Archive for January, 2015

January 8, 2015

Thursday, January 8th, 2015

Hurray! The S&P 500 is even on the year!

The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index rallied a second day, wiping out its losses for the year, on speculation central banks will support growth even as the American economy shows signs of strength.

The S&P 500 added 1.8 percent to 2,062.14 at 4 p.m. in New York, after rallying 1.2 percent yesterday to halt a five-day selloff. The Dow Jones Industrial Average jumped 323.35 points, or 1.8 percent, to 17,907.87, also erasing its loss for 2015. The Nasdaq 100 Index soared 1.9 percent and the Dow Jones Transportation Average climbed the most since October. More than 7.3 billion shares changed hands on U.S. exchanges, 4.8 percent above the three-month average.

Stocks extended gains after European Central Bank President Mario Draghi said in a letter published today that central bank stimulus measures may include sovereign-bond buying. Producer prices slid more than analysts anticipated in the euro area and German factory orders fell more than forecast in November, underlining the fragile state of Europe’s economy and strengthened the case for more stimulus.

The next interest-rate decision by the ECB is scheduled for Jan. 22 when officials will consider a quantitative-easing package that will probably include buying government bonds. Policy makers disagree about whether action is required, with some arguing deflation risks have increased and others pointing to the stimulating effects of lower prices on the economy.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 11bp, FixedResets off 4bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 6bp. The Performance Highlights table is surprisingly short and dominated by TRP issues. Volume was low.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:

  • based on Implied Volatility Theory only
  • are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
  • assume constant GOC-5 yield
  • assume constant Implied Volatility
  • assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150108
Click for Big

So according to this, TRP.PR.A, bid at 21.60, is $0.92 cheap, but it has already reset (at +192). TRP.PR.C, bid at 21.02 and resetting at +154bp on 2016-1-30 is $1.13 rich.

impVol_MFC_150108
Click for Big

MFC.PR.F continues to be on the line defined by its peers. Implied Volatility continues to be a conundrum. It is far too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

impVol_BAM_150108
Click for Big

There continues to be cheapness in the lowest-spread issue, BAM.PR.X, resetting at +180bp on 2017-6-30, which is bid at 21.41 and appears to be $0.90 cheap, while BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp 2016-6-30 is bid at 25.17 and appears to be $0.95 rich.

It seems clear that the higher-spread issues define a curve with significantly more Implied Volatility than is calculated when the low-spread outlier is included.

impVol_FTS_150108
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 18.77, looks $1.04 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 25.16, looks $1.11 expensive and resets 2019-3-1

pairs_FR_150108
Click for Big
Click for Big

Pairs equivalence is all over the map.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6958 % 2,557.6
FixedFloater 4.39 % 3.62 % 23,860 18.09 1 -0.8700 % 3,983.7
Floater 2.96 % 3.09 % 58,422 19.52 4 0.6958 % 2,718.9
OpRet 4.05 % 1.65 % 96,479 0.44 1 0.0000 % 2,752.0
SplitShare 4.26 % 4.15 % 38,190 3.65 5 -0.0587 % 3,206.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,516.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % -3.53 % 60,963 0.08 19 0.0103 % 2,494.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.15 % 5.02 % 107,376 15.37 16 -0.1107 % 2,691.7
FixedReset 4.19 % 3.48 % 208,988 16.75 77 -0.0399 % 2,554.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % -0.43 % 94,331 0.13 39 0.0564 % 2,621.0
FloatingReset 2.67 % 1.92 % 59,978 3.41 7 0.0976 % 2,493.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -1.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 17.63
Evaluated at bid price : 17.63
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 21.32
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 21.54
Evaluated at bid price : 21.86
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 2.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.C FixedReset 102,836 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 78,930 Scotia crossed 27,700 at 25.26. RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
CM.PR.P FixedReset 71,230 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible 63,661 Nesbitt crossed 34,900 at 25.75. Scotia crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-27
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : -4.41 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 55,992 Scotia crossed blocks of 27,700 and 25,000 at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 23.38
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 52,210 RBC crossed 52,000 at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.57
Bid-YTW : 2.60 %
There were 18 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.52 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.2982

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 24.26
Evaluated at bid price : 24.52
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %

ENB.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.63 – 24.07
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3011

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 22.74
Evaluated at bid price : 23.63
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %

POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.11 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2819

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.11
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %

BAM.PF.G FixedReset Quote: 25.62 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2654

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.04 – 22.36
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2261

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-08
Maturity Price : 21.71
Evaluated at bid price : 22.04
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %

BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.01 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1999

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-07
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : -10.84 %

New Issue: Brompton Oil Split Corp. 5-Year 5%

Wednesday, January 7th, 2015

Brompton Funds Limited has announced (table formatting added):

that Brompton Oil Split Corp. (the “Company”) has filed an amended and restated preliminary prospectus in respect of an initial public offering of preferred shares and class A shares.

The Company will invest in a portfolio (the “Portfolio”) of equity securities of at least 15 large capitalization North American oil and gas issuers, as listed below, selected by the Manager from the S&P 500 Index and the S&P/TSX Composite Index giving consideration to attractive valuation, growth prospects, profitability, liquidity, sustainability of dividends and a strong balance sheet. The Portfolio will be focused primarily on oil and gas issuers that have significant exposure to oil, and will include equities of the following oil and gas issuers:

ARC Resources Ltd. Chevron Corporation Occidental Petroleum Corporation
Canadian Natural Resources Limited Encana Corporation PrairieSky Royalty Ltd.
ConocoPhillips EOG Resources Inc. Suncor Energy Inc.
Crescent Point Energy Corp. Husky Energy Inc. Vermilion Energy Inc.
Cenovus Energy Inc. Imperial Oil Limited Exxon Mobil Corporation

Prospective purchasers investing in the Company will have the option of paying for shares in cash or by exchanging equity securities of Exchange Eligible Issuers (the “Exchange Option”), as set forth below. Prospective purchasers who utilize the Exchange Option must have their investment advisor deposit their securities of Exchange Eligible Issuers with Equity Financial Trust Co. (the “Exchange Agent”) through CDS prior to 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on January 23, 2015. Please contact your investment advisor or refer to the prospectus for detailed information on how to participate in the offering by way of either cash purchase or exchange of securities. The Exchange Eligible Issuers include all of the Portfolio issuers, with the exception of Occidental Petroleum Corporation.

Holders of Class A shares will receive the benefits of monthly cash distributions targeted to be 8.0% per annum on the $15.00 issue price, low management fees and the opportunity for growth in net asset value. Holders of preferred shares will receive attractive quarterly distributions of 5.0% per annum on the $10.00 issue price.

Brompton Funds Limited will be the investment fund manager and portfolio manager of the Company. The Manager currently manages 4 split share funds with assets under management over $900 million. The portfolio management team will be led by Laura Lau, an award winning portfolio manager with over 20 years of experience in financial services, who has a proven track record in managing flow-through funds and resource assets. The team also includes Michael Clare, an experienced energy and flow-through portfolio manager who specializes in the analysis of crude oil and natural gas markets.

The syndicate of agents for the offering is being led by Scotiabank, CIBC and RBC Capital Markets with TD Securities Inc., BMO Capital Markets, National Bank Financial Inc., GMP Securities L.P., Raymond James Ltd., Canaccord Genuity Corp., Desjardins Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Ltd., Industrial Alliance Securities Inc. and Mackie Research Capital Corporation.

The preliminary prospectus is available on the Brompton website.

Brompton Oil Split Corp. (the ‘‘Company’’) is a mutual fund corporation established under the laws of the Province of Ontario. The Company proposes to offer preferred shares (‘‘Preferred Shares’’) and class A shares (‘‘Class A Shares’’) at a price of $10.00 per Preferred Share and $15.00 per Class A Share (the ‘‘Offering’’). Preferred Shares and Class A Shares are issued only on the basis that an equal number of Preferred Shares and Class A Shares will be outstanding at all times.

The investment objectives for the Preferred Shares are to provide their holders with fixed cumulative preferential quarterly cash distributions in the amount of $0.1250 per Preferred Share ($0.50 per annum or 5.0% per annum on the issue price of $10.00 per Preferred Share) until March 31, 2020 (the ‘‘Maturity Date’’) and to return the original issue price of $10.00 to holders on the Maturity Date. See ‘‘Investment Objectives’’.

It is noteworthy that:

No distributions will be paid on the Class A Shares if (i) the distributions payable on the Preferred Shares are in arrears or (ii) in respect of a cash distribution by the Company, the NAV per Unit would be less than $15.00.

Preferred Shares may be surrendered at any time for retraction to • (the “Registrar and Transfer Agent”), the Company’s registrar and transfer agent, but will be retracted only on the second last Business Day of a month (the “Retraction Date”). … Holders of Preferred Shares whose Preferred Shares are surrendered for retraction will be entitled to receive a retraction price per Preferred Share equal to 96% of the lesser of (i) the NAV per Unit determined as of such Retraction Date, less the cost to the Company of the purchase of a Class A Share for cancellation; and (ii) $10.00.

Redemption of the Shares by the Company: All Preferred Shares and Class A Shares of the Company outstanding on the Maturity Date will be redeemed by the Company on such date provided that theterm of the Company may be extended after the Maturity Date for a further period of five years and thereafter for additional successive periods of five years as determined by the Company’s Board of Directors on such date.

So it’s got a NAV test on Capital Units dividends, monthly retractions and no redemption prior to maturity. I like it already!

They also state (I believe that this is a regulatory requirement):

Assuming that the gross proceeds of the Offering are $100 million and fees and expenses are as presented in this prospectus, in order to achieve the Company’s targeted annual distributions for the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares while maintaining a stable NAV per Unit, the Company will be required to generate an average annual total return (comprised of net realized capital gains, option premiums and dividends) on the Portfolio of approximately 8.4%. The Portfolio currently generates dividend income of 3.5% per annum and would be required to generate an additional 4.9% per annum from other sources to return and distribute such amounts. Such distributions may consist of ordinary dividends, capital gains dividends or returns of capital. There can be no assurance that the Company will be able to pay distributions to the holders of Preferred Shares or Class A Shares.

This is hopelessly misleading. In the presence of cash flows and volatility, the company is exposed to Sequence of Returns risk and the quoted 8.4% total return requirement is applicable only if volatility is zero (ha!) or option profits make up the “additional 4.9% from other sources” (ha!) or in some other way the company does not have to take market action on its portfolio to alternately raise and invest cash (see Credit Quality of SplitShare Preferreds. 8.4% is the mathematical minimum requirement; in practice the requirement is much higher. But that’s mainly for the suckers who buy Capital Units to worry about and discuss.

The pricing doesn’t give much of a concession to buyers, but if this is issued in reasonable size it will certainly be tracked by HIMIPref™.

Update, 2015-01-08: Provisionally rated Pfd-3(high) by DBRS:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today assigned a provisional rating of Pfd-3 (high) to the Preferred Shares to be issued by Brompton Oil Split Corp. (the Company). The Company will issue an equal number of Preferred Shares and Class A Shares, at an issue price of $10.00 per Preferred Share and $15.00 per Class A Share. The Preferred Shares and Class A Shares will be scheduled to mature on March 31, 2020.

Net proceeds from the offering will be used to invest in the common shares of at least 15 large capitalization North American oil and gas issuers (the Portfolio). The Portfolio will be initially equally weighted and will be rebalanced at least semi-annually. A portion of the Portfolio’s investments will be denominated in U.S. dollars, and this exposure is expected to be hedged completely back to the Canadian dollar.

Dividends received on the Portfolio will be used to pay a fixed cumulative quarterly distribution to holders of the Preferred Shares of $0.1250 per Preferred Share ($0.50 per annum or 5.0% per annum on the initial issue price of $10.00 per Preferred Share), while holders of the Capital Shares are expected to receive a regular monthly non-cumulative cash distribution of $0.10 per Class A Share. The Company has the ability to write covered call options or engage in securities lending in order to generate additional income. Based on the minimum offering size, the initial downside protection available to holders of the Preferred Shares is expected to be approximately 57.3%.

The provisional rating is primarily based on the expected level of downside protection and dividend coverage available to holders of the Preferred Shares as well as the credit quality of the underlying companies in the Portfolio.

January 7, 2015

Wednesday, January 7th, 2015

Buy on dips? Not if you’re a central banker!

The total amount of reserves held in euros fell 8.1 percent in the third quarter, more than the currency’s 7.8 percent decline in the period against the dollar, according to the most recent figures from the International Monetary Fund. The last two times the euro depreciated 7 percent or more in a quarter, 2011 and 2010, holdings declined much less.

The data suggest reserve managers are passing up the chance to buy euros while they’re cheap, removing a key pillar of support. In August, European Central Bank President Mario Draghi cited the drop in central banks’ euro holdings as a factor that would help weaken the exchange rate and ultimately boost the region’s faltering economy.

The ECB has experimented with negative interest rates on deposits in an attempt to draw money out of safe government debt and into the broader economy. Yields on two-year notes in Germany, the Netherlands and France are all below zero on speculation the ECB is losing the battle against deflation.

Negative yields on twos? Well … consider inflation:

The inflation rate in the euro area fell below zero for the first time in more than five years, bolstering the case for more European Central Bank stimulus.

Prices dropped 0.2 percent in December, the European Union’s statistics office in Luxembourg said today. That’s the lowest rate since September 2009. Economists in a Bloomberg survey predicted a decline of 0.1 percent. Unemployment held at 11.5 percent in November, Eurostat said in a separate report.

Joblessness in Italy rose to a record 13.4 percent in November, separate data showed. German unemployment, calculated under a national measure, fell to 6.5 percent in December, the lowest in more than two decades.

Here’s another idiotic regulation story:

Each year a bank wins the mandate to convert about 3.4 billion euros ($4.1 billion) of subsidies to sterling. The rate they use has less to do with free-market economics than self-interest, according to four traders and salespeople interviewed by Bloomberg News who said their goal was to make the most money they could for their firms to the detriment of their clients.

The EU requires the U.K. government to exchange the currency at the European Central Bank benchmark rate on the last trading day of September. The price, set at 1:15 p.m. in London, is derived from a snapshot of trades and is supposed to be an independent measure of the value of currencies. It’s anything but, the traders said.

When London-based Barclays Plc (BARC) won the job for 2011, the first thing its foreign-exchange desk did was to place bets with its own money that the euro would fall against the pound, knowing that the transaction would move the market lower, said one trader with direct knowledge of the deal who asked not to be identified because he still works in banking.

Salespeople at Barclays, the world’s third-biggest currency dealer, also told their best customers, including some of the largest hedge funds, that the bank would be selling euros in the expectation the clients would adopt the same trading strategy, turbocharging efforts to push the exchange rate lower, the former employees said.

Well, of course they did. What would anybody with half a brain do? Just think of it … all these high-frequency trading firms spend millions to extract very short-term market movement predictions from the order book, so in order to avoid HFT, the European Union basically announces that Euros will be sold for Sterling in big size at the price determined in a specific way at a specific time.

I haven’t yet been able to figure out a more brain-dead method of trading. Just why the EU insists on conversion at all is a mystery to me, but if they do insist on conversion, surely it could be handled better … ‘exchange it however you like between this time on this date and that time on that date. Open market operations, an auction, whatever. A single auction will still experience disadvantageous price moves in the market during the run up to it … JUST LIKE BONDS. JUST LIKE STOCKS. JUST LIKE EVERY OTHER DAMN THING ON THE MARKET. You really don’t need to be very sophisticated to be able to work this out and observe it for yourself. Are strawberries cheaper in December or June?

But even when aware that they’re being (quite rightfully) penalized for telegraphing their trades, the bureaucrats still insist on using arbitrary quotations:

The U.K. now has the option of exchanging currency using an average of all ECB fixes in September, which will make it harder for banks to rig the rate.

It all fits in with the “Prevention” self-regulatory focus discussed yesterday. If a trader was given the job of conversion, he might underperform some benchmark, whatever it was … so the bureaucrats conclude that paying a fee to convert at that benchmark is a better idea. Then they cannot be criticized for allowing underperformance – even though a large conversion at a small benchmark is a really, really stupid and expensive way to trade, the costs are invisible.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 57bp, FixedResets up 13bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 3bp. The Performance Highlights table is again quite lengthy, this time heavily skewed towards winners. Volume was very low.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.02%, equivalent to 6.53% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 3.9% so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 265bp, a significant widening from the 245bp reported December 24.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:

  • based on Implied Volatility Theory only
  • are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
  • assume constant GOC-5 yield
  • assume constant Implied Volatility
  • assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150107
Click for Big

So according to this, TRP.PR.A, bid at 21.31, is $1.26 cheap, but it has already reset (at +192). TRP.PR.C, bid at 21.02 and resetting at +154bp on 2016-1-30 is $0.98 rich.

impVol_MFC_150107
Click for Big

MFC.PR.F continues to be on the line defined by its peers. Implied Volatility continues to be a conundrum. It is far too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

impVol_BAM_150107
Click for Big

There continues to be cheapness in the lowest-spread issue, BAM.PR.X, resetting at +180bp on 2017-6-30, which is bid at 21.42 and appears to be $0.84 cheap, while BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp 2016-6-30 is bid at 25.11 and appears to be $0.88 rich.

It seems clear that the higher-spread issues define a curve with significantly more Implied Volatility than is calculated when the low-spread outlier is included.

impVol_FTS_150107
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 18.81, looks $1.06 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 25.23, looks $1.07 expensive and resets 2019-3-1

pairs_FR_150107
Click for Big

Pairs equivalence is all over the map.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1280 % 2,539.9
FixedFloater 4.35 % 3.58 % 23,734 18.16 1 0.8776 % 4,018.7
Floater 2.98 % 3.09 % 59,190 19.52 4 0.1280 % 2,700.1
OpRet 4.05 % 1.64 % 98,048 0.44 1 0.0000 % 2,752.0
SplitShare 4.26 % 4.18 % 37,861 4.05 5 0.2848 % 3,208.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,516.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.45 % -3.16 % 61,743 0.09 19 0.2680 % 2,494.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.15 % 5.02 % 106,092 15.39 16 0.5714 % 2,694.7
FixedReset 4.18 % 3.48 % 209,987 16.72 77 0.1253 % 2,555.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % -0.32 % 95,504 0.14 39 0.0346 % 2,619.5
FloatingReset 2.67 % 1.93 % 60,669 3.41 7 0.2589 % 2,491.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 20.72
Evaluated at bid price : 20.72
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.34
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : -3.75 %
IFC.PR.C FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.87
Bid-YTW : 2.20 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 22.43
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 4.97 %
CGI.PR.D SplitShare 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 24.34
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 22.21
Evaluated at bid price : 22.52
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 21.93
Evaluated at bid price : 22.26
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.39
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 22.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 4.97 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 3.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 17.95
Evaluated at bid price : 17.95
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.C FixedReset 272,890 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 251,818 Scotia crossed 100,000 at 25.35. Desjardins crossed blocks of 100,000 and 50,000, both at 25.36.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : -0.29 %
CM.PR.P FixedReset 130,475 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
NA.PR.W FixedReset 62,200 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 47,398 TD crossed 43,200 at 25.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
BMO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 45,278 RBC bought 10,000 from Scotia at 26.55 and another 10,000 from TD at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-06
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.44
Bid-YTW : -17.73 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 19.50 – 20.79
Spot Rate : 1.2900
Average : 1.0443

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 19.50
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 2.71 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.86 – 23.19
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.1992

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 22.58
Evaluated at bid price : 22.86
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.00 – 24.41
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.3028

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %

ENB.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 23.75 – 24.09
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2365

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-07
Maturity Price : 22.75
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %

GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.96 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1968

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %

SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.09 – 23.41
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2286

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.09
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %

January 6, 2015

Tuesday, January 6th, 2015

Nothing happened today except for the the usual decline in equities and related decline in government bond yields, so instead I will devote this post to the Dalhouse Dental Disaster.

For those of you unfamiliar with the news, the basic story is that a group of male Dalhousie dental students started a private group on Facebook, in which they made a lot of juvenile remarks about sex and women, and some that crossed the line into offensive territory, with a poll on which of their female peers should be ‘hate-fucked’. An informer took 70+ screenshots of this stuff and distributed it and it has now become a major talking point – to the point at which dental regulators are opining on the topic:

Also Tuesday, the Alberta Dental Association and College joined Ontario’s dental regulatory body to call on Dalhousie’s dentistry faculty to release the names of the 13 students who posted misogynist comments, “if and when they graduate.”

In a statement, the college said it is “profoundly disturbed about the alleged inappropriate behaviour of some dental students” at Dalhousie and expects dentists who want to practise in Alberta to supply evidence of their good character.

On Monday, the Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, which regulates 9,000 dentists, said it had asked Dalhousie for the names of the 13 men.

In a statement Tuesday, Dalhousie said “it will not be releasing the names of the individuals involved. The university has an obligation to protect the privacy and confidentiality of our students.”

Irwin Fefergrad, the college’s registrar, had warned that if Dalhousie does not provide the names, the College will ask each Dal graduate if they have been the subject of a university complaint or inquiry. “My members have been appalled and disgusted by the students. I’ve had more e-mails on this issue than I can remember on anything else,” he said.

The Provincial Dental Board of Nova Scotia has also said in a statement it will consider the outcome of the inquiries at Dalhousie in any decision to allow the students to practise.

The men have been suspended from clinical activities while an academic committee considers further penalties, such as academic suspension or expulsion.

Now, by me this is just craziness. The stuff was definitely puerile, but the fact that it’s gotten to the point that it’s career threatening is indicative of a hysterical over-reaction. Regrettably, I’ve seen only one column in the media that agrees with my view but even that went too far in advocating “serious consequences”.

I mean, really, why should the university – or any other authority – be involved at all? It strikes me as much more rational and natural that the women involved should tell the men what goofs they are, receive shamefaced apologies, and then everybody gets on with their lives.

But it is the regulatory involvement that fascinates me, because if juvenile sexual remarks made in supposed privacy are career threatening then basically everybody in the securities industry is about to get fired. So it occurred to me that all of this nonsense about rules and official involvement might be related to the increasing number of women in the workforce in general and in the regulatory industry in particular. My rationale for this is not dependent upon ‘women sticking up for each other’, but on my perception that women in general like process, rules and consequences. But does this perception make me a sexist pig?

I am relieved to state that as far as I can tell it does not. I discovered something called Regulatory Focus Theory:

Regulatory focus theory (RFT) is a goal pursuit theory[1] formulated by Columbia University psychology professor and researcher E. Tory Higgins regarding peoples’ perceptions in the decision making process. RFT examines the relationship between the motivation of a person and the way in which they go about achieving their goal.[2] RFT posits two separate and independent self-regulatory orientations: prevention and promotion (Higgins, 1997).

This psychological theory, like many others, is applied in communication, specifically in the subfields of nonverbal communication and persuasion.Chronic regulatory focus is measured using the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 2001) or the Regulatory Strength measure. Momentary regulatory focus can be primed or induced.

To understand RFT, it is important to understand another of E. Tory Higgins’ theories, Regulatory Fit Theory. When a person believes that there is “fit”, they will involve themselves more in what they are doing and “feel right” about it.[3] Regulatory fit should not directly affect the hedonic occurrence of a thing or occasion, but should influence a person’s assurance in their reaction to the object or event.

Regulatory fit theory suggests that a match between orientation to a goal and the means used to approach that goal produces a state of regulatory fit that both creates a feeling of rightness about the goal pursuit and increases task engagement (Higgins, 2001, 2005). Regulatory fit intensifies responses, such as the value of a chosen object, persuasion, and job satisfaction (Kruglanski, Pierro, & Higgins, 2007).

Completed_RFT_flowchart_3
Click for Big

And in confirmation of my bias, there’s an interesting paper by Sassenberg, Brazy, Jonas and Shah titled When gender fits self-regulatory preferences: The impact of regulatory fit on gender-based ingroup favoritism, which is available here in full. It interests me more for the introductory literature review than for the specifics of the study:

Females are perceived to have less power than males. These differences in perceived power might render different self-regulatory strategies appropriate: women should (as member of other low power groups) care about security, whereas men should (as members of other high power groups) strive for accomplishment. These regulatory implications of gender provide the basis for regulatory fit between individuals’ gender and their regulatory focus. Higher fit should lead to stronger gender-based in group favoritism: Prevention focused females and promotion focused males were expected to show more ingroup favoritism than both genders in the respective other regulatory focus. According to the regulatory fit hypothesis this effect should occur for evaluative but not stereotype based ingroup favoritism. Three studies supported these hypotheses.

Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997, 1998) distinguishes two motivational systems: promotion and prevention focus. These foci differ in their underlying needs(achievement in a promotion focus vs. security in a prevention focus) and in turn imply the pursuit of differing types of goals (ideals, wishes, and aspirations in a promotion focus vs. oughts, duties, and responsibilities in a prevention focus). Individuals in a promotion focus tend to think global and are primarily concerned with the absence and presence of positive outcomes. Individuals in a prevention focus strive to avoid errors, follow rules and are primarily concerned with the absence and presence of negative outcomes. Regulatory focus may vary between situations and between persons.

Nonetheless, we assume that the impact of regulatory focus and power on ingroup favoritism generalizes to gender, as females and males share the features of high and low power groups which provide the opportunity for experiencing regulatory fit. Sassenberg et al. (2007) argued that the crucial difference between high and low power groups is that high power groups are perceived to provide the opportunity to apply promotion strategies whereas low power groups are perceived to come with the necessity to apply prevention strategies. Such perceptions also exist for females and males. Gender roles and gender stereotypes indicate that females are(among other things) sensitive, caring, dependent, and submissive, which indicates that a security-oriented strategy is perceived as appropriate for them. Male roles and stereotypes include (among other things) the characteristics daring, competitive, ambitious, and persistent(Bem, 1974; Deaux & Lewis, 1983; Oswald & Lindstedt, 2006; Williams & Best, 1982),suggesting that an achievement-oriented strategy is perceived as appropriate for males. Hence, the roles, stereotypes, and the implied behavioral strategies ascribed to the genders suggest a regulatory fit between females and a prevention focus as well as males and a promotion focus. Therefore, we assume that the fit between regulatory focus and group power also occurs for the genders.

So my interpretation of all this is:

  • Women are disproportionately drawn towards regulatory work because it involves rulemaking and process
  • Therefore the culture of the regulatory bodies becomes more feminine – i.e., is more strongly tilted towards the ‘prevention focus’
  • Therefore more rules get invented and the power of the regulatory body increases

Let’s just hope that broader public regulation does not become as intrusive and vindictive as that exemplified by the Dalhousie dentist fiasco!

It was another poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 5bp, FixedResets losing 28bp and DeemedRetractibles down 19bp. FixedResets and insurance DeemedRetractibles were prominent on the bad side of the lengthy Performance Highlights table. Volume was low.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:

  • based on Implied Volatility Theory only
  • are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
  • assume constant GOC-5 yield
  • assume constant Implied Volatility
  • assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150106
Click for Big

So according to this, TRP.PR.A, bid at 21.36, is $1.06 cheap, but it has already reset (at +192). TRP.PR.C, bid at 21.02 and resetting at +154bp on 2016-1-30 is $1.26 rich.

impVol_MFC_150106
Click for Big

MFC.PR.F continues to be on the line defined by its peers. Implied Volatility continues to be a conundrum. It is far too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

impVol_BAM_150106
Click for Big

There continues to be cheapness in the lowest-spread issue, BAM.PR.X, resetting at +180bp on 2017-6-30, which is bid at 21.24 and appears to be $0.80 cheap, while BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp 2016-6-30 is bid at 25.01 and appears to be $0.86 rich.

It seems clear that the higher-spread issues define a curve with significantly more Implied Volatility than is calculated when the low-spread outlier is included.

impVol_FTS_150106
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 18.81, looks $1.04 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 25.26, looks $1.10 expensive and resets 2019-3-1

pairs_FR_150106
Click for Big

Pairs equivalence is all over the map.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6728 % 2,536.7
FixedFloater 4.39 % 3.62 % 23,825 18.10 1 0.0925 % 3,983.7
Floater 2.99 % 3.10 % 59,006 19.49 4 0.6728 % 2,696.6
OpRet 4.05 % 1.63 % 101,372 0.44 1 0.0395 % 2,752.0
SplitShare 4.27 % 4.18 % 35,681 4.05 5 -0.1426 % 3,199.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0395 % 2,516.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.43 % -2.45 % 61,589 0.08 19 -0.0783 % 2,487.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.17 % 5.05 % 105,806 15.29 16 -0.0503 % 2,679.4
FixedReset 4.19 % 3.49 % 213,130 16.71 77 -0.2800 % 2,552.1
Deemed-Retractible 4.95 % 1.28 % 93,213 0.23 39 -0.1947 % 2,618.6
FloatingReset 2.68 % 1.92 % 60,496 3.41 7 -0.0067 % 2,484.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -2.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -2.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 17.41
Evaluated at bid price : 17.41
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 21.77
Evaluated at bid price : 22.17
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.06
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.03
Bid-YTW : 5.52 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset -1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 22.63
Evaluated at bid price : 23.41
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.37
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 24.24
Evaluated at bid price : 24.49
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.71
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 22.36
Evaluated at bid price : 22.76
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 21.02
Evaluated at bid price : 21.02
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.96
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 19.50
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 2.71 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 24.24
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.C FixedReset 171,110 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.03
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
CM.PR.P FixedReset 149,360 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
PVS.PR.D SplitShare 44,850 National bought blocks of 10,000 and 25,000 from Scotia, both at 24.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 41,362 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 22.14
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 40,662 Nesbitt crossed 33,200 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 23.34
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 31,177 ITG bought 11,700 from Nesbitt at 24.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 23.92
Evaluated at bid price : 24.32
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.06 – 24.59
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3269

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.06
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %

NEW.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 32.11 – 33.00
Spot Rate : 0.8900
Average : 0.7339

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-06-26
Maturity Price : 32.07
Evaluated at bid price : 32.11
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %

SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.05 – 24.48
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2742

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %

ENB.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 22.17 – 22.60
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2860

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 21.77
Evaluated at bid price : 22.17
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %

BAM.PF.G FixedReset Quote: 25.65 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2282

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 23.33
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %

ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.12 – 25.56
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3349

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-06
Maturity Price : 24.65
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %

January 5, 2014

Monday, January 5th, 2015

Kerr-rrash! Equities got hammered today and the damage is spreading:

Crude oil’s slide below $50 sent the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (SPX) to its biggest drop since October, as selling spread from the energy industry amid concern that cuts in capital spending will hurt earnings.

Energy shares in the S&P 500 plunged 4 percent as West Texas Intermediate sank to the lowest since April 2009. Exxon Mobil Corp. lost 2.7 percent and Chevron Corp. retreated 4 percent. Caterpillar (CAT) Inc. declined 5.3 percent and an index of railroad stocks lost 3.2 percent on concern that the energy slump may hurt spending on capital equipment and crude transportation.

The S&P 500 dropped 1.8 percent to 2,020.58 for its first four-day losing streak since 2013. The gauge fell below its average price for the last 50 days. The Dow Jones Industrial Average retreated 331.34 points, or 1.9 percent, to 17,501.65. More than 7.1 billion shares changed hands on U.S. exchanges, 2.9 percent above the three-month average.

Canada, too:

Canadian stocks posted the steepest plunge since 2013, joining a global selloff, as banks and energy producers tumbled after oil prices slumped below $50 a barrel for the first time in five years amid concern over Greece.

MEG Energy Corp. and Legacy Oil & Gas (LEG) Inc. sank at least 19 percent as energy stocks fell 5.5 percent as a group. Toronto-Dominion Bank and National Bank of Canada slumped more than 2.3 percent as bank shares declined a fourth day. First Quantum Minerals Ltd. lost 8.3 percent with copper at a four-year low.

The Standard & Poor’s/TSX Composite Index (SPTSX) fell 360.95 points, or 2.5 percent, to 14,392.70 at 4 p.m. in Toronto, the biggest decline since June 2013. The benchmark equity gauge rose 7.4 percent in 2014.

Oil prices? Yes, oil prices:

Benchmark U.S. oil prices dropped below $50 a barrel for the first time since April 2009 as surging supply signaled that the global glut that drove crude into a bear market will persist.

West Texas Intermediate slid 5 percent in New York while Brent fell below $55 in London for the first time since May 2009. Russia’s output rose to a post-Soviet high while Iraq, the second-largest producer in OPEC, plans to boost crude exports to a record this month. The price drop accelerated as the dollar climbed against the euro amid investor concern Greece might leave the currency union

Oil is in a race with the Euro, the Loonie and the Ruble:

The euro weakened to an almost nine-year low versus the dollar amid investor concern Greece might leave the currency union and on speculation the European Central Bank has moved closer to large-scale sovereign-bond purchases.

A gauge of the dollar reached the strongest in nine years with the Federal Reserve moving toward raising interest rates. The yen gained to an eight-week high against the euro as a slide in Asian stocks boosted haven demand. The Russian ruble and Canadian dollar slipped as oil fell. Brazil’s real dropped after economists boosted inflation forecasts and cut growth estimates. Volatility jumped to the highest in more than a year.

The euro dropped 0.6 percent to $1.1933 as of 5 p.m. in New York after sliding to $1.1864, the least since March 2006. The shared currency fell 1.3 percent to 142.76 yen and earlier reached 142.30, lowest since Nov. 10. The dollar depreciated 0.7 percent to 119.64 yen.

The Bloomberg Dollar Spot Index (BCOM), which tracks the U.S. currency against 10 major peers, rose 0.2 percent to 1,143.40 and touched 1,146.49, the highest in data going back to 2005.

The Canadian preferred share market was also hit on the day, with PerpetualDiscounts off 12bp, FixedResets down 22bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 37bp. The performance highlights table is suitably lengthy, with insurance DeemedRetractibles prominent on the downside. Volume was extremely low.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:

  • based on Implied Volatility Theory only
  • are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
  • assume constant GOC-5 yield
  • assume constant Implied Volatility
  • assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150105
Click for Big

So according to this, TRP.PR.A, bid at 21.23, is $1.35 cheap, but it has already reset (at +192). TRP.PR.C, bid at 21.25 and resetting at +154bp on 2016-1-30 is $1.31 rich.

impVol_MFC_150105
Click for Big

MFC.PR.F continues to be on the line defined by its peers. Implied Volatility continues to be a conundrum. It is far too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

impVol_BAM_150105
Click for Big

There continues to be cheapness in the lowest-spread issue, BAM.PR.X, resetting at +180bp on 2017-6-30, which is bid at 21.35 and appears to be $0.87 cheap, while BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp 2016-6-30 is bid at 25.16 and appears to be $0.98 rich.

It seems clear that the higher-spread issues define a curve with significantly more Implied Volatility than is calculated when the low-spread outlier is included.

impVol_FTS_150105
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 19.06, looks $0.98 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 25.32, looks $1.04 expensive and resets 2019-3-1

pairs_FR_150105
Click for Big

Pairs equivalence is all over the map.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2296 % 2,519.7
FixedFloater 4.39 % 3.63 % 24,737 18.09 1 0.0000 % 3,980.1
Floater 3.01 % 3.11 % 59,692 19.48 4 0.2296 % 2,678.6
OpRet 4.05 % 1.71 % 102,942 0.45 1 -0.0395 % 2,750.9
SplitShare 4.27 % 4.09 % 34,694 3.65 5 -0.0158 % 3,204.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0395 % 2,515.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.43 % -4.95 % 62,467 0.08 19 -0.1317 % 2,489.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.16 % 5.03 % 105,253 15.31 16 -0.1189 % 2,680.7
FixedReset 4.17 % 3.49 % 214,503 16.72 77 -0.2156 % 2,559.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.93 % 1.04 % 94,024 0.14 39 -0.3705 % 2,623.7
FloatingReset 2.68 % 1.89 % 60,675 3.40 7 -0.8766 % 2,484.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset -5.22 % Not really all that real, since the low for the day was 22.01, with transaction prices falling on the basis of 7,200 shares sold in the last half hour.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -2.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible -2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.33
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 23.87
Evaluated at bid price : 24.27
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.46
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset -1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 22.53
Evaluated at bid price : 23.02
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.41
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.44
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 24.16
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %
PWF.PR.T FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.11
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 22.54
Evaluated at bid price : 23.38
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 24.63
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 24.85
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 19.25
Evaluated at bid price : 19.25
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 26.11
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 21.23
Evaluated at bid price : 21.23
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 152,325 RBC crossed blocks of 96,100 and 50,000, both at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 23.34
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 133,454 Nesbitt crossed 114,000 at 21.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 21.23
Evaluated at bid price : 21.23
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
TD.PF.C FixedReset 116,740 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset 73,755 Recent exchange from TRP.PR.A.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 52,620 RBC crossed 50,000 at 22.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 22.19
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %
CM.PR.P FixedReset 50,675 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
There were 7 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset Quote: 21.25 – 22.30
Spot Rate : 1.0500
Average : 0.6756

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.55 – 24.00
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2863

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %

GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.33 – 24.80
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3367

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.33
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.70 – 24.18
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3496

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.27 – 24.65
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2612

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 23.87
Evaluated at bid price : 24.27
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %

CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.51 – 22.90
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2749

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-05
Maturity Price : 22.19
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.04 %

MAPF Performance: December 2014

Monday, January 5th, 2015

The fund outperformed significantly in December.

ZPR, is an ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues and a very high proportion of junk issues, returned -0.73%, -0.43% and +4.72% over the past one-, three- and twelve-month periods, respectively (according to the fund’s data), versus returns for the TXPL index of -0.63%, -0.22% and +5.35% respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $1,145-million since inception in November 2012; AUM increased by $29-million in November; given an index return of -0.63% an decrease of about $7-million was expected, indicating that money is still flowing into the fund. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents.

TXPR had returns over one- and three-months of -0.30% and +0.94%, respectively with CPD performance within expectations.

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for October were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to December 30, 2014
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat N/A N/A
Floater -1.28% -3.69%
OpRet -0.29% +0.83%
SplitShare +0.33% +1.51%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium +0.31% +2.02%
PerpetualDiscount -0.02% +3.55%
FixedReset -0.77% +0.45%
DeemedRetractible +0.63% +2.83%
FloatingReset -2.13% -1.56%

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close December 31, 2014, was $10.5701 after a distribution of 0.135068 per unit.

Returns to December 31, 2014
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month +0.17% -0.33% -0.30% N/A
Three Months +2.34% +0.82% +0.94% N/A
One Year +12.60% +5.19% +6.82% +6.33%
Two Years (annualized) +3.90% +1.93% +1.98% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +6.77% +3.10% +3.14% +2.65%
Four Years (annualized) +5.50% +4.26% +3.79% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +7.58% +5.40% +4.57% +3.95%
Six Years (annualized) +15.68% +9.07% +8.01%  
Seven Years (annualized) +12.66% +5.00% +4.05%  
Eight Years (annualized) +10.77% +3.53%    
Nine Years (annualized) +10.33% +3.62%    
Ten Years (annualized) +9.88% +3.64%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +10.20% +3.85%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +11.98% +4.14%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +11.11% +4.16%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.09%, +1.16% and +6.62%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +3.67%; five year is +5.09%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.70%, -0.82% and +1.97% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is +0.35%; five-year is +2.07%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Class Adv [into which was merged Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund)] (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.09%, +0.87% & +6.44%, respectively.
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.12%, +1.04% & +6.42%, respectively. Three year performance is +3.96%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are -0.41%, +0.66% and +5.61% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is +0.41%, -0.46% and +4.03% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund (Dividend Tax Credit Class, the best performing) are +%, +% and +% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively. (Figures to December 31 have not be published as of January 11)
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are +0.63% and +3.89% for the past three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for PowerShares Canadian Preferred Share Index Class, Series Fare -0.04%, +1.13% and +5.95% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The three year figure is +1.62%

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past two years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. The fund occasionally finds an attractive opportunity to trade between GWO issues, which have a good range of annual coupons (but in which trading is now hampered by the fact that the low-coupon issues are trading near par and are callable at par in the near term), but is “stuck” in the MFC and SLF issues, which have a much narrower range of coupon, while the IAG DeemedRetractibles are quite illiquid. Until the market became so grossly segmented, this was not so much of a problem – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio is, in effect ‘locked in’ to the MFC & SLF issues due to projected gains from a future OSFI decision, to the detriment of trading gains particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index, and in June, 2013, when the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles behaved like PerpetualDiscounts in a sharply negative market.

However, it will be noted, as discussed in several reports on Portfolio Composition since June, 2014, there has been a continuing series of trades from DeemedRetractibles into low-Spread FixedResets of the same issuer … so there are some opportunities to trade, although they don’t happen often!

In December, insurance DeemedRetractibles outperformed bank DeemedRetractibles:

insBankPerf_Straight_141231
Click for Big

… and also performed better than Unregulated Straight Perpetuals.

insUnregPerf_Straight_141231
Click for Big

A lingering effect of the downdraft of 2013 has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility but given my recent updates in recent daily market reports, I will not discuss them further in this post.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles; something that dismays me, particularly given that the market does not yet agree with me regarding the insurance issues! There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
September 10.4601 5.28% 0.997 5.296% 1.0000 $0.5540
December, 2014 10.5701 4.83% 1.009 4.787% 1.0000 $0.5060
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.
Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on November 28; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a small position in these issues.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas (set at 1.40% for the December 31 calculation) to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Dividend Yield” of 4.5% as of August 29, 2014, but this is the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF was 4.89% as of August 29, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s a little higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to discuss it in the context of portfolio reporting is misleading.

However, BMO has taken a significant step forward in that they are no longer reporting the “Portfolio Yield” directly on their website; the information is taken from the “Enhanced Fund Profile” which is available only as a PDF link. CPD doesn’t report this metric on the CPD fact sheet or on their website. I may have one less thing to mock the fundcos about!

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance has generally been due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

Low Spread FixedResets: December 2014

Monday, January 5th, 2015

As noted in MAPF Portfolio Composition: November 2014, this year’s trend for the fund to sell Straight Perpetuals to buy FixedResets continued and even accelerated during the month. This continued at a slower pace in December.

It is interesting to look at the price trend of some of the Straight/FixedReset pairs. We’ll start with GWO.PR.N / GWO.PR.I; the fund sold the latter to buy the former at a takeout of about $1.00 in mid-June, 2014; relative prices over the past year are plotted as:

GWOPRN_GWOPRI_bidDiff_141231
Click for Big

Given that the December month-end take-out was $2.95, this is clearly a trade that has not worked out very well.

In July, 2014, I reported sales of SLF.PR.D to purchase SLF.PR.G at a take-out of about $0.15:

SLFPRG_SLFPRD_bidDiff_141231
Click for Big

There were similar trades in August, 2014 (from SLF.PR.C) at a take-out of $0.35. The December month-end take-out was $2.16, so that hasn’t worked very well either.

The trend paused in September, 2014 and, indeed, can be said to have reversed, with the fund selling SplitShares (PVS.PR.B at 25.25-30) to purchase PerpetualDiscounts (BAM.PR.M / BAM.PR.N at about 21.25), a trade which worked out favourably and has been sort-of reversed (into PVS.PR.D) in November 2014.

In October 2014 there was another bit of counterflow, as the fund sold more SplitShares (CGI.PR.D at about 25.25) to purchase more PerpetualDiscounts (CU.PR.F and CU.PR.G, at about 21.25) which again worked out well and was reversed in November, selling the CU issues at about 22.45 to purchase low-spread FixedResets (TRP.PR.A and TRP.PR.B) at about 21.50 and 18.75 (post dividend equivalent), which was basically down by transaction costs at November month-end, but a significant loser by December month-end.

And November saw the third insurer-based sector swap, as the fund sold MFC.PR.C to buy the FixedReset MFC.PR.F at a post-dividend-adjusted take-out of about $0.85 … given a month-end take-out of about $1.30, that’s another regrettable trade, although another piece executed in December has done better.

MFCPRF_MFCPRC_bidDiff_141231
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This trend is not restricted to the insurance sector. Other pairs of interest are BAM.PR.X / BAM.PR.N:

BAMPRX_BAMPRN_bidDiff_141231
Click for Big

… and FTS.PR.H / FTS.PR.J:

FTSPRH_FTSPRJ_bidDiff_141231
Click for Big

… and PWF.PR.P / PWF.PR.S:

PWFPRP_PWFPRS_bidDiff_141231
Click for Big

I will agree that the fund’s trades highlighted in this post may be decried as cases of monumental bad timing, but I should point out that in May, 2014, the fund was 63.9% Straight / 9.5% FixedReset
while in December 2014 the fund was 39.4% Straight / 44.6% FixedReset & FloatingReset. Given that the indices are roughly 30% Straight / 60% FixedReset & FloatingReset, it is apparent that the fund was extremely overweighted in Straights / underweighted in FixedResets in May 2014 and that this qualitative tilt remains – just not quite so extreme.

Summarizing the charts above in tabular form, we see:

FixedReset Straight Take-out
December 2013
Take-out
MAPF Trade
Take-out
December 2014
GWO.PR.N
3.65%+130
GWO.PR.I
4.5%
($0.04) $1.00 $2.95
SLF.PR.G
4.35%+141
SLF.PR.D
4.45%
($1.29) $0.25 $2.16
MFC.PR.F
4.20%+141
MFC.PR.C
4.50%
($1.29) $0.86 $1.20
BAM.PR.X
4.60%+180
BAM.PR.N
4.75%
($2.06)   $0.17
FTS.PR.H
4.25%+145
FTS.PR.J
4.75%
$0.60   $5.68
PWF.PR.P
4.40%+160
PWF.PR.S
4.80%
($0.67)   $3.00
The ‘Take-Out’ is the bid price of the Straight less the bid price of the FixedReset; approximate execution prices are used for the “MAPF Trade” column. Bracketted figures in the ‘Take-Out’ columns indicate a ‘Pay-Up’

So why is all this happening? One should take care in explaining market movements, but it is my belief that in the latter half of 2013 we were dealing with the ‘taper tantrum’ – the market’s fears that Fed tapering and subsequent tapering would lead to massive spikes in yields; this led to a great preference for FixedResets over Straights. Now, with the economic news getting less inflationary with every news story and Europe and Japan desperately trying to reflate their sluggish economies, the market seems to think that these rate increases are still a long way off … leading to a great preference for Straights over FixedResets.

In addition, the graphs show a sharp spike in early December, during which the low-spread FixedResets were very badly hurt; I believe this to be due to a combination of tax-loss selling and a panicky response to the 29% reduction in the TRP.PR.A dividend.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: December 2014

Sunday, January 4th, 2015

Turnover continued to be above average in December, at about 19%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped was the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) in early 2013 – many of the PerpetualPremiums had negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! While market weakness since the peak of the PerpetualDiscount subindex in May, 2013, has mitigated the situation somewhat, the population of PerpetualDiscounts is still exceeded by that of PerpetualPremiums – most of which are trading at a negative Yield-to-Worst.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to further footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on December 31 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2014-12-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 6.8% (0) 4.41% 6.20
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 4.5% (-0.2) 5.59% 14.56
Fixed-Reset 37.8% (-1.2) 4.43% 10.87
Deemed-Retractible 34.9% (-3.0) 5.17% 7.99
FloatingReset 6.8% (+6.8) 3.11% 19.37
Scraps (Various) 10.1% (-0.1) 5.81% 11.36
Cash -0.9% (-2.3) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 4.83% 10.44
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The big shift during the month was from FixedResets into FloatingResets, which occurred entirely due to the conversion of TRP.PR.A into TRP.PR.F (in accordance with my recommendation shortly before the deadline; this conversion was executed by a small majority of holders and turned out quite well, at least as far as the first two days of trading are concerned.

The proportion of the portfolio held in FixedResets didn’t change much due to numerous flows into the sector, e.g., some MFC.PR.C (DeemedRetractible) was sold at about 23.35 to buy MFC.PR.F (FixedReset) at about 21.78; this trade was profitable by month-end; and some GWO.PR.R (DeemedRetractible) was sold at about 24.46 to buy FTS.PR.H (FixedReset) at about 20.25; this trade was significantly underwater at the end of the month.

While these changes are dramatic, it will be noted that the fund is still overweighted in Straight Perpetuals (almost all DeemedRetractibles now) and underweighted in FixedResets relative to the index, which is roughly 31% Straight and 60% FixedReset.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2014-12-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 23.3% (-1.4)
Pfd-2(high) 40.3% (+0.2)
Pfd-2 0%
Pfd-2(low) 27.2% (+3.6)
Pfd-3(high) 1.6% (+0.4)
Pfd-3 4.2% (-0.1)
Pfd-3(low) 3.1% (-0.4)
Pfd-4(high) 0.7% (0)
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0% (0)
Pfd-5(high) 0% (0)
Pfd-5 0.5% (0)
Cash -0.9% (-2.3)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.C, which is rated P-5 by S&P and is unrated by DBRS
A position held in NPI.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3(high)” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3(high).

The change in credit distribution is due largely to the sale of the GWO.PR.R (Pfd-1(low)) into FTS.PR.H (Pfd-2(low)) mentioned above.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2014-12-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 12.1% (-0.9)
$50,000 – $100,000 3.4% (+0.9)
$100,000 – $200,000 42.3% (-12.3)
$200,000 – $300,000 26.2% (+11.3)
>$300,000 16.9% (+3.3)
Cash -0.9% (-2.3)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

January 2, 2015

Friday, January 2nd, 2015

The loonie got out of the wrong side of bed this year:

The loonie plunged to a level not seen in more than five years Friday amid a strengthening U.S. greenback and weaker crude oil prices.

The Canadian dollar ended the day down 1.18 cents at 85.02 cents (U.S.), The last time it closed below this level was on May 15, 2009.

The currency finished 2014 down about 8 per cent or 7.8 cents against the American currency compared with where it began the year.

It’s in a race with oil:

Oil dropped to the lowest in more than five and a half years amid growing supply from Russia and Iraq and signs of manufacturing weakness in Europe and China.

Futures capped a sixth weekly loss in New York and London. Oil output in Russia and Iraq surged to the highest levels in decades in December, according to data from both countries’ governments. Euro-area factory output expanded less than initially estimated in December. A manufacturing gauge in China, the world’s second-largest oil consumer, fell to the weakest level in 18 months, government data showed yesterday.

Prices slumped 46 percent in New York in 2014, the steepest drop in six years and second-worst since trading began in 1983, as U.S. producers and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ceded no ground in their battle for market share. OPEC pumped above its quota for a seventh month in December even as U.S. output expanded to the highest in more than three decades, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

What I need is a gimmick:

So-called “smart beta” funds, the fastest-growing segment of the exchange-traded fund market, are sold as index funds but are actively – sometimes frenetically – traded portfolios that can whipsaw investors and often fail to deliver the outsized returns their issuers promote.

Over the last one- and three-year periods, they have on average lagged their plain-vanilla counterparts in almost every highly competitive category, according to an analysis performed for Reuters by ETF.com, a research firm. Along the way, many have turned over their portfolios two and three times a year and undershot their own specialized benchmarks by significant margins.

Yet they have become a magnet for investor dollars, pulling in 60 cents of every dollar flowing to ETFs over the last two years, according to Morningstar.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 8bp, FixedResets down 10bp and DeemedRetractibles off 2bp. The modest numbers masked an impressive amount of volatility, but volume was virtually non-existent.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:

  • based on Implied Volatility Theory only
  • are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
  • assume constant GOC-5 yield
  • assume constant Implied Volatility
  • assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150102
Click for Big

So according to this, TRP.PR.A, bid at 21.20, is $1.17 cheap (despite today’s impressive performance), but it has already reset (at +192). TRP.PR.C, bid at 21.11 and resetting at +154bp on 2016-1-30 is $1.37 rich.

impVol_MFC_150102
Click for Big

MFC.PR.F continues to be on the line defined by its peers. Implied Volatility continues to be a conundrum. It is far too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

impVol_BAM_150102
Click for Big

There continues to be cheapness in the lowest-spread issue, BAM.PR.X, resetting at +180bp on 2017-6-30, which is bid at 21.21 and appears to be $0.87 cheap, while BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp 2016-6-30 is bid at 25.10 and appears to be $0.98 rich.

It seems clear that the higher-spread issues define a curve with significantly more Implied Volatility than is calculated when the low-spread outlier is included.

impVol_FTS_150102
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 19.30, looks $0.93 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp, and bid at 25.29, looks $0.89 expensive and resets 2019-3-1

FRPairs_150102
Click for Big

Pairs equivalence is all over the map, but is better than yesterday and will probably converge as volumes increase in the new year.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1294 % 2,513.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 1 0.1294 % 3,980.1
Floater 3.02 % 3.12 % 61,889 19.46 4 0.1294 % 2,672.5
OpRet 4.05 % 1.68 % 102,319 0.46 1 0.0000 % 2,752.0
SplitShare 4.27 % 4.12 % 32,850 3.66 5 -0.1421 % 3,204.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,516.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.43 % -5.54 % 63,048 0.08 19 -0.0226 % 2,492.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.17 % 5.03 % 106,390 15.32 16 0.0795 % 2,683.9
FixedReset 4.17 % 3.57 % 222,956 8.41 77 -0.1027 % 2,564.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.92 % 0.53 % 93,980 0.16 39 -0.0157 % 2,633.5
FloatingReset 2.64 % 1.86 % 58,814 3.40 7 0.2097 % 2,506.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -2.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.72
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset -1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 24.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.56
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 24.18
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 24.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 21.56
Evaluated at bid price : 21.86
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 19.30
Evaluated at bid price : 19.30
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 21.76
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.96 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 21.85
Evaluated at bid price : 21.85
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 2.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 21.20
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.F FloatingReset 29,650 Recent exchange from TRP.PR.A.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 22.10
Evaluated at bid price : 22.36
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 23,825 ITG (who?) bought 14,300 from CIBC at 22.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 21.75
Evaluated at bid price : 22.03
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
TD.PF.C FixedReset 22,840 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BAM.PF.G FixedReset 15,415 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 14,075 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-01
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.87
Bid-YTW : -16.79 %
BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 10,476 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-01
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : -16.36 %
There were 0 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TD.PR.T FloatingReset Quote: 25.49 – 26.53
Spot Rate : 1.0400
Average : 0.5655

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.49
Bid-YTW : 1.86 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 21.72 – 22.40
Spot Rate : 0.6800
Average : 0.4444

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.72
Bid-YTW : 4.71 %

MFC.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 25.05 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3612

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 21.11 – 21.69
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.4198

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 21.11
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.75 – 23.13
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2524

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-01-02
Maturity Price : 22.46
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %

CGI.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 25.75 – 26.15
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2761

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %

PIC.PR.A, SBN.PR.A, TXT.PR.A & WFS.PR.A Holders Approve Mandate Changes

Friday, January 2nd, 2015

Strathbridge Asset Management Inc. has announced (although not yet on their website):

that securityholders of the Funds have approved a proposal to change the investment restrictions and/or investment strategy of each of the Funds.

As a result, the Manager will have greater flexibility in managing each Fund’s portfolio securities such that each Fund may (i) invest in certain portfolio securities (known as the basket) to enhance returns beyond the Fund’s core portfolio holdings, (ii) invest in other investment funds (including exchange traded funds and other Strathbridge funds) to assist in achieving its investment objectives in an efficient manner, (iii) invest up to 10% of its net assets to purchase call options on securities in which it is permitted to invest and (iv) invest portfolio assets entirely in cash or cash equivalents, in the Manager’s discretion, for defensive or other purposes.

The special meetings were previously reported on PrefBlog.