Category: Issue Comments

Brookfield Asset Management Inc. has announced:

that after having taken into account all election notices received by the September 16, 2019 deadline for the conversion of its Cumulative Class A Preference Shares, Series 40 (the “Series 40 Shares”) (TSX: BAM.PF.F) into Cumulative Class A Preference Shares, Series 41 (the “Series 41 Shares”), there were 116,560 Series 40 Shares tendered for conversion, which is less than the one million shares required to give effect to conversions into Series 41 Shares. Accordingly, there will be no conversion of Series 40 Shares into Series 41 Shares, and holders of Series 40 Shares will retain their Series 40 shares.

BAM.PF.F is a FixedReset, 4.50%+286, that commenced trading 2014-6-5 after being announced 2014-5-27. The issue will reset at 4.029% effective October 1, 2019. I recommended against conversion. BAM.PF.F is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset – Discount subindex.

Element Fleet Management Corp. has announced:

that none of its outstanding Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series E (the “Series E shares”) will be converted into Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series F (the “Series F shares”) on September 30, 2019.

During the conversion notice period, which commenced on September 3, 2019 and ended at 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on September 16, 2019, 90,430 Series E shares were tendered for conversion into Series F shares. In accordance with Section 8.03(a)(iii) of the rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to the Series E shares, as provided in the Corporation’s restated articles of incorporation dated October 4, 2016, since there would be outstanding on September 30, 2019 less than 500,000 Series F shares, after having taken into account all Series E shares tendered for conversion into Series F shares,

holders of Series E shares who elected to tender their shares for conversion will not have their Series E shares converted into Series F shares on September 30, 2019.

As a result, no Series F shares will be issued in connection with the current conversion privilege.

EFN.PR.E is a FixedReset, 6.40%+472, that was announced 2014-6-2 but not immediately tracked by HIMIPref™ as it was unrated. Coverage commenced in September, 2015 after the company’s preferreds were rated Pfd-3 by DBRS. The extension was announced 2019-8-27. The issue will reset at 5.903% effective September 30, 2019. I recommended against conversion. The issue is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the Scraps – FixedReset – Discount subindex.

TransAlta Corporation has announced:

that after taking into account all election notices received for the conversion of the Cumulative Redeemable Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series G (the “Series G Shares”) into Cumulative Redeemable Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series H (the “Series H Shares”), there were only 140,730 Series G Shares tendered for conversion, which is less than the one million shares required to give effect to conversions into Series H Shares. As a result, none of the Series G Shares will be converted into Series H Shares on September 30, 2019.

TA.PR.J is a FixedReset, 5.30%+380, that commenced trading 2014-8-14 after being announced 2014-8-6. TA.PR.J will reset at 4.988% effective September 30, 2019. I recommended against conversion. The issue is tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been assigned to the Scraps index on credit concerns. It was recently downgraded to P-4(high by S&P but remains at Pfd-3(low) with DBRS.

Pembina Pipeline Corporation has announced:

that it has agreed with Kinder Morgan Canada Limited (TSX: KML) (“KML”) to amend and restate the previously announced arrangement agreement dated August 20, 2019 (the “Arrangement Agreement”) to include the preferred shares of KML in the arrangement transaction pursuant to which Pembina will acquire KML (the “Transaction”). If requisite approval by the holders of KML preferred shares is obtained, upon closing of the Transaction, each outstanding KML preferred share of a series will be exchanged for one preferred share of Pembina with the same commercial terms and conditions as that series of KML preferred shares. The inclusion of KML preferred shares in the Transaction is subject to approval by at least 66 2/3 percent of the votes cast by holders of KML preferred shares, voting together as a single class, present in person or represented by proxy at the special meeting of the holders of KML preferred shares to be held to approve the Transaction, but is not a condition to closing of the Transaction. If KML preferred shareholders do not approve the Transaction but all other conditions to closing are satisfied or waived by the applicable party, the KML preferred shares will remain outstanding as shares in the capital of KML, which will be part of the Pembina group following completion of the Transaction.

Further information regarding the Transaction will be contained in a proxy statement of KML that it will prepare, file and mail to its shareholders in due course in connection with KML voting and preferred special shareholders meetings.

A copy of the amended and restated Arrangement Agreement with respect to the Transaction will be filed under Pembina’s profile on SEDAR at www.sedar.com and on the Company’s website at www.pembina.com.

This follows news that PPL To Acquire KML Under Proposed Plan of Arrangement and that the two KML issues were on Review-Developing by DBRS due to uncertainty.

KML.PR.A is a FixedReset 5.25%+365M525 that commenced trading 2017-8-15 after being announced 2017-8-3. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps-FixedReset Discount subindex on credit concerns.

KML.PR.C is a FixedReset, 5.20%+351M520, that commenced trading 2017-12-15 after being announced 2017-12-6. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps-FixedReset Discount subindex on credit concerns.

Hat tip to Assiduous Reader CanSiamCyp for ensuring I was aware of this development.

Update, 2019-09-12: The price movement left the PPL and VSN preferreds trading as equivalents:

Click for Big

The results of this Implied Volatility analysis are a little puzzling, if we look solely at those issues with a minimum reset guarantee.

It’s very strange. Each of the five issues has approximately the same unexplained value, which we may conjecture is equal to the market value of the Reset Floor, even though:

• The GOC-5 yields at which these guarantees become applicable varies widely, with three being in-the-money and two out.
• Two issues are trading at a premium to par, three at a discount

I’m not sure what to make of it. But I will say I’m glad I’m not the guy in the PPL treasury department who has to decide whether or not to call the two issues trading at a premium!

It will be recalled that TA.PR.J will reset at 4.988% effective September 30, 2019

TA.PR.J is a FixedReset, 5.30%+380, that commenced trading 2014-8-14 after being announced 2014-8-6. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been assigned to the Scraps index on credit concerns. It was recently downgraded to P-4(high by S&P but remains at Pfd-3(low) with DBRS.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g. TA.PR.J and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

Click for Big

The market appears to have lost its fleeting interest in floating rate product; the implied rates until the next interconversion are well below the current 3-month bill rate as the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are at +0.79% and +1.10%, respectively (after ignoring FFH.PR.C/FFH.PR.D, which is a huge outlier today). Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the TA.PR.J FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-may-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to trade below the price of their FixedReset counterparts, TA.PR.J. Therefore, I recommend that holders of TA.PR.J continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that once the FloatingResets commence trading (if, in fact, they do) it may be a good trade to swap one issue for the other in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – hopefully – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the path of policy rates over the next five years. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Those who wish to convert are advised that the deadline for notifying the company of such a desire is 3:00 p.m. (MST) / 5:00 p.m. (EST) on September 15, 2019. This is a Sunday, but I can only report what the press releases tell me! Brokers and other intermediaries generally set their internal deadlines a day or two in advance of this date, so if you wish to convert there’s no time to waste! Note that brokers will, in general, try to execute the instruction on a ‘best efforts’ basis if received between the two deadlines, provided that the procrastinating shareholder grovels entertainingly enough.

It will be recalled that DC.PR.B will reset at 5.284% effective September 30, 2019

DC.PR.B is a FixedReset, 5.688%+410, that commenced trading 2009-9-15 with a 6.75% coupon after being announced 2009-8-25. It reset to 5.688% effective 2014-09-30. I made no recommendation regarding conversion. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ but us relegated to the Scraps – FixedReset (Discount) subindex on credit concerns.

DC.PR.D is a FloatingReset, +410, that came into existence via a partial conversion from DC.PR.B. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps – FloatingReset subindex on credit concerns.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g. DC.PR.B and the FloatingReset DC.PR.D that will continue to exist if enough holders want it). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

Click for Big

The market appears to have lost its fleeting interest in floating rate product; the implied rates until the next interconversion are well below the current 3-month bill rate as the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are at +0.53% and +1.00%, respectively. Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the DC.PR.B FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its FloatingReset DC.PR.D counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets DC.PR.D that will result from conversion are likely to trade below the price of their FixedReset counterparts, DC.PR.B. Therefore,

• I recommend that holders of DC.PR.B continue to hold the issue and not to convert.
• I recommend that holders of DC.PR.D exchange their holdings to DC.PR.B.

I will note that once the FloatingResets commence trading (if, in fact, they do) it may be a good trade to swap one issue for the other in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – hopefully – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the path of policy rates over the next five years. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Those who wish to convert are advised that the deadline for notifying the company of such a desire is 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on September 16, 2019. Brokers and other intermediaries generally set their internal deadlines a day or two in advance of this date, so if you wish to convert there’s no time to waste! Note that brokers will, in general, try to execute the instruction on a ‘best efforts’ basis if received between the two deadlines, provided that the procrastinating shareholder grovels entertainingly enough.

It will be recalled that ALA.PR.G will reset at 4.242% effective September 30, 2019

ALA.PR.G is a FixedReset, 4.75%+306, that commenced trading 2014-7-3 after being announced 2014-6-23. Notice of extension was announced 2019-8-29. The issue is tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns. In December, 2018, the issue was downgraded to Pfd-3(low) by DBRS and to P-3 by S&P.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g. ALA.PR.G and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

Click for Big

The market appears to have lost its fleeting interest in floating rate product; the implied rates until the next interconversion are well below the current 3-month bill rate as the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are at +0.53% and +1.00%, respectively. Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the ALA.PR.G FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-may-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to trade below the price of their FixedReset counterparts, ALA.PR.G. Therefore, I recommend that holders of ALA.PR.G continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that once the FloatingResets commence trading (if, in fact, they do) it may be a good trade to swap one issue for the other in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – hopefully – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the path of policy rates over the next five years. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Those who wish to convert are advised that the deadline for notifying the company of such a desire is 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on September 13, 2019. Brokers and other intermediaries generally set their internal deadlines a day or two in advance of this date, so if you wish to convert there’s no time to waste! Note that brokers will, in general, try to execute the instruction on a ‘best efforts’ basis if received between the two deadlines, provided that the procrastinating shareholder grovels entertainingly enough.

It will be recalled that EFN.PR.E will reset at 5.903% effective September 30, 2019

EFN.PR.E is a FixedReset, 6.40%+472, that was announced 2014-6-2 but not immediately tracked by HIMIPref™ as it was unrated. Coverage commenced in September, 2015 after the company’s preferreds were rated Pfd-3 by DBRS. The extension was announced 2019-8-27.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g. EFN.PR.E and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

Click for Big

The market appears to have lost its fleeting interest in floating rate product; the implied rates until the next interconversion are well below the current 3-month bill rate as the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are at +0.53% and +1.00%, respectively. Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the EFN.PR.E FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-may-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to trade below the price of their FixedReset counterparts, EFN.PR.E. Therefore, I recommend that holders of EFN.PR.E continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that once the FloatingResets commence trading (if, in fact, they do) it may be a good trade to swap one issue for the other in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – hopefully – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the path of policy rates over the next five years. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Those who wish to convert are advised that the deadline for notifying the company of such a desire is 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on September 16, 2019. Brokers and other intermediaries generally set their internal deadlines a day or two in advance of this date, so if you wish to convert there’s no time to waste! Note that brokers will, in general, try to execute the instruction on a ‘best efforts’ basis if received between the two deadlines, provided that the procrastinating shareholder grovels entertainingly enough.

It will be recalled that BAM.PF.F will reset at 4.029% effective October 1, 2019

BAM.PF.F is a FixedReset, 4.50%+286, that commenced trading 2014-6-5 after being announced 2014-5-27. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset – Discount subindex.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g. BAM.PF.F and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

Click for Big

The market appears to have lost its fleeting interest in floating rate product; the implied rates until the next interconversion are well below the current 3-month bill rate as the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are at +0.53% and +1.00%, respectively. Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the BAM.PF.F FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-may-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to trade below the price of their FixedReset counterparts, BAM.PF.F. Therefore, I recommend that holders of BAM.PF.F continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that once the FloatingResets commence trading (if, in fact, they do) it may be a good trade to swap one issue for the other in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – hopefully – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the path of policy rates over the next five years. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Those who wish to convert are advised that the deadline for notifying the company of such a desire is 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on September 16, 2019. Brokers and other intermediaries generally set their internal deadlines a day or two in advance of this date, so if you wish to convert there’s no time to waste! Note that brokers will, in general, try to execute the instruction on a ‘best efforts’ basis if received between the two deadlines, provided that the procrastinating shareholder grovels entertainingly enough.