Market Action

December 13, 2011

European banks are frantically raising cash:

European banks, under pressure from regulators to bolster capital, are selling some of their fastest-growing businesses to competitors from outside the region — at the expense of future profit and economic growth.

Spain’s Banco Santander SA (SAN), Belgium’s KBC Groep NV (KBC) and Germany’s Deutsche Bank AG are accelerating plans to exit profitable operations outside their home markets. Santander, which said in October it needs to plug a 5.2 billion-euro ($6.9 billion) capital gap, sold its Colombian unit last week to Chile’s Corpbanca for $1.16 billion. Deutsche Bank is weighing options including a sale of most of its asset-management unit, while KBC may dispose of businesses in Poland.

The MF Global inquiry continues:

Henri Steenkamp, chief financial officer of MF Global, and Bradley Abelow, the firm’s president and chief operating officer, said in testimony prepared for a Senate Agriculture Committee hearing today that they still don’t know the location of the funds.

Jon S. Corzine, former chairman and chief executive officer of the broker, is scheduled to testify at the same witness table, after telling U.S. House lawmakers last week that he never intended to authorize any misuse of client money.

“I do not know why these funds cannot be accounted for, but based on the fact that no shortfalls had been reported to me previously, it appears that any irregularities were likely caused by events that occurred shortly before the bankruptcy filing,” Steenkamp said in the testimony.

I’ve expressed doubts about all this before, and continue to believe that if there actually were nefarious activities, then by now the trustee would be able to testify that “On November X there was a transfer from MF Account Y to a third party account Z instigated by Mr. A” … but that’s not happening. Instead, everybody’s muttering darkly about ‘missing funds’. I suspect that this is mostly, if not entirely, regulatory theatre.

Why do I suspect this? Because that’s what always happens. Nobody’s name will be cleared until nobody cares any more, and in three years we’ll just be left with a hazy memory of executive misconduct foiled by the heroic efforts of dedicated regulatory staff.

But now there’s a theory!

One working theory for the missing money is that it was taken from customer accounts and not replaced with equal collateral, as mandated by law, according to the people familiar with the investigation. Then, they said, after the funds were moved to the broker-dealer unit of MF Global they may have been used to pay margin on the repurchase agreements.

Unless the books are complete spaghetti, I don’t see how that could possibly take more than a day or two to confirm.

The FOMC statement was cheery:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in November suggests that the economy has been expanding moderately, notwithstanding some apparent slowing in global growth. While indicators point to some improvement in overall labor market conditions, the unemployment rate remains elevated. Household spending has continued to advance, but business fixed investment appears to be increasing less rapidly and the housing sector remains depressed. Inflation has moderated since earlier in the year, and longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.

The Committee also decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions–including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the medium run–are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.

Voting against the action was Charles L. Evans, who supported additional policy accommodation at this time.

DBRS confirmed BNA at Pfd-2(low):

The downside protection available to the Class AA Preferred Shares is approximately 66.0%, based on the market value of the BAM Shares as of November 25, 2011. The dividend coverage ratio is approximately 1.1 times. As a result, the Company will initially be able to fund the Class AA Preferred Shares distributions without relying on other methods for generating income or reverting to the sale of common shares in the Portfolio. In the event of a shortfall, the Company will sell some of the BAM Shares or write covered call options to generate sufficient income to satisfy its obligations to pay the Class AA Preferred Shares dividends.

The Pfd-2 (low) ratings of the Class AA Preferred Shares are primarily based on the downside protection and dividend coverage available to the Class AA Preferred Shares.

S&P has applied revised methodology to North American banks, which has had an effect on TD, BMO, CM, BNS and RY. NA escaped unscathed.

It was a strong day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 18bp, FixedResets up 12bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 12bp. Volatility was good. Volume was a little below par.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3444 % 2,038.3
FixedFloater 4.91 % 4.66 % 34,707 17.03 1 -0.8709 % 3,138.9
Floater 3.27 % 3.56 % 66,943 18.39 3 -0.3444 % 2,200.9
OpRet 4.92 % 1.52 % 57,286 1.42 6 0.5970 % 2,482.8
SplitShare 5.80 % 6.54 % 61,860 5.11 3 0.4965 % 2,528.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5970 % 2,270.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.50 % 2.87 % 89,932 0.85 18 -0.0065 % 2,166.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.23 % 5.19 % 104,401 15.09 12 0.1838 % 2,318.2
FixedReset 5.10 % 3.04 % 219,116 2.49 64 0.1179 % 2,342.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.03 % 4.19 % 192,062 3.31 46 0.1229 % 2,230.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.I FixedReset -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.81
Bid-YTW : 4.40 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.79
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 2.82 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 2.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-13
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.D FixedReset 127,251 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-13
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 109,371 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 shares, 39,000 and 11,000, al at 25.24.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 4.32 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Premium 97,905 TD bought 17,100 from Nesbitt at 25.30, then crossed 40,000 at the same price. RBC crossed 14,400 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 5.07 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 66,073 RBC crossed 40,500 at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-13
Maturity Price : 23.44
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 66,000 Nesbitt crossed 65,000 at 27.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 2.82 %
BMO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 35,212 TD crossed 30,000 at 27.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.19
Bid-YTW : 2.53 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.80 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2604

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %

MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 21.11 – 21.53
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.3177

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.11
Bid-YTW : 6.66 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.21 – 26.49
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1937

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %

CU.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.70 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2254

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-12
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : -12.79 %

MFC.PR.A OpRet Quote: 25.25 – 25.44
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1209

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %

SLF.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 23.51 – 23.70
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1237

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.51
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %

Issue Comments

TLM.PR.A Does Not Charm Market

Talisman Energy Inc. has announced:

it has completed the sale to a syndicate of underwriters led by RBC Capital Markets and CIBC of 8,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable Rate Reset First Preferred Shares, Series 1 at a price of CAD$25.00 per share, pursuant to its previously announced public offering of the preferred shares in Canada.

There was a greenshoe for another 2-million shares which was not exercised.

TLM.PR.A is a FixedReset, 4.20%+277 announced December 5. The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

The issue traded 68,600 shares in a range of 24.25-88 before closing at 24.10-25. Vital statistics are:

TLM.PR.A FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-13
Maturity Price : 22.82
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
Issue Comments

TD: Preferred Technical Downgrade on Global Scale by S&P

Standard and Poor’s has announced:

  • Following a review of The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD Bank) under Standard & Poor’s revised bank criteria (published on Nov. 9, 2011), we are affirming our ratings on the bank, including the ‘AA-/A-1+’ long- and short-term issuer credit ratings. The outlook is stable.
  • The ratings on TD Bank are based on its strong business position, adequate capital and earnings, adequate risk position, and above-average funding and adequate liquidity, compared with those of global peers with the same industry and economic risk scores.
  • The ratings on TD Bank benefit from a one-notch uplift for potential extraordinary government support in a crisis.
  • We expect stable performance from TD Bank’s retail-oriented Canadian and U.S. franchises, based on resilient asset quality and ongoing revenue growth opportunities, despite an uncertain economic outlook.

As we previously announced, on Dec. 13, 2011, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD Bank), including the ‘AA-/A-1+’ long- and short-term issuer credit ratings. The stand-alone credit profile (SACP) on TD Bank is ‘a+’. In addition, we lowered the rating on TD Bank’s nondeferrable subordinated debt to ‘A’ from ‘A+’ and the rating on its preferred shares to ‘A-‘ from ‘A’. The outlook is stable.

The Preferred Share Scale ratings for the issue remain at P-1(low).

TD has the following issues outstanding: TD.PR.O, TD.PR.P, TD.PR.Q and TD.PR.R (DeemedRetractible) and TD.PR.A, TD.PR.C, TD.PR.E, TD.PR.G, TD.PR.I, TD.PR.K, TD.PR.S and TD.PR.Y (FixedReset).

Issue Comments

BMO: Preferred Technical Downgrade by S&P

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • Following a review of Bank of Montreal (BMO) under our revised bank criteria (published on Nov. 9, 2011), we are affirming our ‘A+/A-1’ issuer credit rating on BMO. The outlook is stable.
  • Our rating on BMO reflects our adequate scores for the bank’s business position, capital and earnings, and risk position, and average funding and adequate liquidity.
  • The issuer credit rating on BMO incorporates one notch of uplift, reflecting BMO’s high systemic importance in Canada and our assessment of the Canadian government as supportive.
  • We expect the bank to continue to generate consistent earnings, supported by its stable retail banking operations and to benefit from its higher proportion of commercial lending with better growth prospects and manageable loan losses.

As we previously announced, on Dec. 13, 2011, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services affirmed its ‘A+/A-1’ issuer credit rating on Bank of Montreal (BMO). The stand-alone credit profile (SACP) is ‘a’. At the same time, we lowered our ratings on the bank and its subsidiaries’ hybrid securities and preferred stock to ‘BBB+’ from ‘A-‘, two notches below the SACP, consistent with application of our revised bank hybrid capital criteria (published Nov. 1, 2011). The outlook is stable.

As a result of this, the global scale rating is now BBB+; the preferred scale rating is P-2(high); for all issues.

BMO has the following preferred share issues outstanding: BMO.PR.H, BMO.PR.J, BMO.PR.K and BMO.PR.L (DeemedRetractible); and BMO.PR.M, BMO.PR.N, BMO.PR.O, BMO.PR.P and BMO.PR.Q (FixedReset).

Issue Comments

CM: Preferred Technical Downgrade by S&P

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • Following a review under Standard & Poor’s revised bank criteria (published on Nov. 9, 2011), we have affirmed our ‘A+/A-1’ issuer credit rating on Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC). The outlook is
    stable.

  • Our ratings on CIBC reflect our adequate assessments for its business position, capital and earnings, risk position, and liquidity, and average funding.
  • The ratings on CIBC benefit from one notch of uplift for potential extraordinary government support in a crisis.
  • We expect CIBC’s profitability to continue to improve as loan quality improves and the company further executes on its core banking strategy.

As we previously announced, on Dec. 13, 2011, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services affirmed its ‘A+/A-1’ issuer credit rating (ICR) on CIBC. The outlook is stable. The stand-alone credit profile (SACP) is ‘a’. In addition, we lowered the rating on CIBC’s nondeferrable subordinated debt to ‘A-‘ from ‘A’ and the rating on its preferred stock to ‘BBB+’ from ‘A-‘. CIBC’s nondeferrable subordinated debt is rated one notch below the ‘a’ SACP as opposed to being notched from the ‘A+’ ICR, based on our new hybrid criteria. Nondeferrable subordinated debt is rated below a bank’s SACP in countries whose legal or regulatory frameworks may not support this type of debt in a stress scenario. Recent guidance from Canada’s Office of the Superintendant of Financial Institutions expresses an expectation that all Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments “must be able to absorb losses in a failed financial institution.” We expect different treatment would apply to capital instruments and senior debt as a Canadian bank approaches a state of nonviability. Preferred stock is rated two notches below the ‘a’ SACP, consistent with our new hybrid criteria.

CM has the following preferred share issues outstanding: CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E and CM.PR.G (PerpetualPremium); CM.PR.I, CM.PR.J and CM.PR.P (DeemedRetractible); and CM.PR.K, CM.PR.L and CM.PR.M (FixedReset).

The change has affected the rating of the preferreds on the local scale: CM.PR.D and CM.PR.E are now P-2 (CM.PR.G is not rated by S&P): all other issues are now P-2(high).

Issue Comments

BNS: Preferred Technical Downgrade on Global Scale by S&P

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • Following a review of the Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) under Standard & Poor’s revised bank criteria (published on Nov. 9, 2011), we are affirming the ‘AA-/A-1+’ long- and short-term issuer credit ratings on
    BNS. The outlook is stable.

  • Our ratings on BNS reflect the bank’s strong business position, adequate
    capital and earnings, strong risk position, and average funding and adequate liquidity, as our criteria define these terms.

  • The ratings on BNS benefit from a one-notch uplift for potential extraordinary government support in a crisis.
  • We expect the bank to continue to generate consistent earnings supported by its stable retail banking operations and manageable loan losses.

As we previously announced, on Dec. 13, 2011, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services affirmed its ‘AA-/A-1+’ long- and short-term issuer credit ratings on The Bank of Nova Scotia. The outlook is stable. At the same time, we lowered the ratings on the bank and its subsidiaries’ hybrid securities and preferred stock to ‘A-‘ from ‘A’, two notches below the SACP, consistent with the application of our revised bank hybrid capital criteria (published Nov. 1, 2011).

The issues remain at P-1(low) on the Preferred Scale.

BNS has the following issues outstanding: BNS.PR.J, BNS.PR.K, BNS.PR.L, BNS.PR.M, BNS.PR.N and BNS.PR.O (DeemedRetractible) and BNS.PR.P, BNS.PR.Q, BNS.PR.R, BNS.PR.T, BNS.PR.X, BNS.PR.Y and BNS.PR.Z (FixedReset).

Issue Comments

RY: Preferred Technical Downgrade on Global Scale by S&P

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • Following a review of Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) under Standard & Poor’s revised bank criteria (published Nov. 9, 2011), we are affirming the ‘AA-/A-1+’ issuer credit ratings on the bank. The outlook is stable.
  • Our ratings on RBC are based on its strong business position, moderate capital and earnings, strong risk position, and average funding and adequate liquidity, as our criteria define these terms.
  • The issuer credit rating on RBC receives one notch of uplift, reflecting RBC’s high systemic importance in Canada and our assessment of the Canadian government as supportive.
  • We expect the bank to continue to generate consistent earnings supported
    by its premier business franchises in Canada with its stable retail banking operations and manageable loan losses.

As we previously announced, on Dec. 13, 2011, Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services affirmed its ‘AA-/A-1+’ issuer credit ratings on Royal Bank of Canada (RBC). The stand-alone credit profile (SACP) is ‘a+’. The outlook is stable. At the same time, we lowered the ratings on the bank and its subsidiaries’ hybrid securities and preferred stock to ‘A-‘ from ‘A’, two notches below the SACP, consistent with application of our revised bank hybrid capital criteria (published Nov. 1, 2011).

We also lowered our ratings on RBC and its subsidiaries’ nondeferrable subordinated debt to ‘A’ from ‘A+’. RBC’s nondeferrable subordinated debt is rated off the ‘a+’ SACP as opposed to being notched from the ‘AA-‘ issuer credit rating, based on our new hybrid criteria. We stipulate that nondeferrable subordinated debt would be rated below a bank’s SACP in countries whose legal or regulatory frameworks may not support this type of debt in a stress scenario. Recent guidance from the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) expresses an expectation that, after a transition period, all Tier 1 and 2 capital instruments “must be able to absorb losses in a failed financial institution”. Standard & Poor’s expects differentiated treatment would apply to capital instruments and senior debt as a Canadian bank approaches a state of nonviability.

The issues remain at P-1(low) on the Preferred Scale.

RY has the following preferred shares outstanding: RY.PR.A, RY.PR.B, RY.PR.C, RY.PR.D, RY.PR.E, RY.PR.F, RY.PR.G and RY.PR.H (DeemedRetractible); RY.PR.I, RY.PR.L, RY.PR.N, RY.PR.P, RY.PR.R RY,PR.T, RY.PR.X and RY.PR.Y (FixedReset); and RY.PR.W (PerpetualDiscount)

Issue Comments

SLF Put on CreditWatch Negative by S&P

Sun Life Financial announced December 12:

the completion of a major strategic review of its businesses. Dean A. Connor, President and Chief Executive Officer, said the company will be repositioned to accelerate growth, improve return on shareholders’ equity and reduce volatility by concentrating its future growth into four key pillars:

  • Continuing to build on its leadership position in Canada in insurance, wealth management and employee benefits;
  • Becoming a leader in group insurance and voluntary benefits in the U.S.;
  • Supporting continued growth in MFS Investment Management, and broadening Sun Life’s other asset management businesses around the world; and
  • Strengthening Sun Life’s competitive position in Asia.

As a result of this strategic review, the Company announced that it will close its domestic U.S. variable annuity and individual life products to new sales effective December 30, 2011. The decision to discontinue sales in these two lines of business is based on unfavourable product economics which, due to ongoing shifts in capital markets and regulatory requirements, no longer enhance shareholder value. This decision reflects the Company’s intensified focus on reducing volatility and improving the return on shareholders’ equity by shifting capital to businesses with superior growth, risk and return characteristics.

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • Sun Life Financial Inc. announced that it will discontinue sales of its U.S. variable annuity (VA) and U.S. individual life products effective Dec. 31, 2011.
  • We have placed our ratings on Sun Life Financial Inc., including our ‘A’ counterparty credit rating, on CreditWatch with negative implications, reflecting the potential loss of earnings quality and diversification at the holding company.
  • In addition, we have revised our view of Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.) and subsidiaries (SLUS) to nonstrategically important to Sun Life Financial Inc., from core.
  • As a result, we lowered our long-term counterparty and financial strength rating on SLUS to ‘A-‘ and placed the ratings on CreditWatch with negative implications.
  • The ratings on the Canadian entities within the group are unaffected.


We expect to resolve the CreditWatch within three months, following a more in-depth analysis of the SLUS prospective stand-alone capitalization, earnings, the details of the run-off plan, and the potential parental support.

We could affirm the ratings on Sun Life Financial if, upon further analysis, we believe the loss of earnings from SLUS is immaterial and coverage ratios and earnings diversification from remaining operations continue to support the current holding company notching. Otherwise, we could lower our ratings on the holding company by one notch, so that we would rate it three notches below the financial strength rating on the group’s core subsidiaries instead of the current two notches.

In contrast:

DBRS has today commented on the decision announced today by Sun Life Financial Inc. (SLF or the Company) to stop selling variable annuity and individual life insurance products in the U.S. market. DBRS views the decision favourably. There are no rating changes as a result of this action.

SLF has the following preferred shares outstanding: SLF.PR.A, SLF.PR.B, SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E (DeemedRetractible) and SLF.PR.F, SLF.PR.G, SLF.PR.H and SLF.PR.I (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™ and assigned to their respective indices.

Issue Comments

MFC.PR.G Underwriters' Clearance Sale

Usually reliable sources tell me that the underwriters of MFC.PR.G are blowing out their inventory at 23.75.

MFC.PR.G is a 4.40%+290 FixedReset that settled December 6 to widespread revulsion and despair … the inventory blow-out is happening while the ink’s still wet on the certificate!

It is interesting to compare this with the BCE.PR.K reopening announced yesterday … BCE.PR.K is a 4.15%+188 FixedReset trading at around par.

I don’t get it.

You want to talk about BCE being a better credit than MFC? We can talk. You want to talk about BCE being non-financial and therefore having some scarcity value? We can talk. But is that worth A WHOLE FRIGGIN’ POINT of dividend after reset? Even before accounting for the price difference? You better talk real good!

Market Action

December 12, 2011

The European governments need the banks, because the banks buy their debt. Guess who the banks depend on?

European banks turning to their governments to raise required capital could trigger a downward spiral of declining sovereign-debt prices and further losses for the lenders.

The European Banking Authority ordered the region’s banks on Dec. 8 to raise 115 billion euros ($154 billion) by June. Faced with dwindling profits and unable to tap capital markets to sell new shares, firms may be forced to seek government help. About 70 percent of the capital requirement falls on lenders in Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal, countries struggling to convince the world they can pay their debts.

“If the Southern governments put money in their banks, their sovereign debt will go up, exacerbating their problems,” said Karel Lannoo, chief executive officer of the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels. “Then the banks’ losses will rise because they hold the government debt. That’s a vicious cycle. It’s hard to know which one to stabilize first, the sovereign bonds or the banks.”

Moody’s blue:

European leaders unveiled a blueprint after meetings on Dec. 8 and 9 for a closer fiscal accord to save the euro, adding 200 billion euros to their bailout fund and tightening rules to curb future debts. They also agreed to start a 500 billion-euro rescue fund next year.

The agreement offered few new measures and doesn’t diminish the risk of credit-ranking revisions, Moody’s said in its Weekly Credit Outlook. “In the absence of any decisive policy initiatives that stabilize credit-market conditions effectively, our intention as announced in November is to revisit the level and dispersion of ratings during the first quarter of 2012,” the company said.

Bad news from Sino-Forest:

The company won’t be able to publish the earnings within the 30-day period stated on Nov. 15, Hong Kong- and Mississauga, Ontario-based Sino-Forest said today in a statement. There’s no assurance if or when the results will be released, it said. Sino-Forest also said a report by an independent committee into the fraud allegations now won’t be issued until 2012, instead of the year-end as previously stated.

Sino-Forest said it decided it won’t make a $9.78 million interest payment on its 2016 convertible notes that’s due Dec. 15. The company said it retained Houlihan Lokey and Bennett Jones LLP as its financial and legal advisers to assist in the evaluation of its options.

“In these circumstances, the board has determined that it must consider all strategic options available,” the company said in the statement. “The company may consider obtaining other sources of capital, including through the recapitalization of the company or the sale of some or all of its business.”

A lot of the fuss could be – could! – simply hysteria. That’s just people talking. But not being able to produce financials, another delay in the special committee report and skipping an interest payment … that’s real.

The Republicans are going to love this:

China may use tax cuts to shore up expansion in the second-largest economy next year as export growth weakens and the threat of bad loans from stimulus spending narrows the government’s options.

Another thing that’s real is Sun Life retreating from the US:

Sun Life Financial Inc. (SLF), Canada’s third-largest insurer, plans to stop selling variable annuities and individual life insurance products in the U.S. and will cut 800 jobs there as it shifts focus to Canada and Asia. The stock had its biggest gain in more than two years.

Sun Life expects to record costs of about C$75 million ($73 million) to C$100 million from the changes, a portion of which will be in the fourth quarter, the Toronto-based company said today in a statement. The insurer will also take a writedown of about C$97 million.

Variable annuities, which provide guaranteed incomes to customers regardless of market performance, have led to losses at Sun Life and bigger rival Manulife Financial Corp. (MFC) after equities plunged. Sun Life’s U.S. insurance unit had losses of C$569 million in the third quarter, and C$279 million in the first nine months of 2011.

The common soared, but the preferreds were actually down on good volume!

DBRS commented:

Over the past several years, volatility has highlighted SLF’s economic exposure to the capital markets from guarantees written on variable annuities and embedded interest rate guarantees associated with life insurance products. However, the Company’s ability to mitigate these market fluctuations is limited by the disadvantageous accounting and regulatory capital treatment faced by Canadian life insurance companies, especially with regard to these long-tailed products. Since U.S.-based competitors have not faced the same disadvantage, the ability of Canadian companies to compete on a level playing field in these increasingly commoditized product lines has deteriorated. Despite recent efforts to de-risk, re-price and hedge these products, the cost to the Company in terms of capital allocation charges and earnings volatility, combined with cost and product disadvantages, has been deemed by the management team under new Sun Life CEO Dean Connor to be unsustainable. As of December 30, 2011, sales of these products will therefore cease.

While reduced exposure to the U.S. variable annuity and individual life markets makes good sense from a capital and earnings perspective, DBRS recognizes that the Canadian life insurance industry continues to move away from its core and unique expertise in life underwriting in favour of more commoditized and more competitive wealth management products that require less regulatory capital.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 4bp, FixedResets down 1bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 12bp. Volatility was good, mostly on the down side. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3484 % 2,045.4
FixedFloater 4.87 % 4.61 % 34,789 17.10 1 -1.6625 % 3,166.4
Floater 3.24 % 3.55 % 65,229 18.32 3 -0.3484 % 2,208.5
OpRet 4.91 % 3.05 % 57,555 1.42 6 -0.2179 % 2,468.1
SplitShare 5.83 % 6.85 % 59,229 5.10 3 -0.7322 % 2,516.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2179 % 2,256.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.50 % 2.92 % 90,968 0.86 18 0.2238 % 2,166.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.23 % 5.15 % 105,413 15.08 12 0.0413 % 2,313.9
FixedReset 5.10 % 3.03 % 221,207 2.52 64 -0.0102 % 2,340.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.04 % 4.32 % 194,199 3.38 46 -0.1244 % 2,227.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.52
Bid-YTW : 4.61 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.64
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.96
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-12
Maturity Price : 24.20
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 29,465 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.83
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 21,677 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-12
Maturity Price : 14.95
Evaluated at bid price : 14.95
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
ENB.PR.D FixedReset 21,635 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-12
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 20,193 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 19,075 RBC crossed 17,200 at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-12
Maturity Price : 23.45
Evaluated at bid price : 25.68
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 18,776 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.83
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
There were 19 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.30 – 22.02
Spot Rate : 0.7200
Average : 0.6353

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-12
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.30
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %

CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.90 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2238

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %

BAM.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 25.40 – 25.64
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1686

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-12-12
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.42 – 25.73
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2421

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.42
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 22.64 – 22.94
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2401

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.64
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %

CIU.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 26.91 – 27.45
Spot Rate : 0.5400
Average : 0.4839

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.91
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %