Market Action

September 19, 2007

Thanks, Rebel Traders (via WSJ)! 

Inflation numbers came out today, with the core rate in the US easing to 2.1% yoy, which some have taken as a validation of the Fed’s rate cut. The core rate in Canada is 2.1% yoy, but there are storm clouds on the horizon:

Signs inflation may pick up include a Sept. 14 Statistics Canada report showing unit labor costs, the cost of paying workers to produce an extra unit of a good, jumped 4.8 percent in the second quarter from a year earlier, the fastest since 1991. Also, average hourly wages rose the fastest in six years in August with the jobless rate at a 33-year low of 6 percent.

There are hopes that the PCE index will also come down – we will see! 

Another interesting trend is the increased linkage between energy and foodstuff prices. We’ve heard about the Italian pasta strike and Mexican tortilla protests. We may well see Canadian Jos. Louis riots if the trend continues.  

The authorities in general are loosening standards! Do they know something we don’t or what? The Bank of England has reversed its position on loosing loan standards, while the portfolio limits on the US Government Sponsored mortgage lenders are being relaxed. I suspect that James Hamilton will not be pleased. In addition to raising the portfolio limits, there is also pressure to increase the permitted size of each mortgage: Bernanke is not pleased:

“Both the size and composition of the portfolios should be tied to reforms that both reduce the systemic risks posed by the portfolios and also clarify the public purpose,” Bernanke said.

But – look at the situation: record foreclosures:

U.S. home prices fell by a record 3.2 percent in the second quarter, according to the S&P/Case-Shiller Index. Lawrence Yun, chief economist for the Chicago-based National Association of Realtors, has warned that year-over-year prices will fall for the first time since the Great Depression of the 1930s.

And the Congressional Budget Office has adopted a somewhat gloomy tone:

The recent market turmoil and a weakening of consumer confidence could “pose serious economic risks,” and as a result have “heightened” the chance of a recession, Congressional Budget Office Director Peter Orszag says in testimony before the Joint Economic Committee this morning.

The Brookings institution has published a commentary on current economic and regulatory issues – the author concludes, inter alia, that although the Fed wasn’t perfect in the 2004-06 period, they weren’t all that wrong, either. He also agrees with most of Levitt’s credit rating agency recommendations

On September 10 I noted a report of the destabilizing effect of mark-to-market accounting;  Moody’s has produced an interesting commentary:

The world would be a much safer place if all securities were held by “real money” buy-and-hold investors who did not have to mark to market, and who therefore did not have to make forced sales into panicked markets. Unfortunately, literally trillions of dollars of securities are now held by leveraged mark-to-market institutions relying on other people’s money to finance sometimes opaque, complex and risky investments.

CNR had a new bond issue today for USD 550-million that showed a few signs of the times: the purpose of the issue is to repay commercial paper and reduce the size of the accounts receivable securitization programme; and there is a poison put, whereby the bonds are puttable to the company at $101 upon a credit downgrade. While as a bond-guy I like the poison-put feature (and will pay more for the issue than its comparables because of it), as an amateur-economist guy and equity-guy, I’m not so sure. This will have the effect of forcing the bond market’s mark-to-market woes onto the operating company, which will have to find financing (or sweeten the terms of the deal and negotiate their way out of it) at the worst possible time. Hmm …

Other issuers today were Lehman and GE as well as Suncor. Money abounds for solid credits; the market is operating as it should in this, the most perfect of all possible worlds.

Another hedge fund has stopped redemptions, in what seems like a rather complex story in which the portfolio manager quit:

Homm said yesterday he quit after directors declined to follow his lead by turning down bonuses and contributing shares to support the funds during market turmoil. Absolute Capital said today it approved the bonuses Homm recommended.

Homm didn’t answer calls to his mobile phone, and Chief Executive Officer Jonathan Treacher didn’t immediately return calls to his office and mobile phone. In an interview yesterday, Treacher said he was “surprised” by Homm’s departure. “We never discussed him resigning,” he said.

The BCE saga, last reviewed about five weeks ago has taken another twist: the bondholders are going to court:

They want the deal declared a “reorganization” under the terms of the 1976 and 1996 trust indentures, which would require bondholder approval.

BCE bondholders argue the takeover is unfair will see them take “significant losses” since the debentures have lost “hundreds of millions of dollars” in market value since talks of the company going private began earlier this year.

As well, the debt for the leveraged buyout and related interest costs have caused one rating agency to downgrade the debentures from investment grade to junk status, the bonderholders argue.

It’s interesting that a rating agency downgrade should be considered worthy of mention – I thought we weren’t paying attention to them any more. PrefBlog’s crack investigative reporting team has discovered the fact that the issuer, BCE, is paying the credit ratings agencies! Video at 11.

Brad Setser has reviewed the larger implications of the liquidity crunch:

My wild guess is that some kind of new financial innovation will be necessary to end the (financial) droid wars …

Either that or there may be a lot of CDOs containing some housing exposure may be sitting around on various firms balance sheets for a very long time.

My guess? Hedge funds will arise that are more than happy to take care of the problem at a discount to market. I don’t think the banks will mind – the big losses will have been taken by by the original owners that were forced to sell. Not a big deal, really.

Cleveland Fed researchers have reviewed the slope of the yield curve again and its implications for recession probabilities, but note:

First, probabilities are themselves subject to error, as is the case with all statistical estimates. Second, other researchers have postulated that the underlying determinants of the yield spread today are materially different from the determinants that generated yield spreads during prior decades. Differences could arise from changes in international capital flows and inflation expectations, for example.

I suggest that any such readings taken now will reflect plain and simple panic. Let’s wait until panic has subsided and uncertainty has returned to normal levels before drawing any conclusions from the slope of the government yield curve.

US Equities continued their huge rally, but Canadian equities fell:

Canadian stocks fell, led by Suncor Energy Inc., on concern that a proposed oil and gas royalty increase may cut energy companies’ profits.

The province of Alberta should raise royalty rates to reap the benefits of rising prices, a report from a government-appointed task force said yesterday after markets closed.

The phrase “markets closed” should be read “markets closed Tuesday“, by the way.

Treasuries fell with steepening due to inflation fears.  Canadas followed.

Something of an odd Pref market today, with the PerpetualPremiums down and the PerpetualDiscounts up … given the action in the bond market, with the long end having an awful day, the opposite might have been expected. Assigning reasons to day-to-day fluctuations in any market, let alone the pref market, is something of an exercise in frustration, so we’ll just let that slide, shall we? Volume picked up a little today, a good sign.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.82% 4.77% 1,300,892 15.73 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.84% 4.75% 99,969 15.83 8 +0.3184% 1,035.5
Floater 4.47% 1.82% 84,202 10.79 3 +0.1232% 1,050.1
Op. Retract 4.83% 3.86% 76,114 3.86 15 -0.0376% 1,029.8
Split-Share 5.14% 4.88% 95,623 3.86 13 -0.2242% 1,045.4
Interest Bearing 6.30% 6.75% 65,855 4.26 3 -0.3362% 1,036.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.48% 5.09% 90,310 5.28 24 -0.1201% 1,031.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.04% 5.09% 245,066 15.72 38 +0.1156% 986.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.6358% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of September 14, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.82% (mostly interest) based on a bid of 9.02 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.5618% Asset coverage of 3.83:1 as of July 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.83% based on a bid of 22.06 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.0331% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 24.45 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat +1.4015%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
FFN.PR.A SplitShare 110,900 A split share, top of the list! Scotia crossed 96,300 at 10.39. Asset coverage of 2.53:1 as of September 14, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.69% based on a bid of 10.38 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-01 at 10.00.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat 39,700 TD crossed 17,400 at 24.65.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualPremium 24,200 Desjardins crossed 23,400 at 25.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.67% based on a bid of 25.87 and a call 2013-3-27 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 17,650 Closed at 20.20-25, 2×16. The virtually identical BAM.PR.M closed at 20.45-56, 5×1. BAM.PR.N now has a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.91% based on a bid of 20.20 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 17,533 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 23.11 and a limitMaturity.

There were eleven other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : March, 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-03-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,597.3 1 1.00 5.51% 14.7 67M 5.48%
FixedFloater 1,989.1 11 1.90 5.35% 14.4 183M 5.50%
Floater 1,512.3 4 1.75 5.48% 13.0 61M 6.07%
OpRet 1,448.3 35 1.23 4.71% 2.0 69M 6.16%
SplitShare 1,472.3 8 1.87 5.20% 5.3 97M 6.15%
Interest-Bearing 1,656.7 7 2.00 7.03% 3.0 171M 7.95%
Perpetual-Premium 1,177.9 1 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,246.7 11 1.54 5.72% 14.4 170M 5.77%

Index Constitution, 2001-03-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-03-30, Post-rebalancing

Market Action

September 18, 2007

The Fed cut by 50bp today, giving equities a big boost at the expense of long bonds and the greenback. As justification, their statement said:

Today’s action is intended to help forestall some of the adverse effects on the broader economy that might otherwise arise from the disruptions in financial markets and to promote moderate growth over time.

Readings on core inflation have improved modestly this year. However, the Committee judges that some inflation risks remain, and it will continue to monitor inflation developments carefully.

 For those keeping score, a handy guide to predictions of the Fed move by the brokerages houses was compiled by the WSJ Economics blog. Post-event reactions ranged from ‘Bold!’ to ‘Irresponsible!’. Tom Graff at Accrued Interest supplies an interesting prediction for the next two years.

James Hamilton of Econbrowser noted:

The Fed deliberately took a step back from its longer-run mission of containing inflation today. I don’t think Bernanke did so because he’d like to see 3-1/2 instead of 2-1/2 percent real growth next year. I’ve been saying all along that his intention is to squeeze inflation as much as possible without sending the economy into recession or financial crisis.

The verdict is still out on whether we’ve avoided one or both of those last two pitfalls. If we have, I’m not sure that the market’s confidence in another 50 basis points of cuts is warranted. If we haven’t, today’s exuberance in equity markets cannot be rational.

Well, US Core PPI looks OK anyway!

Over the past 12 months, producer prices rose 2.2 percent, down from a 4 percent increase in July. The year-over-year increase in costs excluding food and energy also eased to 2.2 percent compared with 2.3 percent in July.

In a highly interesting Canadian ABCP development, it looks like Dundee Bank flamed out:

Scotiabank will pay C$260 million in cash for Dundee Bank, a small bank that had been raking in deposits but was recently shaken by its exposure to a troubled corner of Canada’s asset-backed commercial paper sector, a short-term debt market that ground to a halt last month.

That was even after DundeeWealth said it will realize a net loss of about C$70 million on the sale of Dundee Bank “as a result of certain investments that are currently being valued below initial cost.”

DundeeWealth revealed on August 23 that the group was holding about C$400 million of commercial paper, instruments that are currently locked in a moratorium while the biggest players in that market try to hammer out a solution to prevent defaults.

I’d love to have more details on this. $70-million is an awful lot of mark-down on a $400-million position that, by all accounts, is reasonably well-secured with underlying assets anyway (albeit of a much longer term than originally intended). I wonder what else is going on with them? According to my interpretation of today’s DBRS rating confirmation, the problem was that they simply can’t place the money that has been deposited with them:

Aside from not yet achieving ongoing profitability, the Bank’s business model had become somewhat constrained given the recent credit market disruption. Without a lending operation, the Bank was relying on investments in collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) to support its deposit liabilities, a strategy that is no longer practicable in the current market. The Bank grew to about $2 billion in assets since it began operations in September 2006.

Dundee Wealth has a ten-year retractible, DW.PR.A, in the preferred share market, rated Pfd-3 by DBRS. The issue soared on the news, presumably on market speculation that it is effectively an obligation of Scotiabank now and therefore of much higher quality.

Does everybody remember my speculation about the possibility of  a spectacular flame-out if a large bank suddenly discovered its risk controls weren’t exactly perfect? Looks like one shop, anyway, has come close:

Calyon, the investment banking arm of France’s Credit Agricole SA, said third-quarter profit will be “sharply down” after an unauthorized proprietary trade cost the bank 250 million euros ($347 million).

Calyon discovered an “unusually large market position” on diversified credit market indexes at its New York unit on Sept. 4, the Paris-based company said in a statement today. The trade, which breached authorized limits, has no relation to the subprime mortgage market, the bank added.

And, finally …

US Equities roared upwards after the Fed rate cut, as did the Canadian market.

Treasuries pivoted:

The difference in yield, or spread, between two- and 10-year notes widened to 0.5 percentage point, the most since Aug. 21. The gap was about 0.38 percentage point before the Fed statement.

Always remember: the short end trades on monetary policy while the long end trades on inflation expectations (the 10-years trade on futures & mortgage hedging!). One of the most educational graphs I’ve ever seen was of the Gilt market for a period of some years in the ’90’s … a beautiful, huge, smooth pivot, centered on the 10-year which barely moved.

Canadas pivoted.

The preferred share market continued its quiet ways. Volume continues to be light; entertainment was provided by the DW.PR.A mentioned above.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.84% 4.79% 1,355,020 15.70 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.76% 98,358 15.81 8 +0.0211% 1,032.0
Floater 4.48% 1.82% 85,505 10.78 3 +0.0413% 1,048.8
Op. Retract 4.83% 3.93% 76,060 3.93 15 +0.1239% 1,030.2
Split-Share 5.13% 4.88% 95,302 3.87 13 -0.0406% 1,047.7
Interest Bearing 6.28% 6.73% 64,889 4.56 3 +0.1232% 1,039.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.47% 5.00% 90,174 4.62 24 +0.0512% 1,032.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 246,646 15.33 38 -0.0193% 985.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.2253% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.53% based on a bid of 10.48 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.0096% Closed at 20.59-70,2×2. The virtually identical BAM.PR.N closed at 20.13-10, 5×2. BAM.PR.M now has a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.80% based on a bid of 20.59 and a limitMaturity.
DFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.0476% Asset coverage of just over 2.8:1 as of August 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.32% based on a bid of 10.61 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.J PerpetualPremium 60,545 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.66% based on a bid of 26.01 and a call 2013-11-28 at 25.00.
TD.PR.M OpRet 34,330 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 26.35. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.84% based on a bid of 26.34 and a softMaturity 2013-10-30 at 25.00.
CM.PR.E PerpetualPremium 24,400 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.88% based on a bid of 26.66 and a call 2008-11-30 at 26.00.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 18,530 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.94% based on a bid of 22.85 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualPremium 17,340 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.47% based on a bid of 26.12 and a call 2013-3-27 at 25.00.

There were seven other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : February, 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-02-28
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,600.6 1 1.00 5.57% 14.6 49M 5.54%
FixedFloater 1,978.3 10 1.89 5.47% 14.0 198M 5.52%
Floater 1,500.7 4 1.75 5.90% 12.1 87M 6.54%
OpRet 1,434.4 35 1.20 4.80% 2.1 70M 6.10%
SplitShare 1,452.2 6 1.83 6.16% 5.3 71M 6.14%
Interest-Bearing 1,622.2 7 2.00 7.60% 10.1 168M 7.98%
Perpetual-Premium 1,150.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,217.5 12 1.58 5.79% 14.2 169M 5.83%

Index Constitution, 2001-02-28, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-02-28, Post-rebalancing

Issue Comments

SBN.PR.A Officially Rated by DBRS : Tough Standards!

DBRS released its official rating of Pfd-2(low) for this issue today:

The Company will aim to provide the Class A Shareholders with regular monthly cash distributions in an amount targeted to be 6.00% per annum on the net asset value (NAV) of the Class A Shares. No distributions will be paid to the Class A Shares if the asset coverage available to the Preferred Shares drops below 1.65. Furthermore, no special distributions will be paid to the Class A Shares if the payment would drop the Company NAV to less than $25 per unit; however, special distributions may be made to mitigate any potential tax liabilities to the Company.

The Pfd-2 (low) rating of the Preferred Shares is based on the downside protection available to the Preferred Shareholders, the credit quality and consistency of the BNS Shares dividend distributions, the dividend coverage for the Preferred Shares and the asset coverage test.

The main constraints to the rating are the following:

(1) The downside protection available to holders of the Preferred Shares depends totally on the value of the BNS Shares.

(2) The concentration of the entire portfolio in the BNS Shares.

(3) Changes in price and dividend policies of Bank of Nova Scotia may result in significantly less downside protection being available to the Preferred Shareholders.

Now, I don’t want to get into an endless game of ‘outguess the rating agency’, but the Pfd-2(low) rating looks a little low to me, compared with the other constituents of the SplitShare index. Or, perhaps, some of the Pfd-2 issues are due for a one-notch downgrade …

SBN.PR.A and some Competitors
Ticker Rating Asset
Coverage
Underlying
MUH.PR.A Pfd-2  1.49:1 Diversified 
FFN.PR.A Pfd-2  2.56:1 15 Financials
FBS.PR.B Pfd-2  2.88:1 Big 5 Banks
FTN.PR.A Pfd-2  2.75:1 15 Financials 
DFN.PR.A Pfd-2  2.82:1 15 Blue Chips
LBS.PR.A Pfd-2  2.45:1 4 Lifecos, 6 Banks
WFS.PR.A Pfd-2  2.05:1  30 Financials 
PIC.PR.A Pfd-2  1.73:1 Big 5 Banks
SBN.PR.A Pfd-2(low)  2.36:1  BNS Shares 
BNA.PR.A Pfd-2(low)  3.83:1 BAM.A Shares
LFE.PR.A Pfd-2(low)  2.72:1 4 LifeCo’s
ALB.PR.A Pfd-2(low)  2.01:1 Big 5 Banks
BNA.PR.C Pfd-2(low)  3.83:1 BAM.A Shares

Update: The Asset Coverage ratio in the chart has been corrected for ALB.PR.A – the ratio originally shown was incorrect. Thanks to cowboylutrell in the comments who pointed out this outbreak of boneheadism on my part.

Market Action

September 17, 2007

Panic, thy name is retail:

Despite the credit-market uproar, redemptions from money market funds were described as lower than expected at $915.5 million. Bond funds had $368.1 million in net redemptions excluding reinvested distributions, and Canadian equity funds had net redemptions of $578.4 million.

The only positive major category was balanced funds, offering conservative managed combination of stocks and fixed-income holdings. Canadian balanced funds endured $271.5 million in net redemptions, but the global balanced segment showed net sales of $670.5 million.

I’m sure that somebody, somewhere, has studied mutual fund cash flows vs. 12-month future returns. If anybody knows where I can find such a thing, let me know and I’ll post the link.

The Northern Rock crisis continues in Britain, with the stock dropping, customers crowding the withdrawal window and the Bank of England’s actions being questioned. The part I don’t understand is:

Northern Rock credit-default swaps increased 15 basis points to 170 basis points, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. The cost of the credit-default swaps, which traded as high as 210 basis points on Sept. 14, rises as creditworthiness deteriorates.

Only 170bp? You don’t have to look very hard to find higher prices than that in the North American markets … Countrywide & CIT Group are quoted in the mid-200s, for instance, and with all their problems they’re not actually suffering a run and getting publicly announced support from the Fed. Bear Stearns & Lehman are in the low-100s. Still – I haven’t actually looked at NR’s financials, so I’ll just pass on the tidbit without further comment.

But! After the UK markets closed, the following announcement was made:

The British government is to guarantee all existing deposits at troubled bank Northern Rock, Treasury Chief Alistair Darling said Monday.

People can continue to take their money out of the Northern Rock, but if they choose to leave their money in the bank it will be guaranteed safe and secure,” Darling said at a Downing Street press conference.

Now, that is a bail-out. I don’t know what to make of it … but my gut reaction is unfavourable.

Meanwhile, in LBO news … Blackstone might be getting a black eye:

PHH Corp., the mortgage lender and vehicle-fleet manager that agreed to be bought by General Electric Co. and Blackstone Group LP, said the sale may unravel after Blackstone failed to get $750 million in loans.

And Credit Suisse is taking a hit on First Data:

Credit Suisse, the lead arranger of financing for First Data Corp.’s LBO, last week agreed to lower the amount of loans that banks initially will sell to $5 billion from $14 billion, and cut the price to 96 cents on the dollar, said three people with knowledge of the talks. The discount alone could cost about $200 million.

Deutsche Bank AG, Germany’s biggest bank, and JPMorgan, the No. 3 U.S. bank, found buyers last week for the highest-yielding loans financing KKR’s purchase of U.K. pharmacist Alliance Boots. The banks had abandoned selling 6 billion pounds ($12 billion) of mostly senior loans in August because buyers weren’t interested.

Investors agreed to buy the loans at 95 cents on the dollar, according to bankers.

That concession followed the sale of loans to back the purchase of Allison Transmission, the Indianapolis-based auto- parts supplier, by Carlyle Group and Onex Corp. Banks led by Citigroup, the biggest U.S. bank, sold $1 billion of loans for the Allison purchase for 96 cents on the dollar.

The fact that these loans are moving at all, albeit at a hefty discount, will be welcome news for holders of BCE Prefs. BCE common was down a tad today, but well within the boundaries of random jiggle-jaggles.

Oil prices set a new record today, which might have long term implications for the Gulf states:

It should go without saying that the strong oil/ weak dollar mix creates real problems for all the Gulf countries that insist (still) on pegging to the dollar.   They are effectively importing a weak currency and low nominal interest rates when there economies are booming.   The result: massive inflation and very negative real rates that are adding to the boom now, but risk creating problems later.

Three income trusts have celebrated oil’s rise by cutting their distributions:

Income-trust distribution malaise spread through the oilpatch Monday as Enterra Energy Trust (TSX: ENT-UN.TO) suspended its payout while Wellco Energy Services Trust (TSX: WLL-UN.TO) cut its distribution in half.

Those moves followed a 10 per cent distribution reduction Friday by Pengrowth Energy Trust (TSX: PGF-UN.TO) and extended a wave of payout disappointments for investors, particularly in energy services trusts.

NovaStar, mentioned here on September 4 is in the news again:

NovaStar Financial Inc., the subprime home lender trying to survive by conserving cash, scrapped plans to pay a dividend on 2006 profit and will forfeit its real estate investment trust tax status as a result.

The mortgage company, one of more than 110 that have halted lending or left the business since the start of 2006, said in a statement that the loss of REIT status will have a “significant adverse impact” on third-quarter results. Kansas City, Missouri- based NovaStar is reviewing its listing requirements with the New York Stock Exchange.

“Clearly, we did not anticipate the drop in market value or the level of demands on liquidity caused by the market turmoil this summer,” said Chief Executive Officer Scott Hartman in the statement. “Canceling the previously planned dividend is the only reasonable and prudent course of action.”

James Hamilton of Econbrowser thinks enormous pressure for increased regulation is inevitable – and, at least to some degree, desirable. Econbrowser’s other principal, Menzie Chinn, notes:

As social scientists, we should try to explain why the current Administration behaves in this manner. One approach is the capture and ideology perspective of Kalt and Zupan (1984). Although not directly applicable (since their study was of legislative actions), the framework is of interest. If policy is captured by economic interests, then analysis is irrelevant. If ideology is paramount, then again analysis is irrelevant.

Oh, it’s a glorious world, where evidence, argument and analysis are irrelevant!

US Equities were off a bit, having run aground on the Northern Rock (and a sudden realization that maybe the Fed doesn’t actually have to cut by 50bp tomorrow if they don’t feel like it); Canadian equities followed.

Short-term Treasuries also fell, flattening the curve; Canadian ten-years rose, flattening the curve.

Preferreds didn’t do much on low volume, although the SplitShare and InterestBearing sectors drifted up a bit.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.85% 4.81% 1,411,410 15.67 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.76% 99,562 15.82 8 +0.0257% 1,031.8
Floater 4.48% 2.98% 86,466 10.80 3 -0.0254% 1,048.4
Op. Retract 4.84% 3.91% 75,506 3.13 15 +0.0137% 1,028.9
Split-Share 5.13% 4.79% 95,847 3.87 13 +0.2558% 1,048.1
Interest Bearing 6.25% 6.74% 64,535 4.54 3 +0.1718% 1,038.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.47% 5.04% 88,998 5.24 24 -0.0918% 1,032.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 249,244 15.06 38 +0.0064% 985.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.2622% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 24.25 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +1.4634% Closed at 20.80-87, 7×6. The virtually identical BAM.PR.N closed at 20.11-21, 2×1. There are things in life that I don’t understand. BAM.PR.M now has a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.74% based on a bid of 20.80 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
FTN.PR.A SplitShare 66,700 Asset coverage of about 2.5:1 as of August 31 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.69% based on a bid of 10.08 and a hardMaturity 2008-12-01 at 10.00.
ACO.PR.A OpRet 23,725 Scotia crossed 18,400 at 26.65. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.33% based on a bid of 26.30 and a call 2009-12-31 at 25.50.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 21,700 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 23.13 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.R OpRet 15,120 Scotia dominated the action, buying 14,820 of the shares and selling 14,800. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.29% based on a bid of 26.01 and a call 2009-5-30 at 25.60.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare 37,915 Asset coverage of just under 2.1:1 as of September 6 according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.80% based on a bid of 10.15 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.

There were four other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : January, 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-01-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,599.8 1 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,983.1 10 1.89 5.74% 4.0 251M 5.50%
Floater 1,506.5 4 1.75 5.87% 12.3 68M 6.48%
OpRet 1,428.8 32 1.19 4.79% 2.2 90M 6.14%
SplitShare 1,477.4 7 1.86 5.54% 5.4 65M 5.97%
Interest-Bearing 1,629.7 7 2.00 7.35% 3.2 158M 7.95%
Perpetual-Premium 1,196.1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,224.9 11 1.63 5.79% 14.1 145M 5.80%

Index Constitution, 2001-01-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-01-31, Post-rebalancing

PrefLetter

PrefLetter for September, 2007, Released!

The September edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the September, 2007 issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the October, 2007 issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close October 12 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on October 15.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Market Action

September 14, 2007

Retail Sales in the US were unexpectedly weak in August, adding to the rationale for a Fed Rate cut (although the numbers are considered highly adjustable by some). Tom Graff uses a Taylor Rule (parameterized as a trading indicator, not as a policy gauge) to estimate the future Fed Funds Rate as 3.75% down 150bp from current, while emphasizing that he considers it a qualitative measure of direction, rather than an actual prediction. Fed Funds Futures are now predicting a value of about 4.5% at year-end. The use of the Taylor rule to determine neutrality – and the effects of getting it wrong – was discussed at the recent Jackson Hole conference. Economic chatter leans to a 25bp cut.

It will be most interesting to see the reaction of USD LIBOR and USD CP rates to whatever the Fed ends up doing. There are definite indications that USD ABCP investors are anticipating a rate cut – perhaps the next weekly Federal Reserve report on ABCP will not show such a huge decline. That will annoy the banks! Cushioning fear-driven liquidity shocks is their bread and butter:

This paper argues that banks have a unique ability to hedge against market-wide liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide funding for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, one dimension of bank “specialness” is that banks can insure firms against systematic declines in market liquidity at lower cost than other financial institutions. We provide supporting empirical evidence from the commercial paper (CP) market. When market liquidity dries up and CP spreads increase, banks experience funding inflows. These flows allow banks to meet increased loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from pre-existing commercial paper backup lines, without running down their holdings of liquid assets. Using bank-level data, we provide evidence that implicit government support for banks during crises explains the funding flows.

From the same paper, incidentally:

Banks’ functioning as liquidity insurance providers originated early in the development of the commercial paper market. In 1970, Penn Central Transportation Company filed for bankruptcy with more than $80 million in commercial paper outstanding. As a result of their default, investors lost confidence in other large commercial paper issuers, making it difficult for some of these firms to refinance their paper as it matured. The Federal Reserve responded to the Penn Central crisis by lending aggressively to banks through the discount window and encouraging them, in turn, to provide liquidity to their large borrowers (Kane, 1974). In response to this difficulty, commercial paper issuers thereafter began purchasing backup lines of credit from banks to insure against future funding disruptions (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999).

David Dodge is quoted in The Economist as saying:

He acknowledged that the Bank of Canada may itself have played a role in stoking the excesses by not raising interest rates enough. “One can see in retrospect that we should have been driving those rates harder than we did, because in reality credit conditions were being eased by increased securitisation and movement of stuff off balance [sheet],” he says.

Presumably, therefore, decreased securitization and movement of stuff onto balance sheet is a de facto tightening.

Meanwhile, China is hiking rates due to inflation concerns. There is evidence that the effect of high levels of imports from China is shifting to inflationary from deflationary. And Brad Setser is puzzled about the current account deficit and how it relates to the investment income balance:

Since the US has a borrowed a lot more – about $ 5 trillion more — than it has lent out, mathematically, a constant deficit on the interest balance implies that either that the interest rate on US lending has to be rising faster than the interest rate on US borrowing or that the interest rate on US borrowing has to be falling faster than the interest rate on US lending.

If I did all the calculations correctly, it turns out that the implied interest rate on US lending has been constant (at around 4.7%) while the implied interest rate on US borrowing is actually falling, from a bit under 4.4% in 2006 to 4.25% in the first half 2007.

The Credit Rating Agencies are beginning to take a little more action to polish their public profile. Moody’s has published some reflections on liquidity and flight to quality, and promise more. They note:

The need for a liquid and transparent secondary market for structured product may delay a recovery in primary issuance as investors will avoid purchasing an asset in the primary market if a similar asset can be purchased in the secondary market at a lower price. Therefore, greater transparency will be required of the secondary market as well as lower prices (or better protection) in the primary market. The liquidity risk premium is going to be higher and investors will be reluctant to buy these products unless there is some degree of standardization and secondary market liquidity. Marked to market actors may be reluctant to buy customized product, and higher risk premia could temporarily reduce the economic attractiveness of securitization for certain classes.

Illiquidity was highlighted as one of six “key vulnerabilities” of the UK financial system in the Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report of April 2007:

Unusually low premia for bearing risk, especially in credit markets. Benign current economic conditions, the greater dispersal of credit risk and confidence that market liquidity will remain high may have weakened risk assessment standards. If risk perceptions were to adjust, unexpectedly large shifts in market liquidity might lead to sharper asset price changes than anticipated by market participants, with knock-on effects on counterparty credit risk.

The moral of the story is: liquidity is a risk! Investors may intend to buy and hold but the consequences of having to sell (or wishing to sell due to credit concerns) into an illiquid market can be severe. The best defense is, as always, a broadly diversified portfolio with the individual elements bearing a wide variety of risk/reward profiles. Just look at HSBC: what they’re losing on sub-prime, they’re making up on insurance.

Thomson, issuer of the TOC.PR.B floaters, has been downgraded by Moody’s from A3 to Baa1. Moody’s did not specifically address preferred shares; I believe they have a mandate only for Thomson’s USD debt.

BCE holders will be interested in the latest news from junk-land. Prices on TXU and First Data common have gotten closer to the deal price on hopes that financing will not kill the deal. Several others have also narrowed, but poor old Sallie Mae is a wallflower, now that Dad’s cutting her allowance. The First Data bond deal is getting done, albeit at a spread almost 100bp more than originally intended, with more restrictive covenants. Investment grade issuers are issuing lots of paper, swallowing the high spreads; presumably they are calculating their spread to some kind of ‘non-panic’ government yield rather than actual market levels.

US Equities finished a great weak on a quiet note; as did stocks in Canada. Both Treasuries and Canadas were boring.

Volume in preferred shares was extremely light, which is leading to some strange pricing moves. The market looks quite sloppy, although now that the BCE issues are acting a little bit more like Pfd-2(lows) again, my curve-fitting is showing reasonable goodness-of-fit. It’s one of them conundrum thingies!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.87% 4.83% 1,470,158 15.64 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.76% 100,732 15.82 8 +0.0005% 1,031.5
Floater 4.48% 1.33% 87,071 10.77 3 +0.1645% 1,048.7
Op. Retract 4.84% 3.83% 75,358 3.07 15 -0.0200% 1,028.8
Split-Share 5.14% 4.91% 95,378 3.88 13 -0.2947% 1,045.5
Interest Bearing 6.26% 6.76% 64,304 4.54 3 +0.0752% 1,036.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.47% 5.01% 89,370 5.26 24 +0.0853% 1,033.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 251,510 15.07 38 +0.0100% 985.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.1038% On volume of – count ’em – 55 shares. Somebody moved the bid up and the fish still wouldn’t bite! Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of September 7 according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.54% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.16 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
FAL.PR.H Scraps (Would be PerpetualPremium, but there are credit concerns) 150,800 Scotia crossed 100,000 at 25.10, then Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 25.10 and a call 2008-4-30 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 17,075 It seems to me that retail is nibbling away at these things since the price collapse. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.96% based on a bid of 20.02 and a limitMaturity. Closed at 20.02-10, 6×45; the almost identical BAM.PR.M closed at 20.50-59, 1×1, on volume of 8,500. Which is one of my conundrums! Why pay fifty cents when you can pay ten?
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 16,820 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.98% based on a bid of 22.78 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.A OpRet 12,655 Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 25.50. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.88% based on a bid of 25.40 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 11,040 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.86% based on a bid of 23.45 and a limitMaturity.

There were NO other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : December, 2000

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2000-12-29
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,528.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,973.2 11 1.90 5.91% 4.0 247M 5.54%
Floater 1,439.3 4 1.75 6.50% 11.6 73M 6.99%
OpRet 1,424.8 32 1.19 4.62% 2.2 97M 6.12%
SplitShare 1,471.9 6 1.83 5.44% 5.5 86M 6.01%
Interest-Bearing 1,609.0 7 2.00 7.57% 3.5 172M 8.05%
Perpetual-Premium 1,161.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,189.8 12 1.58 5.77% 14.1 128M 5.93%

Index Constitution, 2000-12-29, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2000-12-29, Post-rebalancing