PrefBlog

It will be recalled that TD.PF.B will reset At 3.681% effective July 31, 2019.

TD.PF.B is a FixedReset 3.80%+227, NVCC-compliant, issue that commenced trading 2014-7-31 after being announced 2014-7-22. TD provided notice of extension on 2019-6-25. The issue is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset (Discount) subindex.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g. TD.PF.B and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

Click for Big

The market appears to have lost its fleeting interest in floating rate product; the implied rates until the next interconversion are well below the current 3-month bill rate as the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are at +0.66% and +0.95%, respectively. Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the TD.PF.B FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-may-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to trade below the price of their FixedReset counterparts, TD.PF.B. Therefore, I recommend that holders of TD.PF.B continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that once the FloatingResets commence trading (if, in fact, they do) it may be a good trade to swap one issue for the other in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – hopefully – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the path of policy rates over the next five years. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Those who wish to convert are advised that the deadline for notifying the company of such a desire is 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on July 16, 2019. Brokers and other intermediaries generally set their internal deadlines a day or two in advance of this date, so if you wish to convert there’s no time to waste! Note that brokers will, in general, try to execute the instruction on a ‘best efforts’ basis if received between the two deadlines, provided that the procrastinating shareholder grovels entertainingly enough.

It will be recalled that CM.PR.O will reset At 3.713% effective July 31, 2019.

CM.PR.O is a FixedReset, 3.90%+232, NVCC-compliant, that commenced trading 2014-6-11 after being announced 2014-6-2. The extension was announced 2019-6-12. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset (Discount) subindex.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g. CM.PR.O and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

Click for Big

The market appears to have lost its fleeting interest in floating rate product; the implied rates until the next interconversion are well below the current 3-month bill rate as the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are at +0.66% and +0.95%, respectively. Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the CM.PR.O FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-may-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to trade below the price of their FixedReset counterparts, CM.PR.O. Therefore, I recommend that holders of CM.PR.O continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that once the FloatingResets commence trading (if, in fact, they do) it may be a good trade to swap one issue for the other in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – hopefully – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the path of policy rates over the next five years. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Those who wish to convert are advised that the deadline for notifying the company of such a desire is 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Daylight Time) on July 16, 2019. Brokers and other intermediaries generally set their internal deadlines a day or two in advance of this date, so if you wish to convert there’s no time to waste! Note that brokers will, in general, try to execute the instruction on a ‘best efforts’ basis if received between the two deadlines, provided that the procrastinating shareholder grovels entertainingly enough.

It will be recalled that BRF.PR.C will reset At 4.351% effective August 1, 2019.

BRF.PR.C is a FixedReset, 4.40%+294, that commenced trading 2010-10-11 after being announced 2010-10-1. The issue has been tracked by HIMIPref™, but assigned to the Scraps – FixedReset (Discount) subindex on credit concerns.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g. BRF.PR.C and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

Click for Big

The market appears to have lost its fleeting interest in floating rate product; the implied rates until the next interconversion are well below the current 3-month bill rate as the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are at +0.66% and +0.95%, respectively. Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the BRF.PR.C FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-may-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to trade below the price of their FixedReset counterparts, BRF.PR.C. Therefore, I recommend that holders of BRF.PR.C continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that once the FloatingResets commence trading (if, in fact, they do) it may be a good trade to swap one issue for the other in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – hopefully – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the path of policy rates over the next five years. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Those who wish to convert are advised that the deadline for notifying the company of such a desire is 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on July 16, 2019. Brokers and other intermediaries generally set their internal deadlines a day or two in advance of this date, so if you wish to convert there’s no time to waste! Note that brokers will, in general, try to execute the instruction on a ‘best efforts’ basis if received between the two deadlines, provided that the procrastinating shareholder grovels entertainingly enough.

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

• We are revising our outlook on Brookfield Renewable Partners L.P. (BREP) to stable from negative and are affirming our ‘BBB+’ issuer credit rating.
• At the same time, we are affirming our ‘BBB+’ issue-level rating on the company’s unsecured notes and our ‘A-2’ short-term rating. Our ‘BBB-/P-2(Low)’ preferred rating remains unchanged.
• The stable outlook reflects our view that the company’s business profile is less susceptible to resource risk because its hydrology is reverting back to historical levels. The decline in its financial measures, reflected in its year-end 2017 adjusted funds from operations (FFO) to debt of about 14%, has also reversed and its FFO-to-debt ratio improved to about 19% as of the quarter ended March 2019. We now expect BREP to maintain adjusted FFO to debt in the 20%-25% range over the next couple of years.

NEW YORK (S&P Global Ratings) July 8, 2019—S&P Global Ratings today took the rating actions above. Our affirmation reflects the continuing strength of BREP’s hydro-centric portfolio, which features assets with longer lives and relatively lower required capital spending than other generation asset types. We revised our outlook to stable because of the receding hydrology risk across the company’s portfolio, which had previously weighed on its financial measures, and its corporate-level debt prepayment. In the first quarter of 2019, BREP repaid almost all of its corporate credit facility using the proceeds from its issuance of preferred units and part of the proceeds from its sale of a 25% interest in one of its Canadian hydroelectric portfolios.

BREP’s year-end 2018 financial results demonstrate the successful execution of its long-term strategy to strengthen its liquidity and improve its credit metrics through both organic and inorganic growth. Even as the hydrology for its Brazilian assets continues to trend lower than we expected, we see the portfolio’s hydrology risk as moderating based on BREP’s generation levels for the most recent two years. The affirmation also incorporates the addition of the Terraform Power and Terraform Global wind and solar assets that contributed to the improvement in the company’s financial metrics in 2018.

The stable outlook on BREP reflects our expectation that the company will maintain a well-diversified portfolio of generation assets, operate under long-term contracts with investment-grade counterparties, and generate fairly predictable cash flows to support its holding-company debt obligations. We expect its adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio to improve to the 20%-25% range and anticipate that its adjusted debt to EBITDA will decline to 4.0x over the next 12 months. We also expect BREP to remain moderately strategic to its parent BAM per our group rating assessment.

We could lower our rating on BREP if its adjusted FFO-to-debt ratio consistently remains below 20% or if the company acquires assets that are higher risk that its existing portfolio, leading to a deterioration in the quality of the distributions from its portfolio. This could occur if it finances its acquisitions with substantially higher levels of holding-company debt or acquires higher-risk merchant assets or if there is a material change in the contractual profile of its operating assets.

While we view an upgrade as unlikely, we could raise our ratings on BREP if we revise our view of its stand-alone credit profile (SACP) to ‘a-‘. This is because our ratings on BREP already benefit from its perceived parental support but are capped one notch below our ‘A-‘ rating on BAM.

Affected issues are: (issued directly by Brookfield Renewable Partners L.P.) BEP.PR.E, BEP.PR.G, BEP.PR.I, BEP.PR.K, BEP.PR.M & BEP.PR.O

(issued by Brookfield Renewable Power Pref Eqty Inc, its subsidiary, and guaranteed by the parent) BRF.PR.A, BRF.PR.B, BRF.PR.C, BRF.PR.E, BRF.PR.F