Market Action

August 29, 2011

Banks are pushing back against proposed capital rules:

The Clearing House Association and the Institute of International Bankers, whose members include JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM), Bank of America Corp. (BAC), Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), Citigroup Inc. (C), Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) and ING Groep NV (INGA), said in a letter that capital surcharges agreed to by the Federal Reserve and international regulators are “deeply flawed” and “reflexively based on the notion that size alone creates prudential concerns.”

Bloomberg News obtained an Aug. 25 draft of the letter, which will be filed as a comment on proposed capital surcharges for big banks agreed on by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in June. The Fed, which is part of the Basel Committee, is also preparing to release its own proposals under the Dodd-Frank Act for stricter standards for the largest U.S. banks sometime in the next five weeks.

Tighter international and U.S. standards on capital, liquidity and risk management are likely to alter competition in the U.S., the banking groups said in their letter. The Basel capital surcharge will “lead to unjustified competitive inequities between large banks” subject to the charge and others that aren’t, they said.

A bit more detail regarding TRE. Sino-Forest announced the resignation of its chairman:

Sino-Forest Corporation (“Sino-Forest” or the “Company”)
(TSX:TRE) announced that Allen Chan has voluntarily resigned as Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and Director, pending completion of the review by the Independent Committee of the allegations made by Muddy Waters.

Mr. Chan will become Founding Chairman Emeritus of the Company and will be fully available to assist Mr. Martin with operational matters and with the Independent Committee review as requested.

The Globe reported on the sequence of events :

Mr. Chan’s resignation follows a tumultuous week of allegations and confrontations. Shortly after the company alerted the OSC about its discovery of what sources described as irregular deals involving Mr. Chan, the OSC caught the company off guard on Friday by slapping a cease trade order on its stock and ordering the resignation of Mr. Chan and the four executives.

I have not yet seen any updated commentary from Richard Kelertas of Dundee Securities, whose changing views on the topic were discussed here on June 20.

S&P withdrew ratings after a downgrade to CCC-:

  • We expect China-based commercial forest operator Sino-Forest’s business
    to rapidly deteriorate following additional fraud allegations and senior management resignations.

  • We are lowering the corporate credit rating on Sino-Forest and the issue rating on its senior unsecured notes and convertible bonds to ‘CCC-‘ from ‘B’. We removed all the ratings from CreditWatch.
  • We are also withdrawing the ratings due to heightened information risks.
  • The negative outlook prior to the rating withdrawal reflected our view that the company’s operations were likely to deteriorate further in the
    next 12 months, at least.

Moody’s also downgrade, but did not withdraw the rating:

Moody’s Investors Service has downgraded to Caa1 from B1 the corporate family and senior unsecured debt ratings of Sino-Forest Corporation (“Sino-Forest”).

At the same time, Moody’s continues its review for further downgrade.

What a surprise! The Maple-TMX deal may well fail!

TMX Group Inc., which has gained the most of any exchange involved in the industry’s biggest wave of acquisitions, is now in danger of being left without a buyer.

Since reaching a three-year high in June as the London Stock Exchange Group Plc and a group of Canadian banks waged a bidding contest, the owner of the Toronto bourse has now fallen more than 10% with the LSE scrapping its agreement. TMX is trading almost $10 below the $50-a-share unsolicited bid from Maple Group Acquisition Corp., close to the widest gap since it was announced in May and indicating that traders are growing increasingly concerned the takeover will also fail.

While more than US$30-billion in acquisitions for exchanges have been announced in the past year, only one deal — Deutsche Boerse AG’s takeover of NYSE Euronext — has been approved by shareholders. Macquarie Group Ltd. says Maple’s attempt to buy TMX may not overcome antitrust scrutiny because it would combine Canada’s largest bourse with its biggest rival, Alpha Group, and create an entity controlling 85 percent of the nation’s trading. That may make TMX, one of the least valuable market venues versus earnings, fall further, said WallachBeth Capital LLC.

Of course, that all depends on what you mean by the word “fail”. If you define success as “scuttling an international acquisition that would create an entity with enough size to talk back to the banks”, then it’s already a success!

The Globe & Mail blog had a good post titled Ms. Lagarde’s recapitalization plan makes sense:

Freed of her government shackles, the former French finance minister pulled no punches Saturday in her first major speech to the august audience. Ms. Lagarde declared flatly that European banks “need urgent recapitalization. They must be strong enough to withstand the risks of sovereigns and weak growth. This is key to cutting the chains of contagion. If it is not addressed, we could easily see the further spread of economic weakness to core countries, or even a debilitating liquidity crisis.”

Her proposal: “Mandatory substantial recapitalization — seeking private resources first, but using public funds if necessary.”

The response, predictably, has been howls of indignation in European political and banking circles. A Reuters headline summed up the attitude: “Europe snubs IMF call to force-feed bank capital.”

But there is a saying that a nation’s banking system is only as sound as its government. And that is particularly true in Europe, where banks hold an inordinate amount of government debt on their books. The reason is simple: Loans to your friendly local government count as a risk-free asset under Basel rules. Too bad the markets don’t agree.

Golly – substitute “AAA subprime paper” for “loans to your friendly local government” and that last paragraph could have been written in 2008!

Her published remarks also include an exhortation for the US:

So the United States needs to move on two specific fronts.
….
Second—halting the downward spiral of foreclosures, falling house prices and deteriorating household spending. This could involve more aggressive principal reduction programs for homeowners, stronger intervention by the government housing finance agencies, or steps to help homeowners take advantage of the low interest rate environment.

See the post titled Redefault on Modified Mortgages for more on that idea.

There’s more commentary at BusinessInsider.com

The Italians aren’t hurting enough yet:

The Italian government backtracked on parts of its widely criticized austerity package on Monday, scrapping a tax on high earners and scaling back cuts to local authority funding.

In a statement after seven hours of talks at Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s home outside Milan, the government said it would also exclude years spent at university and military service from retirement age calculations, delaying retirement for some people.

The statement contained little detail on the funding impact of the changes or how the government would make up for revenue lost from the €45.5-billion ($66-billion U.S.) austerity package now making its way through parliament which is aimed at balancing the budget by 2013.

There was also no mention of any increase in value-added tax, a measure which had been widely mooted in the media before the meeting.

It was a good day overall for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 21bp, FixedResets down 3bp and DeemedRetractibles up 10bp. Volatility was reasonable. Volume was a little on the soft side of average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2681 % 2,148.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2681 % 3,230.5
Floater 2.82 % 2.54 % 26,150 20.96 4 -0.2681 % 2,319.3
OpRet 4.88 % 2.86 % 59,794 0.57 9 -0.0817 % 2,444.5
SplitShare 5.38 % 0.97 % 62,037 0.50 4 0.1771 % 2,491.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0817 % 2,235.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.66 % 4.69 % 128,585 1.13 14 0.1043 % 2,108.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.34 % 5.46 % 98,163 14.64 16 0.2093 % 2,236.7
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.23 % 213,196 2.67 60 -0.0275 % 2,318.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.69 % 255,975 7.96 46 0.0982 % 2,183.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.E OpRet -1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.58
Bid-YTW : 2.86 %
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-29
Maturity Price : 21.49
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.14
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-29
Maturity Price : 24.28
Evaluated at bid price : 24.57
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 241,086 RBC crossed four blocks: 47,500 shares, two of 50,000 each, and one of 49,500, all at 25.20. Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 86,179 TD crossed 50,000 at 27.00; Scotia crossed 35,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.90
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 71,667 RBC crossed 65,600 at 27.68.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.42
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 67,314 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 13,000, both at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.89
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 62,082 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 22.18; TD crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.16
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 56,203 TD crossed blocks of 25,000 and 24,500, both at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.15 – 26.95
Spot Rate : 0.8000
Average : 0.5909

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 20.76 – 22.00
Spot Rate : 1.2400
Average : 1.0681

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-29
Maturity Price : 20.76
Evaluated at bid price : 20.76
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 15.99 – 16.48
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3348

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-29
Maturity Price : 15.99
Evaluated at bid price : 15.99
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.01 – 22.49
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3332

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-29
Maturity Price : 21.67
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.01 – 23.38
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2579

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-29
Maturity Price : 22.72
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %

NA.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 27.06 – 27.38
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2083

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %

Issue Comments

YLO MTN BuyBacks: Filings 2011-8-29

Details are available at SEDI.

YLO MTN Buybacks Disclosed 8/29
Issue Trade
Date
(?)
Face Value Price Yield
?
5.25% Feb 15, 2016 8/24 47,000 39,105 83.14 10.03%
Total for Issue to Date 67,486,350 56,277,068  
5.71% April 21, 2014 8/25 18,211,000 16,821,381 90.32 9.96%
Total for Issue to Date 42,767,000 40,112,149  
7.3% Feb 2, 2015 8/24 15,000 14,181 94.00 9.38%
Total for Issue to Date 121,900,000 115,136,576  
Grand Total to Date 238,081,350 215,234,727  
Yields have been calculated (using MS-Excel) assuming that the “Transaction Date” reported on SEDI is the Trade Date and that all trades were executed for normal settlement

The odd number for the total face value (a non-integral multiple of 1,000) has been previously discussed, so don’t start, OK? Totals include all filings commencing August 18.

The price paid for the 5.71% April 21, 2014 is considerably lower than they have paid before.

Readers of the August edition of PrefLetter will understand that I am bitterly disappointed with the company’s decision to pursue buybacks by private contract; I feel that a Dutch Auction Tender, for all issues in one big pot (with conversion factors on the prices of different issues to reflect differing desirability to the company of purchasing the issues) would be a far better way to go.

YLO has the following preferred issues outstanding: YLO.PR.A, YLO.PR.B, YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D; the Normal Course Issuer Bid for these issues is still being pursued vigorously.

Issue Comments

WFS.PR.A: 11H1 Semi-Annual Report

World Financial Split Corp has released its Semi-Annual Report to June 30, 2011:

Distributions to Class A shareholders remained suspended in accordance with the terms of the prospectus which states: “No distribution will be paid to the Class A shares if (i) the distributions payable on the Preferred shares are in arrears; or (ii) after the payment of the distribution by the Fund, the net asset value per unit would be less than $15.00”.

During the six months ended June 30, 2011, the total return of the Fund was negative 4.1 percent reflecting a decline in value of the securities in the portfolio. The MSCI World Financials Index (the “Financials Index”) total return in Canadian dollar terms during the same period was negative 1.1 percent. As a result of the Fund being limited to a specific universe of stocks and utilizing a covered call writing strategy to generate income, comparison with a market index may not be appropriate. The Financials Index is calculated without the deduction of management fees and fund expenses, whereas the performance of the Fund is calculated after deducting such fees and expenses.

MER:

The MER for 2011 excluding warrant exercise fees and special resolution expense
is 1.65%.

Average Net Assets: This is difficult to calculate from the financial statements, but if we accept that MER is based on the average, and that the expenses used for this calculation were the “Subtotal Expenses” on the income statment, we arrive at Average Net Assets of 56.5-million, which looks like a reasonable figure.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Investment income (sum of interest, dividends and withholding taxes) of $1.244-million received multiplied by two (since it’s a six month figure) divided by average net assets of $56.5-million is 4.40%.

Income Coverage: Net investment income of $1.244-million less expenses before special resolution expense of $0.932-million is $0.312-million, to cover preferred dividends of 1.894-million is about 16%.

With respect to the Monthly Retraction Right, the Special Resolution (which was approved) states:

If the Reorganization is approved and implemented, shares will have to be surrendered for retraction by a holder of Class A Shares or Preferred Shares at least ten business days prior to a Valuation Date in order to be retracted on such Valuation Date and such shareholder will receive payment on or before the tenth business day following such Valuation Date.

Shareholders whose Preferred Shares are retracted on a Valuation Date will be entitled to receive a retraction price per share (the “Preferred NAV Retraction Price”) equal to 96% of the lesser of (a) the NAV per Unit as of the applicable Valuation Date less the cost to the Fund of purchasing a Class A Share in the market for cancellation and (b) 10.00.

Under the Reorganization, the monthly retraction price for the Preferred Shares will be changed and shareholders whose Preferred Shares are retracted on a Valuation Date will be entitled to receive a retraction price per share equal to the lesser of:
(a) the Preferred NAV Retraction Price; and
(b) 96% of the lesser of (i) the Unit Market Price less the cost to the Fund of purchasing a Class A Share in the market for cancellation and (ii) $10.00.

For this purpose, the cost of the purchase of a Preferred Share or a Class A Share will include the purchase price of the share, commission and such other costs, if any, related to the liquidation of any portion of the Portfolio to fund the purchase of such share. Any declared and unpaid distributions payable on or before a Valuation Date in respect of Class A Shares or Preferred Shares tendered for retraction on such Valuation Date will also be paid on the retraction payment date. In addition, the following terms have the meanings set forth below.

Class A Market Price: means the weighted average trading price of the Class A Shares on the principal stock exchange on which the Class A Shares are listed (or, if the Class A Shares are not listed on any stock exchange, on the principal market on which the Class A Shares are quoted for trading) for the 10 trading days immediately preceding the applicable Valuation Date.

Preferred Market Price: means the weighted average trading price of the Preferred Shares on the principal stock exchange on which the Preferred Shares are listed (or, if the Preferred Shares are not listed on any stock exchange, on the principal market on which the Preferred Shares are quoted for trading) for the 10 trading days immediately preceding the applicable Valuation Date.

Unit Market Price: means the sum of the Class A Market Price and the Preferred Market Price.

This is somewhat more complex than it used to be! Using current figures from the Mulvihill site:
NAV: 10.29
Preferred Share Price: 8.66
Class A Share Price: 1.07

And assuming that the average trading price (determined after the shares are tendered) is equal to the current price and that the NAV also doesn’t change (always a risk with this type of retraction; sometimes significant!) we may derive:

Preferred NAV Retraction Price = 96% of lesser of (a) 10.29 – 1.07 and (b) 10.00
= 96% of 9.22
= 8.85

The Unit Market Price is 8.66+1.07 = 9.73; the cost to the fund of purchasing a class A share is assumed to be 1.07; so part (b) of the calculation is now
96% of the less of (i) 9.73 – 1.07 = 8.66
and (ii) 10.00
= 96% * 8.66
= 8.31

So, careful examination of the above will reveal that the monthly retraction privilege is now useless for preferred shareholders: the price you get may be assumed (given prudence) to be 96% of what you would get on the market, so what’s the point? Very clever, Mr. Mulvihill … but “Clever Dick came to a bad end” is a Victorian nursery proverb that comes to mind.

Press Clippings

James Hymas Quoted in Winnipeg Free Press

Joel Schlesinger of the Winnipeg Free Press was kind enough to quote me in a piece titled Roller-coaster times, published 2011-8-20:

Surprisingly, the rating agencies still have enough authority to give markets a good shake as S&P demonstrated, recently downgrading U.S. debt from AAA, its highest rating, to AA+, the second highest credit rating.

The downgrade really means nothing in terms of default risk, says James Hymas, president of Hymas Investment Management, Inc., a Toronto-based fixed income investment firm.

“The chance of default has increased from 0.01 per cent to 0.015 per cent,” he says. “The difference between AAA and AA+ is something that’s more a matter of perception than something that can actually be measured.”

Call it a shot across the bow of U.S. lawmakers.

The U.S. debt downgrade was only a side dish to the main course of financial worries that have driven markets over the past few weeks, Hymas says.

“The real story was the debt crisis in Europe with the European Central Bank starting purchases of Spanish and Italian bonds,” he says. “That had the effect of forcing people to focus their attention on the bond portfolios and to a large extent they decided that Europe was getting too risky for them and they wanted to hold the U.S. debt.”

At the moment, the market is selling these bonds, not buying them. European banks and other large investors have these bonds on their books and want to unload them. The ECB is stepping in to buy up the unwanted bonds to help stabilize the European banks because just the prospect of default on Spanish and Italian bonds affects their ability to do business, Hymas says.

“A big piece of the puzzle is liquidity because a bank keeps a liquid reserve of investments and in the course of its business it might need to borrow $100 million for a short term and it might want those bonds as collateral to get a loan from another institution,” he says.

“The trouble is, what if you own Greek bonds, for instance, and your usual counterparties aren’t accepting those as collateral?”

And liquidity is important to banks. Greek bond defaults are one thing, but default worries about Italy and Spain’s bonds — much larger fish — are another. If financial institutions become worried enough about one another’s investment books, liquidity in markets can dry up — as we saw in 2008.

But Hymas says while the problems are real, they don’t necessarily lead to a major calamity until there’s a major shift in perception all at once. It’s a ‘Wile E. Coyote moment’ — to quote New York Times financial columnist and economist Paul Krugman.

“You’ll remember from the cartoons that Wile E. Coyote is always running off cliffs, but he doesn’t start falling until he looks down,” he says. “The way crises finally come to light is when investors as a group suddenly look down.”

Arguably, we have been having those moments every other day in the markets of late, Hymas says. This has led to volatility in both the bond and stock markets.

“We have this daily risk on and risk off in the marketplace,” Graham says.

Stock indices can be up 500 points one day — the risk is on — and down 400 points the next — the risk is off.

Market Action

August 26, 2011

Three cheers for Muddy Waters!

The Ontario Securities Commission said it ordered five executives of Sino-Forest Corp. (TRE) including Chief Executive Officer Allen Chan to resign because the forestry operator may have misrepresented revenue and exaggerated its timber holdings.

Canada’s main securities regulator also ordered the shares to cease trading, it said in an e-mailed statement today. Stan Neve, an external spokesman for the Hong Kong- and Mississauga, Ontario-based company, declined to comment. OSC spokesman Dylan Rae didn’t immediately return a phone call seeking comment.

The OSC Cease Trade / Suspension Order states in part:

12. Sino-Forest, through its subsidiaries, appears to have engaged in significant non-arm’s length transactions which may have been contrary to Ontario securities laws and the public interest;

13. Sino-Forest and certain of its officers and directors appear to have misrepresented some of its revenue and/or exaggerated some of its timber holdings by providing information to the public in documents required to be filed or furnished under Ontario securities laws which may have been false or misleading in a material respect contrary to section 122 or 126.2 of the Act and contrary to the public interest;

14. Sino-Forest and certain of its officers and directors including Chan appear to be engaging or participating in acts, practices or a course of conduct related to its securities which it and/or they know or reasonably ought to know perpetuate a fraud on any person or company contrary to section 126.1 of the Act and contrary to the public interest;

Let’s take a vote … would the Madoff Ponzi scheme have done so much damage if it had been possible to short-sell his fund?

The OSC later rescinded the order regarding the executives because, um, they don’t have that authority:

The Ontario Securities Act doesn’t allow the commission to force the resignation of a corporate officer in a temporary order without a hearing.

Well, one way or another, it looks like Sino-Forest was actually doing something naughty – just how naughty, is currently impossible to tell, but I don’t think the OSC would take this step unless they could actually point to something meaningful. Fearless Forecast: the usual pack of clowns will claim that (a) this is the regulators’ fault, and (b) it never would have happened if we had a national regulator.

US banks have a problem – too much money:

U.S. regulators have asked some banks to take more deposits from large investors even if it’s unprofitable, and lenders in return are seeking relief on insurance premiums and leverage ratios, according to six people with knowledge of the talks.

Deposits are flooding into the biggest U.S. banks as customers seek shelter from Europe’s debt crisis and falling stock prices. That forces lenders to raise capital for a growing balance sheet and saddles them with the higher deposit insurance payments. With short-term interest rates so low, it’s hard for financial firms to reinvest the new money profitably.

While the Fed has been paying 0.25 percent interest on deposits placed with the central bank, known as interest on excess reserves, since late 2008, it may not be enough to erase the cost to banks of holding the deposits, said Robert Eisenbeis, a former head of research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and now chief monetary economist for Sarasota, Florida-based Cumberland Advisors Inc.

FDIC insurance fees for large banks typically average more than 0.1 percent, three of the people said. In addition, large banks also may apply an internal capital charge of at least 0.1 percent to such reserves, one bank executive estimated.

The Greek government has announced terms for its COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY exchange offer:

“Greece shall not be obliged to proceed with any portion of the transaction described in this letter unless holders of eligible GGBs tender, in response to Greece’s eventual Invitation to Tender, eligible GGBs having a principal amount equal to not less than 90% of all eligible GGBs, including 90% of that portion of the eligible GGBs maturing during the period from June 30, 2011 through August 31, 2014. If these thresholds (or either of them) are not met, Greece shall not proceed with any portion of the transaction described in this letter if it determines, in consultation with the official sector, that the total contribution of private sector creditors towards the financing needs of Greece and Greece’s debt sustainability resulting from this transaction is insufficient to permit the official sector to support the new multi-year adjustment program for Greece announced on July 21, 2011.”

The interest rate (which will comprise of an initial rate applicable to years 1–5 increasing by 0.50% p.a. for years 6-10 and a further 0.50% p.a. for years 11-30) will be determined at or about the time of launch of the liability management transaction (the “Rate Fixing Date”) to result in a net present value of 79% of the face value of eligible GGBs tendered.

Merkel continued to ratchet up the inflammatory language:

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said investors are trying to “blackmail” governments into helping debt-strapped European countries, underscoring the need for all euro-area governments to reduce debt.

You tell ’em, Merkel! You tell the financial markets: ‘We won’t pay your extortionate interest rates because we don’t need to borrow any money!’ That’ll fix ’em.

Hurricanes affect markets:

Rates for borrowing and lending securities in the repurchase-agreement market rose and investors sought to extend maturities on concern power outages and closings of mass transit will keep traders home after Hurricane Irene strikes.

Overnight general collateral Treasury repurchase, or repo, rates, opened today at 0.10 percent and traded at 0.13 percent at 10 a.m. New York time, according to data from ICAP Plc, the world’s largest inter-dealer broker.

Securities dealers use repos to finance holdings and increase leverage. The majority of repo transactions take place on an overnight basis, with those current funding positions maturing on Aug. 29. Diminished staffing and computer-related problems following the hurricane may make it difficult to roll over such transactions.

BC voted in favour of increasing the cost of tax collection:

British Columbian voters have rejected the province’s controversial harmonized sales tax in an unprecedented referendum – a decision that will complicate efforts by the province’s Liberal government to manage B.C.’s finances and may also head off the prospect of a fall election.

Adrian Dix, leader of the opposition BC New Democrats, urged the provincial government to move quickly to restore the 7 per cent B.C. provincial sales tax., and also urged the Liberals to focus on the economy, jobs, health, education and the environment.

It was a quiet day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 1bp, FixedResets flat, and DeemedRetractibles losing 4bp. Volatility was reasonable; volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7836 % 2,153.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7836 % 3,239.2
Floater 2.82 % 2.54 % 27,276 20.96 4 0.7836 % 2,325.5
OpRet 4.88 % 2.03 % 58,388 0.57 9 0.1205 % 2,446.5
SplitShare 5.39 % 1.84 % 64,606 0.51 4 -0.2286 % 2,487.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1205 % 2,237.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.66 % 4.76 % 127,514 1.18 14 0.1072 % 2,106.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.35 % 5.47 % 99,055 14.61 16 -0.0052 % 2,232.0
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.18 % 206,879 2.71 60 0.0000 % 2,319.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.71 % 258,276 7.99 46 -0.0412 % 2,181.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.B FixedReset -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.17
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-26
Maturity Price : 23.84
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.73
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-26
Maturity Price : 15.91
Evaluated at bid price : 15.91
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-26
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.05
Bid-YTW : 2.37 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 233,426 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.00; RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 98,200 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.87
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 154,300 Nebitt crossed 34,900 at 25.15; Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.20; RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 114,085 RBC crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, both at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 112,862 Nesbitt crossed 52,100 at 27.45; RBC crossed 28,000 at 27.45; Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 27.46.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 96,400 RBC crossed blocks of 75,000 and 20,000, both at 27.26.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 58,861 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 26.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 20.76 – 21.99
Spot Rate : 1.2300
Average : 0.8796

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-26
Maturity Price : 20.76
Evaluated at bid price : 20.76
Bid-YTW : 2.54 %

CIU.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 27.17 – 27.86
Spot Rate : 0.6900
Average : 0.5033

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.17
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %

GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.05 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3060

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %

NA.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.20 – 26.64
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3183

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.52 – 25.97
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3370

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.52 – 25.87
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2487

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %

Issue Comments

YLO MTN BuyBacks: Filings 2011-8-26

Details are available at SEDI.

YLO MTN Buybacks Disclosed 8/26
Issue Trade
Date
(?)
Face Value Price Yield
?
5.25% Feb 15, 2016 8/22 72,000 59,864 83.09 10.04%
Total for Issue to Date 67,439,350 56,237,936  
7.3% Feb 2, 2015 8/18 1,258,000 1,188,307 94.00 9.38%
  8/23 200,000 188,960 94.00 9.38%
Total for Issue to Date 121,885,000 115,122,386  
Grand Total to Date 219,808,350 198,360,061  
Yields have been calculated (using MS-Excel) assuming that the “Transaction Date” reported on SEDI is the Trade Date and that all trades were executed for normal settlement

The odd number for the total face value (a non-integral multiple of 1,000) has been previously discussed, so don’t start, OK? Totals include all filings commencing August 18.

Readers of the August edition of PrefLetter will understand that I am bitterly disappointed with the company’s decision to pursue buybacks by private contract; I feel that a Dutch Auction Tender, for all issues in one big pot (with conversion factors on the prices of different issues to reflect differing desirability to the company of purchasing the issues) would be a far better way to go.

YLO has the following preferred issues outstanding: YLO.PR.A, YLO.PR.B, YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D; the Normal Course Issuer Bid for these issues is still being pursued vigorously.

Market Action

August 25, 2011

Only four months until Christmas!

Oh, those naughty European speculators! No matter how often they’re told everything is fine, they keep panicking!

Stocks retreated as panic selling pushed Germany’s DAX Index (DAX) down 4 percent in 15 minutes amid speculation that Germany’s public finances are deteriorating and that regulators may impose restrictions on the market. The dollar and Treasuries advanced, while oil fell and Bank of America Corp. shares surged.

There was concern Germany’s debt rating would be reduced, said Walter Todd, the chief investment officer at Greenwood Capital Inc. in Greenwood, South Carolina. CNBC reported that S&P, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings all affirmed their ratings.

Investors also speculated that Germany would impose a short-selling ban, said Ryan Larson, head of U.S. equity trading at RBC Global Asset Management Inc. in Chicago. German regulator BaFin has “all the regulation in place” regarding short selling in equities, press officer Dominika Kula said, in response to a question on whether the agency may ban the practice.

I propose that anybody wishing to sell a stock should submit a form in triplicate to the regulators, who will ensure that the decision has been made in accordance with the required process. That’ll fix those pesky speculators!
On cue:

French, Italian and Spanish stock- market regulators extended temporary bans on short selling introduced this month in a bid to stem market volatility.

Spain and Italy extended their bans through Sept. 30, regulators in both countries said in a statement. France’s Autorite des Marches Financiers said its ban could last as long as Nov. 11. The “objective” is to lift the temporary ban on short-selling of financial stocks “as soon as market conditions allow,” Spain’s CNMV market regulator said.

YLO took a break on its MTN buyback today, with no filings. However, it appears that they continued buying YLO.PR.B, YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D on the exchange through their Normal Course Issuer Bid.

DBRS confirmed Toronto at AA:

DBRS has today confirmed the ratings of the debentures issued by the City of Toronto (the City) at AA. The trends remain Stable, supported by the City’s relatively wealthy tax base and strong resolve in restraining spending and finding permanent solutions to eliminate the budget gap. However, debt remains under considerable pressure as a result of heavy capital spending, which is eroding financial flexibility and could affect the City’s rating if increases are not contained.

DBRS commends management for the thorough review underway, which is probably the most extensive cost-containment effort undertaken by the City in recent memory. However, it remains unclear whether Council will approve the full range of measures necessary to protect fiscal sustainability. Significant concerns also remain with respect to the rising tax-supported debt burden, which stood at a moderate $964 per capita at December 31, 2010, but is set to grow by more than 50% to approximately $1,550 per capita by 2014 due to capital investments. While still manageable, the projected debt peak is up notably from the forecasts available at the time of last year’s rating review and is expected to consume a significant portion of the remaining flexibility within the current rating category. Since the capital plan excludes more than $8 billion in transit needs, the risk of further sizeable revisions to debt projections and their potentially adverse effect on the rating remains material.

I received notice today that a neighbor is seeking a zoning variance. It would appear that supporting documents are not filed electronically and are not available on the Internet. I have get to the York Civic Centre and ask a bureaucrat if I can look at them. Hymas Bonehead Rating Service confirms Toronto at AAAA++.

The Canadian preferred share market pulled back today, with PerpetualDiscounts down 13bp, FixedResets off 10bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 26bp. Good volatility – albeit highly skewed to the negatives! – and volume was merely average, although several issues traded more than 100,000 shares.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5241 % 2,137.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5241 % 3,214.0
Floater 2.84 % 2.54 % 27,520 20.96 4 -0.5241 % 2,307.4
OpRet 4.89 % 2.09 % 58,766 0.58 9 0.1034 % 2,443.6
SplitShare 5.38 % 0.95 % 60,686 0.51 4 -0.2902 % 2,493.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1034 % 2,234.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.67 % 5.02 % 128,728 1.14 14 0.0565 % 2,103.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.35 % 5.46 % 99,653 14.63 16 -0.1280 % 2,232.1
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.17 % 208,063 2.68 60 -0.1009 % 2,319.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 4.70 % 261,784 7.96 46 -0.2614 % 2,182.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible -2.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-25
Maturity Price : 22.79
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-25
Maturity Price : 15.70
Evaluated at bid price : 15.70
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 6.67 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-25
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 225,954 Nesbitt crossed 108,200 at 21.80; Desjardins crossed 101,500 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.79
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 124,575 RBC crossed blocks of 70,000 and 21,800 at 25.05; then another block of 21,800 at 25.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-25
Maturity Price : 24.77
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 113,495 TD crossed blocks of 49,600 and 50,000, both at 25.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 4.58 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 112,951 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 26.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 111,512 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.00; Desjardins crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
FTS.PR.E OpRet 75,300 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 18,000, both at 26.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.92
Bid-YTW : 2.09 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.10 – 27.18
Spot Rate : 1.0800
Average : 0.6021

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %

IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.26 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.7400
Average : 0.5124

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.26
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.90 – 24.34
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.2816

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-25
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %

BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 25.89 – 26.44
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.4013

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.89
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %

RY.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 27.15 – 27.48
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2135

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.15
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.32 – 23.99
Spot Rate : 0.6700
Average : 0.5587

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-25
Maturity Price : 22.90
Evaluated at bid price : 23.32
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %

New Issues

New Issue: BPO FixedReset 5.10%+348

Brookfield Office Properties has announced:

that it has agreed to issue to a syndicate of underwriters led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC, Scotia Capital Inc. and TD Securities Inc., for distribution to the public, eight million Class AAA Preferred Shares, Series R. The Preferred Shares, Series R will be issued at a price of C$25.00 per share, for aggregate proceeds of C$200 million. Holders of the Preferred Shares, Series R will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 5.10% annually for the initial 5-year period ending September 30, 2016. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 3.48%.

Holders of Preferred Shares, Series R will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into cumulative Preferred Shares, Series S, subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2016 and on September 30 every five years thereafter. Holders of Preferred Shares, Series S will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 3.48%.

Brookfield Office Properties has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part anytime up to two business days prior to closing, to purchase an additional two million Preferred Shares, Series R at the same offering price. Should the option be fully exercised, the total gross proceeds of the financing will be C$250 million.

The Preferred Shares, Series R will be offered by way of a prospectus supplement to the short-form base shelf prospectus of Brookfield Office Properties dated December 15, 2009. The prospectus supplement will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in all provinces of Canada.

The net proceeds of the issue will be added to the general funds of Brookfield Office Properties and be used for general corporate purposes, including, but not limited to, the repayment or refinancing of debt, acquisitions, capital expenditures and working capital needs. The offering is expected to close on or about September 2, 2011.

Update, 2011-8-26: P-3(high) from S&P:

  • We assigned our ‘BB+’ global scale rating and our ‘P-3 (High)’ Canadian national scale rating to Brookfield Office Properties Inc.’s new 5.1% C$200 million series R preferred share issue.
  • The preferred shares will be listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.
  • Our ratings on Brookfield acknowledge its good-quality office portfolio, long-term leases, and in-place rents that are, on average, below current market rents.
Market Action

August 24, 2011

Moody’s downgraded Japan:

Japan’s debt rating was lowered by Moody’s Investors Service, which cited “weak” prospects for economic growth that will make it difficult for the government to rein in the world’s largest public debt burden.

Moody’s cut the grade one step to Aa3, with a stable outlook, it said in a statement today. Rebuilding costs from the March 11 earthquake and tsunami, along with continuing efforts to contain the Fukushima nuclear crisis, may make it hard for officials to meet their borrowing target this year, it said.

More joy from US housing:

Home prices in the U.S. fell 5.9 percent in the second quarter from a year earlier, the biggest decline since 2009, as foreclosures added to the inventory of properties for sale.

Prices dropped 0.6 percent from the prior three months, the Federal Housing Finance Agency said today in a report from Washington. In June, prices retreated 4.3 percent from a year earlier, while increasing 0.9 percent from the previous month.

The U.S. inventory of homes for sale averaged 3.7 million during the second quarter, the highest since the third quarter of 2010, data from the National Association of Realtors show. The mortgages on 6.5 million U.S. homes had late payments or were in foreclosure in June, according to Lender Processing Services Inc. in Jacksonville, Florida.

It’s all the banks fault! Banks are evil! Banks should show forebearance, the way the neighbors would!

Members of the Vintage East Condominium Association in Miami Beach got tired of waiting for JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) to foreclose on unit 9, so they sued the bank in February to take control of the property.

In June, more than four years after the owner stopped making payments, a judge ruled that JPMorgan lost its claim to the $144,000 mortgage. The apartment is now on the market for $87,500, and the association may stave off insolvency with proceeds from the sale and a new owner who pays monthly dues, said Jane Losson, a board member at the complex.

Financially troubled condo associations are taking banks to court as foreclosure delays enable delinquent homeowners to stay in their buildings for years, often without paying dues that keep boards running. The groups start by pressuring lenders to speed up home seizures and take over payment of the monthly fees. In extreme situations, like the Vintage East case, associations may force banks to give up rights to the property.

The bank delays have left homes in the delinquency process longer. U.S. homeowners facing foreclosure averaged 587 days without making a mortgage payment in June, up from 251 days in January 2008, according to Lender Processing Services Inc. (LPS), a real estate information company in Jacksonville, Florida.

In Florida, where 14 percent of homes with a mortgage have a foreclosure notice, the average delinquent borrower hadn’t made a payment for 719 days, or almost two years, LPS data show.

What a surprise! European credit markets are sick:

Investors are demanding a yield of 42 per cent to buy Greek two year notes amid concern that bailouts won’t work.

In the corporate credit markets, huge financial institutions aren’t able to borrow for longer terms such as five years. There’s no credible market for their bonds, strategists say, but even guesses at the prices show interest rates that investors would demand from banks mean there’s no way they would borrow.

This is having a few knock-on effects:

UBS AG (UBSN)’s decision to cut 5 percent of its workforce brings to more than 40,000 the number of jobs cut by European banks in the past month as the region’s worsening sovereign debt crisis crimps trading revenue.

UBS, Switzerland’s biggest bank, said yesterday it will eliminate 3,500 jobs, mainly from its investment bank. It follows HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA), which announced 30,000 cuts on Aug. 1, Barclays Plc (BARC), which is cutting headcount by 3,000, and Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (RBS), which is eliminating 2,000 posts. Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN) announced 2,000 reductions on July 28.

European banks are slashing jobs this year six times faster than their U.S. peers, according to data compiled by Bloomberg…

I’m not the only one nervous about the ECB buying bad credits:

“In the long term, this can’t be good, and therefore should be tolerated at best for a short period of time,” Mr. Wulff said in the English text of his remarks, which were delivered in German. “The guardians of the currency, too, must quickly find their way back to the agreed principles. I regard the huge buy-up of government bonds of individual states by the European Central Bank as legally questionable.”

Mr. Wulff’s views are reflective more of the mood of the rank-and-file of Germany coalition government than of the government itself. German Chancellor Angel Merkel said in the eastern German city of Mageburg Wednesday that she would vigorously fight the breakup of the currency bloc.

The yield on two-year Greek debt surged to a record Wednesday, as investors demanded interest of more than 44 per cent to buy the security. Faith in the latest European effort to rescue Greece is waning as several of its euro-area partners demand collateral in return for aid payments. Greece earlier sent Finland cash to secure the Nordic country’s contribution to the pan-European bailout plan.

You win some, you lose some:

John Paulson, the billionaire who is betting on an economic recovery by the end of 2012, has lost about 14 percent this month on a merger arbitrage hedge fund, according to an investor.

The Paulson Partners Enhanced fund declined 11 percent this year through Aug. 19, said the investor, who asked not to be named because the information is private. The fund had been up 2.9 percent this year through Aug. 4.

Paulson’s merger-fund losses add to the declines his New York-based firm, Paulson & Co., has suffered on other strategies. His largest hedge fund, Paulson Advantage Plus, dropped 22 percent this month through Aug. 19, bringing its 2011 loss to 39 percent, the investor said.

I wonder how the Disadvantage Minus fund did!

DBRS confirmed AER.PR.A at Pfd-3.

S&P downgraded Sino-Forest yesterday:

  • We believe the delay in the findings of an independent committee’s investigation into fraud allegations is negative for Sino-Forest’s credit profile.
  • In addition, the company’s operating profit declined in the most recently reported financial quarter.
  • We are therefore lowering the corporate credit rating on Sino-Forest and the issue rating on its senior unsecured notes and convertible bonds to ‘B’ from ‘B+’.
  • We have kept all the ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications. We may withdraw or suspend the ratings if we believe information risk is too high, such as the company delays its results announcement for the third quarter of 2011 or the investigation is extended again.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 20bp, FixedResets gaining 12bp and DeemedRetractibles up 17bp. Good volatility, with the Performance Highlights table comprised completely of winners. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.45%, equivalent to about 7.08% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 4.95%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 210bp, a tightening from the 225bp reported August 17 as the yields converged slightly.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0672 % 2,148.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0672 % 3,231.0
Floater 2.82 % 2.54 % 27,906 20.95 4 0.0672 % 2,319.6
OpRet 4.89 % 2.20 % 55,343 0.58 9 0.0561 % 2,441.0
SplitShare 5.36 % 0.95 % 60,860 0.51 4 0.8570 % 2,500.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0561 % 2,232.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.67 % 5.01 % 129,402 2.00 14 0.0706 % 2,102.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.34 % 5.45 % 100,127 14.66 16 0.2016 % 2,235.0
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.15 % 207,459 2.69 60 0.1154 % 2,321.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 4.67 % 265,838 7.95 46 0.1733 % 2,187.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-24
Maturity Price : 24.68
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-24
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare 1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-24
Maturity Price : 21.18
Evaluated at bid price : 21.18
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 4.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-24
Maturity Price : 23.18
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
FTS.PR.E OpRet 256,350 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 150,000 and 75,000, both at 26.90. Desjardins crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.87
Bid-YTW : 2.20 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 171,454 TD crossed blocks of 68,000 and 25,000, both at 23.10. Desjardins crossed 30,000 at the same price. RBC crossed 25,000 and 11,100, both at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.06
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 138,870 Desjardins crossed 105,000 at 22.65; Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 22.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 76,909 RBC crossed blocks of 23,800 and 48,800, both at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 74,687 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 35,000 each, both at 27.29.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 69,975 Scotia crossed blocks of 40,000 and 25,000, both at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-24
Maturity Price : 23.43
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 24.00 – 24.65
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.4533

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-24
Maturity Price : 22.73
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 15.93 – 16.34
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.2862

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-24
Maturity Price : 15.93
Evaluated at bid price : 15.93
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.67 – 25.98
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2165

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %

POW.PR.C Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.12 – 25.43
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2182

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-08-24
Maturity Price : 24.82
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %

CU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.25 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1529

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %

CM.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.53 – 25.78
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1727

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %

Issue Comments

YLO MTN BuyBacks: Filings 2011-8-24

Details are available at SEDI.

YLO MTN Buybacks Disclosed 8/24
Issue Trade
Date
(?)
Face Value Price Yield
?
7.3% Feb 2, 2015 8/18 32,647,000 30,831,827 94.00 9.38%
Total for Issue to Date 120,427,000 113,745,119  
Grand Total to Date 215,441,350 194,563,732  
Yields have been calculated (using MS-Excel) assuming that the “Transaction Date” reported on SEDI is the Trade Date and that all trades were executed for normal settlement

The odd number for the total face value (a non-integral multiple of 1,000) has been previously discussed, so don’t start, OK? Totals include all filings commencing August 18.

Readers of the August edition of PrefLetter will understand that I am bitterly disappointed with the company’s decision to pursue buybacks by private contract; I feel that a Dutch Auction Tender, for all issues in one big pot (with conversion factors on the prices of different issues to reflect differing desirability to the company of purchasing the issues) would be a far better way to go.

YLO has the following preferred issues outstanding: YLO.PR.A, YLO.PR.B, YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D; the Normal Course Issuer Bid for these issues is still being pursued vigorously.