Market Action

September 2, 2014

Auto dealers in Georgia are competing with new technology using tried and true methods:

Tesla Motors Inc. (TSLA), which has fought U.S. dealers over its direct sales of electric cars, faces a new challenge in Georgia where auto retailers want the Peach State to bar distribution of sedans from the company’s store.

Tesla sells vehicles in violation of the state’s rules limiting the annual volume of cars it can sell directly to the public, the Georgia Automobile Dealers Association said in a petition filed with the Georgia Department of Revenue.

The group, which represents 500 dealerships, asked that Tesla’s license be revoked and the agency block sales of Tesla’s Model S sedan at its shop in Marietta, near Atlanta.

The carmaker’s license in Georgia allows it only to sell vehicles made “in accordance with custom design specifications of the customer” and retail fewer than 150 a year, the group said in the petition. Tesla sold 173 sedans at its suburban Atlanta outlet, its only store in the state, from October to June, according to the petition, a copy of which was obtained by Bloomberg News from the revenue department.

It was a good day for economic news:

The dollar climbed 0.7 percent to 105.10 yen at 4 p.m. in New York and gained 0.8 percent to $1.6472 per British pound. Yields on 10-year Treasury notes increased seven basis points, the most in more than a month, to 2.42 percent. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index lost less than 0.1 percent after the biggest monthly rally since February, as energy companies tumbled 1.3 percent. Gold slid 1.7 percent and Brent crude slumped to a 16-month low.

U.S. manufacturing expanded in August at the fastest pace in three years as orders grew by the most in a decade, bolstering the case for the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates sooner than anticipated. Gauges of factory output in Europe and China signal slower growth, boosting speculation that policy makers will need to boost stimulus measures. European money markets are pricing in about a 50 percent probability that the European Central Bank will cut interest rates by 10 basis points this week, according to BNP Paribas SA.

There’s about a 44 percent chance Fed policy makers will raise the benchmark interest-rate target by June 2015, futures data compiled by Bloomberg showed today. A 36 percent likelihood was seen on Aug. 18.

Bond yields across the euro area have tumbled, enhancing the appeal of payments available from Treasuries, since ECB President Mario Draghi said at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s annual conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on Aug. 22 that the central bank will use “all the available instruments needed to ensure price stability.”

And, with the 75th anniversary of Canada’s declaration of war on Germany almost upon us, we are getting a flavour of what it was like to live through the Munich Crisis:

[Outgoing president of the European commission, José Manuel] Barroso told the closed meeting that Putin had told him Kiev would be an easy conquest for Russia, according to the Italian newspaper, La Repubblica. According to the account, Barroso asked Putin about the presence of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. Nato says there are at least 1,000 Russian forces on the wrong side of the border. The Ukrainians put the figure at 1,600.

“The problem is not this, but that if I want I’ll take Kiev in two weeks,” Putin said, according to La Repubblica.

The Kremlin did not deny Putin had spoken of taking Kiev, but instead complained about the leak of the Barroso remarks.

Petro Poroshenko, the Ukrainian president, attended the EU summit and painted an apocalyptic picture of the conflict, with EU leaders dropping their usual public poise in a heated debate.

Dalia Grybauskaite, the Lithuanian president, declared Russia was “at war with Europe”. The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, the main mediator with Putin, was said to be furious with the Russian leader, warning that he was “irrational and unpredictable”, while David Cameron was said to have raised the issue of Britain discussing policy options regarding Putin.

Cameron likened the west’s dilemma with Putin to relations between the then British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, with Adolf Hitler in Munich in 1938, when Anglo-French appeasement encouraged the Nazi leader to launch the second world war the following year.

“We run the risk of repeating the mistakes made in Munich in 1938. We cannot know what will happen next,” Cameron was reported as saying. “This time we cannot meet Putin’s demands. He has already taken Crimea and we cannot allow him to take the whole country.”

DBRS confirmed Aimia, proud issuer of AIM.PR.A and AIM.PR.C:

DBRS has today confirmed Aimia Inc.’s (Aimia or the Company) Issuer Rating at BBB and the ratings of its Senior Secured Debt and Preferred Shares at BBB and Pfd-3, respectively, all with Stable trends. The confirmation of the ratings is based on the Company’s relatively stable operating performance and credit metrics through 2013 and progress made to date with the Aeroplan program transformation and financial cards agreement with TD Bank Group (TD; rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS) and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC; rated AA with a Stable trend by DBRS). The ratings continue to be based on the strength of Aimia’s brands and its strong relationship with key commercial partners. The ratings also reflect the Company’s high exposure to consumer spending and redemption patterns, as well as the significant but moderating degree of revenue concentration.

DBRS expects Aimia’s financial profile to remain commensurate with the current rating category, based on strong and stable free cash flow-generating capacity and steady leverage. DBRS believes free cash flow will decline modestly due to slightly higher capex requirements and continued growth in the Company’s dividend payments. Free cash flow is expected to continue to be applied primarily toward small tuck-in acquisitions, most likely in the data analytics business. DBRS anticipates that Aimia will use cash on hand to repay approximately $150 million of debt maturing in 2014. As such, when combined with the expected decline in adjusted EBITDA, key credit metrics should remain appropriate for the current rating category (i.e., gross debt-to-adjusted EBITDA before distributions of approximately 1.75x to 2.25x and adjusted EBITDA coverage around 7.0x).

The Canadian preferred share market opened the month on a sour note, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 17bp, FixedResets down 6bp and DeemedRetractibles off 2bp. Volatility was low. Volume was practically non-existent.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1524 % 2,632.7
FixedFloater 4.15 % 3.40 % 26,891 18.57 1 0.1313 % 4,178.5
Floater 2.91 % 3.07 % 48,980 19.48 4 -0.1524 % 2,722.4
OpRet 4.05 % -0.65 % 95,144 0.08 1 -0.1184 % 2,726.0
SplitShare 4.29 % 3.95 % 117,934 3.95 5 -0.0997 % 3,148.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1184 % 2,492.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.46 % -1.10 % 81,960 0.08 20 0.0118 % 2,440.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.22 % 5.14 % 111,574 15.20 16 -0.1709 % 2,607.6
FixedReset 4.23 % 3.69 % 182,792 6.63 74 -0.0588 % 2,570.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.00 % 1.44 % 107,607 0.17 42 -0.0228 % 2,566.3
FloatingReset 2.63 % 2.05 % 79,920 3.71 6 -0.2289 % 2,525.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-09-02
Maturity Price : 22.57
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 2.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-09-02
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.M FixedReset 84,340 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 61,720 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-02
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : -4.48 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 52,050 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.14.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 31,307 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 26.23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.18
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
PWF.PR.T FixedReset 28,957 Desjardins crossed 26,200 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.99
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 23,244 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-09-02
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
There were 6 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.22 – 23.48
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1704

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.22
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 22.43 – 22.70
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1880

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-09-02
Maturity Price : 22.08
Evaluated at bid price : 22.43
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.21 – 26.48
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1926

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.45 – 21.65
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1302

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-09-02
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.31 – 25.50
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1280

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 0.76 %

BAM.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 26.07 – 26.32
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1904

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.07
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %

MAPF

MAPF Performance: August 2014

The fund outperformed in August, assisted by its overweight positions in low-coupon insurance DeemedRetractibles, which outperformed.

relPerf_140829
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relYield_140829
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I continue to believe that the decline in the preferred share market remains overdone; the following table shows the increase in yields since May 22, 2013, of some fixed income sectors:

Yield Changes
May 22, 2013
to
August 29, 2014
Sector Yield
May 22
2013
Yield
August 29
2014
Change
Five-Year Canadas 1.38% 1.51% +13bp
Long Canadas 2.57% 2.56% -1bp
Long Corporates 4.15% 4.1% -5bp
FixedResets
Investment Grade
(Interest Equivalent)
3.51% 4.73% +122bp
Perpetual-Discounts
Investment Grade
(Interest Equivalent)
6.34% 6.67% +33bp
The change in yield of PerpetualDiscounts is understated due a massive influx of issues from the PerpetualPremium sub-index over the period, which improved credit quality. When the four issues that comprised the PerpetualDiscount sub-index as of May 22, 2013 are evaluated as of August 29, 2014, the interest-equivalent yield is 7.22% and thus the change is +88bp.

ZPR, is an ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues and a very high proportion of junk issues, returned +%, +% and +% over the past one-, three- and twelve-month periods, respectively (according to the fund’s data), versus returns for the TXPL index of +0.74%, +2.73% and +5.51% respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $1,055-million since inception in November 2012; AUM increased by $15-million in August; given an index return of +0.74% an increase of $7.8-million was expected, indicating that money is still flowing into the fund. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents.

TXPR had returns over one- and three-months of +0.69% and +2.41%, respectively with CPD performance within expectations.

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for August were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to August 29, 2014
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat +0.22% +9.94%
Floater +1.12% +1.23%
OpRet +0.46% +0.71%
SplitShare +0.93% +1.07%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium +0.35% +1.49%
PerpetualDiscount +0.99% +2.40%
FixedReset +0.50% +2.17%
DeemedRetractible +0.45% +1.89%
FloatingReset +0.66% +2.02%

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close August 29, 2014, was $10.6606.

Returns to August 29, 2014
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month +0.92% +0.63% +0.69% N/A
Three Months +2.09% +2.22% +2.41% N/A
One Year +11.34% +5.48% +6.65% +6.10%
Two Years (annualized) +4.98% +2.90% +2.75% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +4.73% +3.84% +3.57% +3.08%
Four Years (annualized) +7.15% +5.55% +4.77% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +7.61% +5.69% +5.02% +4.38%
Six Years (annualized) +14.79% +6.15% +5.26%  
Seven Years (annualized) +12.34% +4.40% +3.50%  
Eight Years (annualized) +11.18% +3.89%    
Nine Years (annualized) +10.58% +3.87%    
Ten Years (annualized) +10.17% +3.98%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +10.86% +4.15%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +11.47% +4.34%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +11.13% +4.25%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two- or four-year returns.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.60%, +1.97% and +6.79%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +3.90%; five year is +5.24%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.39%, +1.47% and +3.07% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +1.35%; five-year is +2.60%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.86%, +2.40% & +4.40%, respectively. Three Year performance is +1.74%; five-year is +2.92%
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.60%, +2.15% & +6.75%, respectively. Three year performance is +4.50%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are +0.62%, +2.08% and +4.86% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is +0.64%, +2.51% and +5.47% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund are not available although I believe the first year black-out period has expired.
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are +1.80% and +3.89% for the past three- and twelve-months, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past two years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund occasionally finds an attractive opportunity to trade between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons (but in which trading is now hampered by the fact that the low-coupon issues are trading near par and are callable at par in the near term), but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index, and in June, 2013, when the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles behaved like PerpetualDiscounts in a sharply negative market.

However, it will be noted, as discussed in the August report on Portfolio Composition that the month saw some swaps from the low-coupon SLF Straights to a low-spread SLF FixedReset … so there are some opportunities to trade, although they don’t happen often! There were similar swaps executed in June and July.

At this point, the composition of the BMO-CM “50” index should be discussed; it has greatly outperformed TXPR over the year to May 30, and MAPF holders will have noticed that the fund only just returned to a positive differential against BMO-CM “50” on a year-over-year basis to May 30. While I have not done a thorough analysis of the difference, I’ve done some approximations – note that the numbers in this section are approximations, but are close enough for government work.

I believe that BMO-CM “50” has benefitted greatly over the past year by being over-weight in bank Straight Perpetuals relative to other Straight Perpetuals:

Sampling Error in BMO-CM “50”
Class of
Straight
Perpetual
BMO-CM “50”
Weight
May 2013
Proportion of BMO-CM “50” Straights Shares
Outstanding
May 2014
Proportion
Shares
Outstanding
Performance
May 2013
to
May 2014
Bank DeemedRetractible 17.7% 59.8% 240.5-million 34.9% +4.81%
Insurance DeemedRetractible 6.5% 22.0% 183.5-million 26.6% -0.86%
Bank Straight 1.8% 6.1% 47.2-million 6.8% +4.88%
Straight 3.6% 12.2% 218.6-million 31.7% +0.51%

Thus we see that at the beginning of the downdraft, the BMO-CM “50” was highly overweighted in Bank DeemedRetractibles, which performed quite well over the year, and highly underweighted in Straight Perpetuals, which underperformed. Weightings in the other two sectors were about right. It’s no wonder the fund struggled to outperform the BMO-CM “50” index in the period May, 2013, to May, 2014, and no wonder BMO-CM “50” outperformed TXPR!

In August, insurance DeemedRetractibles outperformed bank DeemedRetractibles:

bankInsDRPerf_140829Click for Big

… and slightly outperformed Unregulated Straight Perpetuals, although that looks like it could be a “coupon distribution thing” rather than a “sectoral preference thing”.

straightInsDRPerf_140829
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Of the regressions shown in the above two charts, the Adjusted Correlation of the Bank DeemedRetractible performance is a mere 12%, Straight Perpetuals come in at 14% and Insurance DeemedRetractibles (not shown because it’s so lousy) are at a big fat 0%. Average performance are:

  • Bank Deemed Retractibles: +0.05%
  • Insurance DeemedRetractibles: +0.93%
  • Unregulated Straight Perpetuals: +0.72%

A lingering effect of the downdraft of 2013 has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility (all Implied Volatility calculations use bids from August 29):

ImpVol_GWO_140829
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ImpVol_PWF_140829
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ImpVol_BNS_140829
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Implied Volatility of
Three Series of Straight Perpetuals
August 29, 2014
Issuer Pure Yield Implied Volatility
GWO 3.80% (-0.40) 22% (+4)
PWF 0.26% (-0.57) 40% (+1)
BNS 0.13% (+0.04) 30% (0)
Bracketted figures are changes since July month-end

It is disconcerting to see the difference between GWO and PWF; if anything, we would expect the implied volatility for GWO to be higher, given that the DeemedRetraction – not yet given significant credence by the market – implies a directionality in prices. The GWO data with the best fit derived for PWF is distinguishable from the best fit; the best fit has a lower Sum of Squared Errors (1.01 vs 1.49):

ImpVol_GWO_PWF_140829
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In the September, 2013, edition of PrefLetter, I extended the theory of Implied Volatility to FixedResets – relating the option feature of the Issue Reset Spreads to a theoretical non-callable Market Spread.

ImpVol_BPO_140829
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ImpVol_FFH_140829Click for Big

Implied Volatility of
Two Series of FixedResets
August 29, 2014
Issuer Market Reset Spread
(Non-Callable)
Implied Volatility
BPO 106bp (-5) 40% (0)
FFH 304bp (-3) 8% (-1)
Bracketted figures are changes since July month-end

These are very interesting results: The BPO issues are trading as if calls are a certainty, while FFH issues are trading as if calls are much less likely. The FFH series continues to be perplexing, this time with the four lower-coupon issues showing virtually no implied volatility – with the highest coupon issue (FFH.PR.K) being well off the mark … all I can think of is that the market has decided that FFH.PR.K, with an Issue Reset Spread of 351bp, is sure to be called in 2017, while the other four (highest spread is FFH.PR.C, +315) are not at all likely to be called.

Those of you who have been paying attention will remember that in a “normal” market (which we have not seen in well over a year) the slope of this line is related to the implied volatility of yields in Black-Scholes theory, as discussed in the January, 2010, edition of PrefLetter. As has been previously noted, very high levels of Implied Volatility (in the 40% range, at which point the calculation may be considered virtually meaningless) imply a very strong expectation of directionality in future prices – i.e, an expectation that all issues will be redeemed at par.

It is significant that the preferred share market knows no moderation. I suggest that a good baseline estimate for Volatility over a three year period is 15% but the observed figure is generally higher in a rising market and lower in a declining one … with, of course, a period of adjustment in between, which I suspect we are currently experiencing.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles; something that dismays me, particularly given that the market does not yet agree with me regarding the insurance issues! There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
August, 2014 10.6606 5.01% 1.016 5.090% 1.0000 $0.5426
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and FixedReset issues on August 29; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares). This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds positions in various SplitShare issues which also have their yields calculated with the expectation of a maturity at par.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a small position in these issues.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas (set at 1.51% for the August 29 calculation) to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Dividend Yield” of 4.6% as of July 31, 2014, but this is the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF was 4.90% as of July 30, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s a little higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to discuss it in the context of portfolio reporting is misleading.

However, BMO has taken a significant step forward in that they are no longer reporting the “Portfolio Yield” directly on their website; the information is taken from the “Enhanced Fund Profile” which is available only as a PDF link. CPD doesn’t report this metric on the CPD fact sheet or on their website. I may have one less thing to mock the fundcos about!

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance has generally been due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition: August, 2014

Turnover remained steady in August, at about 10%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped was the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) in early 2013 – many of the PerpetualPremiums had negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! While market weakness since the peak of the PerpetualDiscount subindex in May, 2013, has mitigated the situation somewhat, the population of PerpetualDiscounts is still exceeded by that of PerpetualPremiums – most of which are trading at a negative Yield-to-Worst.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to further footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on August 29 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2014-08-29
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 8.1% (-4.6) 3.93% 6.02
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 12.4% (+2.9) 5.32% 14.94
Fixed-Reset 24.3% (+2.7) 4.22% 10.05
Deemed-Retractible 43.5% (-2.4) 5.58% 8.17
Scraps (Various) 10.0% (-0.6) 5.77% 10.83
Cash 1.6% (+1.9) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.01% 9.43
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from July month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

There were significant trades during the month into FixedResets (mainly SLF.PR.G at about 22.35) from DeemedRetractibles (mainly SLF.PR.C at about 22.70). There was also movement from SplitShares (PVS.PR.B at about 25.00) into PerpetualDiscounts (BAM.PR.M at about 21.50). These first of these swaps was a little ahead at month-end, with SLF.PR.G bid at 22.25 after a dividend of 0.272 and SLF.PR.C at 22.50 after a dividend of 0.278; the second was significantly behind, with PVS.PR.B bid at 25.16 after a dividend of 0.272 and BAM.PR.M at 21.53.

June’s trades of GWO.PR.I into GWO.PR.N, performed at a take-out of $1.00, made up some lost ground over the month – from the June month-end take-out of $1.33 through the July 31 take-out of $1.64 to August 29 at $1.23, after dividends of 0.281 and 0.228, respectively.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2014-8-29
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 26.7% (+0.1)
Pfd-2(high) 48.0% (-3.2)
Pfd-2 0%
Pfd-2(low) 13.7% (+1.8)
Pfd-3(high) 0.0% (0)
Pfd-3 4.4% (-0.4)
Pfd-3(low) 3.1% (-0.1)
Pfd-4(high) 0.7% (0)
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0.8% (0)
Pfd-5(high) 0% (-1.1)
Pfd-5 1.1% (+1.1)
Cash 1.6% (+1.9)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from June month-end.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.B, which is rated P-5 by S&P and is unrated by DBRS

The change in the levels of Pfd-5(high) / Pfd-5 are due to the DBRS discontinuation of its rating; the lower rating from S&P has been substituted. There was some trading of BNS.PR.Z (Pfd-2(high)) into TRP.PR.B (Pfd-2(low)) at prices of about 24.30 and 19.90, respectively. This swap hadn’t moved much by month-end, with closing bids of 24.35 and 19.66 (after a dividend of 0.25).

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2014-8-29
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 10.6% (-0.1)
$50,000 – $100,000 10.2% (+1.5)
$100,000 – $200,000 49.4% (-2.0)
$200,000 – $300,000 26.2% (+2.1)
>$300,000 2.1% (-3.2)
Cash 1.6% (+1.9)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from July month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower
Market Action

August 29, 2014

Times are tough indeed for the gnomes of Zurich:

Zurich’s red-light district is dimming. Bankers who have been core patrons of the city’s sex industry and cabarets are curbing spending.

The venues of Langstrasse — or long street — are closing, replaced by hipster bars, techno clubs and even a backpackers’ hostel. Like the finance industry, the sex trade has opted for a lower profile.

“Times have changed,” said Kevin Joliat, the manager of the Petit Prince nightclub in central Zurich. “Bankers really have to show who the client was, why they spent the money and was it really necessary,” said Joliat, who once worked at Zuercher Kantonalbank, Switzerland’s largest state-owned bank.

The decline of erotic entertainment highlights a changing culture in Zurich as banking jobs ebb and public opinion turns against inflated bonuses. That and smaller budgets for entertaining customers have deprived the clubs and bars of a key customer base

Meanwhile, the West has a problem:

As Russian-backed separatists advance in southeastern Ukraine, the U.S. and European Union are still searching for a sanction that can force Vladimir Putin to stop and think again.

More than 1,000 of the Russian president’s troops are operating inside Ukraine, manning sophisticated weaponry and advising local separatists, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization said yesterday. The escalation, denied by Russia, prompted a warning of “consequences” from U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel said EU leaders would discuss new sanctions this weekend.

The U.S. and EU have been trying since March to come up with measures that would impose sufficient costs to make Putin call off his effort to destabilize eastern Ukraine while causing only minimal harm to Russian citizens and European and U.S. economies and businesses.

Here’s my plan: bar Putin from Disneyland.

The Canadian preferred share market finished the month on a positive note, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 18bp, FixedResets up 12bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 4bp. Volatility was quite good. Volume was quite low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7254 % 2,636.7
FixedFloater 4.16 % 3.40 % 27,886 18.57 1 0.0000 % 4,173.0
Floater 2.91 % 3.07 % 50,626 19.49 4 0.7254 % 2,726.5
OpRet 4.05 % -2.62 % 95,556 0.08 1 0.0395 % 2,729.3
SplitShare 4.24 % 3.75 % 60,337 3.96 6 0.0486 % 3,151.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0395 % 2,495.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.48 % -3.46 % 82,812 0.08 19 0.1302 % 2,440.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.20 % 5.13 % 114,926 15.17 17 0.1830 % 2,612.0
FixedReset 4.23 % 3.64 % 185,120 6.65 74 0.1173 % 2,572.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.99 % 1.04 % 104,472 0.18 42 0.0380 % 2,566.9
FloatingReset 2.63 % 0.48 % 80,882 0.16 6 -0.0131 % 2,531.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
NA.PR.M Deemed-Retractible -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-28
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : -17.77 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 23.26
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 23.29
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 21.15
Evaluated at bid price : 21.15
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 20.70
Evaluated at bid price : 20.70
Bid-YTW : 2.55 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 22.29
Evaluated at bid price : 23.06
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.W FixedReset 49,700 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 41,419 TD crossed 40,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : -10.20 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 37,578 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 21.84
Evaluated at bid price : 22.16
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 31,523 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 28,948 Nesbitt bought 10,600 from anonymous at 23.93.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.86
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 25,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.44
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 20.51 – 21.50
Spot Rate : 0.9900
Average : 0.7688

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 20.51
Evaluated at bid price : 20.51
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

NA.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.33 – 26.67
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.1980

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-28
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : -17.77 %

TD.PF.B FixedReset Quote: 25.17 – 25.48
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1785

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %

BAM.PF.B FixedReset Quote: 25.20 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1791

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 23.26
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %

TRP.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 25.45 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1442

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-29
Maturity Price : 23.29
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %

GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.41 – 25.68
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1752

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : -19.21 %

Market Action

August 28, 2014

Nothing happened today, either.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1254 % 2,617.7
FixedFloater 4.16 % 3.40 % 28,162 18.57 1 0.2633 % 4,173.0
Floater 2.93 % 3.09 % 52,359 19.45 4 -0.1254 % 2,706.9
OpRet 4.05 % -2.28 % 96,444 0.08 1 -0.0395 % 2,728.2
SplitShare 4.24 % 3.79 % 61,157 3.97 6 -0.2341 % 3,149.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0395 % 2,494.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.49 % -2.21 % 82,500 0.09 19 -0.0124 % 2,437.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.21 % 5.12 % 113,505 15.20 17 0.0451 % 2,607.3
FixedReset 4.24 % 3.65 % 184,467 6.57 74 -0.0264 % 2,569.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.00 % 1.97 % 103,986 0.24 42 0.0610 % 2,565.9
FloatingReset 2.63 % 1.20 % 80,499 0.16 6 0.1638 % 2,531.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -3.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-28
Maturity Price : 20.52
Evaluated at bid price : 20.52
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-28
Maturity Price : 22.01
Evaluated at bid price : 22.57
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
PVS.PR.C SplitShare -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.10 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-28
Maturity Price : 22.73
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 203,692 Indicated for redemption September 30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 2.22 %
GWO.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 55,585 Scotia crossed 30,000 at 23.88; Desjardins crossed 12,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 52,680 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.97.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 51,134 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-28
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 43,080 TD crossed 35,000 at 23.89.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.89
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 25,070 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 20.52 – 21.45
Spot Rate : 0.9300
Average : 0.5262

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-28
Maturity Price : 20.52
Evaluated at bid price : 20.52
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 22.57 – 23.09
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3302

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-28
Maturity Price : 22.01
Evaluated at bid price : 22.57
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %

GWO.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.95 – 24.45
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3298

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.08 – 24.54
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3282

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-28
Maturity Price : 23.70
Evaluated at bid price : 24.08
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.02 – 26.39
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2493

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 22.53 – 22.80
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1616

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-28
Maturity Price : 22.15
Evaluated at bid price : 22.53
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %

Market Action

August 27, 2014

Nothing happened today.

It was another mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 10bp, FixedResets off 10bp and DeemedRetractibles up 15bp. Volatility was muted. Volume was above average, with the highlights comprised entirely of FixedResets.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.13%, equivalent to 6.67% interest at the standard conversion factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.15%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 250bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) decline from the 255bp reported August 13.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0279 % 2,621.0
FixedFloater 4.17 % 3.41 % 28,158 18.56 1 0.1318 % 4,162.0
Floater 2.93 % 3.08 % 52,521 19.48 4 -0.0279 % 2,710.3
OpRet 4.05 % -2.88 % 96,433 0.08 1 0.0395 % 2,729.3
SplitShare 4.23 % 3.74 % 61,857 3.97 6 0.1394 % 3,157.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0395 % 2,495.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.49 % -4.12 % 83,568 0.08 19 0.0372 % 2,437.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.21 % 5.13 % 111,170 15.20 17 0.0979 % 2,606.1
FixedReset 4.23 % 3.67 % 185,692 6.57 74 -0.0855 % 2,569.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.03 % 105,276 0.24 42 0.1537 % 2,564.3
FloatingReset 2.63 % 1.92 % 81,550 0.16 6 0.0131 % 2,527.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-27
Maturity Price : 22.46
Evaluated at bid price : 22.87
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-27
Maturity Price : 20.35
Evaluated at bid price : 20.35
Bid-YTW : 2.59 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.W FixedReset 86,146 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-27
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 84,500 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-27
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 82,570 RBC crossed 75,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset 73,437 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.13
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 64,287 RBC crossed 43,100 at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 46,355 RBC crossed 18,800 at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-27
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
There were 38 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.88 – 26.29
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.2594

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.17 – 26.51
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2043

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.17
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %

GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 21.50 – 21.95
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3440

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %

CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.20 – 22.54
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2437

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-27
Maturity Price : 21.87
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 5.07 %

RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.59 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3193

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-26
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : 0.50 %

CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.41 – 22.63
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1484

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-27
Maturity Price : 22.11
Evaluated at bid price : 22.41
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %

Market Action

August 26, 2014

Nothing happened today.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 28bp, FixedResets gaining 6bp and DeemedRetractibles off 2bp. Volatility was good, with both winners and losers dominated by FixedResets. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0836 % 2,621.7
FixedFloater 4.17 % 3.42 % 27,786 18.55 1 0.0000 % 4,156.5
Floater 2.93 % 3.07 % 49,079 19.50 4 0.0836 % 2,711.1
OpRet 4.05 % -2.54 % 89,295 0.08 1 0.0791 % 2,728.2
SplitShare 4.23 % 3.86 % 64,400 3.97 6 -0.0058 % 3,152.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0791 % 2,494.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.49 % -1.43 % 83,572 0.08 19 -0.0331 % 2,436.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.21 % 5.15 % 111,858 15.21 17 0.2844 % 2,603.5
FixedReset 4.23 % 3.65 % 186,331 6.57 74 0.0556 % 2,572.0
Deemed-Retractible 4.99 % 2.17 % 104,114 0.34 42 -0.0199 % 2,560.4
FloatingReset 2.63 % 1.92 % 84,305 0.16 6 0.0918 % 2,527.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-26
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.95
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-26
Maturity Price : 21.82
Evaluated at bid price : 22.32
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.46
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-26
Maturity Price : 24.23
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible 304,700 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 150,000 shares, 50,000 and 100,000, all at 26.15. Nice tickets!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-25
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : -6.84 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 202,718 Indicated for redemption September 30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.38
Bid-YTW : 2.51 %
BMO.PR.W FixedReset 120,357 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-26
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 84,418 TD crossed blocks of 50,000 and 28,700, both at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-25
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : -10.69 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 73,692 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-26
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 73,397 Nesbitt crossed 70,700 at 17.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-26
Maturity Price : 17.25
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
NEW.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 32.58 – 32.88
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2159

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-06-26
Maturity Price : 32.07
Evaluated at bid price : 32.58
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %

PVS.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 26.20 – 27.20
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.9252

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : -6.43 %

IAG.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.46 – 26.77
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2412

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.46
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 25.91 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1274

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-26
Maturity Price : 23.92
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 20.90 – 21.16
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.2000

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-26
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

CGI.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 25.01 – 25.20
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1336

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %

Issue Comments

DC.PR.B Will Not Be Called

Dundee Corporation has announced:

that it does not intend to exercise its right to redeem any currently outstanding cumulative 5‐year rate reset first preference shares, series 2 (the “Series 2 Shares”) on September 30, 2014 and, as a result, subject to certain conditions, the holders of the Series 2 Shares have the right, at their option, to convert all or part of their Series 2 Shares on a one for one basis into Cumulative Floating Rate First Preference Shares, Series 3 (the “Series 3 Shares”) as at September 30, 2014. Holders who do not exercise their right to convert their Series 2 Shares into Series 3 Shares will retain their Series 2 Shares, unless automatically converted in accordance with the conditions below.

The foregoing conversions are subject to the conditions that: (i) if, after September 15, 2014, the Company determines that there would be less than 500,000 Series 2 Shares outstanding on September 30, 2014, then all remaining Series 2 Shares will automatically be converted into an equal number of Series 3 Shares on September 30, 2014, and (ii) alternatively, if the Company determines that there would be less than 500,000 Series 3 Shares outstanding on September 30, 2014, no Series 2 Shares will be converted into Series 3 Shares. In either case, Dundee will give written notice to that effect to holders of the Series 2 Shares affected by the preceding minimums on or before September 23, 2014.

The dividend rate applicable to the Series 2 Shares for the 5‐year period commencing on September 30, 2014 to, but excluding September 30, 2019, and the dividend rate applicable to the Series 3 Shares for the 3‐month period commencing on September 30, 2014 to, but excluding December 31, 2014, will be determined and announced by way of a news release on September 2, 2014.

Beneficial owners of Series 2 Shares who wish to exercise their right of conversion should instruct their broker or other nominee to exercise such right before 5:00 p.m. (EDT) on September 15, 2014. Instructions of conversion are irrevocable.

Beneficial owners should direct any conversion inquiries to their broker or Dundee’s Registrar and Transfer Agent, Computershare Investor Services Inc., at 1‐800‐564‐6253.

Market Action

August 25, 2014

Bloomberg has a fascinating article on the value of liquidity:

For an extreme case, look at Bridgewater Associates. The investment manager is the largest holder of the iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF (EEM), with $3.3 billion worth of shares. It’s charged 0.67 percent in fees, about four times more than what’s charged for several other liquid, emerging markets ETFs that trade similarly to EEM.

If Bridgewater switched to the iShares Core MSCI Emerging Markets ETF (IEMG), which charges 0.18 percent, they’d save about $15 million each year. But while IEMG trades a healthy $54 million worth of shares daily, EEM trades $2.1 billion worth. With a $3.3 billion stake, you can see why they’d prefer EEM. For the rest of us, IEMG trades plenty.

EEM also costs the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan and the State of New Jersey Common Pension Plan about $7 million per year. And there are many other high-profile holders of EEM, which has $43 billion in assets. Its cheaper, equally effective, better-performing sibling IEMG has $5 billion.

A high-cost ETF is also a big part of hedge fund manager John Paulson’s portfolio. He has $1.3 billion in SPDR Gold Shares (GLD), which charges 0.40 percent. If Paulson moved into the iShares Gold Trust (IAU), which charges 0.25 percent, he’d save $1.9 million per year. Again, there’s a liquidity gap: IAU’s respectable $26 million worth of shares traded daily pales next to GLD’s $768 million.

Let’s see … it’s about seven years since the start of the credit crunch and already we’re seeing demands for growth at all costs. Huh. It usually takes about twenty, but then, we’re Canadian and are therefore smarter bankers than everybody else (1980s excepted):

Peter Routledge at National Bank of Financial says the bank is misguided in limiting its growth in capital markets.

“Some observers argue that RY must limit its growth in capital markets, maintaining this segment’s contribution in the neighborhood of 25% of total earnings, and justify this self-imposed limitation on the view that capital markets activities contain exorbitant tail risks that will ultimately threaten the bank’s capital. We disagree.”

He points to a number of reasons. Even when the financial crisis hit, RBC’s capital markets arm “earned its way through this infamous period and avoided the financial traps into which many other financial institutions fell. The segment also avoided material earnings hits during the equity market correction of the early 2000s.”

That was no accident, he argues. RBC is simply better at risk-return calculations. “This competitive advantage would, if the bank decided to exploit it more aggressively, enable the bank to expand its capital markets revenues and earnings without putting shareholder capital at undue risk.”

Investors and forecasters believe different things:

After giving up on calls last month that Treasury yields will rise in 2014, forecasters are sticking to estimates those on the 10-year note will climb next year and reach 3.6 percent as the Federal Reserve increases interest rates. Yet based on the performance of long-term Treasuries, implied yields suggest investors don’t foresee yields that high for a decade or more.

Getting it right has never been more important. With America’s outstanding public debt at a record $17.7 trillion, Fed Chair Janet Yellen faces the task of lifting rates from close to zero without sparking a surge in funding costs. While economists point to unrest in Ukraine and Gaza for why Treasuries remain in demand, the bond market’s view that the U.S. expansion isn’t strong enough to force the Fed’s hand suggests yields can stay low for years to come.

Peak rates, known as the neutral or terminal rate, have averaged 4.25 percent when inflation has historically been at the bank’s current target, New York Fed President William Dudley said in May. Trading in the interest-rate swaps suggests benchmark borrowing costs will top out closer to 3 percent.

Swaps based on the Fed funds effective rate, a proxy for the target rate, indicate it will average 2.84 percent in 2019. Another gauge, the one-year swap traded five years forward, has fallen a full percentage point this year to 3.2 percent.

Those peak levels are lower than the Fed’s own “dot plot” projections released in June, which showed a long-term forecast of 3.75 percent based on the median estimate. If the bond-market indicators prove to be accurate, they would also be the lowest since the 1950s, according to MKM’s Darda.

Barry Ritholtz of Bloomberg has some wise words on numeracy in general and investing in general:

When it comes to stock picking and portfolio construction, understanding probabilities goes a long way. You must assume that some of your picks aren’t going to work out. Once you recognize that simple reality, you then can have an exit strategy for when those eventualities occur.

Same with portfolio construction. As we showed last week in the annual asset-class performance chart, recognizing what you don’t and can’t possibly know is a key to long-term planning.

Some have suggested starting statistics education in kindergarten. That might be a little radical, but beginning early is crucial. Having an educated population that understands probability and statistics is the key to an informed citizenry and a better economy.

… while Jeff Green and John Irwin of Bloomberg remind us that actually being able to do something is a rare and valuable talent:

Two years out of high school, Evan Fischbach is earning $40,000 a year. His secret: shop class.

Fischbach, 19, has known he wanted to work on cars ever since he took an automotive class in his junior year of high school in Saline, Michigan. His college-educated parents wondered if he was aiming too low.

Then when Fischbach was still a junior, a local auto dealer desperate for mechanics hired him as an apprentice in the service bay. Now he’s earning about three times as much as the average 19-year-old high school grad and slightly more than the national median, according the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Fifty years ago, most American kids in middle and high school attended shop class, where they learned to make ash trays, rebuild engines, weld metal and even market products. As the space race gave way to the high-tech era, policy makers decided such skills were unnecessary. College prep classes gradually supplanted shop, which by then was perceived as a place for slackers and stoners.

The average number of high school credits earned in career and technical education fell 15 percent from 1990 to 2009 at the same time core academic credits in study areas such as English, math and science rose 20 percent, according to the U.S. Department of Education.

DBRS has some comments on the proposed Burger King – Tim Horton’s tie-up:

Should an official agreement or offer be announced, DBRS would review the value and form of financing, structure of the transaction and resulting combined entity, as well as the business plan and financial management intentions going forward. The combination of THI and Burger King would result the third-largest quick-serve restaurant in the world with 18,000 restaurants in over 100 countries. DBRS notes that Burger King has significantly higher leverage than THI (approximately 5.0 times (x) lease-adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR versus approximately 2.77x for THI, both for the last 12-months ended Q2 2014).

DBRS also notes that THI’s Senior Unsecured Debt contains a change of control trigger provision that requires the occurrence of both a change of control and a rating event (i.e., downgrade below investment grade). If triggered, the provision requires than an offer be made to repurchase at a price equal to 101% of the outstanding Senior Unsecured Debt of the Company.

Towers Perrin has released the Pension Finance Watch for July 2014:

Negative equity returns pushed the pension index down in July. The Towers Watson Pension Index declined 1.6% for the month to 73.9, and has now dropped 5.5% for the year.

Our liability index (based on projected benefit obligations) increased 0.3% for July, all of which represents interest accumulation. The changes in asset and liability values caused the Towers Watson Pension Index to drop 1.6% to 73.9.

The 73.9% funding figure is at the high-end of the post-Credit Crunch Range, but well below the pre-Credit Crunch range.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 12bp, FixedResets off 6bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 10bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was very extremely awfully low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0977 % 2,619.5
FixedFloater 4.17 % 3.42 % 26,696 18.55 1 0.0000 % 4,156.5
Floater 2.93 % 3.07 % 47,792 19.50 4 0.0977 % 2,708.8
OpRet 4.05 % -1.72 % 90,189 0.08 1 0.0000 % 2,726.0
SplitShare 4.23 % 3.80 % 67,064 3.98 6 -0.0198 % 3,153.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,492.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.49 % -3.71 % 84,005 0.08 19 -0.0103 % 2,437.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.23 % 5.17 % 111,145 15.16 17 -0.1207 % 2,596.2
FixedReset 4.23 % 3.66 % 187,952 6.66 74 -0.0630 % 2,570.6
Deemed-Retractible 4.99 % 2.40 % 104,267 0.25 42 0.0970 % 2,560.9
FloatingReset 2.64 % 2.06 % 87,335 3.80 6 0.0459 % 2,525.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-25
Maturity Price : 23.75
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PF.E FixedReset 98,583 CIBC sold 10,000 to anonymous at 25.05. RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-25
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 67,226 TD crossed 50,000 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : -10.86 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 63,105 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-25
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 54,864 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.44.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.49
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 54,090 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 24.98.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
BMO.PR.W FixedReset 40,455 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-25
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
There were 11 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TD.PR.T FloatingReset Quote: 25.36 – 26.36
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.5577

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 2.03 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.20 – 24.79
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.3983

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-25
Maturity Price : 23.75
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %

GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 21.35 – 21.83
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3131

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %

PVS.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 26.10 – 27.10
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.8432

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : -2.03 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 23.50 – 23.90
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3011

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-25
Maturity Price : 23.06
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %

TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.06 – 26.38
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2402

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : -5.19 %

Market Action

August 22, 2014

The times, they are a-changing:

More than half of the asset managers polled that use ETFs have fixed income funds in their portfolios now, and the category has seen major growth in the last two years. That compares to more than 80 per cent who use international and domestic equity funds in their investing.

Mr. Walker attributes this to regulatory changes making traditional markets more expensive, as well as the maturity and size of the ETF market with secondary markets now available on larger funds.

The WSJ points out:

While it’s important to look at how ETF shares are trading, the fund’s underlying holdings are really the heart of the liquidity issue, experts say.

One reason: Big investors known as “authorized participants” can swap a basket of the fund’s underlying holdings for ETF shares—or vice versa. This process helps arbitrage away significant gaps between the ETF’s share price and its NAV, the value of its underlying holdings. But when the underlying holdings are costly to trade and tough to obtain, authorized participants are less willing to round up that basket of securities. That means big gaps can develop between an ETF’s share price and its NAV.

One place to watch out for these premiums and discounts is in bond ETFs, especially those focused on areas like corporate investment-grade and high-yield, or “junk,” bonds. The iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond Fund closed within 0.5% of NAV on only four days in the fourth quarter, iShares says, and traded at a premium as large as 2.1% in that period.

When underlying holdings are traded less frequently, or not at all, an ETF’s returns also may diverge from the benchmark it is designed to track. That became an issue for some bond ETFs recently as the Federal Reserve bought up large quantities of agency bonds and mortgage-backed securities, essentially removing them from the market. Vanguard Group recently changed some of its bond index funds and ETFs to benchmarks that exclude these securities purchased by the Fed.

The biggest test of bond-ETF liquidity may be yet to come. So far investors have poured money into these products, and many bond ETFs are trading at significant premiums to NAV. But if investors reverse course and stampede out, the trading could get ugly, experts say. Given the relative illiquidity of many of the underlying bonds, the ETFs could start trading at significant discounts to NAV.

“When everybody tries to get out, it’s going to be a debacle,” says Scott Freeze, president of Street One Financial.

Yellen’s speech at Jackson Hole dealt with the labour market:

Labor force participation peaked in early 2000, so its decline began well before the Great Recession. A portion of that decline clearly relates to the aging of the baby boom generation. But the pace of decline accelerated with the recession. As an accounting matter, the drop in the participation rate since 2008 can be attributed to increases in four factors: retirement, disability, school enrollment, and other reasons, including worker discouragement. Of these, greater worker discouragement is most directly the result of a weak labor market, so we could reasonably expect further increases in labor demand to pull a sizable share of discouraged workers back into the workforce. Indeed, the flattening out of the labor force participation rate since late last year could partly reflect discouraged workers rejoining the labor force in response to the significant improvements that we have seen in labor market conditions. If so, the cyclical shortfall in labor force participation may have diminished.

One convenient way to summarize the information contained in a large number of indicators is through the use of so-called factor models. Following this methodology, Federal Reserve Board staff developed a labor market conditions index from 19 labor market indicators, including four I just discussed.14 This broadly based metric supports the conclusion that the labor market has improved significantly over the past year, but it also suggests that the decline in the unemployment rate over this period somewhat overstates the improvement in overall labor market conditions.

Finally, changes in labor compensation may also help shed light on the degree of labor market slack, although here, too, there are significant challenges in distinguishing between cyclical and structural influences. Over the past several years, wage inflation, as measured by several different indexes, has averaged about 2 percent, and there has been little evidence of any broad-based acceleration in either wages or compensation. Indeed, in real terms, wages have been about flat, growing less than labor productivity. This pattern of subdued real wage gains suggests that nominal compensation could rise more quickly without exerting any meaningful upward pressure on inflation. And, since wage movements have historically been sensitive to tightness in the labor market, the recent behavior of both nominal and real wages point to weaker labor market conditions than would be indicated by the current unemployment rate.

Overall, I suspect that many of the labor market issues you will be discussing at this conference will be at the center of FOMC discussions for some time to come. I thank you in advance for the insights you will offer and encourage you to continue the important research that advances our understanding of cyclical and structural labor market issues.

On a more practical note, the Fed will have to implement monetary policy in a more complicated than usual way when the tightening eventually comes:

The Federal Reserve will probably borrow “several hundred billion” dollars from money-market mutual funds and others to anchor the federal funds rate when it begins tightening policy, according to St. Louis Fed President James Bullard.

“I don’t think it would have to be that large of a program. Possibly several hundred billion would be enough,” Bullard said, referring to the Fed’s overnight reverse repurchase facility, which it has been testing since September.

The Fed’s need for a tool to influence repo rates directly arose after almost six years of bond buying to stimulate faster economic growth flooded the banking system with $2.79 trillion of excess reserves. Banks no longer need to borrow reserves in the once-vibrant fed funds market, so the fed funds rate no longer represents the true cost of overnight credit.

The fed funds market is “a mere shadow of its former self, but I think we can maintain some of the focus on the federal funds rate on the grounds that that’s the usual rate that we’ve used to communicate to people,” Bullard said.

What a day for central bankers! Even Parakeet Poloz was handed a script:

Bank of Canada Governor Stephen Poloz said the economy has “lots of room to grow,” suggesting a spate of stronger data points won’t sway the central bank from its plan to leave interest rates unchanged at least until well into next year.

Mr. Poloz made the comments in an interview Friday, after Statistics Canada reported milder inflation and stronger-than- expected retail sales. At the same time, the vast majority of jobs created this year in Canada are part-time positions, a phenomenon that Mr. Poloz said is a “symptom of slack” in the labour market. That argues in favour of maintaining a policy of low borrowing costs, as the economy is a long way from putting pressure on inflation.

There is a thought-provoking piece on The Dish:

As the indispensable Valleywag tells us this morning, people within the app economy are catching on to the fact that it’s not, actually, an industry in which they can achieve long-term economic security, let alone riches. The bottom 47% of developers make less than $100 a month. Studies have shown that the vast majority of revenues goes to a tiny fraction of developers. The numbers are even more stark when it comes to in-app revenue. Less than .01% of all apps will be considered a financial success, according to some estimates. It turns out that, as in so many other things in the American economy, the app industry is a winner-take-all field, a lottery ticket economy where a tiny number make out like bandits and most people can’t get ahead. And as usual, it’s only the biggest firms– Apple, Google, Microsoft– which are getting ahead.

So all the kids who heard the clarion call and rushed out to get CS degrees, or to drop out under the advice of Peter Thiel, and start coding in their basements– are they all chumps? Do they deserve scorn? Do they deserve to be unable to scratch out a living? Of course not. Like so many others, most of them did what their society told them to do to pursue the good life: work hard, go to school, and try to provide value for people so that you can earn a living. They were sold on a social contract that is failing them. No one can be reasonably expected to predict what skills the economy will value five, ten, twenty years in advance. The urge to call out others for what you perceive as their bad choices is destructive in a labor economy where, despite gains in overall unemployment rate, workers still have remarkably little bargaining power, thanks to underemployment, lack of benefits, low pay, and poor hours. Rather than succumbing to our petty insecurities by blaming others for their economic conditions, we need to look at the macroeconomic factors that are hurting our labor markets. We need to recognize that automation and artificial intelligence are pushing us towards a new era of work– one with tremendous potential productivity gains, but also tremendous uncertainty for labor, even educated labor. It’s time to stop calling people chumps and start building the kind of social system that can guarantee basic material security for all of our people, so that we can all share in the staggering gains of efficiency and productivity that technology is bringing about.

deBoer is too pessimistic. While apps are clearly the sexy part of the coding world, they’re not the total of it. A skilled coder can make good money working for … just about any company big enough to write its own code. Of more interest is the emphasis on macro-economic factors … I believe that we are heading towards an era of increased personal service in a polarized economy; personal service up to and including a return of full-time servants. That’s a shift that will take some getting used to!

Tim Kiladze of the Globe writes a good piece on private equity valuation:

The issue is a hot one at the University of Toronto’s Rotman International Centre for Pension Management, which is run by renowned pension expert Keith Ambachtsheer. At this very moment the ICPM is doing research to find better ways to come up with mid-point valuations for illiquid, private assets.

When pressed about their private equity exposures, Canada’s pension funds often point out that their private asset portfolios are largely comprised of infrastructure investments, such as toll roads or water utilities. Because these assets are government regulated and are often essential to daily life, they are widely viewed as extremely safe alternatives that are bound to see their values rise in the long run.

Not everyone is convinced. Jim Keohane, chief executive officer of HOOPP, the pension plan for Ontario health care workers, stresses that these assets are still illiquid. “Liquidity can have tremendous value at certain points in time,” he said, adding that the risk premiums embedded in the values for these rarely traded assets often aren’t high enough. “From what we can see in pricing, it’s just not there.”

“I go to meeting after meeting, and I hear over and over again, ‘I just made this investment last year and the regulator came in and changed the rules on me.’ That happens all the time,” he said.

The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, for one, recently invested in Gassled, Norway’s offshore gas pipeline system, and shortly after, the country announced major cuts to gas transportation tariffs, prompting the Canadian fund and its investment partners to sue, tying them – and their capital – to a lawsuit that could drag on for years.

Speaking of government regulation, maybe we’ll get more interference from the feds in the rail system, to deal with this year’s projected bumper harvest:

The ripening corn and soybean fields stretch for miles in every direction from Dennis Wentworth’s farm in Downs, Illinois. As he marveled at his best-yielding crops ever, he wondered aloud where the heck he’ll put it all.

“Logistics are going to be a huge problem for everyone,” the 62-year-old grower said, adding that he has invested in boosting output rather than grain bins. When harvesting starts in a few weeks, Wentworth expects his 150-year-old family farm to produce 10 percent more than last year’s record. “There are going to be some big piles of grain on the ground this fall.”

Surging crop supplies may exacerbate the squeeze on grain storage and shipping. BNSF Railway Co., owned by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK/B), and Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. struggled with “greater-than normal” demand from shippers of coal, oil and Midwest crops, the USDA said this month in a report.

Combined with inventories left from the 2013 harvest, production of all grains and oilseeds will boost 2014 supply to 26.97 billion bushels, USDA data show. That’s more than the 23.4 billion of storage on farms and grain-company silos as of Dec. 1, the government estimated in a Jan. 10 report.

“I don’t know where it will all go this year,” said Richard Guse, a 54-year-old farmer from Waseca, Minnesota, who owns a 1 million-bushel grain elevator that he expanded in the past year by 275,000 bushels. “We need better roads and faster train shipping to keep the grain moving,” Guse said this week while inspecting fields as part of the Pro Farmer crop tour.

As a concerned citizen, I have finally been brave enough to buy some early corn for dinner and will work night and day to reduce the surplus to the best of my ability.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 19bp, FixedResets up 12bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 8bp. Volatility was nil. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1677 % 2,617.0
FixedFloater 4.17 % 3.42 % 26,456 18.56 1 0.0000 % 4,156.5
Floater 2.93 % 3.07 % 47,043 19.51 4 0.1677 % 2,706.2
OpRet 4.05 % -2.13 % 90,552 0.08 1 -0.0790 % 2,726.0
SplitShare 4.23 % 3.78 % 69,521 3.98 6 0.1052 % 3,153.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0790 % 2,492.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.49 % -1.26 % 82,618 0.08 19 0.0351 % 2,437.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.22 % 5.17 % 111,770 15.17 17 0.1889 % 2,599.3
FixedReset 4.28 % 3.62 % 186,358 6.68 76 0.1193 % 2,572.2
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 2.36 % 104,020 0.26 42 0.0768 % 2,558.4
FloatingReset 2.64 % 2.07 % 89,739 3.80 6 0.0131 % 2,523.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No individual gains or losses exceeding 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PF.E FixedReset 139,670 RBC bought blocks of 20,600 and 26,800 from Nesbitt at 25.05. TD crossed 45,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-22
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset 118,885 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 112,419 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.70. RBC crossed 42,900 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 100,600 RBC crossed 100,000 at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-22
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 81,480 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-22
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 60,351 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.43.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-22
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.06 – 26.06
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.6239

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-22
Maturity Price : 24.85
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %

PVS.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 26.10 – 27.10
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.6712

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-21
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : -2.48 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.01 – 23.50
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3019

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %

BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.52 – 21.96
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2589

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-08-22
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.52
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %

RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.61 – 26.01
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2744

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-21
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : -1.17 %

RY.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.61 – 25.91
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2080

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-21
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : -1.13 %