Archive for August, 2011

August 18, 2011

Thursday, August 18th, 2011

It’s been a bad few weeks for pension plans:

Pension consulting firm Aon Hewitt estimates the average funded position of corporate pension plans in Canada fell from 97 per cent on July 25 to 85 per cent by Aug. 8 after stock markets went into a tailspin. That means plans have slid into a significant deficit after being close to fully funded, based on financial statement disclosure measures.

The results show pension plans have been “on a roller coaster,” [Aon Hewitt vice-president] Mr. [Tom] Ault said, with high volatility and daily swings of more than two percentage points in their funded position on many of the days in August so far.

There’s at least one European bank with a major funding problem:

The euro zone’s sovereign debt crisis knows no bounds. The European Central Bank’s disclosure that it had provided $500-million to a bank — the biggest sum in two years — shows that one euro zone institution is struggling to raise dollars.

U.S. money market funds, although a small proportion of overall European bank funding, give an idea of the risk: they have reduced both maturities and funding lines. BBVA and Santander, Spanish banks with U.S. retail units, had a foretaste last year when they struggled to raise dollar funds. This year, as investors fret about Italy’s sovereign risk, it is Italian lenders that are looking for alternative short-term funding as U.S. sources hug the sidelines.

In July alone, their usage of ECB repo lines increased by €40-billion to compensate, Morgan Stanley notes. French banks are also big users of U.S. money funds (perhaps €50-billion for BNP Paribas and €38-billion for Société Générale, the broker estimates) but their ECB usage rose by much less, suggesting they could roll over dollar funding, but perhaps only at shorter maturities.

It was quite a day:

Stocks plunged while Treasuries rallied, pushing yields to record lows, amid growing signs the economy is slowing and speculation that European banks lack sufficient capital. Gold climbed to a record, while oil led commodities lower.

The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index tumbled 4.5 percent to 1,140.74 at 4 p.m. in New York. The Stoxx Europe 600 Index lost 4.8 percent in its worst plunge since March 2009 and Germany’s DAX Index slid 5.8 percent, the most since 2008. Ten-year Treasury yields fell as much as 19 basis points to 1.97 percent as rates on similar-maturity Canadian and British debt also reached all-time lows. The dollar gained versus 15 of 16 major peers, strengthening 0.6 percent to $1.4336 per euro. Gold futures rallied as much as 2.1 percent to $1,832 an ounce, while oil slid 5.9 percent.

Banks led losses a day after the European Central Bank said a lender will borrow dollars for the first time in six months. Lars Frisell, chief economist at Sweden’s financial regulator, said it won’t take much for interbank lending to freeze and the Wall Street Journal reported regulators were scrutinizing the U.S. operations of Europe’s largest lenders to assess their vulnerability. U.S. jobless claims rose and Philadelphia-area manufacturing shrank by the most since 2009, while hopes for more stimulus from the Federal Reserve receded.

Politicians like to pretend they care about productivity, while at the same time forking over millions in milkfare, protecting Air Canada from foreign competition and subsidizing not-ready-for-prime-time solar technology. The latest example is a little more homespun:

A local fruit vendor has been forced to close a popular produce stand after the City of Vancouver decided the operation had grown too large for its streetside space.

To continue operating the stand at its present size, [Vancouver deputy chief licence inspector] Mr. [Tom] Hamilton said, Mr. Smith would require a farmer’s-market permit.

But such a permit would require Mr. Smith’s suppliers to sell their produce directly to the public at the stand, Mr. Hamilton said.

Quick! Find out who developed the rules and put them in charge of Toronto’s food cart programme! With some help, we can make it even more counterproductive and precious this time ’round!

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 22bp, FixedResets up 5bp and DeemedRetractibles down 14bp. Volatility was quite good. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.1416 % 2,175.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.1416 % 3,271.4
Floater 2.79 % 2.57 % 30,895 20.89 4 -1.1416 % 2,348.6
OpRet 4.87 % 3.70 % 57,414 0.12 9 0.0387 % 2,446.9
SplitShare 5.45 % 0.92 % 62,202 0.53 4 -1.3070 % 2,461.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0387 % 2,237.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 5.12 % 136,048 2.02 14 -0.1976 % 2,098.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.38 % 5.47 % 108,723 14.63 16 0.2187 % 2,220.6
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.15 % 213,539 2.73 60 0.0495 % 2,319.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.05 % 4.66 % 269,225 7.77 46 -0.1422 % 2,183.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.E SplitShare -3.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.31
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -2.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-18
Maturity Price : 16.13
Evaluated at bid price : 16.13
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-18
Maturity Price : 16.20
Evaluated at bid price : 16.20
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-18
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 2.32 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.54
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.07
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-18
Maturity Price : 23.87
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-18
Maturity Price : 23.76
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-18
Maturity Price : 24.25
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-18
Maturity Price : 20.51
Evaluated at bid price : 20.51
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-18
Maturity Price : 23.65
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 4.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-18
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
IFC.PR.C FixedReset 425,905 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 49,800 Nesbitt crossed 35,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.89
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 30,825 Nesbitt crossed 26,900 at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 27,564 RBC crossed 20,000 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 24,900 TD crossed 18,100 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 22,300 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.73
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 22.31 – 23.69
Spot Rate : 1.3800
Average : 0.8233

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.31
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.59 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2608

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-18
Maturity Price : 23.39
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %

TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.26 – 26.57
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2018

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 27.20 – 27.85
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.5457

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 1.47 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.27 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2404

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %

BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 25.01 – 25.36
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2636

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %

IFC.PR.C Settles Firm on Good Volume

Thursday, August 18th, 2011

Intact Financial Corporation has announced:

that it has closed its $300 million offering of medium term notes (the “Notes”) and its $250 million offering of Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class A Shares Series 3 (the “Series 3 Preferred Shares”).

The Notes were offered on a best efforts basis through a syndicate led by CIBC World Markets Inc., RBC Dominion Securities Inc. and TD Securities Inc. and including Scotia Capital Inc., BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., National Bank Financial Inc. and Casgrain & Company Limited. The Notes will be direct unsecured obligations of IFC and will rank equally with all other unsecured and unsubordinated indebtedness of IFC. The Notes will bear interest at a fixed annual rate of 4.70% until maturity on August 18, 2021.

The Series 3 Preferred Share offering was underwritten on a bought deal basis by a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC World Markets Inc., RBC Dominion Securities Inc., Scotia Capital Inc., and TD Securities Inc. and including National Bank Financial Inc., BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., Canaccord Genuity Corp., GMP Securities L.P., Desjardins Securities Inc., HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc., Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd. and Raymond James Ltd. (the “Underwriters”). IFC entered into an underwriting agreement dated August 11, 2011 with the Underwriters under which the Underwriters agreed to purchase from IFC and sell to the public 9,000,000 Series 3 Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per Series 3 Preferred Share for gross proceeds to IFC of $225,000,000. The Underwriters have exercised their over-allotment option and purchased an additional 1,000,000 Series 3 Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per Series 3 Share for gross proceeds to IFC of $25,000,000.

The holders of Series 3 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of IFC, on a quarterly basis (with the first quarterly dividend to be paid on September 30, 2011), for the initial fixed rate period ending on September 30, 2016, based on an annual rate of 4.20%. The dividend rate will be reset on September 30, 2016 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.66%. The Board of Directors has approved and declared the initial dividend of $0.12370 per Series 3 Preferred Share which is payable on September 30, 2011 to holders of record on September 15, 2011.

Holders of the Series 3 Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their Series 3 Preferred Shares into Non-cumulative Floating Rate Class A Shares Series 4 (the “Series 4 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2016 and on September 30 every five years thereafter. The holders of Series 4 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive floating rate non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of IFC, at a rate equal to the 90-day Canadian Treasury Bill rate plus 2.66%.

IFC intends to use the net proceeds of the Series 3 Preferred Share offering and the Note offering, together with borrowings under acquisition credit facilities previously arranged by IFC, the proceeds of a previously announced subscription receipt offering, the net proceeds from a previously announced private placement of medium term notes, the net proceeds of a previously announced preferred share offering and a portion of IFC’s existing cash resources, to fund the purchase price for its previously announced acquisition of all of the issued and outstanding shares of AXA Canada (the “Acquisition”). The closing of the Acquisition is expected to occur in the fall of 2011 subject to receipt of required competition and insurance regulatory approvals and the satisfaction of certain closing conditions. The Series 3 Preferred Share offering and the Note offering are not conditional upon closing of the Acquisition; if the Acquisition is not completed, the net proceeds from these offerings will be used for general corporate purposes.

The Notes have been given a rating of A(low) with a Stable trend by DBRS Limited and a rating of A3, under review for possible downgrade by Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. DBRS Limited has assigned a rating of Pfd-2(low) with a Stable trend for the Series 3 Preferred Shares.

The Series 3 Preferred Shares will commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange on August 18, 2011 under the symbol IFC.PR.C.

IFC.PR.C is a FixedReset, 4.20%+266, announced August 9. As the issue does not have a NVCC clause, I have followed my current policy and added a Deemed Maturity entry to the call schedule for 2022-1-31 in the expectation that the NVCC rules will be imposed on insurers and insurance holding companies in the reasonably near future. The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset subindex.

The issue traded 425,905 shares today in a range of 24.87-95 before closing at 24.90-94, 30×100.

Vital statistics are:

IFC.PR.C FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %

BoC Releases Summer 2011 Review

Thursday, August 18th, 2011

The Bank of Canada has released the Summer 2011 Bank of Canada Review:

This special issue, “Real-Financial Linkages,” examines the Bank’s research using theoretical and empirical models to improve its understanding of the linkages between financial and macroeconomic developments in the wake of the recent global financial crisis.

Very important, I know – and it’s what the Bank’s job is all about! – but not my favourite topic.

Articles are:

I found the last article, by Marc Larson and Étienne Lessard, to be too general to be satisfying, but there were some interesting points:

Step 3 – Selecting optimal strategies In this step, a wide range of different financing strategies are reviewed, some of which may involve issuing debt in only some maturity sectors but not others. An optimization algorithm is then used to select those strategies with the best cost-risk tradeoffs, or the lowest cost for a specific level of risk. The output of this work is a curve that represents the most efficient financing strategies, similar to an efficient portfolio frontier, as well as the composition of the most efficient financing strategies.

Chart 2 and Chart 3 illustrate the results of the optimization exercise based on debt rollover as a risk measure. Note that the same exercise can also be performed using other risk measures. Chart 2 shows the efficient frontier of the optimal debt structures (lowest cost for a specific level of risk). Moving along this frontier from left to right shows how expected borrowing costs decrease—and rollover risk increases—as the government shifts the proportion of its borrowing program from long-term debt to shortterm debt. Chart 3 illustrates how the proportion of short-term debt in the optimal portfolio changes as one moves along the efficient frontier. Each colour represents a different debt instrument issued by the Government of Canada. As shown in this chart, low risk debt structures contain mainly long-term maturity instruments (10-year and 30-year nominal bonds and Real Return Bonds), while high-risk debt structures contain mostly short-term debt instruments (3-, 6- and 12-month treasury bills and 2-year bonds).


Click for big

I find the relationship between efficient amounts – as defined – of long nominals vs. RRBs to be fascinating. I suppose part of the reason for the relationship is that they are considered to have similar cost, but a big chunk of the RRB return is paid only on maturity; therefore they will have a lower quarterly rollover rate (less risk) at the same [relationship of] cost. Maybe! I’d have to look at the model in more detail!

However, rest assured that I will be quoting the bank’s conclusions on risk to support my “security of income” vs “security of principal” argument until you are all heartily sick of it, never fear! The risk of variance of investor’s income is exactly the flip side of the risk of variance of the Bank’s expenses.

The article on bank balance sheets by Césaire Meh uses a model to derive interesting relationships between counter-cyclical capital buffers and monetary policy. Note that “(demand-type) financial shocks … generate simultaneous downward pressures on inflation and credit contractions.” – i.e., a standard recession,while “(supply-type) financial shocks … cause credit contractions and upward inflation pressures,” i.e., a financial crisis / credit crunch:

Overall, these results suggest that the impact of countercyclical capital buffers on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and, consequently, the nature of the coordination between these two tools, depend on the nature of the shocks experienced by the economy. Demand-type financial shocks pose no inherent trade-offs between stabilizing credit and achieving price stability. In this case, the use of countercyclical capital buffers eases the pressure on monetary policy, and less-aggressive movements in the interest rate would be required to achieve economic stability. Supply-type financial shocks, however, can generate a tension between stabilizing credit and price stability. In this case, activating countercyclical capital buffers could make it harder to stabilize inflation, and more-aggressive movements in the interest rate would be required. Under such circumstances, proper coordination between the two policy instruments will lead to a better policy outcome. [Footnote]

Footnote: Countercyclical capital buffers should be considered neither a substitute for monetary policy nor an all-purpose stabilization instrument. Rather, they should be viewed as a useful complement to monetary policy in a world in which financial shocks have become an important source of economic fluctuations.

August 17, 2011

Wednesday, August 17th, 2011

Both Yellow Media common and Sino-Forest common will be removed from the MSCI world index.

Predictably, it doesn’t look as if the proposed European financial transaction tax is going anywhere:

Banks criticized Franco-German plans for a tax on financial transactions, saying they will jeopardize economic growth and distort markets, as the British, Dutch and Swedish governments distanced themselves from the proposals.

The British government, which oversees Europe’s biggest financial center, is preparing to clash with its French and German counterparts over the levy, which would be applied in all 27 European Union countries. Finance chiefs failed to agree on a transactions tax in September 2010, amid opposition from nations including the U.K. The Swedish and Dutch governments also said today that they oppose the plans. EU taxation proposals require unanimous support from the bloc’s 27 governments to become law.

We have our first rationale for dissent from the last FOMC statement:

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher said the central bank shouldn’t ease monetary policy whenever there is a big drop in U.S. stock prices, an action he said some traders might view as a “Bernanke put.”

“My long-standing belief is that the Federal Reserve should never enact such asymmetric policies to protect stock market traders and investors,” Fisher said today in prepared remarks in Midland, Texas. “I believe my FOMC colleagues share this view.”

Fisher’s comments offered his first explanation of his dissent from the Federal Open Market Committee decision last week to specify a date for their commitment to low borrowing costs. The Fed said the benchmark interest rate will stay in a range of zero to 0.25 percent at least through mid-2013. The new language replaces a prior promise to keep rates low for an “extended period.”

The shape of the Treasury curve also attracted notice:

The extra yield Treasury investors get to hold 30-year bonds instead of two-year notes shrank to the narrowest in a week on speculation the U.S. economic recovery is stalling.

The long bonds rose as much as two points as stocks pared gains. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia President Charles Plosser told Bloomberg Radio today that policy makers should have waited to see how the economy performed before pledging on Aug. 9 to hold interest rates at record lows for two years.

The difference between yields on two-year notes and 30-year bonds shrank to 3.37 percentage points at 5 p.m. in New York, from 3.48 percentage points yesterday. The spread was the narrowest since Aug. 10, when it was the smallest since October 2010.

Closet indexing is alive and well:

The study by Lipper and Avana, a German asset management boutique firm, found that portfolio managers started a risk management system that measured relative risk compared to their benchmarks instead of measuring absolute risk in terms of losses.

The new management guidelines did not meet the expectations of private investors and led to the following conclusions:

Relative risk management systems are penalizing fund managers if their risk compared to the benchmark moved above a defined level. The study found that a fund manager was not allowed to hold a high percentage of his portfolio in cash or decrease the weighting of a specific industry to zero, as this would increase the risk of the portfolio relative to the benchmark.

As a result, managers moved their allocations closer to the benchmarks in market downturns to avoid penalties. Conversely, if a fund lost 45 percent, while the respective benchmark had lost 50 percent, for example, the fund manager could be rewarded for his outperformance, even as he lost money for investors.

I don’t see anything wrong with the tendency expressed in the last sentence – or, indeed, with the concept of measuring relative risk compared to benchmarks! But I don’t believe outperformance happens much.

DBRS downgraded Ireland:

DBRS Inc. (DBRS) has downgraded the Republic of Ireland’s long-term foreign and local currency debt to A (low) from “A”. The trend on both ratings remains Negative. In spite of strong political commitment to fiscal consolidation and lower interest rates on official loans, the downgrade reflects weaker than expected growth prospects. As a result, public debt ratios are estimated to peak in 2013 at higher levels than previously anticipated. The Negative trend reflects DBRS’s view that downside risks to Ireland’s export-led recovery persist, particularly given heightened uncertainty over the economic outlook in the United States and Europe and ongoing turbulence in financial markets.

Weaker than expected growth is likely to push public debt ratios higher than previously anticipated. In our revised baseline scenario, Ireland’s gross general government debt peaks at 120% of GDP in 2013 and gradually declines thereafter. This excludes NAMA bonds and its associated assets.

DBRS also changed the trend on Spain to negative:

DBRS Inc. (DBRS) has today confirmed the ratings of the Kingdom of Spain’s long-term foreign and local currency debt at AA and changed the trends from Stable to Negative.

The ratings balance Spain’s relatively low public-sector indebtedness and its progress in achieving its fiscal targets with high fiscal deficits, high unemployment, a fragile recovery and a weakened financial sector. The Negative trends reflect the potentially adverse effects of the sharp rise in uncertainty in financial markets on economy-wide funding conditions and the increased risks to the growth outlook of the United States that could affect both Europe and Spain’s export-based recovery.

They soon after published a correction which commenced:

DBRS Inc. (DBRS) has today confirmed the ratings of the Kingdom of Spain’s long-term foreign and local currency debt at AA and changed the trend from Stable to Negative.

The ratings balance Spain’s relatively low public-sector indebtedness and its progress in achieving its fiscal targets with high fiscal deficits, high unemployment, a fragile recovery and a weakened financial sector. The Negative trends reflect the potentially adverse effects of the sharp rise in uncertainty in financial markets on economy-wide funding conditions, and the increased risks to the growth outlook of the United States that could affect both Europe’s and Spain’s export-based recovery. This concern goes beyond the direct trade link between the United States and Spain, which is limited, as there may be more widespread consequences on growth and trade in Europe.

It was a very strong day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 36bp, FixedResets gaining 34bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 48bp. Volatility was good, as might be inferred from the index performances; volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.49%, equivalent to 7.14% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 4.9%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is not about 225bp, a good tightening from the 240bp reported on August 10 derived from movement in both sectors.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.3970 % 2,200.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.3970 % 3,309.1
Floater 2.76 % 2.60 % 30,729 20.80 4 1.3970 % 2,375.7
OpRet 4.88 % 3.54 % 57,176 0.12 9 0.0645 % 2,445.9
SplitShare 5.32 % 2.22 % 59,882 0.53 4 -0.2460 % 2,494.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0645 % 2,236.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.67 % 5.15 % 134,132 2.02 14 0.1230 % 2,102.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.39 % 5.49 % 108,692 14.60 16 0.3597 % 2,215.7
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.11 % 213,810 2.71 59 0.3378 % 2,318.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.05 % 4.64 % 269,749 7.99 46 0.4778 % 2,186.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CM.PR.K FixedReset -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 23.56
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.40
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 24.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 5.00 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.27
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 2.60 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 20.91
Evaluated at bid price : 20.91
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 5.52 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 2.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 22.82
Evaluated at bid price : 24.21
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 2.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.62
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 16.51
Evaluated at bid price : 16.51
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 2.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 16.60
Evaluated at bid price : 16.60
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 15.76 % The closing (or last?) quotes on this issue have been all over the map recently and this doesn’t mean anything.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 316,980 Recent new issue. This is more volume than it had on the day it closed!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.79
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 94,527 TD bought 14,400 from RBC at 27.39, then crossed 40,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.36
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 47,172 Scotia crossed 43,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.19
Bid-YTW : 2.84 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 47,100 TD crossed 20,000 at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium 42,447 TD crossed blocks of 25,000 and 10,900, both at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-09-16
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 1.68 %
TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 37,562 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 22.85 – 23.50
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.4922

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 22.60
Evaluated at bid price : 22.85
Bid-YTW : 2.29 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 27.21 – 27.79
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.4314

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 27.21
Bid-YTW : 1.44 %

BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.90 – 22.34
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3010

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 21.57
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %

CM.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 26.36 – 26.80
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3013

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.08 – 23.82
Spot Rate : 0.7400
Average : 0.6268

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 22.70
Evaluated at bid price : 23.08
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %

PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.80 – 25.18
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2697

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-17
Maturity Price : 23.67
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %

DBRS To Rate NVCC Preferreds

Wednesday, August 17th, 2011

Following the finalization of the OSFI NVCC Advisory and basically simultaneously with the Review-Negative slapped on NVCC-eligible extant preferreds, DBRS has announced that it:

has concluded today that it expects it can rate Canadian subordinated debt with a non-viability contingent capital clause (sub debt NVCC) and Canadian preferred shares with a non-viability contingent capital clause (pref NVCC) following the review of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) Advisory on Non-Viability Contingent Capital, issued on August 16, 2011 (NVCC Advisory).

In this document, all references to non-viability contingent capital (NVCC) instruments are based on our expectations that non-viability (as determined by OSFI) is the only contingent event, that the contingent event triggers permanent conversion to common equity and that over time, as NVCC becomes the major instrument with respect to subordinated debt and preferred shares, any trigger event for sub debt NVCC holders would cause these holders to become meaningful owners of the bank in question. These considerations are also consistent with our ability to rate the NVCC instruments. According to DBRS criteria, the triggers are well defined and permit an assessment of the risks.

Both the sub debt NVCC and pref NVCC ratings will have wider notching, based on the global standard notching for preferred shares, because of additional risk associated with tripping the trigger. The expected losses resulting from tripping the trigger would have an impact on the relative rating of sub debt NVCC and pref NVCC. As guidance, sub debt NVCC will likely be rated no higher than the standard rating for preferred shares and the pref NVCC will likely be rated one notch below the standard rating for preferred shares.

For clarity, global standard notching for preferred shares means the starting point for notching preferred share ratings is the intrinsic assessment (IA) rating rather than the final senior debt rating, and the degree of notching from the IA rating to the preferred share rating widens to reflect our perception of the increased risk in these capital instruments. The base notching policy is three notches for AA, four notches for “A” and five notches for BBB and lower IA ratings. Note that when DBRS initiated the criteria on June 29, 2009, most banks in Canada had their preferred share ratings downgraded to only one notch above the global standard notching for preferred shares

DBRS has determined that the likelihood of tripping the trigger event (i.e., non-viability as determined by OSFI) would be very hard or remote. DBRS’s decision was based on the assessment of the criteria to be considered in triggering conversion of NVCC instruments that was spelled out in the NVCC advisory by OSFI. Lower-rated banks suggest an increased probability of conversion as a result of tripping the trigger given the greater need for a bank to generate regulatory capital. This would result in higher notching from the intrinsic assessment, as set out in the DBRS methodology Rating Bank Preferred Shares and Equivalent Hybrids. As such, both the sub debt NVCC and pref NVCC ratings would be tied to the preferred share rating of the bank.

The expected losses as a result of the conversion would affect the rating for sub debt NVCC relative to pref NVCC. It is the economic entitlement each receives post-trigger that is the significant factor in the relative ratings as opposed to the host security’s pre-trigger features. This economic entitlement can be assessed only after terms are provided in a contractual agreement between the issuing bank and the purchaser.

NVCC: DBRS Places TD.PR.M, TD.PR.N, RY.PR.W, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G & BMO.PR.V on Review-Negative

Wednesday, August 17th, 2011

TD.PR.M & TD.PR.N:

DBRS has today placed the Non-Cumulative Class A 1st Preferred Shares, Series M and Non-Cumulative Class A 1st Preferred Shares, Series M (collectively, the Convertible Preferred Securities) ratings of The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD or the Bank) Under Review with Negative Implications. The Convertible Preferred Securities are convertible to common equity at the issuer’s option. Today’s actions apply only to the Convertible Preferred Shares that DBRS rates; all other preferred share ratings of the Bank are unaffected.

Our review will consider the changing Canadian regulatory landscape as it relates to resolution mechanisms, the ability of the issuer to convert the preferred shares into common equity and the expected losses incurred as a result of the conversion. Additionally, the review will incorporate whether convertible preferred securities will have wider notching, based on the global standard notching for preferred shares, because of additional risk associated with conversion. As guidance, subordinated debt non-viability contingent capital will likely be rated no higher than the standard rating for preferred shares and the preferred share non-viability contingent capital will likely be rated one notch below the standard rating for preferred shares.

For clarity, global standard notching for preferred shares means the starting point for notching preferred share ratings is the intrinsic assessment (IA) rating rather than the final senior debt rating, and the degree of notching from the IA rating to the preferred share rating widens to reflect our perception of the increased risk in these capital instruments. The base notching policy is three notches for AA, four notches for “A” and five notches for BBB and lower IA ratings. Note that when DBRS implemented the changes in the preferred share methodology, on June 29, 2009, to increase the base notching at even the strongest rating categories and the expansion of the base notching as the credit quality of the bank migrates downward, most banks in Canada had their preferred share ratings downgraded to only one notch above the global standard notching for preferred shares.

The language for the other issues is similar, if not identical, so I’ll only quote the first paragraph of each press release.

RY.PR.W:

DBRS has today placed the Non-Cumulative First Preferred Shares, Series W (the Convertible Preferred Security) of Royal Bank of Canada (RBC or the Bank) Under-Review with Negative Implications. The Convertible Preferred Security is convertible to common equity at the issuer’s option. Today’s action applies only to the Convertible Preferred Security that DBRS rates; all other preferred share ratings of the Bank are unaffected.

CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G:

DBRS has today placed the ratings of the Non-Cumulative Class A Preferred Shares, Series 26 , Non-Cumulative Class A Preferred Shares, Series 27 and Non-Cumulative Class A Preferred Shares, Series 29 (collectively, the Convertible Preferred Securities) of Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC or the Bank) Under Review with Negative Implications. The Convertible Preferred Securities are convertible to common equity at the issuer’s option. Today’s actions apply only to the Convertible Preferred Securities that DBRS rates; all other preferred share ratings of the Bank are unaffected.

BMO.PR.V (which rarely gets mentioned on PrefBlog because it’s US Funds):

DBRS has today placed the Non-Cumulative Perpetual Class B Preferred Shares, Series 10 (the Convertible Preferred Security) rating of Bank of Montreal (BMO or the Bank) Under Review with Negative Implications. The Convertible Preferred Security is convertible to common equity at the issuer’s option. Today’s action applies only to the Convertible Preferred Security that DBRS rates; all other preferred share ratings of the Bank are unaffected.

Update, 2011-8-18: DBRS is holding a teleconference:

DBRS will be holding a teleconference at 10.30 a.m. today to discuss its recent rating actions on Canadian banks’ non-cumulative preferred shares. Yesterday, DBRS placed various non-cumulative preferred shares of Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada and The Toronto-Dominion Bank Under Review with Negative Implications following the review of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI) Advisory on Non-Viability Contingent Capital, issued on August 16, 2011 (NVCC Advisory).

The rating actions follow the revision of how DBRS views the elevated risk of conversion in an environment where OSFI is encouraging Canadian banks to put in place resolution mechanisms, including the release of the NVCC Advisory, and the regulator’s ongoing push toward loss absorption from capital instruments, including convertible preferred securities, to generate common equity prior to the declaration of non-viability by OSFI. On conversion, there is the potential for the holder of this instrument to incur losses.

The teleconference, hosted by Brenda Lum, Managing Director, and Robert Long, Senior Vice President, will cover the key analytical considerations in the DBRS rating action and allow for a question-and-answer period

A replay will be available immediately after the teleconference until September 1, 2011, at the following numbers:

REPLAY CALL-IN DETAILS
Available until 11:59 p.m. on September 1, 2011
Telephone: +1 905 694 9451 or toll-free at +1 800 408 3053
Pass Code: 5608110

DBRS will also publish a full transcript of the teleconference by the end of business on August 19, 2011. The transcript will be available at www.dbrs.com or by contacting us at info@dbrs.com

Update, 2011-8-22: DBRS released a minor correction to the TD release:

In the DBRS press release published on August 17, 2011, in which DBRS placed the Non-Cumulative Class A 1st Preferred Shares, Series M and Non-Cumulative Class A 1st Preferred Shares, Series N ratings of The Toronto-Dominion Bank Under Review with Negative Implications, the first paragraph referred to only the Series M. The press release has been corrected below and is available at www.dbrs.com or by contacting us at info@dbrs.com

CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed

Wednesday, August 17th, 2011

The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce has announced:

that it has received confirmation from the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) that its non-cumulative Class A preferred shares, Series 26, 27 and 29 (the Convertible Preferred Shares) will be treated as non-viability contingent capital (NVCC) for the purposes of determining regulatory capital under Basel III.

On May 26, 2011, CIBC announced that it intended to seek to have the Convertible Preferred Shares treated as NVCC once OSFI finalized its advisory on NVCC (the NVCC Advisory). OSFI published the final NVCC Advisory on August 16, 2011.

In connection with receiving this confirmation, CIBC has taken the following actions:

  • (i) CIBC has irrevocably renounced its rights to convert the Convertible Preferred Shares into CIBC common shares by way of a deed poll except in circumstances that would be a “Trigger Event” as described in the NVCC Advisory; and
  • (ii) CIBC has provided an undertaking to OSFI that CIBC will immediately exercise its rights to convert each of the Convertible Preferred Shares into CIBC common shares upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event.

These are unilateral actions taken at CIBC’s discretion and do not change any of the other terms of the Convertible Preferred Shares including CIBC’s redemption rights.

By renouncing CIBC’s conversion rights except upon the occurrence of a Trigger Event, the Convertible Preferred Shares will continue to not be dilutive to earnings per share following the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) commencing November 1, 2011 nor for the portion of the IFRS comparative year ending October 31, 2011 that is subsequent to August 16, 2011 the date the conversion rights were renounced.

CIBC announcement that it would seek this status was previously reported on PrefBlog. I discussed the probable rationale for their action in this matter in the June, 2011, edition of PrefLetter.

CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E and CM.PR.G are all tracked by HIMIPref™. All are currently assigned to the PerpetualPremium subindex.

OSFI Finalizes NVCC Advisory

Wednesday, August 17th, 2011

OSFI has released a final Advisory on NVCC, with some changes from the draft advisory which was discussed on PrefBlog. The draft advisory has been removed from OSFI’s website in accordance with their policy to ensure that the rationale behind their policies and their development is not understood by investors. Naturally, no comment letters have been published, nor have any documents been referenced that might provide any vestiege of support for their arbitrary and capricious rule-making.

The final advisory begins with a non-sequiter that would not be tolerated in Grade 4:

All regulatory capital must be able to absorb losses in a failed financial institution. During the recent crisis, however, this premise was challenged as certain non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments did not absorb losses for a number of foreign financial institutions that would have failed in the absence of government support.

Principle 3 from the draft advisory, giving the Superintendent the right to trigger conversion if she feels like it, with no appeal, has been retained. Banks are urged to hire lots of former OSFI employees.

There is now a requirement that there be a floor on the conversion price – this did not exist before:

Principle # 4: The conversion terms of new NVCC instruments must reference the market value of common equity on or before the date of the trigger event. The conversion method must also include a limit or cap on the number of shares issued upon a trigger event.

On the one hand, this will prevent so-call “death spirals”. On the other hand, it may make NVCC instruments harder to issue during times of crisis. The necessity of such an unprincipled principle is necessary due to OSFI’s insistence on “low-trigger” NVCC, at a time when the rest of the world has determined that “high-trigger” NVCC is the way to go (see, for example, statements by officials of S&P, more from S&P, Switzerland, the UK, respected academics, and other respected academics, and an equivocal view from IMF staff).

Principal #8, which throws contract law into the same garbage bin as bankruptcy law, has been retained:

Principle # 8: The terms of the NVCC instrument should include provisions to address NVCC investors that are prohibited, pursuant to the legislation governing the DTI, from acquiring common shares in the DTI upon a trigger event. Such mechanisms should allow such capital providers to comply with legal prohibitions while continuing to receive the economic results of common share ownership and should allow such persons to transfer their entitlements to a person that is permitted to own shares in the DTI and allow such transferee to thereafter receive direct share ownership.

Section 2 seeks to ensure permanent employment and many future job opportunities for OSFI employees:

Section 2: Information Requirements to Confirm Quality of NVCC Instruments

While not mandatory, DTIs are strongly encouraged to seek confirmations of capital quality from OSFI’s Capital Division prior to issuing NVCC instruments11. In conjunction with such requests, the DTI is expected to provide the following information….

BoC Working Paper: CDS Crisis Prices

Wednesday, August 17th, 2011

The Bank of Canada has released a working paper by Jason Allen, Ali Hortaçsu and Jakub Kastl titled Analyzing Default Risk and Liquidity Demand during a Financial Crisis: The Case of Canada:

This paper explores the reliability of using prices of credit default swap contracts (CDS) as indicators of default probabilities during the 2007/2008 financial crisis. We use data from the Canadian financial system to show that these publicly available risk measures, while indicative of initial problems of the financial system as a whole, do not seem to
correspond to risks implied by the cross-sectional heterogeneity in bank behavior in short-term lending markets. Strategies in, and reliance on the payments system as well as special liquidity-supplying tools provided by the central bank seem to be more important additional indicators of distress of individual banks, or lack thereof than the CDSs. It therefore seems that central banks should utilize high-frequency data on liquidity demand to obtain a better picture of financial health of individual participants of the financial system.

Essentially, the paper provides further evidence that the bond market is excitable:

In contrast to public measures of bank risk (such as CDS prices), which varied widely both crosssectionally and in the time-series, we show that Canadian banks’ bidding behavior in the liquidity auctions as well as their behavior in the payment system and overnight interbank market was largely indicative of low risk. The fact that overnight market remained quite active throughout the crisis – total loans transacted stayed virtually unchanged while prices actually fell – indicates that participants did not believe there were significant liquidity or counterparty risks. Similarly, Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2010) find that the overnight Feds Fund market remained active following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, although they do find evidence of increased counterparty risk. We argue that the impact of various liquidity-providing actions undertaken by the cental bank and federal government during 2008 might have led to a surplus of liquidity in the market, resulting in overnight unsecured loans transacting even below the target rate. In contrast, we find that during the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) crisis in the summer of 2007, when these extraordinary liquidity facilities did not exist, interbank rates did increase. Similar to Acharya and Merrouche (2010) this suggests liquidity was more scarce at this time. In neither episode, however, do we find evidence of an increase in counterparty risk.

We will provide evidence that in the case of Canadian financial institutions, for which CDS spreads varied substantially both in the cross-section and in the time series, the corresponding variation in the short-term spreads was lacking. We will argue based on further indirect evidence that it therefore seems that in case of fairly illiquid CDS markets, the short term spreads recovered from the bidding behavior in liquidity auctions may provide a more useful source of information about counterparty risk and potential financial trouble in the turbulent times of a crisis.

The situation in Canada was remarkably different. While the default probabilities of individual banks implied by the prices of their respective CDS contracts followed a similar pattern as their European counterparts, the Canadian banking system showed very limited signs of stress (or increase in liquidity demand) in 2007 and in the first half of 2008. In particular, the Canadian banks were much less willing to pay a premium above the reference overnight rate to obtain liquidity from the Bank of Canada. Figure 4 depicts the aggregate bidding functions in each auction that the Bank of Canada conducted before September 2008. It suggests that virtually all banks judged that even if they would not have their demands in these auctions satisfied, they could secure the liquidity elsewhere and hence were bidding at, or very close to, the reference overnight rate (OIS).

Using the standard
formula (see e.g., Hull (2007)):

Pr (Default 5y)T = 100 * (1 – (1/(1 + (cdsT /10000)/(1 – recovery))T ))

we can recover the risk-neutral default probabilities implied by the CDS prices. For the largest institutions, banks A,E and K, the implied default probabilities (assuming 40 per cent recovery rates) went from close to zero to over 15 per cent. Given the increase in default risk implied by the CDS contracts on the banks in our sample we might expect an increase in liquidity hoarding during the crisis.


Click for big

August 16, 2011

Wednesday, August 17th, 2011

Oh joy, oh bliss! US monetary policy is being politicized – and in pretty polemical terms:

Texas Governor Rick Perry, finishing his first full day of campaigning for the U.S. Republican presidential nomination in Iowa, said it would be “almost treacherous — or treasonous” for Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke to increase stimulus spending before the 2012 election.

“If this guy prints more money between now and the election, I don’t know what you would do with him,” Perry said at a backyard appearance in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. “We would treat him pretty ugly down in Texas. Printing more money to play politics at this particular time in American history is almost treacherous — or treasonous in my opinion.”

It’s pretty hard to walk away from language like that … even as the US slides slowly towards total dysfunction.

On a cheerier note, France and Germany propose to eliminate the European financial sector, allowing business opportunities for the rest of us:

France and Germany will propose a financial transaction tax in September, President Nicolas Sarkozy said after talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

There were further details:

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy said they’ll press for closer euro-area economic integration with tougher deficit rules and stricter supervision to stamp out the debt crisis.

Merkel and Sarkozy rejected euro bonds and expanding the 440 billion-euro ($633 billion) rescue fund. A plan to resubmit a financial-transaction tax, which was rejected in 2010, extended declines in U.S. stocks. They proposed debt limits be written into national law and a “euro council” to be headed by European Union President Herman van Rompuy established as part of a planned “economic government” for Europe.

It was a strong day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 40bp, FixedResets up 13bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 25bp. Volatility was good. Volume was average.

Sorry this is so late, folks! Either PrefLetter weekend causes a lot of dislocation, or I’m getting pretty lazy, one or the other.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6740 % 2,169.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6740 % 3,263.5
Floater 2.79 % 2.63 % 30,798 20.72 4 -0.6740 % 2,342.9
OpRet 4.88 % 3.60 % 57,670 0.84 9 0.0344 % 2,444.3
SplitShare 5.30 % 2.46 % 59,450 0.53 4 0.0984 % 2,500.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0344 % 2,235.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.68 % 5.15 % 135,053 2.02 14 0.0679 % 2,099.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.41 % 5.50 % 109,267 14.59 16 0.4036 % 2,207.8
FixedReset 5.17 % 3.14 % 214,695 2.71 59 0.1322 % 2,310.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.73 % 272,103 7.99 46 0.2505 % 2,176.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -2.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-16
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 2.63 %
IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-16
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.62
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-16
Maturity Price : 23.97
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
BMO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 2.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 1.75 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 199,950 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 91,655 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 25,000, both at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 43,815 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 16.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-16
Maturity Price : 16.11
Evaluated at bid price : 16.11
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 40,343 Desjardins crossed 15,000 at 24.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 36,410 Nesbitt crossed 24,700 at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.93
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 35,981 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-11-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.94
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 20.30 – 24.75
Spot Rate : 4.4500
Average : 3.7123

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-16
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 20.00 – 21.20
Spot Rate : 1.2000
Average : 1.0214

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-16
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 2.63 %

IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.86 – 26.54
Spot Rate : 0.6800
Average : 0.5054

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %

BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 26.29 – 26.96
Spot Rate : 0.6700
Average : 0.5357

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.29
Bid-YTW : 4.64 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 23.72 – 24.30
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.4661

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-16
Maturity Price : 22.61
Evaluated at bid price : 23.72
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

TRP.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 25.10 – 25.37
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1763

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-16
Maturity Price : 23.30
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 2.77 %