T+1 Settlement is Coming!

February 15th, 2023

The SEC has announced:

The Securities and Exchange Commission today adopted rule changes to shorten the standard settlement cycle for most broker-dealer transactions in securities from two business days after the trade date (T+2) to one (T+1). The final rule is designed to benefit investors and reduce the credit, market, and liquidity risks in securities transactions faced by market participants.

“I support this rulemaking because it will reduce latency, lower risk, and promote efficiency as well as greater liquidity in the markets,” said SEC Chair Gary Gensler. “Today’s adoption addresses one of the four areas the staff recommended the Commission address in response to the meme stock events of 2021. Taken together, these amendments will make our market plumbing more resilient, timely, orderly, and efficient.”

In addition to shortening the standard settlement cycle, the final rules will improve the processing of institutional trades. Specifically, the final rules will require a broker-dealer to either enter into written agreements or establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure the completion of allocations, confirmations, and affirmations as soon as technologically practicable and no later than the end of trade date. The final rules also require registered investment advisers to make and keep records of the allocations, confirmations, and affirmations for certain securities transactions.

Further, the final rules add a new requirement to facilitate straight-through processing, which applies to certain types of clearing agencies that provide central matching services. The final rules will require central matching service providers to establish, implement, maintain, and enforce new policies and procedures reasonably designed to facilitate straight-through processing and require them to submit an annual report to the Commission that describes and quantifies progress with respect to straight-through processing.

The adopting release is published on SEC.gov and will be published in the Federal Register. The final rules will become effective 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. The compliance date for the final rules is May 28, 2024.

This is wonderful news, albeit of more interest to institutional investors and their fund managers than to retail. Back in my Canada bond trading days, it was unusual, but not unknown, for clients of the firm to have trades totalling 100-million per side (buy and sell) with a single dealer. Say the market has moved by a buck after trade time but before settlement. Then one side has a loss of 1-million odd, and the other side has a gain of about the same amount. Now say the dealer goes bust before the trade gets settled. The losing side of the trade would settle, but the winning side … maybe. When Confederation Life went bust in the nineties, if you had an outstanding FX trade that you were losing money on, it settled. If you were winning … get in line, buddy! So this is a risk that is reduced by faster settlement.

There are implications for retail, though … everybody remembers the Robin Hood / Meme Stock problem, when Robin Hood suddenly started getting very fussy about what orders they would accept … and although you’ll find lots of vitriol on the web directed at them by newbie retails, you’ll also learn that few of these guys understood the problem: the problem was that clearing corporations demand collateral to mitigate the settlement risk described above:

New York markets had just fired up, and the investing world was tuning in for Thursday’s episode of the continuing drama: Legions of Robinhood Markets investors versus hedge-fund Goliaths.

But within minutes, a shock wave invisible to the outside world rattled the mechanics of Wall Street — sending Robinhood rushing for more than $1 billion of additional cash. The stock market’s central clearing hub had demanded large sums of collateral from brokerages including Robinhood that for weeks had facilitated spectacular jumps in shares such as GameStop Corp.

The Silicon Valley venture with the wildly popular no-fee trading app came to a crossroads. It reined in the risk to itself by banning certain trades and unwinding client bets — igniting an outcry from customers and even U.S. political leaders. By that night, word was emerging that Robinhood had raised more than $1 billion from existing investors and drawn hundreds of millions more from bank credit lines to weather the storm.

The question is whether such critics will dig into the industry’s inner workings, where pressure mounted on Robinhood and other firms to limit certain trades. That would put a rare spotlight on arcane parts of the market designed to prevent catastrophe, such as the Depository Trust & Clearing Corp.

One key consideration for brokers, particularly around high-flying and volatile stocks like GameStop, is in the money they must put up with the DTCC while waiting a few days for stock transactions to settle. Those outlays, which behave like margin in a brokerage account, can create a cash crunch on volatile days, say when GameStop falls from $483 to $112 like it did at one point during Thursday’s session.

The trouble on Thursday began around 10 a.m., when after days of turbulence, the DTCC demanded significantly more collateral from member brokers, according to two people familiar with the matter.

A spokesman for the DTCC wouldn’t specify how much it required from specific firms but said that by the end of the day industrywide collateral requirements jumped to $33.5 billion, up from $26 billion.

Brokerage executives rushed to figure out how to come up with the funds. Robinhood’s reaction drew the most public attention, but the firm wasn’t alone in limiting trading of stocks such as GameStop and AMC Entertainment Holdings Inc.

In fact, Charles Schwab Corp.’s TD Ameritrade curbed transactions in both of those companies on Wednesday. Interactive Brokers Group Inc. and Morgan Stanley’s E*Trade took similar action Thursday.

So, faster settlement will alleviate, to a large degree, the amount of settlement risk there is in the system and, hopefully, reduce the chance of serious volatility freezing the markets.

There was a lot of self-congratulation. Chair Gary Gensler stated:

First, the amendments will shorten the standard settlement cycle by half, from two business days (“T+2”) to one business day (“T+1”). The amendments also will halve the settlement cycle for trades relating to initial public offerings, from T+4 to T+2. As they say, time is money. Halving these settlement cycles will reduce the amount of margin that counterparties need to place with the clearinghouse. This lowers risk in the system and frees up liquidity elsewhere in the market.

Now, that’s not to say this change will be new; in fact, this change simply brings us back to the T+1 settlement cycle our markets used up until the 1920s. It also aligns with the T+1 cycle used in the $24 trillion Treasury market.

Today’s adoption addresses one of the four areas the staff recommended the Commission address in response to the meme stock events of 2021. Further, the implementation for these amendments will be set to after Memorial Day weekend (May 28, 2024). This implementation comes more than three years after key industry members first proposed shortening the settlement cycle, and a year and a quarter from now, providing sufficient time in my view for the transition. Further easing the transition, the implementation date will occur during a three-day holiday weekend.

Commissioner Jaime Lizárraga stated:

Why does this matter to the investing public? Because buyers and sellers of securities will receive their cash and securities a day earlier under T+1 than they do currently. And because market participants can allocate their capital more quickly and efficiently. Based on the public comments to the proposal, these benefits accrue to retail investors in particular.

Reducing the current settlement time in half will alleviate some of the downsides of the current T+2 cycle, such as counterparty, market, liquidity, credit, and other risks. A longer settlement time also requires risk management tools, such as margin requirements, that carry significant costs. Shortening the settlement cycle not only helps reduce these risks and costs but lowers volatility and makes our markets more fair and efficient.

The risks of longer settlement times are not just theoretical. In January 2021, unprecedented price volatility in so-called “meme stocks” challenged many retail investors’ faith in our in financial markets. Clearing agencies in equities and options experienced record volumes cleared. In the face of high volume and volatility, market utilities had to issue significant margin calls. In reaction to these margin calls, certain brokers restricted trading in some, or all, of the meme stocks. According to media reports, at least one broker’s decisions to halt trading came at the peak of the market and infuriated many retail investors. Investors have filed approximately 50 class action lawsuits claiming substantial harm from this broker’s trading halt.

Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw stated (with lots of valuable footnotes):

Specifically, a shorter settlement cycle should reduce the number of outstanding unsettled trades, reduce clearing agency margin requirements, and allow investors quicker access to their securities and funds. Longer settlement periods, on the other hand, are associated with increased counterparty default risk, market risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, and overall systemic risk.[7]

Commenters were overwhelmingly in favor of shortening the settlement cycle.[8] We received supportive comments from a broad range of stakeholders, including individual investors, investor advocates, clearing agencies, and broker-dealers.[9] Some commenters raised concerns regarding the proposed changes related to the processing of institutional trades,[10] firm commitment offerings,[11] and security-based swaps,[12] and the final rule reflects certain changes from the proposal in response to those comments. A number of commenters also raised concerns about the implementation timeline, which has been extended by several months from the proposed date to facilitate a smooth transition.[13] The new compliance date would provide market participants more than fifteen months to prepare for the transition.[14]

The proposal also included a request for comment on the possibility of settling trades by the end of the trade date, or what we call “T+0.” Some commenters highlighted challenges relating to multi-lateral netting, securities lending practices, and other issues.[15] However, many others expressed support for an eventual move to T+0.[16] While it is clear that T+0 will entail greater operational and technological challenges than the move to T+1, I agree with commenters that such a move may be both desirable and feasible in the future, and I look forward to working with my colleagues and stakeholders toward that important goal.[17]

Commissioner Mark T. Uyeda was a little bitter (bolding added):

While the net benefits of a shorter settlement cycle are clear, T + 1 can potentially increase some operational risks. There will be less time to address errors within the process and, in some circumstances, less time to deal with trading entities that are suddenly confronting massive and unexpected trading losses within the settlement cycle timeframe. There is also less time for regulators to identify and freeze the potential proceeds from potential frauds, such as, insider trading and market manipulation, before those proceeds exit our jurisdiction. These arguments and considerations, however, do not ultimately weigh against shortening the settlement cycle, but they provide reason for ensuring readiness among market participants. This speaks to the implementation date.

Ensuring a smooth transition will take significant investment and systems changes as well as operational and computational testing among broker-dealers, clearing firms, investment advisers, custodians, payment systems, and so on. Detailed planning is required, as is process adjustment, organizational change, and changes in the relationships among market participants. There is asymmetry in terms of costs and benefits—a smooth transition would provide net benefits for investors and U.S. markets to be accrued over the long-term in the future. On the other hand, the downside of a rough, turbulent transition could be steep, and could induce substantial harm in the short-run. That asymmetry cautions us to provide sufficient time to ensure a smooth transition.

Many comment letters have emphasized the need for more time than the Commission proposed.[5] Many have pointed to the 2024 Labor Day weekend as the implementation date. It would have the added advantage that Canada is also moving forward with T + 1 around the same time. Instead, the Commission appears to be ready to adopt May 28, 2024 as the implementation date.[6] In my view, we are in an imprudent rush away from a sensible transition date and, for that reason, I am unable to support the final rule.

Commissioner Hester M. Peirce also complained about implementation (bolding added):

I support the plan to move to T+1, but do not support the proposed timeline for making this change. Shortening the settlement cycle is a way to remove some risk from our markets. Mandating that the change occur in May 2024, however, could pose risks of its own by forcing the transition before market participants are ready. I propose instead a September 3, 2024 implementation date. Let me explain why:

  • Although preferable to the proposed March 31, 2024 implementation date, the May 28, 2024 date is still too early. Shortening the settlement cycle by one business day is a big change with implications all across the market. We cannot afford a cavalier approach.
  • Many commenters called for a September 3, 2024 date to ensure that the transition would happen with minimal disruption to the markets.
  • Tuesday, September 3, 2024 is the first business day after the 3-day Labor Day weekend, and Canada, the only jurisdiction currently planning on moving with us to T+1, shares this 3-day weekend. The transition from T+3 to T+2 occurred successfully over Labor Day weekend in 2017.
  • This later date would give other foreign market participants the time to work out some of the challenges they will face from our transition to a shorter settlement cycle than they have in their markets.
  • The additional three months will allow more time for firm-specific and coordinated, industry-wide testing, which will make a smoother transition more likely.
  • The transition from T+2 to T+1 is likely to present numerous operational challenges—some of them more difficult than in the last transition—related to, among other things, pre- and post-trade processes, securities lending, foreign exchange transactions, and processing corporate actions.
  • The transition is happening at the same time the market is processing many other regulatory changes.

I do not have any questions for the staff, but do want to make one final plea to Chair Gensler. Why not adopt a September 3, 2024 compliance date? I will vote for the rule if you make this change.

February 14, 2023

February 14th, 2023

US inflation was complicated:

The price index was up 6.4 percent in January compared with a year earlier. That was a slight slowing from 6.5 percent in December, and is down notably from a peak of about 9 percent last summer. But compared with the previous month, prices climbed 0.4 percent after stripping out groceries and fuel — a rapid pace of growth that matched the increase in December.

The overall report shows that while the Federal Reserve has been receiving positive news on inflation, price increases are no longer relentlessly accelerating, the way they did for much of 2021 and the first half of 2022, it could be a long and bumpy road back to the 2 percent annual inflation gains that used to be normal.

Much of the inflation slowdown in recent months has come from a moderation in price increases for goods and commodities. After stripping those out, services inflation — which includes health care, restaurant meals, pedicures and other non-goods purchases — has remained unusually rapid and has shown little sign of slowing down.

That trend continued in January, with services prices excluding energy continuing to increase rapidly, partly owing to the jump in rental and other housing costs. A measure that Mr. Powell watches closely — one that tracks services and strips out housing in addition to food and gas — eased very slightly last month.

Monthly growth in food prices accelerated slightly in January, reversing a gradual decline seen in recent months, as the price of eggs, cookies and citrus fruits all rose.

Food prices grew 0.5 over the month, ticking up slightly compared with an increase of 0.4 percent in December. A price index for meats, poultry, fish and eggs increased in January, as did another for cereals and bakery products. An overall index for fruits and vegetables fell from the previous month, while an index for dairy products was unchanged.

The price of eggs was up 8.5 percent from the previous month, the Bureau of Labor Statistics said, as an outbreak of avian influenza around the United States continues to cause egg prices to surge. However, other measures, like a market report compiled by the Agriculture Department, show that the price of eggs has been dropping sharply in recent months. The average price of large eggs dropped from more than $5 a carton earlier this year to less than $3 in February, the department said.

And the New York Fed released their Underlying Inflation Gauge:

  • The UIG “full data set” measure for January is currently estimated at 5.1%, a 0.3 percentage point decrease from the current estimate of the previous month.
  • The “prices-only” measure for January is currently estimated at 5.1%, a 0.3 percentage point decrease from the current estimate of the previous month.
  • The twelve-month change in the January CPI was +6.4%, a 0.1 percentage point decrease from the previous month.
    • -For January 2023, trend CPI inflation is estimated to be in the 4.2% to 5.1% range, a similar range to December, with a 0.3 percentage point decrease of both its lower and upper bound.
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0743 % 2,587.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0743 % 4,962.1
Floater 8.71 % 8.90 % 61,128 10.41 2 0.0743 % 2,859.7
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0119 % 3,432.3
SplitShare 4.90 % 6.46 % 58,029 2.77 7 -0.0119 % 4,098.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0119 % 3,198.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2249 % 2,861.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.96 % 6.02 % 70,738 13.83 37 -0.2249 % 3,120.7
FixedReset Disc 5.30 % 7.31 % 88,434 12.28 59 0.2584 % 2,300.4
Insurance Straight 5.83 % 5.97 % 92,753 13.89 20 -0.2022 % 3,083.0
FloatingReset 9.72 % 10.24 % 35,613 9.27 2 0.1877 % 2,599.7
FixedReset Prem 6.35 % 6.37 % 198,741 4.03 2 1.1769 % 2,391.4
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2584 % 2,351.5
FixedReset Ins Non 5.25 % 7.04 % 49,324 12.48 14 0.7094 % 2,460.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
CCS.PR.C Insurance Straight -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 20.83
Evaluated at bid price : 20.83
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 19.39
Evaluated at bid price : 19.39
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
BN.PF.B FixedReset Disc -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 17.68
Evaluated at bid price : 17.68
Bid-YTW : 8.39 %
MFC.PR.Q FixedReset Ins Non 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 21.16
Evaluated at bid price : 21.16
Bid-YTW : 7.04 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset Ins Non 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 18.09
Evaluated at bid price : 18.09
Bid-YTW : 7.65 %
PVS.PR.H SplitShare 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2027-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
IFC.PR.G FixedReset Ins Non 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 21.39
Evaluated at bid price : 21.67
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset Disc 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 11.85
Evaluated at bid price : 11.85
Bid-YTW : 8.72 %
GWO.PR.T Insurance Straight 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 21.67
Evaluated at bid price : 21.93
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Disc 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 18.23
Evaluated at bid price : 18.23
Bid-YTW : 7.47 %
BIP.PR.F FixedReset Disc 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 21.53
Evaluated at bid price : 21.53
Bid-YTW : 7.29 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Ins Non 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 19.73
Evaluated at bid price : 19.73
Bid-YTW : 7.10 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset Ins Non 2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 13.52
Evaluated at bid price : 13.52
Bid-YTW : 7.93 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Ins Non 2.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 13.50
Evaluated at bid price : 13.50
Bid-YTW : 7.84 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset Disc 2.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 12.24
Evaluated at bid price : 12.24
Bid-YTW : 8.69 %
BIK.PR.A FixedReset Prem 2.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2024-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
BN.PR.X FixedReset Disc 2.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 7.44 %
BN.PF.A FixedReset Disc 3.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 7.31 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
IAF.PR.I FixedReset Ins Non 189,498 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 22.77
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
CM.PR.S FixedReset Disc 104,800 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 6.43 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset Disc 92,000 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 7.49 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset Disc 71,610 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 18.31
Evaluated at bid price : 18.31
Bid-YTW : 7.39 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset Ins Non 49,750 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 13.52
Evaluated at bid price : 13.52
Bid-YTW : 7.93 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset Disc 49,020 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 17.95
Evaluated at bid price : 17.95
Bid-YTW : 7.51 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset Disc Quote: 14.64 – 15.64
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.5822

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 14.64
Evaluated at bid price : 14.64
Bid-YTW : 8.67 %

TD.PF.J FixedReset Disc Quote: 23.02 – 23.85
Spot Rate : 0.8300
Average : 0.5511

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 22.28
Evaluated at bid price : 23.02
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 19.39 – 20.05
Spot Rate : 0.6600
Average : 0.4831

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 19.39
Evaluated at bid price : 19.39
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %

MFC.PR.B Insurance Straight Quote: 20.55 – 21.75
Spot Rate : 1.2000
Average : 1.0402

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 20.55
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %

BN.PR.R FixedReset Disc Quote: 15.17 – 16.10
Spot Rate : 0.9300
Average : 0.7759

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 15.17
Evaluated at bid price : 15.17
Bid-YTW : 8.42 %

MFC.PR.M FixedReset Ins Non Quote: 18.09 – 18.80
Spot Rate : 0.7100
Average : 0.5737

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-14
Maturity Price : 18.09
Evaluated at bid price : 18.09
Bid-YTW : 7.65 %

DBRS: AQN Emerges Unscathed from Review-Developing

February 14th, 2023

Way back in October, 2021, DBRS announced:

placed all the ratings of Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. (APUC or the Company) Under Review with Developing Implications. On October 26, 2021, APUC announced an agreement with American Electric Power (AEP) to acquire Kentucky Power Company (Kentucky Power) and AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc. (Kentucky TransCo) for a total purchase price of USD 2.846 billion, including the assumption of approximately USD 1.221 billion in debt (the Acquisition). Kentucky Power is a state rate-regulated electricity generation, distribution, and transmission utility operating within the Commonwealth of Kentucky, serving approximately 228,000 active customer connections and operating under a cost-of-service framework. Kentucky TransCo is an electricity transmission business operating in the Kentucky portion of the transmission infrastructure that is part of the Pennsylvania–New Jersey–Maryland regional transmission organization. The Acquisition is expected to close mid-2022, subject to regulatory approvals.

DBRS Morningstar views this acquisition as a positive development from a business risk perspective because of the following factors: (1) a significant increase in APUC’s low-risk regulated assets with a total consolidated rate base expected to increase to approximately USD 9 billion from USD 6.8 billion, which would reflect a 32% increase upon closing. After the completion of the Acquisition, DBRS Morningstar expects APUC to generate over 75% (currently 66%) of its consolidated cash flow from stable regulated operations and the remainder from long-term contracted nonregulated generation; (2) an expected improvement in jurisdictional diversification with the addition of Kentucky and the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Kentucky has a reasonable cost-of-service regulatory framework with acceleration of capital recovery and a reasonably regulated return on equity; (3) an expected improvement of capital expenditure planning, which should add more flexibility with the Acquisition.

Notwithstanding these potentially positive impacts, the Under Review with Developing Implications rating action reflects some uncertainties associated with APUC’s financing plan. To finance the Acquisition, APUC intends to issue up to USD 750 million common equity through a bought deal with the banks. APUC expects to finance the remainder in the amount of approximately USD 875 million with a combination of hybrid debt financing, equity units, and proceeds from the sale of the non-regulated assets/investments. DBRS Morningstar has reviewed APUC’s financing plan and is of the view that its current plan (if the hybrid debt is issued out of APUC) could increase APUC’s nonconsolidated leverage. The magnitude of the increase will depend on the amount of the hybrid debt to be issued. DBRS Morningstar notes that if APUC’s nonconsolidated debt-to-capital (as calculated by DBRS Morningstar) rises significantly above 20% following the issuance of the hybrid debt, then a negative rating action could be taken.

They have now announced:

DBRS Limited (DBRS Morningstar) removed the Issuer Rating and Preferred Shares rating of Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. (APUC or the Company) from Under Review with Developing Implications and confirmed the ratings at BBB and Pfd-3, respectively. Both trends are Stable. The rating confirmations reflect DBRS Morningstar’s expectations that the proposed acquisition of Kentucky Power Company and AEP Kentucky Transmission Company, Inc. from American Electric Power (AEP) (collectively, KPC Acquisition) will close in the first half of 2023, and the financing of the KPC Acquisition will be implemented as currently planned. Following APUC’s January 2023 investor call and the latest information provided by the Company, DBRS Morningstar believes that even if the KPC Acquisition does not close, DBRS Morningstar does not expect a materially negative impact on APUC’s current credit profile.

DBRS Morningstar estimates EBITDA contribution from the low-risk regulated utility group accounted for approximately 70% of APUC’s consolidated 2022 EBITDA and the remainder from the power renewable generation group. Following the KPC Acquisition, DBRS Morningstar expects EBITDA contribution from the regulated utility group to increase to between 75% and 80%, significantly strengthening the business risk profile for APUC. Based on APUC’s current financing plan over the next few years, including the financing of the KPC Acquisition, DBRS Morningstar expects APUC to maintain solid consolidated metrics, as well as its nonconsolidated debt-to-capital ratio at a reasonable level (at around 20%) on a sustainable basis. DBRS Morningstar, however, could take a negative rating action if (1) APUC’s consolidated metrics weaken materially from the current level, or (2) its nonconsolidated debt-to-capital ratio increases significantly from the expected levels on a sustained basis, or (3) there is a significant increase in consolidated business risk profile.

Affected issues are AQN.PR.A and AQN.PR.D.

February 13, 2023

February 13th, 2023

The New York Fed has released the latest Survey of Consumer Expectations:

The main findings from the January 2023 Survey are:

Inflation

  • * Median inflation expectations remained unchanged at the year-ahead horizon, decreased by 0.3 percentage point at the three-year-ahead horizon, and increased by 0.1 percentage point at the five-year-ahead horizon, to 5.0%, 2.7% and 2.5%, respectively.
  • * Median inflation uncertainty—or the uncertainty expressed regarding future inflation outcomes—remained unchanged at the one-year horizon but increased slightly at the three- and five-year horizons.
  • * Median home price growth expectations declined by 0.2 percentage point to 1. 1% in January, the second lowest reading since May 2020. The decrease was more pronounced among respondents who are older than 60 and respondents who live in the Northeast.
  • * Median year-ahead expected price changes increased by 1.0 percentage point for gas (to 5.1%), 1.4 percentage point for food (to 9.0%), and 0.1 percentage point for the cost of college education (to 9.3%) . The median expected change in the cost of rent and medical care remained unchanged at 9.6% and 9.7% , respectively.

Labor Market

  • * Median one-year-ahead expected earnings growth remained unchanged at 3.0% in January. The series has been moving between a narrow range of 2.8% to 3.0% since September 2021.

I have attracted some opprobrium for my habit of referring to those whose investment strategies have been noisily inconvenienced by the cancellation of the RRB programme as ‘rich people’. I should correct myself and refer to them as ‘whining, privileged and oblivious rich people’:

A quarter of Canadians wouldn’t be able to come up with $500 to cover an unexpected expense, according to a new Statistics Canada survey that also found people who are younger and racialized report higher levels of financial stress than those who are older and non-racialized.

Worry about housing-related expenses, including rent, appeared to be driving the divide. More than half of survey respondents between the ages of 15 and 34 said they were “very concerned” that they would be unable to keep up with housing costs, compared with just over a quarter of respondents aged 65 and over.

Nearly three quarters of Black respondents, and 65 per cent of South Asians, shared the same sentiment, compared with less than 40 per cent of non-racialized respondents.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4856 % 2,585.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4856 % 4,958.4
Floater 8.72 % 8.88 % 49,138 10.43 2 0.4856 % 2,857.5
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1076 % 3,432.7
SplitShare 4.90 % 6.42 % 57,228 2.77 7 0.1076 % 4,099.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1076 % 3,198.5
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4011 % 2,868.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.94 % 6.01 % 71,484 13.84 37 0.4011 % 3,127.7
FixedReset Disc 5.32 % 7.37 % 88,129 12.27 59 -0.0209 % 2,294.5
Insurance Straight 5.81 % 6.00 % 85,816 13.83 20 -0.1245 % 3,089.3
FloatingReset 9.74 % 10.25 % 34,317 9.27 2 0.4083 % 2,594.9
FixedReset Prem 6.42 % 6.33 % 197,191 4.03 2 0.7233 % 2,363.6
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0209 % 2,345.4
FixedReset Ins Non 5.28 % 7.12 % 51,117 12.45 14 0.1125 % 2,442.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CM.PR.Q FixedReset Disc -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 7.25 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset Disc -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 20.01
Evaluated at bid price : 20.01
Bid-YTW : 6.99 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset Disc -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 11.69
Evaluated at bid price : 11.69
Bid-YTW : 8.82 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset Disc -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 18.65
Evaluated at bid price : 18.65
Bid-YTW : 8.66 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset Ins Non -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 13.25
Evaluated at bid price : 13.25
Bid-YTW : 8.08 %
RY.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 22.52
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
BN.PF.I FixedReset Disc -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 22.33
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 7.35 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Ins Non -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 7.22 %
GWO.PR.L Insurance Straight -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
IFC.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 21.79
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
GWO.PR.H Insurance Straight 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset Ins Non 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 15.82
Evaluated at bid price : 15.82
Bid-YTW : 7.78 %
BN.PF.B FixedReset Disc 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 17.87
Evaluated at bid price : 17.87
Bid-YTW : 8.30 %
BIK.PR.A FixedReset Prem 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 23.91
Evaluated at bid price : 24.37
Bid-YTW : 7.47 %
MIC.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 19.50
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset Ins Non 2.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 3.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
CU.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 10.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 22.53
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset Ins Non 53,300 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 18.40
Evaluated at bid price : 18.40
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset Disc 30,800 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 14.60
Evaluated at bid price : 14.60
Bid-YTW : 8.69 %
BN.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 21,400 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 19.35
Evaluated at bid price : 19.35
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset Disc 19,700 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 18.29
Evaluated at bid price : 18.29
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset Disc 14,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 17.96
Evaluated at bid price : 17.96
Bid-YTW : 7.51 %
CM.PR.S FixedReset Disc 13,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 22.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.76
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
There were 6 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.B Insurance Straight Quote: 20.53 – 21.87
Spot Rate : 1.3400
Average : 0.8650

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 20.53
Evaluated at bid price : 20.53
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %

PWF.PF.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 19.35 – 20.44
Spot Rate : 1.0900
Average : 0.7199

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 19.35
Evaluated at bid price : 19.35
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %

MFC.PR.N FixedReset Ins Non Quote: 17.40 – 18.40
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.7385

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 17.40
Evaluated at bid price : 17.40
Bid-YTW : 7.80 %

CM.PR.Q FixedReset Disc Quote: 19.40 – 20.50
Spot Rate : 1.1000
Average : 0.8886

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 7.25 %

TD.PF.L FixedReset Disc Quote: 24.00 – 24.57
Spot Rate : 0.5700
Average : 0.3662

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 23.52
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %

BN.PF.F FixedReset Disc Quote: 18.15 – 18.80
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.4472

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-13
Maturity Price : 18.15
Evaluated at bid price : 18.15
Bid-YTW : 8.30 %

February PrefLetter Released!

February 12th, 2023

The February, 2023, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “previous” edition will refer to the February, 2023, issue, while the “next” edition will be the March, 2023, issue scheduled to be prepared as of the close March 10, and emailed to subscribers prior to the market-opening on March 13. Prefletter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: There have been problems lately with corporate eMail protection systems that substitute “safe” links for the links sent in the eMails; the problem being that the “safe” links do not work and an error is generated by my software. To avoid possible problems and delays, please subscribe through an eMail account that is not “protected” by such software.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

Note: Assiduous Reader DG informs me:

In case you have any other Apple users: you need to install a free App from the apple store called “FileApp”. It comes with it’s own tutorial and allows you to download and save a PDF file.

However, Assiduous Reader Adrian informs me in the comments to the January 2015 release:

Some nitpicking for DG:
FileApp costs $1.19 in the Apple Store.

But Adrian2 now advises:

Well, as of now, FileApp is free (again?).

DRIP On RY Preferreds

February 12th, 2023

This is old (2022-11-30), but I realized that I allude to this in PrefLetter but not on PrefBlog, so here you go:

Royal Bank of Canada has announced (on 2022-11-30):

In lieu of receiving their dividends in cash, holders of the Bank’s common and preferred shares who reside in Canada and holders of common shares who reside in the United States may elect to have their dividends reinvested in additional common shares of the Bank, in accordance with the Bank’s Dividend Reinvestment Plan (the “Plan”).

Under the Plan, the Bank is entitled to determine whether the additional common shares are purchased in the secondary market by the agent for the Plan or issued from treasury. For the February 24, 2023 dividend and for future dividends declared until further notice, the Bank has decided to issue additional shares from treasury at a 2% discount from the Average Market Price (as defined in the Plan). Most recently, the common shares received by participants under the Plan were purchased in the secondary market with no discount from the Average Market Price.

Shareholders who currently participate in the Plan and who continue to do so on the February 24, 2023 payment date will automatically have the discount applied to the reinvestment of their dividends. Registered holders of record residing in Canada or the United States who wish to participate in the Plan can obtain an enrollment form from the Bank’s Plan agent, Computershare Trust Company of Canada, from their website at www.investorcentre.com/rbc, or by calling 1-866-586-7635. Eligible beneficial or non-registered holders of the Bank’s common and preferred shares must contact their financial institution or broker if they wish to participate in the Plan.

In order to participate in the Plan in time for the February 24, 2023 dividend payment date, enrollment forms from registered holders must be received by Computershare Trust Company of Canada at 100 University Avenue, 8th Floor, Toronto, Ontario M5J 2Y1 before the close of business on January 26, 2023. All shareholders considering enrollment in the Plan should carefully review the terms of the Plan and consult with their advisors as to the implications of enrollment in the Plan.

Registered participants in the Plan who would prefer to receive a cash dividend rather than reinvest their dividends on and after February 24, 2023 may terminate their participation in the Plan by delivering written notice to Computershare Trust Company of Canada at the above address by no later than January 26, 2023. Beneficial or non-registered participants in the Plan should contact their financial institution or broker in advance of January 26, 2023 for instructions on how to terminate participation in the Plan so that the February 24, 2023 dividend is not reinvested in common shares.

A 2% discount on the common may not sound like much, but it’s better than a kick in the pants!

The following RY preferreds are outstanding: RY.PR.H, RY.PR.J, RY.PR.M, RY.PR.N, RY.PR.O, RY.PR.S and RY.PR.Z.

TIPS Liqudity

February 10th, 2023

Here’s an interesting paper partly about TIPS liqudity, titled The Microstructure of the TIPS Market by Michael J. Fleming and Neel Krishnan:

  • • The potential advantages of Treasury inflationprotected securities have yet to be fully realized, mainly because TIPS are not as liquid as nominal Treasury securities.
  • • The less liquid nature of TIPS may adversely affect prices relative to those of nominal securities, offsetting the benefits of TIPS having no inflation risk.
  • • A study of TIPS, using novel tick data from the interdealer market, provides new evidence on the liquidity of the securities and how liquidity differs from that of nominal securities.
  • • Analysis of various liquidity measures suggests that trading activity and the incidence of posted quotes may be better cross-sectional gauges of TIPS liquidity than bid-ask spreads or quoted depth.
  • • Differences in intraday trading patterns and announcement effects between TIPS and nominal securities likely reflect the different use, ownership, and cash-flow attributes of the securities


These potential benefits have not been fully realized, mainly because TIPS lack market liquidity compared with nominal securities.{2} This lack of liquidity is thought to result in TIPS yields having a liquidity premium relative to nominal securities, which offsets the inflation risk premium.{3} Similarly, the presence of a liquidity premium in TIPS yields complicates inferences of inflation expectations, particularly if the premium changes over time. However, despite the importance of TIPS liquidity and the market’s large size ($728 billion as of November 30, 2011), there has been virtually no quantitative evidence on the securities’ liquidity.

Footnote 2: Market liquidity is defined here as the cost of executing a trade, which can depend on the trade’s size, timing, venue, and counterparties. It is often gauged by various measures, including the bid-ask spread, the price impact of trades, quoted depth, and trading activity.

Footnote 3: D’Amico, Kim, and Wei (2008) estimate that the liquidity premium was about 1 percent in the early years of the TIPS program. Pflueger and Viceira (2011) find that the liquidity premium is around 40 to 70 basis points during normal times, but was more during the early years of TIPS and during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Sack and Elsasser (2004) argue that TIPS have not reduced the Treasury’s financing costs because of several factors, including lower liquidity. Roush (2008) finds that TIPS have saved the government money, except during the early years of the program. Dudley, Roush, and Ezer (2009) show that the ex ante costs of TIPS issuance are about equal to the costs of nominal securities issuance.

Our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses institutional features of the market for TIPS. In Section 3, we describe the tick data used in our empirical analysis. Section 4 reports our empirical results, including trading activity by sector, the liquidity of on-the-run and off-the-run securities, price impact estimates, intraday patterns in trading activity and liquidity, and the effects of major announcements. Section 5 concludes.

Our analysis of the TIPS market identifies several microstructure features also present in the nominal Treasury securities market, but several unique features as well. As in the nominal market, there is a marked difference in trading activity between on-the-run and off-the-run TIPS, as trading drops sharply when securities go off the run. In contrast to the nominal market, there is little difference in bid-ask spreads or quoted depth between these securities, but there is a difference in the incidence of posted quotes. The results suggest that trading activity and quote incidence may be better crosssectional measures of liquidity in the TIPS market than bid-ask spreads or quoted depth.

Intraday patterns of trading activity are broadly similar in the TIPS and nominal markets, but TIPS activity peaks somewhat later, likely indicating differences in the use and ownership of these securities. Announcement effects are also different, probably reflecting the types of information most important to the particular securities. The employment report is the most important announcement in the nominal market, but it elicits relatively little response in the TIPS market in terms of trading activity. In contrast, announcements of the consumer price index and the results of TIPS auctions precipitate significant increases in TIPS trading activity, likely indicating these announcements’ particular importance to TIPS valuation

There’s also Trading Activity and Price Transparency in the Inflation Swap Market by Michael J. Fleming and John R. Sporn:

  • • Liquidity and price transparency in derivatives markets have become increasingly important concerns, yet a lack of transaction data has made it hard to fully understand how the inflation swap and other derivatives markets work.
  • • This study uses novel transaction data to shed light on trading activity and price transparency in the rapidly growing U.S. inflation swap market.
  • • It reveals that the market is reasonably liquid and transparent, despite its over-the-counter nature and low level of trading activity. Transaction prices are typically near widely available end-of-day quoted prices and realized bid-ask spreads are modest.
  • • The authors also identify concentrations of activity in certain tenors and trade sizes and among certain market participants as well as point to various attributes that explain trade sizes and price deviations.


Several recent studies have compared the inflation swap rate with breakeven inflation as calculated from Treasury inflationprotected securities (TIPS) and nominal Treasury bonds.1 The two market-based measures of expected inflation should be equal in the absence of market frictions. In practice, inflation swap rates are almost always higher, with the spread exceeding 100 basis points during the recent financial crisis.

Our data set contains 144 U.S. dollar zero-coupon inflation swap transactions, or an average of 2.2 transactions over the 65 trading days in our sample.9 Daily notional trading volume is estimated to average $65 million. Three-quarters (108/144) of the transactions are new trades, 24 percent (35/144) are assignments of existing transactions (whereby one counterparty to a swap steps out of the deal and assigns its position to a new counterparty), and 1 percent (1/144) are cancelations. One new transaction has a forward start date, for which the accrual period begins two years after the trade date, with the remaining 107 new transactions starting two or three business days after the trade date.

We also identify a concentration of activity among certain market participants. In particular, 54 percent (78/144) of our trades are between G14 dealers, 39 percent (56/144) are between G14 dealers and customers, and 7 percent (10/144) are between customers. Of the new trades between G14 dealers and customers, the G14 dealer receives fixed 63 percent (19/30) of the time and pays fixed 37 percent (11/30) of the time.11 New trades in which dealers receive fixed are larger, so that dealers receive fixed for 81 percent of new contract volume. That is, dealers are largely paying inflation and receiving fixed in their interactions with customers.

Our analysis of a novel transaction data set uncovers relatively few trades—just over two per day –in the U.S. zero-coupon inflation swap market. Trade sizes, however, are large, averaging almost $30 million. Sizes are generally larger for new trades, especially if they are bulk and allocated across subaccounts, and tend to decrease with contract tenor. We also identify concentrations of activity—with 45 percent of trades at the ten-year tenor, and 36 percent of all trades (and 48 percent of new ones) for a notional amount of $25 million. Over half the trades (54 percent) are between G14 dealers, 39 percent are between G14 dealers and other market participants, and 7 percent are between other market participants. We identify just eighteen market participants during our study’s sample period, made up of nine G14 dealers and nine other market participants.

Despite the low level of activity in this over-the-counter market, we find that transaction prices are quite close to widely available end-of-day quoted prices. The differential between transaction prices and end-of-day quoted prices tends to decrease with tenor and increase with trade size and for customer trades. By comparing trades for which customers pay fixed with trades for which they receive fixed, we are able to infer a realized bid-ask spread for customers of 3 basis points, which is consistent with the quoted bid-ask spreads reported by dealers.

In sum, the U.S. inflation swap market appears reasonably liquid and transparent despite the market’s over-the-counter nature and modest activity. This likely reflects the fact that the market is part of a larger market for transferring inflation risk that includes TIPS and nominal Treasury securities. As a result, inflation swap positions can be hedged quickly and with low transaction costs using other instruments, and prices of these other instruments can be used to efficiently price inflation swaps, despite modest swap activity

Not exactly the world’s biggest market! I looked up inflation swaps because I was interested in the question “Who the hell pays inflation”, which came to mind due to this article in the Globe, The government ditched inflation-protected bonds – companies should start issuing their own by JOHN H. COCHRANE AND JON HARTLEY:

If the government won’t do it, corporations, banks and financial institutions should issue these bonds themselves rather than just complain. Not every asset must be provided by the government.

If the government won’t do it, however, there is no reason that the government’s critics can’t issue them. Companies can issue real return bonds, as they already issue U.S. dollar bonds. Banks can offer real return accounts and certificates of deposit.

If the government steps out of the market, there’s all the more demand for private issuers to step in. Pension funds desperate to replace vanishing inflation-indexed government bonds are natural clients. Company profits rise and fall with inflation, so they have a natural incentive to issue bonds whose payments rise and fall with inflation. Even mortgage rates could rise and fall with an index of wages.

Why not? Broadly, this reluctance seems one more symptom of an overleveraged, overregulated, government-dependent and not very competitive or innovative banking and financial system. Banks and other financial institutions only want to issue or expand a new product if they can quickly lay off the risk onto the government, and earn steady fees. The model of issuing equity to bear risk and then offering a profitable innovative product to consumers is too out of fashion.

Frankly, I thought the article was naive, but thought: “Who the hell would issue these things? Who’s got a natural hedge against inflation that they might want to offload? Assuming they can recover the ultra-massive liquidity premium there’s gonna be on a, say, 1-billion long-term linker issue from a corporation, that is.” All I could think of was utility companies who have long-term assets currently financed by long-term nominal bonds, with the assets producing commodity-linked revenue. Maybe they could finance with linkers instead? Maybe pipelines? So, I started looking for information on inflation swaps …

I can’t answer the question definitively. The authors of the swaps paper didn’t investigate where the open interest is lodged. But there is enough information in the paper that I’m willing to bet a nickel (a full nickel, mind you, not just a few pennies) that it’s the dealers. The dealers will pay inflation and they buy TIPS to hedge. BORRRRRRR-ING! And it doesn’t work without government-issued linkers.

February 10, 2023

February 10th, 2023

Jobs, jobs, jobs!:

The labour market added 150,000 positions last month, following a gain of roughly 69,000 jobs in December, Statistics Canada said in a report published Friday. Financial analysts were expecting an increase of 15,000. The unemployment rate held steady at 5 per cent.

The hiring surge comes a week after the United States reported a gain of 517,000 positions in January, an outsized increase that also surprised analysts.

By now, many economists projected that Canada would be mired in the early weeks of a mild recession. However, Friday’s report shows that employers are continuing to add to their headcounts, despite the potential stress caused by sharply higher borrowing rates.

Friday’s report pointed to strength in various parts of the labour market. Jobs with full-time hours increased by 121,000 in January, while the private sector drove a gain of 115,000 positions.

After several months of losses, retail and wholesale trade jumped by 59,000 jobs, the largest gain by industry. Health care and social assistance rose by 40,000.

The labour market is drawing plenty of new participants. In January, an additional 153,000 people joined the labour force – meaning, they either took jobs or are actively looking for one. The participation rate is increasing in most major demographic groups.

Average hourly wages rose 4.5 per cent over the past year, down from 4.8 per cent in December. However, the year-over-year comparison was partially a reflection of higher wages in January, 2022, when many lower-paid service workers were temporarily laid off as the Omicron variant of COVID-19 led to a spike of infections.

Liquidity is never important to retail … until it is:

Certain alternative investment funds are facing elevated redemption demands from retail investors — a development that poses possible regulatory and reputational risks to alt fund managers, if not an operational challenge, says Fitch Ratings.

In a new report, the rating agency said certain alt investment vehicles known as “perpetual non-traded” funds (typically REITs or business development corporations) have faced increased redemption requests from investors in recent months.

These vehicles, which aren’t publicly traded and so have no public liquidity, cap redemptions to preserve assets and fund managers’ fee revenues. Typically, funds cap redemptions at 2% of their net asset value per month, or 5% per quarter, it noted.

Recently, several funds have invoked their redemption limits after increased demands from investors hit their pre-determined thresholds, Fitch reported.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2246 % 2,572.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2246 % 4,934.4
Floater 8.76 % 8.93 % 49,878 10.39 2 0.2246 % 2,843.7
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0359 % 3,429.0
SplitShare 4.90 % 6.43 % 57,370 2.78 7 -0.0359 % 4,095.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0359 % 3,195.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5495 % 2,856.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.97 % 6.03 % 74,063 13.85 37 -0.5495 % 3,115.2
FixedReset Disc 5.31 % 7.35 % 85,751 12.34 59 -0.2516 % 2,295.0
Insurance Straight 5.81 % 6.00 % 86,599 13.86 20 -0.3160 % 3,093.1
FloatingReset 9.78 % 10.33 % 35,718 9.22 2 0.6639 % 2,584.3
FixedReset Prem 6.47 % 6.36 % 200,197 4.04 2 -2.0276 % 2,346.6
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2516 % 2,345.9
FixedReset Ins Non 5.29 % 7.14 % 51,029 12.44 14 0.6130 % 2,440.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -4.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 20.21
Evaluated at bid price : 20.21
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
BIK.PR.A FixedReset Prem -3.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 23.55
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 7.56 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -3.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Disc -1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 18.15
Evaluated at bid price : 18.15
Bid-YTW : 7.63 %
BN.PR.X FixedReset Disc -1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 16.59
Evaluated at bid price : 16.59
Bid-YTW : 7.61 %
BN.PR.T FixedReset Disc -1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 15.60
Evaluated at bid price : 15.60
Bid-YTW : 8.31 %
BN.PR.R FixedReset Disc -1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 15.15
Evaluated at bid price : 15.15
Bid-YTW : 8.42 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 19.36
Evaluated at bid price : 19.36
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset Disc -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 20.28
Evaluated at bid price : 20.28
Bid-YTW : 6.90 %
TD.PF.E FixedReset Disc -1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 20.18
Evaluated at bid price : 20.18
Bid-YTW : 7.07 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset Disc -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 12.07
Evaluated at bid price : 12.07
Bid-YTW : 8.79 %
IFC.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 21.56
Evaluated at bid price : 21.87
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
BIP.PR.F FixedReset Disc -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 21.20
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %
CCS.PR.C Insurance Straight -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 21.02
Evaluated at bid price : 21.02
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
BN.PF.B FixedReset Disc -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 17.64
Evaluated at bid price : 17.64
Bid-YTW : 8.41 %
BIP.PR.B FixedReset Disc -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2025-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 7.35 %
GWO.PR.H Insurance Straight -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 20.52
Evaluated at bid price : 20.52
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 22.21
Evaluated at bid price : 22.48
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset Disc -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 18.29
Evaluated at bid price : 18.29
Bid-YTW : 7.48 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset Ins Non 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 13.40
Evaluated at bid price : 13.40
Bid-YTW : 7.99 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Ins Non 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 7.14 %
MFC.PR.Q FixedReset Ins Non 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 20.80
Evaluated at bid price : 20.80
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
BNS.PR.I FixedReset Disc 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 21.15
Evaluated at bid price : 21.15
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset Disc 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 19.68
Evaluated at bid price : 19.68
Bid-YTW : 7.14 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset Disc 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 18.88
Evaluated at bid price : 18.88
Bid-YTW : 8.56 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset 1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 15.77
Evaluated at bid price : 15.77
Bid-YTW : 9.68 %
IAF.PR.I FixedReset Ins Non 2.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 22.61
Evaluated at bid price : 23.65
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset Disc 4.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 13.65
Evaluated at bid price : 13.65
Bid-YTW : 7.95 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.L FixedReset Disc 77,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 23.58
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset Ins Non 42,388 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 12.73
Evaluated at bid price : 12.73
Bid-YTW : 8.00 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset Disc 33,300 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 18.02
Evaluated at bid price : 18.02
Bid-YTW : 7.48 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset Disc 32,200 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 20.10
Evaluated at bid price : 20.10
Bid-YTW : 7.04 %
IFC.PR.E Insurance Straight 25,000 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 21.69
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset Disc 23,700 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 14.56
Evaluated at bid price : 14.56
Bid-YTW : 8.71 %
There were 6 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.21 – 21.20
Spot Rate : 0.9900
Average : 0.6160

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 20.21
Evaluated at bid price : 20.21
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %

CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 19.00 – 20.00
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.6553

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %

EIT.PR.A SplitShare Quote: 24.78 – 25.57
Spot Rate : 0.7900
Average : 0.4532

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2024-03-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.78
Bid-YTW : 6.41 %

BIK.PR.A FixedReset Prem Quote: 24.05 – 24.97
Spot Rate : 0.9200
Average : 0.6382

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 23.55
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 7.56 %

IFC.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.87 – 22.55
Spot Rate : 0.6800
Average : 0.5045

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-10
Maturity Price : 21.56
Evaluated at bid price : 21.87
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %

PVS.PR.K SplitShare Quote: 22.75 – 23.25
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3434

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2029-05-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %

February 9, 2023

February 9th, 2023
HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1868 % 2,566.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1868 % 4,923.4
Floater 8.78 % 8.93 % 51,675 10.40 2 -0.1868 % 2,837.4
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0120 % 3,430.2
SplitShare 4.90 % 6.55 % 55,405 2.78 7 0.0120 % 4,096.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0120 % 3,196.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3386 % 2,872.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.94 % 6.01 % 76,673 13.85 37 0.3386 % 3,132.5
FixedReset Disc 5.30 % 7.15 % 89,297 12.44 59 0.0706 % 2,300.7
Insurance Straight 5.79 % 5.96 % 89,717 13.93 20 0.6693 % 3,102.9
FloatingReset 9.75 % 10.19 % 35,957 9.33 2 -0.2523 % 2,567.3
FixedReset Prem 6.34 % 6.27 % 194,184 4.04 2 -0.0590 % 2,395.2
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0706 % 2,351.8
FixedReset Ins Non 5.32 % 7.12 % 51,236 12.56 14 0.3291 % 2,425.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.I FixedReset Disc -2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 20.87
Evaluated at bid price : 20.87
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset Disc -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 7.13 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset Disc -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 18.40
Evaluated at bid price : 18.40
Bid-YTW : 7.22 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset Disc -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 18.62
Evaluated at bid price : 18.62
Bid-YTW : 7.29 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 15.50
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 9.75 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset Disc -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 18.59
Evaluated at bid price : 18.59
Bid-YTW : 8.56 %
BN.PF.B FixedReset Disc 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 17.88
Evaluated at bid price : 17.88
Bid-YTW : 8.15 %
BIP.PR.E FixedReset Disc 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.12
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 6.90 %
RY.PR.M FixedReset Disc 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
BIP.PR.B FixedReset Disc 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2025-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 6.86 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset Ins Non 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.56
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 6.74 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset Ins Non 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.72
Evaluated at bid price : 23.82
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %
BN.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 20.12
Evaluated at bid price : 20.12
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
GWO.PR.S Insurance Straight 2.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.80
Evaluated at bid price : 22.05
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 19.63
Evaluated at bid price : 19.63
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
BIP.PR.F FixedReset Disc 3.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 7.17 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 3.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
MFC.PR.C Insurance Straight 9.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 20.29
Evaluated at bid price : 20.29
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
NA.PR.S FixedReset Disc 48,650 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 18.79
Evaluated at bid price : 18.79
Bid-YTW : 7.34 %
RY.PR.M FixedReset Disc 42,600 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset Ins Non 38,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 12.66
Evaluated at bid price : 12.66
Bid-YTW : 7.88 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Disc 33,675 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 18.51
Evaluated at bid price : 18.51
Bid-YTW : 7.33 %
TD.PF.M FixedReset Disc 23,200 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2024-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset Disc 20,521 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 18.23
Evaluated at bid price : 18.23
Bid-YTW : 7.65 %
There were 6 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.N FixedReset Ins Non Quote: 17.44 – 18.15
Spot Rate : 0.7100
Average : 0.4866

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 17.44
Evaluated at bid price : 17.44
Bid-YTW : 7.64 %

TD.PF.A FixedReset Disc Quote: 17.90 – 18.35
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3002

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 17.90
Evaluated at bid price : 17.90
Bid-YTW : 7.39 %

BNS.PR.I FixedReset Disc Quote: 20.87 – 21.37
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3569

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 20.87
Evaluated at bid price : 20.87
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %

BMO.PR.S FixedReset Disc Quote: 18.62 – 18.99
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2313

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 18.62
Evaluated at bid price : 18.62
Bid-YTW : 7.29 %

CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.19 – 21.51
Spot Rate : 1.3200
Average : 1.1911

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-02-09
Maturity Price : 20.19
Evaluated at bid price : 20.19
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %

PVS.PR.I SplitShare Quote: 24.12 – 24.50
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2590

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.12
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %

BCE.PR.C To Reset To 5.08%; Interconvertible with BCE.PR.D

February 9th, 2023

BCE Inc. has announced (on 2023-1-13):

Holders of fixed-rate BCE Inc. Series AC Preferred Shares have the right to convert all or part of their shares, effective on March 1, 2023, on a one-for-one basis into floating-rate Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AD of BCE Inc. (the “Series AD Preferred Shares”). In order to convert their shares, holders must exercise their right of conversion during the conversion period which runs from January 15, 2023 until 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on February 20, 2023.

As of March 1, 2023, the Series AC Preferred Shares, should they remain outstanding, will pay, on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., a fixed cash dividend for the following five years that will be determined by BCE Inc. on February 6, 2023 but which shall not be less than 80% of the five-year Government of Canada Yield (as defined in BCE Inc.’s articles) compounded semi-annually and computed on February 6, 2023 by two investment dealers appointed by BCE Inc. The annual dividend rate applicable to the Series AC Preferred Shares will be published on February 8, 2023 in the national edition of The Globe and Mail, the Montreal Gazette and Le Devoir and will be posted on BCE Inc.’s website at www.bce.ca.

With respect to BCE.PR.D, they announced:

Holders of floating-rate BCE Inc. Series AD Preferred Shares have the right to convert all or part of their shares, effective on March 1, 2023, on a one-for-one basis into fixed-rate Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AC of BCE Inc. (the “Series AC Preferred Shares”). In order to convert their shares, holders must exercise their right of conversion during the conversion period which runs from January 15, 2023 until 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on February 20, 2023.

In order to exercise their conversion right in respect of all or part of their Series AD Preferred Shares, registered holders must provide a written notice thereof, accompanied by their Series AD Preferred Share certificates with the transfer form on the back thereof or other appropriate stock transfer power of attorney duly endorsed, and deliver them, at the latest by 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on February 20, 2023, to one of the following addresses of TSX Trust Company:…

As of March 1, 2023, the Series AD Preferred Shares, should they remain outstanding, will continue to pay a monthly floating dividend based on a dividend rate that will fluctuate over time between 50% and 100% of the Prime rate (“Prime”) for each month computed in accordance with the articles of BCE Inc. Accordingly, from March 1, 2023, the holders of Series AD Preferred Shares will continue to be entitled to receive floating adjustable cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., to be paid on the twelfth day of the subsequent month. The dividend rate will be adjusted upwards or downwards on a monthly basis by an Adjustment Factor (as described below) whenever the Calculated Trading Price, being the market price of the Series AD Preferred Shares computed in accordance with the articles of BCE Inc., is $24.875 or less or $25.125 or more, respectively. …

They have now announced:

BCE Inc. will, on March 1, 2023, continue to have Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AC (“Series AC Preferred Shares”) outstanding if, following the end of the conversion period on February 20, 2023, BCE Inc. determines that at least 2,500,000 Series AC Preferred Shares would remain outstanding. In such a case, as of March 1, 2023, the Series AC Preferred Shares will pay, on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., a fixed cash dividend for the following five years that will be based on an annual fixed dividend rate equal to 5.08%

BCE.PR.C is a FixedFloater that has been around for years. A conversion notice was sent in 2008 and it reset to 4.60%. About 55% was converted to BCE.PR.D. A conversion notice was sent in 2013 and it reset to 3.55%. A conversion notice was sent in 2018 and it reset to 4.38%. I recommended conversion.

BCE.PR.D is a RatchetRate preferred that was first issued by partial conversion from BCE.PR.C.

Thanks to Assiduous Reader newbiepref for bringing this to my attention