Archive for February, 2009

KSP.UN Placed under Review-Negative by DBRS; S&P Downgrades

Tuesday, February 10th, 2009

DBRS has announced that it:

placed its rating of the Preferred Units issued by Kingsway Linked Return of Capital Trust, rated at Pfd-3, Under Review with Negative Implications. This action is a result of DBRS placing the ratings of Kingsway Financial Services Inc. and affiliates (the Company) Under Review with Negative Implications on February 9, 2009. This rating action followed the Company’s pre-release of Q4 2008 results.

KSP.UN was issued back in the good old days, when you could issue anything. The prospectus states:

LROC Preferred Unit distributions will consist primarily of returns of capital (which are generally tax-deferred and reduce a Holder’s cost base in the LROC Preferred Units for tax purposes), and may, in certain circumstances, include capital gains distributions.

In order to achieve its investment objectives, the Trust will use the net proceeds of this Offering to subscribe for and purchase all of the limited partnership units (the ‘‘LP Units’’) of KL Limited Partnership (‘‘KL LP’’), a newly created limited partnership organized under the laws of the Province of Ontario, which will, in turn, use the proceeds of such subscription to pre-pay its purchase obligations under a forward securities purchase agreement (the ‘‘Purchase Agreement’’) with The Bank of Nova Scotia, a Canadian chartered bank, the long-term debt of which is currently rated AA- by S&P and AA (low) by DBRS (‘‘BNS’’ or the ‘‘Counterparty’’). The Purchase Agreement will provide exposure to a note (the ‘‘Kingsway Note’’) issued by Kingsway ROC GP, a newly created general partnership organized under the laws of the State of Delaware (‘‘Kingsway ROCGP’’) and unconditionally guaranteed as to payments of principal, interest and other amounts by Kingsway Financial Services Inc. (‘‘Kingsway’’), a corporation incorporated under the laws of the Province of Ontario, and by Kingsway America Inc., a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Kingsway (‘‘Kingsway America’’). The longterm debt of Kingsway and Kingsway America is currently rated BBB-by S&P and BBB by DBRS. The Kingsway Note will be owned by Kingsway Note Trust, a newly created investment trust established under the laws of the Province of Ontario (‘‘KN Trust’’). The initial holder of all of the outstanding units of KN Trust will be the Counterparty or an affiliate of the Counterparty.

I will hazard a guess that the Toronto Stock Exchange refused to issue it a “.PR.” symbol due to confusion regarding what it was preferred to; but it got a “Preferred Scale” rating from both DBRS and S&P.

S&P has announced that today it:

lowered its ratings on the linked return of capital (LROC) preferred units issued by Kingsway Linked Return of Capital Trust (see list).

The lowering of these ratings mirrors today’s downgrade of Kingsway ROCGP’s senior unsecured 10-year note, which is linked to the LROC preferred
units.

It’s now rated P-4 by S&P.

KSP.UN was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was downgraded to Pfd-3 by DBRS.

KSP.UN is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

February 9, 2009

Monday, February 9th, 2009

Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway), in the Financial Times, 3 February 2009:

As today’s financial crisis progressively gets resolved, it will be necessary to start the process of preventing future crises. This will require substantial reform of the regulatory framework. Banks will have to strengthen their capital and their liquidity buffers. And financial regulation must have a less pro-cyclical effect. The objective must be to enable the banks to curb the impact of shocks on the economy, rather than to amplify them, as is the case now, where negative spirals are generated between the financial system and the real economy.

The trouble with attempting a counter-cyclical (or less pro-cyclical) regulatory policy is that it requires the authorities to determine what the cycle is – and I don’t believe that they are any smarter or better informed that the rest of the world. It also opens up a greater possibility of political interference in what is a rather dry, technical and confusing area … can’t you just hear What-Debt? as Pooh-Bah of banking regulation? ‘Thanks to my wise tax-cutting, we are all going to be rich forever. It is impossible for a bank to go bankrupt. Therefore …’

I have heard some things about a Spanish model of “Dynamic Provisioning”, but haven’t investigated any of the details.

Michael Pomerleano, Harald Scheule and Andrew Sheng write a nice piece of VoxEU, The devil is in the details, emphasizing the dangers of cliff risk through model homogeneity:

the price of all risky assets may have dropped below their fundamental value. Therefore, leveraged markets are prone to overshoot in booms and underprice in downturns. If this is true, the current losses in the trading book may be overestimated. If policy does not respond well (or is ineffective), the pessimistic view becomes self-reinforcing. Under the present “fair market value” regulatory regime, market risk exposures are marked to market and a large fraction of the losses reported to date relate to market-risk exposures.

A little understood problem is that the model provider, financial intermediation, and model auditing industry is highly concentrated, leading to systemic risk. Several examples suffice: the small number of credit rating agencies for bond and structured finance issues, the growing market share of “too big to fail” financial institutions, and joint ventures in model construction designed to reduce costs. The problem is compounded by the use of similar quantitative frameworks and frameworks that are calibrated based on similar loss experiences.

An anecdote illustrates this point. Some years ago the chief risk officer of a major U.S. bank presented the asset correlation matrix used by his institution. Another major financial institution at the event confirmed its use of the same matrix. While the institutions were fundamentally different in nature, they shared the same reputable consulting firm. Neither this firm’s model nor any other model has been formally validated. The oligopolistic structure was nurtured by the limited data availability and the propensity of financial institutions to outsource risk modelling. A similar situation prevails in the accounting industry, which is dominated by the “Big Four.” The public sector has abdicated too much authority to vested interests in the private sector.

This behaviour is lauded and encouraged by regulators and large firms, under the twin banners of eliminating regulatory arbitrage and encouraging “best practices”. The authors recommend:

Deconcentration of risk models is another priority. This may involve generating a compulsory global warehouse for financial risk–related data (particularly regarding credit risk) and encouraging alternative modelling techniques. While limited data-sharing initiatives reportedly are being undertaken in Japan, they need to be far more extensive and systematic.

while – in a decision I consider to be inconsistent with their stated thesis – recommending:

Regulatory arbitrage has transferred risks to off-balance-sheet special-purpose vehicles and hedge funds. This practice may have to be limited by homogenising rules across financial instruments and institutions as well as across industries and countries.

The Fed is having difficulty coming to grips with the question of what to do next:

Federal Reserve officials have failed to resolve an internal debate over whether to purchase long-term Treasuries, even as rising yields on the securities threaten to undermine the central bank’s objective of cutting borrowing costs for consumers and businesses.

“The Fed will get a lot more bang for its buck by buying mortgages than buying Treasuries,” said John Ryding, founder and chief economist of RDQ Economics LLC in New York and a former Fed economist.

Lacker preferred to expand the money supply “by purchasing U.S. Treasury securities rather than through targeted credit programs,” the FOMC statement said.

Accrued Interest comments on pending revisions to TARP, which he states will include FDIC insured 10-year covered bonds. The source WSJ article does not reference covered bonds, but the idea has been floating around for a few weeks. As yet there is nothing on the FDIC website regarding such a guarantee – the last mention was a policy statement cleaning up legal loose ends in August.

The market ticked up today on reasonable volume bolstered by all the recent new issues.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.31 % 3.79 % 24,095 17.76 2 0.1275 % 861.0
FixedFloater 7.34 % 7.00 % 65,988 13.85 7 -0.4060 % 1,368.4
Floater 5.33 % 4.40 % 31,097 16.57 4 1.0778 % 985.2
OpRet 5.26 % 4.68 % 153,334 4.01 15 0.1355 % 2,042.4
SplitShare 6.20 % 9.74 % 71,094 4.07 15 0.1503 % 1,798.5
Interest-Bearing 7.02 % 8.47 % 34,181 0.85 2 0.4028 % 2,015.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3763 % 1,562.5
Perpetual-Discount 6.88 % 6.96 % 204,598 12.60 71 0.3763 % 1,439.1
FixedReset 6.11 % 5.73 % 658,001 13.94 27 0.4675 % 1,802.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -2.67 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 30 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.30
Bid-YTW : 11.97 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -2.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 17.27
Evaluated at bid price : 17.27
Bid-YTW : 7.47 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.20
Bid-YTW : 10.22 %
BCE.PR.F FixedFloater -1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.55
Bid-YTW : 7.27 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 17.42
Evaluated at bid price : 17.42
Bid-YTW : 7.31 %
BCE.PR.G FixedFloater -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.56
Bid-YTW : 7.35 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 18.80
Evaluated at bid price : 18.80
Bid-YTW : 7.27 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 15.59
Evaluated at bid price : 15.59
Bid-YTW : 7.35 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 15.47
Evaluated at bid price : 15.47
Bid-YTW : 7.32 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 23.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 16.94
Evaluated at bid price : 16.94
Bid-YTW : 7.17 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 17.55
Evaluated at bid price : 17.55
Bid-YTW : 6.45 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 20.31
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.21
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.80
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.48
Evaluated at bid price : 21.80
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.51
Evaluated at bid price : 22.57
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 20.80
Evaluated at bid price : 20.80
Bid-YTW : 7.09 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 44.92
Evaluated at bid price : 46.71
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
FIG.PR.A Interest-Bearing 1.20 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of February 6, based on Capital units at $1.49 and 0.53 Capital Units per preferred..
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.61
Bid-YTW : 12.34 %
FTN.PR.A SplitShare 1.26 % Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of January 30 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.02
Bid-YTW : 9.35 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 20.01
Evaluated at bid price : 20.01
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 15.65
Evaluated at bid price : 15.65
Bid-YTW : 8.61 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.91
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 7.67
Evaluated at bid price : 7.67
Bid-YTW : 6.96 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 16.69
Evaluated at bid price : 16.69
Bid-YTW : 7.12 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 7.55
Evaluated at bid price : 7.55
Bid-YTW : 7.07 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 17.98
Evaluated at bid price : 17.98
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 2.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.46
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 2.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 9.94 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 3.55 % Asset coverage of 1.9-:1 as of January 30 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.26
Bid-YTW : 14.37 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 171,279 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 122,334 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 24.95
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 101,700 Desjardins crossed 90,000 at 25.76.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 89,460 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 70,149 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 54,445 Nesbitt bought 19,600 from RBC at 15.72.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-09
Maturity Price : 15.45
Evaluated at bid price : 15.45
Bid-YTW : 7.42 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BSD.PR.A Announces Normal-Course Issuer Bid

Monday, February 9th, 2009

Brookfield Investment Funds Management has announced:

as manager of Brascan SoundVest Rising Distribution Split Trust (TSX: BSD.UN and BSD.PR.A) (the “Trust”), announced today that the Toronto Stock Exchange has accepted its Notice of Intention to make a normal course issuer bid. The Trust will have the right under the bid to purchase for cancellation up to 284,127 of its Capital Units and 284,127 of its Preferred Securities (collectively, the “Shares”), representing 5% of the 5,682,543 Capital Units and 5,682,543 Preferred Securities issued and outstanding as at January 29, 2009.

The Manager is of the opinion that Capital Units and Preferred Securities of the Trust may become available during the proposed purchase period at prices that would make such purchases in the best interests of the Trust and its securityholders. The Trust has not previously purchased its Capital Units or Preferred Securities under a normal course issuer bid.

An announcement of a bid of this nature is not normally considered newsworthy unless the company has a history of actually putting some money on the table. In this case, however, the company suspended retraction rights prior to being downgraded to Pfd-5 by DBRS in December. The suspension of retractions was permitted by the prospectus, but was not mandatory, and remains in effect.

The Preferred Securities remain underwater: the February 6 combined NAV of $8.61 may be expressed as an asset coverage of 0.9-:1.

BSD.PR.A closed today at 5.90-00, 3×5, after trading 6,636 shares in a range of 5.70-93. The capital units, BSD.UN, traded 1,000 shares at $0.50 before closing at 0.50-73, 9×4. At these levels, an issuer bid will indeed be incremental to NAV; but I consider it an absolute disgrace that capital unitholders will be getting so much as a nickel from the company through management fiat while the preferreds are underwater.

Catapult Financial Offering Actively-Managed Preferred Share Trust

Monday, February 9th, 2009

Catapult Financial, a wholly owned subsidiary of Aston Hill has announced that:

Preferred Share Investment Trust (the “Trust”) announces that it has filed a preliminary prospectus with the securities regulatory authorities of all of the Canadian provinces for an initial public offering of trust units (the “Units”).

The Trust has been created to invest in an actively managed portfolio (the “Portfolio”) comprised primarily of investment grade preferred shares and to a lesser extent investment grade corporate debt and convertible bonds in order to provide Unitholders with the opportunity for growth of their investment value through any capital appreciation of the Portfolio and quarterly distributions.

The Portfolio will be actively managed by Catapult Financial Management Inc., a subsidiary of Aston Hill Financial Inc. Mr. Ben Cheng will be the lead portfolio manager responsible for the Portfolio. First Asset Investment Management Inc. will act as the manager of the Trust.

The Trust’s investment objectives are:

(a) to provide Unitholders with quarterly distributions, estimated to initially be $0.175 per Unit ($0.70 per annum representing an annual yield of 7.0% based on the original issue price of a Unit of $10.00); and

(b) to provide Unitholders with the opportunity for capital appreciation from the performance of the Portfolio.

James Hymas Quoted in Financial Post

Saturday, February 7th, 2009

The February 5 Financial Post had an article titled Investors Prefer Preferreds, a short piece about the popularity of Fixed Resets. I was able to offer one reason why they are popular with investors:

“Fear levels have ratcheted up,” said James Hymas, president and portfolio manager at Hymas Investment Management. “They are flocking to this because the new structure is giving them some degree of comfort.”

… and one reason why the banks like them …

“One reason the banks like this new structure is because they have a call at par in five years,” Mr. Hymas said.

Well, I can tell you one thing – it’s getting to be a very strange market! There are issues trading at a discount for which the YTW scenario is a call at par as soon as possible – because the reset makes the perpetual yield higher. And other issues which have a “five year yield” (‘yield to next call’ would be a more precise way of expressing the scenario) so high that investors are either (a) trading them as perpetuals, or (b) stupid.

It makes it very difficult to fit the data into a unified theory!

February 6, 2009

Friday, February 6th, 2009

Alea points out that the February 5 H.4.1 Fed release shows that the Fed Balance sheet continues to shrink. “Central Bank Liquidity Swaps” on the asset side and “Deposits – Depository Institutions” on the liability side are down $78-billion and $93-billion respectively.

Unfortunately – and somewhat surprisingly – Commercial Paper holdings increased by about $10.6-billion … but still way down from the peak.

The UK Financial Services Authority has released a consultation paper on Temporary Short-Selling Measures. It appears that they favour continuation of the “Disclosure Obligation” (large short positions must be disclosed), which I don’t have any problem with.

Speaking of disclosure obligations, the SEC has unveiled a raft of NRSRO rules, designed to ensure that future scapegoating will be easier to implement. Lots of disclosures that nobody will ever read, but good practice for the next regulation: a requirement that prices only go up. Surely this ultimate goal is only a few more box-ticks away!

All in all, it was a pretty quiet end to the week. Not much volume, not much movement.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.33 % 3.81 % 24,302 17.74 2 0.4868 % 859.9
FixedFloater 7.31 % 7.01 % 66,924 13.91 7 -0.5962 % 1,374.0
Floater 5.39 % 4.42 % 28,896 16.55 4 -0.2049 % 974.7
OpRet 5.27 % 4.78 % 155,573 4.01 15 0.3916 % 2,039.6
SplitShare 6.21 % 9.02 % 70,078 4.08 15 0.4562 % 1,795.8
Interest-Bearing 7.05 % 8.15 % 34,511 0.86 2 0.4044 % 2,007.0
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0561 % 1,556.7
Perpetual-Discount 6.91 % 6.97 % 206,700 12.60 71 0.0561 % 1,433.7
FixedReset 6.13 % 5.86 % 679,610 13.81 27 -0.0078 % 1,794.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -2.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 14.10
Evaluated at bid price : 14.10
Bid-YTW : 8.56 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -2.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 7.41
Evaluated at bid price : 7.41
Bid-YTW : 7.20 %
BCE.PR.F FixedFloater -2.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.81
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -2.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 19.56
Evaluated at bid price : 19.56
Bid-YTW : 7.10 %
BCE.PR.G FixedFloater -1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.75
Bid-YTW : 7.27 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 18.61
Evaluated at bid price : 18.61
Bid-YTW : 7.34 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 21.33
Evaluated at bid price : 21.61
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 15.43
Evaluated at bid price : 15.43
Bid-YTW : 7.42 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 21.96
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 21.74
Evaluated at bid price : 21.78
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 17.64
Evaluated at bid price : 17.64
Bid-YTW : 6.92 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare 1.19 % Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of January 31 according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.32
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 17.56
Evaluated at bid price : 17.56
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-06-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 16.70
Evaluated at bid price : 16.70
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.55
Bid-YTW : 9.92 %
FTN.PR.A SplitShare 2.33 % Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of January 30 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.92
Bid-YTW : 9.57 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 19.27
Evaluated at bid price : 19.27
Bid-YTW : 7.04 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 2.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-02-06
Maturity Price : 21.55
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 3.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 10.36 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.R FixedReset 99,244 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 93,230 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 88,470 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 87,699 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.89
Bid-YTW : 6.67 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 51,900 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 24.72.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 43,475 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

NEW.PR.B Considering Term Extension

Friday, February 6th, 2009

NewGrowth Corp has announced:

that its Board of Directors has retained Scotia Capital to advise the Company on a possible extension and reorganization of the Company. There is no guarantee that after such review an extension will be proposed or if proposed, will be approved by shareholders.

NewGrowth Corp. is a mutual fund corporation whose investment portfolio consists of publicly-listed securities of selected Canadian chartered banks and utility issuers. The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares of NewGrowth Corp. are both listed for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols NEW.A and NEW.PR.B respectively.

The preferreds currently have asset coverage of 1.9+:1 as of February 5, according to Scotia and are scheduled for full redemption June 26, 2009. There was a tiny call for redemption in June 2008, at which date there was a face value of $42.5-million in preferreds outstanding

NEW.PR.B is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

XCM.PR.A: Reorganization Plan Defeated

Thursday, February 5th, 2009

Bravo!

Commerce Split Corp. has announced:

Commerce Split Corp. (the “Company”) held a meeting today, Thursday February 5, 2009 to vote on the special resolution of the proposed reorganization of the Company. The vote has not been carried, and therefore the proposed capital reorganization will not be implemented. Management thanks all shareholders for considering the proposed reorganization.

PrefBlog had recommended defeat of the proposal, on the grounds Preferred Shareholders were giving a gift to the wiped-out capital unitholders. NAVPU was 9.05 as of January 30, according to the company.

XCM.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

XMF.PR.A: Reorganization Plan Defeated

Thursday, February 5th, 2009

Bravo!

M-Split Corp. has announced:

M Split Corp. (the “Company”) held a meeting today, Thursday February 5, 2009 to vote on the special resolution of the proposed reorganization of the Company. The vote has not been carried, and therefore the proposed capital reorganization will not be implemented. Management thanks all shareholders for considering the proposed reorganization.

PrefBlog had recommended defeat of the proposal, on the grounds Preferred Shareholders were giving a gift to the wiped-out capital unitholders. NAVPU was 9.25 as of January 30, according to the company.

XMF.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

ALB.PR.A Revises Capital Unit Dividend Policy

Thursday, February 5th, 2009

Allbanc Split Corp. II has announced:

The Company has determined to revise its Capital Share dividend policy to not pay a dividend on the Capital Shares if the Net Asset Value at the time of declaration, after giving effect to the dividend, is less than or equal to the par value of the Preferred Shares. Any excess dividends received on the underlying portfolio securities minus the dividends payable on the Preferred Shares and all administrative and operating expenses will be reinvested in short-term debt securities or underlying portfolio securities

That’s nice, eh? They’ll paying dividends on the capital units until the preferred shareholders are actually under water. Still, it’s better than the distribution policy outlined in the prospectus which had no asset coverage test:

It will be the policy of the Board of Directors to declare and pay quarterly distributions on the Capital Shares in an amount equal to the dividends received by the Company on the Portfolio Shares minus the distributions payable on the Preferred Shares and all administrative and operating expenses.

Asset coverage is 1.1+:1 as of January 29, according to Scotia. ALB.PR.A is currently under Review-Negative by DBRS – the mass review announced October 24 has not yet come to resolution … on October 23 the NAVPU was $38.10; it is now $27.76 covering a $25 pref.

ALB.PR.A is currently included in the HIMIPref™ SplitShare index, somewhat to my chagrin.