Archive for November, 2006

November 16, 2006

Thursday, November 16th, 2006
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.19% 4.14% 33,011 10.50 2 -0.0800% 1,017.7
Fixed-Floater 4.82% 3.92% 123,010 14.66 7 -0.0154% 1,026.3
Floater 4.59% -20.21% 65,810 6.53 5 -0.1493% 1,029.4
Op. Retract 4.66% 0.85% 81,264 2.26 18 -0.0057% 1,027.3
Split-Share 5.00% 3.33% 159,050 3.32 9 +0.0760% 1,028.8
Interest Bearing 6.93% 5.74% 64,834 1.90 7 +0.1369% 1,016.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.07% 3.96% 225,362 4.19 49 0.0195% 1,043.4
Perpetual-Discount 4.60% 4.63% 839,160 16.15 8 -0.0501% 1,038.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
There were no index-included issues with absolute returns greater than 1% on the day.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 386,640 A new issue, that traded more on its second day of trading than on its first! “What’s up with CM.PR.I?” my correspondent today asked. To which I answer: “Yield!”. That’s the nice thing about fixed-income. Something’s always up. The issue closed today at $24.83-89, 20×252, so there are a lot of people willing to sell the issue at a discount from issue price (or, I should say, at least one person with a lot of shares!) The question regarding why it’s not trading at a premium puzzles me, quite frankly. Look at the Portfolio Evaluation for the Perpetual Premium Index. You’ve got a Sunlife issue there, rated Pfd-1(low) by DBRS, trading just a hair lower (in pre-tax YTW terms) than the IAG.PR.A – which are only Pfd-2(high) and have a much lower volume. The CM.PR.I are not only trading with a higher YTW than the Industrial Alliance issue, but are only six basis points lower-yielding (six PRE-TAX basis points!) than the WN.PR.E, which is only Pfd-2(low). It’s all rather odd, really, but I’ll take a stab at providing not just one, but two explanations: 

  • The issue is being sold by accounts who bought in hopes of a strong rush out of the gates and a quick flip. But too many people are playing that game and the exit door is getting crowded.
  • Everybody who wants a Bank of Commerce preferred is already filled up to the gills with them; the bank has crowded itself out of the marketplace.

Either explanation could be correct – and both could be wrong. Trying to explain day-to-day moves in the markets is a game for fools and journalists, so I don’t do it much … I just try to keep an eye on basic analysis and trust that eventually the zigs will zag my way.

SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 107,805 Closed at 24.25-33, 1×80. Will these things never settle down?
SLF.PR.B PerpetualPremium 98,780 YTW is 4.37% at the closing bid of $25.91, based on a call 2014-10-30 at $25.00. These pay $1.20 p.a., compared to the $1.1125 on the SLF.PR.C and SLF.PR.D, so admittedly there’s a little more interest-rate protection on the Bs than on the latter two issues. But 20-26bp worth? That seems a little extreme.
GWO.PR.X OpRet 64,882 RBC crossed 30,000 at $27.55, then another 30,000 at the same price about 45 minutes later. Maybe the same 30,000? At the closing bid of $27.55, these had a bid-pre-tax-YTW of 2.73%, and a modified-duration-of-worst of 2.75. Huh. That’s the interest equivalent of 3.82% on a three-year bond: I can do better than that with Canadas. Somebody’s betting – actually, everybody’s betting – that they will last until their “soft Maturity” on 2013-9-29, to have yielded a munificent 3.25% (interest equivalent of 4.55% on a seven year bond … about the same as for bonds of comparable tenor and credit.
NA.PR.L PerpetualPremium 55,575 Nesbitt processed an internal cross of 49,000 shares at $25.86. At this prices (which was the closing bid), they have a pre-tax YTW of 4.34%, based on a call 2014-6-14 at $25.00.

There were twenty-one other index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Tax Rates : User Specification

Thursday, November 16th, 2006

Taxation rates are, of course, the be-all and end-all for preferred share investors, which is one reason why I try to stay on top of marginal tax rates.

These marginal tax rates are stored in HIMIPref™ in a series of taxRateDataRecords which are kept on server-side. They are usually queried via the taxRateDialogBox:

They can also be found printed (on paper and on screen) for the active account at the bottom of the reportSummary.

To get the taxRateDialogBox, it is easiest to run the programme and choose mainMenu|Reports|activePortfolio|taxRate|trading. You can also get it by right-clicking on the relevant column on the portfolioList.

A user has asked whether he should change the taxRateDataRecords for his account, since it’s a little different from the “Highest Marginal Rate in Ontario” used as the default. The answer is yes … but not to expect too many changes in the system for a small change.

To determine whether a trade is recommended or not, HIMIPref™ estimates the total return after tax for both the bought and the sold issues. After adding a little bat’s blood, a trade is recommended if the expected additional return compensates for the known costs of execution (totalFrictionBid), plus a little extra to compensate for risk, plus a little more extra because the whole point of the exercise is to try and make some money.

Tax rates come into play via three channels:

  • Tax Loss Selling (or, alternatively, capital gains avoidance. It’s good to lose tax-deductable money and reduce taxes! It’s bad to incur capital gains unless the poor sap buying your position is also paying your taxes!
  • Differentiation between Interest and Dividends : This is a biggie, at least insofar as not buying Interest bearing prefs just because the headline yield is high is concerned.
  • Differentiation between Capital Gains and Dividends : This is most important when the tax rates for these types of income is greatly different … an account may have capital losses for tax purposes, for instance, and thus want to tell HIMIPref™ that, given its druthers between $1 capital gain and $1 dividend, it would druther  have the capital gain, thank you very much. However, most provinces nowadays won’t have much difference … on the other hand, lots of people have capital losses they can offset free of charge.

In sum, I’d say: Sure. Make the change, even if it’s a small change. After all, why go to all the trouble of throwing away information? In most cases it won’t make a lot of difference, but every now and then it’s worth a little bit of money.

Users cannot add taxRateDataRecords themselves. Send me an eMail specifying the desired values for the record and I’ll set up whatever you like – and we’ll discuss which taxRateSchedule you should select in the portfolioInputBox.

HIMI Preferred Indices : May 1995

Thursday, November 16th, 2006

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 1995-5-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,178.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,178.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Floater 1,112.3 5 1.56 8.34% 11.0 115M 8.18%
OpRet 1,045.4 22 1.26 6.64% 5.7 80M 7.06%
SplitShare 1,045.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest-Bearing 1,045.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Premium 1,080.4 6 1.00 5.80% 2.6 43M 7.87%
Perpetual-Discount 1,031.5 0 0 0 0 0 0

Index Constitution, 1995-5-31, Pre-Rebalancing

Index Constitution, 1995-5-31, Post-Rebalancing

November 15, 2006

Thursday, November 16th, 2006
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.18% 4.13% 32,302 10.53 2 +0.1607% 1,018.5
Fixed-Floater 4.82% 3.92% 124,432 14.71 7 -0.2968% 1,026.5
Floater 4.49% -21.99% 66,172 6.52 5 +0.1663% 1,030.9
Op. Retract 4.66% 1.19% 81,252 2.27 18 +0.0646% 1,027.3
Split-Share 5.00% 3.49% 162,026 3.33 9 +0.0469% 1,028.0
Interest Bearing 6.94% 5.58% 63,579 2.37 7 +0.0142% 1,015.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.07% 4.01% 225,367 4.18 49 0.0112% 1,043.2
Perpetual-Discount 4.59% 4.62% 820,841 14.96 8 +0.0406% 1,038.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
There were no index-included issues with absolute returns greater than 1% on the day.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 288,892 Today was the first day of trading.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 202,150 Scotia crossed 100,000 at 25.00, so that was half of it! Yield-to-Worst of 4.65% based on never being called – bid price at the close was 24.96. It pays $1.15 and is priced a little higher than the new CM.PR.I, which pay a little bit more and are a better credit. So go figure.
IGM.PR.A OpRet 143,327 Pre-tax YTW at the closing bid of $28.24 is 2.50%, based on a call 2009-7-30 at $26.00.
CM.PR.B PerpetualPremium 60,120 Has been called for redemption.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualPremium 45,220 Pre-tax YTW of 4.38%, based on a closing bid of $25.90 and a call 2014-10-30 at $25.00.

There were seventeen other index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

A Subdued Opening for CM.PR.I

Wednesday, November 15th, 2006

CM.PR.I, the new issue discussed November 6, commenced trading today and closed at $24.91-92 on volume of 288,892 shares, having traded in the range 24.89-99 throughout the day.

It is a little difficult to understand why the issue did not rise on the first day, as it appears to be attractive by a wide variety of measures, but such is life in the preferred market! Nothing ever works exactly as expected!

In the earlier post, I compared the issue to the roughly comparable CM.PR.H, so I’ll update that comparison now and we’ll see what we see!

  CM.PR.H CM.PR.I
Changes from the November 6 calculation in brackets
Base Rate 24.05 (+0.03) 23.78 (-0.05)
Price due to short-term 0.08 (-0.01) 0.09 (-0.01)
Price due to long-term 0.59 (+0.07) 0.57 (+0.09)
Price due to error 0.02 (Unch) 0.02 (+0.01)
Price due to Credit Spread (Low) -0.54 (Unch) -0.53 (-0.04)
Intrinsic (subject to rounding error) 24.20 (+0.09) 23.93 (Unch)
Price due to Liquidity 1.60 (+0.02) 1.56 (-0.02)
Total (subject to rounding error) $25.79 (+0.10) $25.49 (-0.02)

The CM.PR.H closed at 25.38-50, 10×73, today, so the CM.PR.I has some company in looking cheap!

As one can see, the curve moved against the new issue in the week or so since the last analysis and now “likes” the slightly greater dividend (and hence chance of call) of the CM.PR.H more than it did.

To look at this more closely, we can examine the output from the optionCashFlowEffectAnalysisBox, which I’ll blog about at some future date.

CM.PR.I has been added to the HIMIPref™ database with the securityCode A42018, replacing the “PreIssue” code of P50007.

HIMI Preferred Indices : April 1995

Wednesday, November 15th, 2006

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 1995-4-28
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,142.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,142.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Floater 1,077.7 5 1.55 8.65% 10.6 91M 8.75%
OpRet 1,025.1 21 1.28 6.87% 6.1 77M 7.15%
SplitShare 1,025.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest-Bearing 1,025.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Premium 1,057.1 4 1.00 6.48% 3.7 42M 8.11%
Perpetual-Discount 1,017.6 1 1.00 7.31% 12.2 53M 7.30%

Index Constitution, 1995-4-28, Pre-Rebalancing

Index Constitution, 1995-4-28, Post-Rebalancing

November 14, 2006

Tuesday, November 14th, 2006
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.18% 4.13% 33,617 10.52 2 +0.0401% 1,016.8
Fixed-Floater 4.81% 3.91% 126,843 13.00 7 +0.0121% 1,029.6
Floater 4.50% -20.29% 65,960 6.52 5 -0.1168% 1,029.2
Op. Retract 4.67% 1.19% 79,687 2.27 18 +0.0255% 1,026.7
Split-Share 5.01% 3.50% 162,372 3.33 9 +0.0022% 1,027.5
Interest Bearing 6.94% 5.70% 63,121 2.37 7 -0.2222% 1,015.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.07% 3.90% 227,615 4.23 49 0.0047% 1,043.1
Perpetual-Discount 4.58% 4.61% 567,932 14.81 7 -0.0051% 1,038.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.5228% Traded as low as $9.30 in the morning but found a bid in the afternoon to close at 9.70-78, 10×8. This has been very volatile following the Income Trick or Trust (the underlying security is Income Trusts) – last mention here was November 10th.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
MFC.PR.B PerpetualPremium 40,875 YTW at the closing bid of 25.44 is only 4.33%, based on a call at $25.00 2014-4-18. Doesn’t seem like much, especially since the MFC.PR.C (which are, if anything, more liquid) are quoted at $25.00-bid to yield 4.47% to a call 2015-4-18. I think both issues are expensive, but what do I know? Since the annual coupon is less than $0.04 different, people seem to be willing to pay a whole lot of money for not very much interest-rate-rise-protection!
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 39,286 This is getting boring. High volumes in this issue are persisting FOREVER!
CM.PR.B PerpetualPremium 37,700 Another repeater! At least this won’t be around much longer.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 34,620 See discussion of MFC.PR.B, above
CM.PR.H PerpetualPremium 34,325 Could be people clearing some shelf-space for the new issue that’s supposed to settle tomorrow. And will, I’m sure! The CM.PR.H closed at $25.45-bid for a pre-tax YTW of 4.58%, based on a call 2014-4-29 at $25.00. The new issue comes with a 4.7% coupon, so should have a pretty good day.

There were ten other index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices : March 1995

Tuesday, November 14th, 2006

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 1995-3-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,129.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,129.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Floater 1,066.1 4 1.44 7.87% 11.5 85M 8.64%
OpRet 1,005.8 20 1.24 6.96% 5.9 64M 7.25%
SplitShare 1,005.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interest-Bearing 1,005.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Premium 1,046.9 4 1.00 6.69% 3.7 41M 8.15%
Perpetual-Discount 1,011.2 1 1.00 7.46% 11.9 51M 7.34%

Index Constitution, 1995-3-31, Pre-Rebalancing

Index Constitution, 1995-3-31, Post-Rebalancing

BBD.PR.B / BBD.PR.D

Tuesday, November 14th, 2006

Well, I promised in a previous post that I’d write a few words about this issue: and the time has come!

According to the prospectus dated May 13, 1997, available on Bombardier’s website (good for them!), these issues are convertable into each other on August 1, 2007 and on the first of August every five years thereafter. In certain circumstances, conversion may be forced and there will be only one series outstanding.

BBD.PR.B is the “Series 2” and currently pays 100% of the Canadian Prime Rate, according to Bombardier’s website – there’s no direct link, so you have to poke around a little … what you want is Bombardier > Investor Relations > Share Information > Dividend Information > BBD.PR.B. Since the Canadian Prime Rate is now 6%, this translates to $1.50 on the face value of $25.00.

BBD.PR.D is the Series 3, and pays $1.369 p.a., which was set in 2002 and will be reset in 2007 to take effect August 1.

THEREFORE, according to Mr. Calculator, the Bs will pay about 13.1 cents p.a. more than the Ds, provided prime stays put, until the next reset date which is now less than 10 months away. Being more precise and taking account of ex-Dates, we find that the Bs have their next dividend ex-date on or about Nov 28, and at the end of each month until the end of next July, which is a total of 9 more payments of $0.125, total $1.125. The Ds will pay in January, March and July, $0.34225 a time, total $1.02675.

All the above assumes no default and no change in prime, of course! But we can basically say that from now until conversion, the Bs will pay about $0.10 more than the Ds, so, in full accordance with the Holy Efficient Market Hypowhatsit, should be priced about maybe approximately $0.10 higher, as adjusted for liquidity and discounting effects, not to mention the phase of the moon.

So let’s take a look at the quotes: BBD.PR.B was quoted at the close of business November 13 at $18.21-35. BBD.PR.D was quoted at the close of business November 13 at $16.80-84.

This is an absurd price spread. Clearly, a strategy that will work very well on paper, at the very least, is to short the BBD.PR.B and long the BBD.PR.D for a gross take-out of about maybe $1.40. What’s the profit?

Strategy: Short BBD.PR.B, Long BBD.PR.D
Item Effect Notes
Initiate Position +$1.40 Will depend on trading prices, obviously
Net Dividend -0.10 Assumes Prime Constant – decline in prime will reduce loss
Cost of Margining -$0.855 Need to put up 150% on the short = $27.40, can borrow 50% on the long = $8.40, have to put up $19.00, don’t get any interest on this because you’re retail scum and don’t get institutional rates, and call your opportunity cost @ 6% for 9 months = $0.855. NOTE: Different brokers perform their short-margin requirements in different ways and I am not familiar with all of the methodologies! If they insist that you have to have the full $27.40 cash in the account not earning interest; or if they charge you interest on your margin-reducing long side, this calculation will not be applicable and the cost of margining will change accordingly! ENSURE YOU KNOW HOW YOUR BROKER WILL CHARGE YOU BEFORE PUTTING ON THE POSITION!
Commission -$0.10 A nickel a side each way to put the position on – the custodian will do the conversion for free. At least, we hope so
Total Net Profit $0.345 Not bad. See any problems with the calculation?

OK, so it looks like there’s a $0.345 / share profit out there, just waiting to be grabbed, for anyone who wants to take it. The only constraint is how much you can get done without moving the price too much – a constraint I won’t attempt to play down! However, so far today, November 14, the Bs have traded 4,610 shares in a range of $18.31-35, while the Ds have traded 8,350 shares in a range of $16.75-81. So it would seem that there’s enough money available to be worth a ‘phone call.

 This strategy is credit neutral – if Bombardier goes bust in the next 9 months, then both your long and short are worthless, which is fine. And you don’t have to rely on the market to recognize the equality either – you can just convert one to the other next summer and your position will flatten out. All in all, it seems like a pretty good play for those who can short. Especially if you have a facility where you get paid interest on your cash collateral for the borrow!

 The major risk is of a short squeeze on the Bs, where you could be forced to buy back the short, perhaps at a greater spread to the Ds than that at which you entered the position. This is the risk of any short strategy – make up your own mind as to the likelihood of that. And never bet the house on ANYTHING. There’s lots of good ideas out there … do enough of them and the one’s that turn out well will pay for the ones that turn out badly, hopefully with a little bit extra tacked on.

I’m not doing this for clients at the moment: shorting is not currently something I “do”. Which, of course, is why I’m publishing the idea! Have a look, maybe it makes sense for your.

I’ve attached two graphs:

Have fun!

Update re short squeezes: According to the prospectus, conversion is effected by surrender of an actual certificate in the period 14-45 days prior to the actual conversion date. This could give rise to a short squeeze – IF a sufficient number of shareholders choose to convert from the higher priced issue shorted into the lower priced issue held … which doesn’t seem too likely, but worth mentioning.

Erk! Update re taxation: It was noted on Financial Webring Forum Financial Wisdom Forum [edited 2015-3-31] that there are tax effects on shorting dividend paying stocks in Canada … according to Blakes

Payments made to compensate a securities lender for dividends on a borrowed share of a Canadian issuer will generally not be deductible unless the securities borrower is a registered securities dealer in which case two thirds of the payment will generally be deductible;

Therefore, tax will be owing on the dividends received, but nothing may be deducted with respect to the dividends paid … at a marginal tax rate of 21% on the $1.12 received on the Bs, the tax loss due to dividends will be $0.235, which nearly wipes out the pre-tax profit all by itself.

The only hope for this strategy, then (in the absence of very fancy trading arrangements to skip over the dividends … and I will NOT opine on the admissability of such a strategy for tax purposes!) is to get paid on the cash collateral for the short, or to simply hope that the spread decreases faster than the nine-month maximum.

*Sigh* Tripped up by tax effects! That’s what happens when I step outside my specialty … but really, these things are Pfd-4 by DBRS so I wouldn’t want to go long … still, anybody who for any reason owns the Bs should give serious consideration to swapping into Ds … assuming they really want to own the name.

Further update re Tax: The relevent section of the Income Tax Act is 260(6)(a):

(6) In computing a taxpayer’s income under Part I from a business or property

(a) where the taxpayer is not a registered securities dealer, no deduction shall be made in respect of an amount that, if paid, would be deemed by subsection 260(5) to have been received by another person as a taxable dividend; and

(b) where the taxpayer is a registered securities dealer, no deduction shall be made in respect of more than 2/3 of that amount.

And please note that I am not a tax specialist! Consult your own tax advisor before making or not making any decision based on the above!

November 13, 2006

Monday, November 13th, 2006
Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.17% 4.13% 33,771 10.53 2 -0.1799% 1,016.4
Fixed-Floater 4.81% 3.96% 126,440 9.44 7 +0.1189% 1,029.4
Floater 4.50% -22.32% 66,317 6.50 5 +0.1836% 1,030.4
Op. Retract 4.67% 0.97% 80,017 2.27 18 +0.0018% 1,026.4
Split-Share 5.01% 3.53% 166,356 3.33 9 -0.0309% 1,027.5
Interest Bearing 6.93% 5.43% 63,296 2.38 7 -0.0357% 1,017.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.07% 3.92% 229,963 4.23 49 -0.0175% 1,043.0
Perpetual-Discount 4.58% 4.61% 572,040 16.18 7 +0.0697% 1,038.3
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.H OpRet +1.5062% Traded in a narrow range today, between 27.56 and 27.62, closing at $27.63-79, 2×11. Pre-tax bid-YTW is now a skimpy 2.13%, based on a call at 25.75 2008-10-30.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CU.PR.V Scraps 100,000 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 @ 25.40 in the day’s only trade. The same 100,000 that they crossed on November 8, perhaps?
CU.PR.T Scraps 91,100 Nesbitt crossed 90,000 @ 25.60 and it closed at $25.02-74. Drive a truck through that spread! This issue was also discussed on November 8.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 33,045 Down 0.2058% on the day (i.e.: a nickel). I’m getting awfully tired of referring to the Clearance Sale.
CM.PR.B PerpetualPremium 13,500 Will be redeemed in January.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualPremium 12,388 Closed at 25.70-77, 20×12. Now has a pre-tax YTW of 4.49% based on a call 2014-10-30 at $25.00. It’s interesting to compare this with the SLF.PR.A, which have a pre-tax YTW of only 4.36% based on a call 2014-04-30. You sure get a lot of yield by extending term half-a-year, eh? The term of the YTW isn’t the be-all and end-all of the analysis, of course, but according to me (OK, well, according to HIMIPref™) curvePrice of the B is 25.79; of the A $25.41. Closing quotes are 25.70-77 (pretty close) and 25.80-92 (yech!) respectively.

There was only one other index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.