 132,946 RBC crossed 88,600 and 40,000, both at 25.46.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 2.84 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 17.70 – 18.20
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3060

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 17.70
Evaluated at bid price : 17.70
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 22.95 – 23.95
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.8072

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 22.95
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 22.25 – 22.84
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.4280

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %

RY.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.41 – 26.84
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2895

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %

BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 17.60 – 17.95
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2904

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 17.60
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %

GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.87 – 24.05
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1219

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.87
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %

Moody’s Assesses Canadian Banking System: Outlook Negative

July 9th, 2014

In a report available only to clients, Moody’s has stated:

Our outlook for the Canadian banking system has been changed to negative from stable to reflect the evolving support environment in Canada. The outlook expresses our expectation of how bank creditworthiness will evolve in this system over the next 12-18 months.

Our outlook for the Canadian banking system has been changed to negative from stable. This change reflects our view that the Canadian government’s plan to introduce a bail-in regime for senior debt combined with the accelerating global trend towards explicit inclusion of burden-sharing with senior debt holders as a means of reducing the public cost of bank resolutions could reduce the predictability of support being provided to the senior debt holders and uninsured depositors of the large Canadian banks.

Most rated Canadian banks’ long-term ratings benefit from at least two notches of uplift due to systemic support, which reflects our currently very high expectation that the government would provide support if required. On June 11, 2014 we affirmed the long-term ratings of the seven largest Canadian banks but changed the outlook to negative from stable on the supported senior debt and uninsured deposit ratings of these banks, to reflect the fact that the balance of risk has shifted to the downside for unsecured bank creditors given the Canadian government’s plans to implement a “bail-in” regime for domestic systemically important banks and the evolving global support environment.

The above-noted actions do not reflect any change in our assessment of the standalone credit profiles of the Canadian banks, all but one of which maintain their stable outlooks (see page 3).

July 8, 2014

July 8th, 2014

Banks engage in maturity transformation and this sometimes gets them in trouble. Many mutual funds and ETFs engage in liquidity transformation, and this is getting some people worried:

Junk-loan funds harbor a significant, structural risk that’s been masked by a three-year rally: Managers may struggle to raise enough cash to meet investor redemptions if too many try to get out at once.

While investors have plowed into the loan market by purchasing mutual-fund shares that trade daily, it typically takes more than two weeks for a money manager selling loans to get cash in exchange for the debt. The concern is that this discrepancy will make it difficult for fund investors to leave the $750 billion leveraged-loan market, where individuals have been playing a bigger role than ever.

“Should investor flows reverse, the mismatch in bank-loan funds could pose a material risk,” Moody’s Investors Service analysts led by Stephen Tu wrote in a July 7 report. “Methods to address sizable investor redemptions in bank loan funds are inadequate.”

In the US Regulation NMS is coming under attack:

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s rules for a national market system have come under scrutiny as lawmakers examine whether high-frequency traders have exploited changes introduced by regulators, exchanges and brokers. The SEC’s rules require all exchanges and brokers to connect to one another to ensure that investors receive the best available prices when they buy shares.

The Senate Banking Committee’s hearing today could intensify pressure on the SEC to change rules it enacted over the past decade. SEC Chair Mary Jo White has said the agency will examine whether its rules have pushed trading away from public markets in favor of private venues such as dark pools.

“The costs associated with maintaining access to each venue, retaining technologists and regulatory staff, and developing increasingly sophisticated risk controls are passed on to investors and result in unnecessary systemic risk,” exchange operator Intercontinental Exchange Inc. (ICE) Chief Executive Officer Jeffrey Sprecher told lawmakers.

Certainly, requirements that everybody connect everywhere are ridiculous; antithetical to the entire concept of competition. It will be quite enough if brokerages disclose the names of the exchanges to which they connect directly and those to which they are indirectly connected by virtue of jitney arrangements with other brokers.

It was an off day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts and DeemedRetractibles both off 2bp and FixedResets down 16bp. The Performance Highlights table is dominated by losing Enbridge issues (which saw yet another new issue announcement today) and winning Power Financial issues (which went ex-dividend). Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.14 % 3.13 % 22,246 19.41 1 0.8435 % 2,533.0
FixedFloater 4.25 % 3.53 % 28,399 18.26 1 -0.2677 % 4,039.5
Floater 2.88 % 2.99 % 46,246 19.79 4 -0.4776 % 2,749.6
OpRet 4.02 % -4.85 % 86,468 0.08 1 -0.4297 % 2,719.0
SplitShare 4.68 % 4.00 % 84,899 4.06 7 -0.1139 % 3,114.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4297 % 2,486.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % -6.52 % 81,712 0.09 17 0.1068 % 2,425.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.25 % 5.16 % 113,007 15.23 20 -0.0242 % 2,570.7
FixedReset 4.39 % 3.65 % 202,939 4.62 76 -0.1598 % 2,558.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.83 % 135,252 0.14 43 -0.0194 % 2,547.4
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.15 % 114,976 3.86 6 -0.0329 % 2,515.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ENB.PR.F FixedReset -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
ENB.PF.A FixedReset -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 24.56
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.73
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 24.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 21.61
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 300,831 RBC crossed blocks of 65,000 and 10,000, both at 25.10. TD crossed blocks of two blocks of 25,000 shares each and one of 34,600 at the same price. Nesbitt crossed 14,800 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
BNA.PR.F SplitShare 191,265 Recent new issue. I understand there was an inventory blow-out sale today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
ENB.PR.J FixedReset 130,410 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 16,100 and 100,000, both at 25.19.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.19
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 94,125 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset 85,730 Nesbitt crossed 70,000 at 25.18.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 84,044 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 23.14.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.65
Evaluated at bid price : 23.02
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.16 – 24.60
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2932

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 23.77
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 22.35 – 23.09
Spot Rate : 0.7400
Average : 0.5958

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-08
Maturity Price : 22.53
Evaluated at bid price : 22.35
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.75 – 26.08
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2295

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %

BAM.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 25.78 – 26.02
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1481

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.29 – 23.75
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3770

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.29
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %

RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.49 – 25.74
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1682

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-07
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.49
Bid-YTW : -0.55 %

New Issue: ENB FixedReset 4.40%+266

July 8th, 2014

Holy Smokes, Enbridge just keeps pounding them out!

Enbridge Inc. has announced:

that it has entered into an agreement with a group of underwriters to sell ten million Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares, Series 13 (the “Series 13 Preferred Shares”) at a price of $25.00 per share for distribution to the public. Closing of the offering is expected on July 17, 2014.

The holders of Series 13 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed cumulative dividends at an annual rate of $1.10 per share, payable quarterly on the first day of March, June, September and December, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Enbridge, yielding 4.40 per cent per annum, for the initial fixed rate period to but excluding June 1, 2020. The first quarterly dividend payment date is scheduled for December 1, 2014. The dividend rate will reset on June 1, 2020 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Canadian Government bond yield plus 2.66 per cent. The Series 13 Preferred Shares are redeemable by Enbridge, at its option, on June 1, 2020 and on June 1 of every fifth year thereafter.

The holders of Series 13 Preferred Shares will have the right to convert their shares into Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares, Series 14 (the “Series 14 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on June 1, 2020 and on June 1 of every fifth year thereafter. The holders of Series 14 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating rate cumulative dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Enbridge, at a rate equal to the sum of the 90-day Government of Canada Treasury bill rate plus 2.66 per cent.

Enbridge has granted to the underwriters an option, exercisable at any time up to 48 hours prior to the closing of the offering, to purchase up to an additional two million Series 13 Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per share.

The offering is being made only in Canada by means of a prospectus supplement to the base shelf prospectus of the Corporation dated June 6, 2013. Proceeds will be used to partially fund capital projects, to reduce existing indebtedness and for other general corporate purposes of the Corporation and its affiliates.

The syndicate of underwriters is led by CIBC World Markets, RBC Capital Markets, TD Securities, and Scotiabank.

That’s a nice long first coupon – there may be some dividend capture possibilities in November!

Later, they announced:

that as a result of strong investor demand for its previously announced offering of Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares, Series 13 (the “Series 13 Preferred Shares”), the size of the offering has been increased to 14 million Series 13 Preferred Shares. The aggregate gross proceeds will be C$350 million. Closing of the offering is expected on July 17, 2014.

Update, 2014-7-11: Rated Pfd-2(low) [Stable] by DBRS.

July 7, 2014

July 7th, 2014

For all the recent hope about the US – given its recent jobs number – the rest of the world isn’t doing all that well:

International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde signaled a cut in the institution’s global growth forecasts, saying investment is still weak and that risks remain in the U.S. even as its rebound accelerates.

“The global economy is gathering speed, though the pace may be a bit less than we previously predicted because the growth potential is lower and investment” spending remains lackluster, Lagarde told the Cercle des Economistes conference in Aix-en-Provence, France.

The remarks underline the threats to global economic growth at a time when the U.S. Federal Reserve is trimming stimulus and the European Central Bank is fighting inflation that is less than half its targeted level. The IMF is preparing to update its economic forecasts this month after predicting April 8 that the global economy will expand 3.6 percent this year and 3.9 percent in 2015.

In the meantime, all the new rules are disrupting the repo market:

The Federal Reserve’s bond purchases combined with demand from banks to meet tightened regulatory requirements is making it harder for traders to easily borrow and lend certain desired securities in the $1.6 trillion-a-day market for repurchase agreements. That’s causing such trades to go uncompleted at some of the highest rates since the financial crisis.

Disruptions in so-called repos, which Wall Street’s biggest banks rely on for their day-to-day financing needs, are another unintended consequence of extraordinary central-bank policies that pulled the economy out of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. They also belie the stability projected by bond yields at about record lows.

Negative rates happen when certain Treasuries are in such high demand or short supply that lenders of cash are actually paying collateral providers interest so they can obtain the needed securities. Traders said that is a big reason why repo rates on desired Treasuries have recently gotten as low as negative 3 percent.

Now, more repo trades are going uncompleted, or failing, because it’s either too difficult or expensive for the borrower to obtain and deliver Treasuries. Such failures to deliver Treasuries have averaged $65.6 billion a week this year, reaching as much as $197.6 billion in the week ended June 18, Fed data show.

Uncompleted trades averaged $51.6 billion in 2013, and $28.8 billion in 2012, according to the Fed.

“The effect of all the collateral issues we see now is an indication of not so much how things are, but how bad things will be when you really need liquidity,” said Jeffrey Snider, chief investment strategist at West Palm Beach, Florida-based Alhambra Investment Partners LLC, in a telephone interview June 30. “That’s when you get into potentially dire situations.”

The conditions for repo stress were on display last month. The 2.5 percent note due in May 2024 reached negative 3 percentage points in repo in the days preceding a June 11 Treasury auction of $21 billion in notes to finance government operations.

Repo rates have been most prone to go negative, a situation known as specials in the market, in the days preceding an auction as traders who previously sold the debt seek to buy the securities to cover those positions.

Those fascinated by the topic might want to read the New York Fed paper Key Mechanics of The U.S. Tri-Party Repo Market.

League Assets Corp. and its IGW REIT have given us what may well be a foretaste of the market’s next disaster – private equity:

League made a name for itself by telling investors that their money was safer within a private REIT because it wouldn’t be subject to fluctuations in the public markets. However, cracks started to show over the past few years, and major caution flags were raised in 2013 when League tried to restructure itself by going public. Some investors worried that tapping new, unknowing public investors for fresh funds was the only way League would be able to resolve its cash crunch. (The detailed story of League’s rise and fall was reported in Report on Business Magazine earlier this year.)

Since League filed for protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, PwC has tried to untangle the company’s complex structure and determine who would get paid what. Through this process, the firm concluded that the following were the main problems that led to League’s undoing:

At the time of its CCAA filing, League hoped it would be able to restructure itself and continue operating. PwC disagreed. Instead, all of the buildings are being sold off, and only two have yet to be sold. While this process has generated funds to help pay back creditors and investors, it has only generated $235-million because League had to sell its properties in what has quickly become a weak commercial property market.

Norm Cham of the SEC had this to say about Private Equity recently:

There is no single methodology for determining the fair value of a security or other asset because fair value depends upon the facts and circumstances of each situation. As a general principle, however, the fair value of a security or other asset held by a fund would be the amount that the fund might reasonably expect to receive for the security or other asset upon its current sale. When determining the fair value of a security or other asset held by an alternative mutual fund, all indications of value that are available must be taken into account.[6] One key to effective valuation is the development of robust valuation policies and procedures. Issues that alternative mutual fund managers may consider addressing in their policies and procedures include: (1) the requirement that the fund monitor for circumstances that may necessitate the use of fair value prices, (2) the provision of a methodology by which a fund determines fair value, (3) the process for price overrides, (4) assurance that controls are in place to review, monitor and approve all overrides in a timely manner, and (5) the prompt notification to, and review and approval by, persons not directly involved in portfolio management to mitigate conflicts of interest.[7]

In other words … “tick the box”. And the blind led the blind into the abyss.

Japan has learned nothing from the western solar energy boondoggle:

The Japanese government’s subsidy program originally paid about triple the amount Germany extended for its solar industries.

Japan approved a cut in tariffs for solar power as a building boom meant the technology made up 97 percent of new renewable capacity since it offered incentives.

The tariff was reduced in April 2013 to 37.8 yen per kilowatt hour from 42 yen. Japan’s method of subsidy for the industry is similar to the program Germany, Spain and the U.K. implemented, offering an above-market rate for solar power.

Japan gave final approval in March for the 11 percent cut to 32 yen a kilowatt-hour for the 20 years from the fiscal year starting April and offered 36 yen for offshore wind, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry said in a statement.

The recent Ontari-ari-ari-Owe election has brought with it the promise of a new fund that will provide citizens with extra pension income – provided, of course, that all the Ontario Bonds this fund will buy doesn’t go bust! The US Treasury has other ideas:

Retirees with 401(k) plans and individual retirement accounts will have more flexibility to purchase annuities that don’t start paying out until age 80 or 85, under final rules from the U.S. Treasury Department.

The rules announced today provide a new way for retirees to limit the drawdowns of their account balances that are now required starting after age 70 1/2. Instead, under the rules, they could use as much as 25 percent of their account balances up to $125,000 to purchase deferred annuities.

The Treasury Department’s final rules give the government’s blessing to the concept of longevity insurance, which hasn’t taken hold in the market, in part because of the required distribution rules and because of relatively high fees that deter potential purchasers.

In 2013, deferred income annuities were a $2.2 billion market, less than 1 percent of all annuity sales, according to the Limra Secure Retirement Institute. Deferred income annuity sales have more than doubled for each of the past two years.

A man who purchases a deferred annuity at age 60 for $50,000 can receive $17,614 in annual income for life starting at age 80, according to New York Life.

And that’s with today’s rates!

There was little overall movement in the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualDiscounts and FixedResets both up 2bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. Volatility was minimal. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.16 % 3.15 % 23,152 19.34 1 -0.9607 % 2,511.8
FixedFloater 4.24 % 3.52 % 28,202 18.28 1 0.2685 % 4,050.4
Floater 2.87 % 2.97 % 46,804 19.83 4 -0.6507 % 2,762.8
OpRet 4.00 % -10.02 % 86,887 0.08 1 0.3922 % 2,730.7
SplitShare 4.68 % 4.05 % 85,835 4.06 7 -0.1012 % 3,117.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3922 % 2,496.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.51 % -4.45 % 80,883 0.08 17 0.0023 % 2,422.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.24 % 5.18 % 111,872 15.02 20 0.0192 % 2,571.3
FixedReset 4.38 % 3.64 % 202,583 4.48 76 0.0223 % 2,562.4
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.94 % 129,854 0.14 43 0.0028 % 2,547.9
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.14 % 115,813 3.86 6 0.2967 % 2,515.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-07
Maturity Price : 21.84
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-07
Maturity Price : 17.68
Evaluated at bid price : 17.68
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-07
Maturity Price : 17.75
Evaluated at bid price : 17.75
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 136,141 RBC crossed 38,600 at 25.33; Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-07
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.33
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 130,800 RBC crossed 126,800 at 25.44.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.48
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible 118,960 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 112,443 Called for redemption July 31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 107,116 Nesbitt crossed 102,700 at 23.18.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-07
Maturity Price : 22.75
Evaluated at bid price : 23.13
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 101,265 Called for redemption July 31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.86 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 0.6400
Average : 0.3785

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 22.41 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.4378

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-07
Maturity Price : 22.58
Evaluated at bid price : 22.41
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %

MFC.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 26.26 – 27.50
Spot Rate : 1.2400
Average : 1.1003

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.37 – 23.77
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2859

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.37
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %

ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.64 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2481

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-07
Maturity Price : 24.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.64
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %

CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.20 – 24.75
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.4449

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-07
Maturity Price : 23.81
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %