PrefBlog

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close September 30, 2019, was $7.7948 after a distribution of $0.102629.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

The preferred share market has suffered a sharp reverse in the past five months, leaving a lot of room for outsized gains. The Seniority Spread (the interest-equivalent yield on reasonably liquid, investment-grade PerpetualDiscounts less the yield on long term corporate bonds) is extremely elevated (chart end-date 2019-9-13)

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Note that the Seniority Spread was 385bp on October 2, a sharp narrowing from the post-Credit-Crunch record 420bp reported at the end of August. As a good practical example of the spreads between markets, consider that on March 20 the redemption of IGM.PR.B was announced; the redemption of this 5.90% Straight Perpetual was explicitly financed by the issue of 4.206% debentures, implying a Seniority Spread for this issuer of about 350bp at that time. It will also be noted that CIU issued a long-term bond in early September yielding 2.963%, about 411bp cheaper than the interest-equivalent figure of 7.07% for CIU.PR.A, which was then yielding about 5.44% as a dividend.

As has been noted, the increase in the Seniority Spread over the past year has been due not to an increase in yield (drop in prices) of Straight Preferreds over the year, but because the yield of the preferreds has remained relatively constant while the yield of long-term corporate bonds has dropped dramatically.

… and the relationship between five-year Canada yields and yields on investment-grade FixedResets is also well within what I consider ‘decoupled panic’ territory (chart end-date 2019-8-9):

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In addition, I feel that the yield on five-year Canadas is unsustainably low (it should be the inflation rate plus an increment of … 1%? 1.5%? 2.0%?),and a return to sustainable levels is likely over the medium term.

It seems clear that many market players are, wittingly or not, using FixedResets to speculate on future moves in the Canada 5-Year yield. This is excellent news for those who take market action based on fundamentals and the long term characteristics of the market because nobody can consistently time the markets. The speculators will, over the long run, lose money, handing it over to more sober investors.

It should be noted that I have been unable to explain the very strong performance of Floor issues over the past year relative to their non-Floor counterparts. See the discussions on PrefBlog at LINK, LINK and LINK.

I believe the bear-market outperformance by the Floor issues is a behavioural phenomenon with very little basis in fundamentals. When interest rates in general move, FixedReset prices should not change much (to a first approximation), since in Fixed Income investing it is spreads that are important, not absolute yields. There should be some effect on Floor issues, which should move up slightly in price as yields go down since the ‘option’ to receive the floor rate will become more valuable. Adjustments due to this effect should be fairly small, however – and over the past year issues with a floor, that started the period being expensive, have simply gotten even more expensive, relative to their non-floored counterparts.

And the tricky thing about behavioural models of investing is that they can lose their explanatory power very quickly when an investment fashion shifts, whereas fundamentals will always be effective. Just to give an example from the preferred share market – until the end of 2014, FixedResets were priced relative to each other according to their initial dividend; when the reset of TRP.PR.A shocked a lot of investors, relative pricing became much more dependent upon the Issue Reset Spread, a much more logical and fundamental property.

FixedReset (Discount) performance on the month was +3.99% vs. PerpetualDiscounts of +2.69% in September; the two classes finally decoupled in mid-November, 2018, after months of moving in lockstep, but it still appears to me that yields available on FixedResets are keeping the yields of PerpetualDiscounts up, even though a consistent valuation based on an expectation of declining interest rates would greatly increase the attractiveness of PerpetualDiscounts:

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Floaters managed a modest bounce, returning +5.01% for September but the figure for the past twelve months remains horrific at -39.52%. Look at the long-term performance:

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Some Assiduous Readers will be interested to observe that the ‘Quantitative Easing’ decline was not initially as bad as the ‘Credit Crunch’ decline, which took the sector down to the point where the 15-year cumulative total return was negative. I wrote about that at the time. but it became worse in August! On August 30, 2019 the HIMI Floater Index (total return) value was calculated as 1906.6; the index first surpassed this value on 2003-8-13. Thus, cumulative total return (that is, including dividends) was negative over a period of slightly-over sixteen years.

It seems clear that Floaters are used, wittingly or otherwise, as a vehicle for speculation on the policy rate and Canada Prime, while FixedResets are being used as a vehicle for speculation on the five-year Canada rate. In support of this idea, I present an Implied Volatility analysis of the TRP series of FixedResets as of September 30, which is comprised of six issues without a Minimum Rate Guarantee and two issues which do have this feature:

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The two issues with floors, TRP.PR.J (+469, minimum 5.50%) and TRP.PR.K (+385, minimum 4.90%) are $2.18 and $4.21 rich, respectively. These are marked increases from last month, despite the fact that their floor will not become effective unless five-year Canadas dip below 0.81% and 1.05%, respectively. For all the gloom, we’re still above those levels!

Lest this be considered a fluke, I also show results for the BAM series of FixedResets, which includes three issues with dividend floors: BAM.PF.H (+417, Minimum 5.00%); BAM.PF.I (+386, Minimum 4.80%); and BAM.PF.J (+310, Minimum 4.75%); these issues are all rich compared to their non-floor siblings, being $2.36, $3.52 and $4.76 expensive, respectively.

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Relative performance during the month was not correlated with Issue Reset Spreads for either “Pfd-2 Group” or “Pfd-3 Group” issues:

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… and results over the quarter were similar (Pfd-3 Group correlation was 28%):

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As for the future, of course, it’s one thing to say that ‘spreads are unsustainable and so are government yields’ and it’s quite another to forecast just how and when a more economically sustainable environment will take effect. It could be years. There could be a reversal, particularly if Trump’s international trade policies cause a severe recession or even a depression. And, of course, I could be just plain wrong about the sustainability of the current environment.

On the other hand, I will pass on my observation that international interest in the Canadian preferred share market is increasing, as other Floating Rate indices globally are doing much better. Consider, for example the Solactive Australian Bank Senior Floating Rate Bond Index, which “provides exposure to the largest and most liquid floating rate debt securities issued by selected Australian banks. The index is comprised of investment grade floating rate debt securities denominated in AUD and calculated as a Total Return Index” (LINK although the index constituents currently all have a remaining term of less than five years), and the S&P U.S. Floating Rate Preferred Stock Index.

Yields on preferred shares of all stripes are extremely high compared to those available from other investments of similar quality. As I told John Heinzl in an eMail interview in late November, 2018, the best advice I can offer investors remains Shut up and clip your coupons!

I think that a broad, sustainable rally in FixedResets will require higher five-year Canada yields (or a widespread expectation of them) … and although I’m sure this will happen eventually, it would be foolish to speculate on just when it will happen!

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Significant positions were held in NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on September 30, 2019; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2030-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares, when present in the portfolio) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate. It will also be noted that my analysis of likely insurance industry regulation as updated is not given much weight by the market.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has published its:

• 19H1 Semi-Annual Financial Statements (unaudited)
• June Month-end statement of holdings (unaudited)
• 19H1 Statement of transactions (unaudited)

All materials are accessable via the fund’s main web-page.

Turnover declined to 14% in September, as the market was very strong until it plateaued starting mid-month.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

• Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
• DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
• DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.

I have argued for a long time that insurers will become covered by NVCC rules similar to the banks, but regulatory process on the issue is very slow.

As a result of prior delays, I initially extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

In December, 2018, I extended the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another five years, to 2030-1-31.

The new date has been chosen with the idea that a decision will be made by the IAIS (International Association of Insurance Supervisors) in 2019, and (if favourable) will be implemented with an 11-year grace period, similarly to the banks. We shall see just how accurate these suppositions might be!

I must emphasize that these extensions do not give rise to any desire on my part to alter the fundamentals of my analysis. It is simply a reaction to the excessive time the regulators are taking to discuss the issue.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on September 30 was as follows:

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

Liquidity Distribution is:

The distribution of Issue Reset Spreads is:

Distribution of Floating Rate Start Dates is shown in the table below. This is the date of the next adjustment to the dividend rate, if the issue is currently paying a fixed rate for a limited time; which in practice is successive terms of 5 years. Issues that adjust quarterly are considered “Currently Floating”.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but are not sold with a prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of July 31, 2017, and published in the August, 2017, PrefLetter. It is fair to say:

• MAPF credit quality is much better
• MAPF liquidity is lower
• MAPF Yield is higher
• Weightings
  • MAPF is much less exposed to Straight Perpetuals
  • Neither portfolio is exposed to Operating Retractibles (there aren’t too many of those any more!)
  • MAPF is equally exposed to SplitShares (that is to say, currently no exposure)
  • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
  • MAPF is significantly higher weighted in FixedResets, with a much greater emphasis on lower-spread and insurance issues