Market Action

May 11, 2011

Nothing happened today.

It was another good solid day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 4bp, FixedResets gaining 13bp and DeemedRetractibles ahead 11bp.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.55%, equivalent to 7.22% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Volatility was muted and volume was average. Long Corporates now yield 5.4%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now 180bp, a little wider than the April 27 figure of 175bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3765 % 2,448.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3765 % 3,681.7
Floater 2.46 % 2.26 % 38,207 21.61 4 0.3765 % 2,643.1
OpRet 4.86 % 2.57 % 62,713 1.17 9 0.0799 % 2,422.6
SplitShare 5.21 % 0.11 % 65,257 0.59 6 0.0300 % 2,501.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0799 % 2,215.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.11 % 134,007 0.87 9 0.1316 % 2,064.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.53 % 5.55 % 118,393 14.52 15 0.0441 % 2,149.7
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.22 % 207,660 2.87 57 0.1279 % 2,309.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.18 % 4.94 % 300,198 8.08 53 0.1108 % 2,118.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.03
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 90,820 Desjardins crossed 85,000 at 26.22.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 2.87 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 62,940 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.68.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 47,499 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 24.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-11
Maturity Price : 23.62
Evaluated at bid price : 23.89
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 42,990 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 27.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.29
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 39,566 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 24.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.31
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 38,920 TD crossed 31,000 at 27.83.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.63
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 24.76 – 25.45
Spot Rate : 0.6900
Average : 0.4254

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.09 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.9000
Average : 0.7104

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.09
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %

SLF.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 27.35 – 27.72
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2808

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %

CM.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 27.73 – 28.05
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2320

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.73
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %

ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.50 – 22.74
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1624

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %

BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.41 – 24.66
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1739

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %

Issue Comments

RON.PR.A: DBRS Changes Trend to Negative

DBRS has revised the trend on the Pfd-3 rating of RON.PR.A from stable to negative:

DBRS has today changed the trend on the BBB Senior Unsecured Debt rating and Pfd-3 Preferred Shares rating of RONA inc. (RONA or the Company) to Negative from Stable. The rating action reflects DBRS’s concern that weak operating performance and a challenging consumer environment may result in RONA’s credit risk profile to deteriorate to a level that is no longer consistent with the current rating categories.

Market Action

May 10, 2011

Global markets are getting more efficient:

Computer-based trading in India’s $1.5 trillion stock market may double to half of all orders within three years as demand for speedier execution surges, according to the Bombay Stock Exchange.

Automated programs carry out about 25 percent of Indian orders currently, Sayee Srinivasan, head of product strategy at Asia’s oldest bourse, said in an interview yesterday. About 60 percent of U.S. stock trades daily come from firms that rely on fast-paced executions, according to Tabb Group LLC.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN) and Nomura Holdings Inc. (8604) say a mix of tight buy and sell spreads, a large volume of smaller orders and no midday break make India ideally suited for growth in algorithmic trading.

The BSE and National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., the nation’s biggest, started high-speed trading in 2009, about a year before the Tokyo Stock Exchange Group Inc. introduced its Arrowhead platform that cut processing to 5 milliseconds from 2 to 3 seconds. Australia’s ASX Ltd. in December moved to a platform that reduced the average time to 250 microseconds from 3 milliseconds.

India “is a big priority for us,” Murat Atamer, head of electronic trading product at Credit Suisse in Hong Kong, said in a phone interview. High-frequency trading accounts for as much as 60 percent of trades done by some of firm’s clients in the South Asian nation, greater than the proportion in Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore, he said.

The TMX Annual Report talks a lot about its “low latency”, but doesn’t provide any numbers … which reminds me of the time, years ago, when I was buying a new computer. Due to the state of the art at the time, the speed of the L2 onboard cache was an important determinant of total speed – so I asked the friendly salesman what it was. After nagging him for a couple of days, I finally got an exasperated answer: “Look, it’s fast OK? It’s fast.”. I changed suppliers shortly afterwards.

All I can find for the TSX is a 6-millisecond response time for the Quantum system in 2008, but I don’t even know whether that measurement is comparable to the latencies discussed above. Still, if they were tops you know we’d never hear the end of it. A recent TMX release trumpets “40,000 order messages per second”, which imples 25-microseconds per message if they’re sequential, but again I don’t know if that’s a comparable number – I suspect not, since the feeds are partitioned.

Gwyn Morgan shows a prediliction for easy answers in his column Wanted: clear thinking on educating the work force:

In a recent column, I criticized Canadian universities for turning away up to half of applicants for in-demand programs such as engineering, information technology and health care, while continuing to allocate much of their money to programs with poor job prospects.

The person went on to say that arts and classics students “understand that their mind is theirs to educate for their fulfilment, not to train for some random future employer.” Another respondent noted that liberal arts courses “educate the mind to think.” Both apparently believe that possession of an arts degree is a vital prerequisite to one’s ability to actually think.

Naturally, there is no discussion on the actual hiring process. In my experience, corporate hiring is abysmal, with grossly incompetent Human Resource people trying to find precise matches of presumed skills to presumed needs. The best example is Commerce degrees – does anybody know anybody with a B.Comm. who can actually do anything? Who did anything in University other than regurgitate superficial explanations of high-level economics? Yet these people are in demand – hiring them is a low-risk proposition for an HR specialist.

Aside from those with actual skill-sets (such as engineering, hard sciences, nursing, etc.), the only people worth hiring for entry-level jobs are those who adored their University studies and as a result worked their buns off. Doesn’t matter if the particular subject was Ancient Greek Pottery or Economics. Once you know how to work, how to think, how to meet a deadline … the rest is just details.

Mind you, for analytical work I have a strong preference for science grads – hard science, mind you – on the grounds that by both prediliction and training, they are likely to believe that for any question, there’s exactly one correct answer.

Royal Bank’s American unit was downgraded:

Standard & Poor’s has downgraded its ratings on RBC Bank (USA) to BBB from A- as a result of changes to Royal Bank of Canada’s long-term strategic plan for its U.S. commercial banking subsidiary amid reports the operation is up for sale.

The rating agency said this is primarily a result of the highliy competitive U.S. banking landscape and RBC Bank’s small regional presence.

S&P also revised its view of RBC Bank to “non-strategically important” from “strategically important,” which shaved three notches off its rating. However, it applied one notch of support to reflect the bank’s shared branding, infrastructure, management, liquidity and capital support from its parent.

The Portuguese Emperor is contemplating action against the boy who shouted ‘No clothes!’:

Portuguese authorities have opened a criminal inquiry into three international credit rating agencies following a complaint, the Attorney General’s office said Monday.

The inquiry is based on a complaint filed last month by four Portuguese academics, an official with the Attorney General’s office said on condition of anonymity, in keeping with departmental regulations.

The four economists claimed the agencies — Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch — caused severe financial losses for Portugal and demanded to know whether they profited from the ratings.

They also complained that the agencies dominated the ratings market and want to know whether competition rules were broken.

The inquiry will determine whether there is evidence for charges to be brought.

It was another strong day across the board for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 31bp, FixedResets gaining 11bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 23bp. Not much volatility. Good volume, with some very impressive spikes.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0235 % 2,438.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0235 % 3,667.9
Floater 2.47 % 2.25 % 37,636 21.62 4 0.0235 % 2,633.2
OpRet 4.85 % 2.58 % 62,104 1.17 9 0.1499 % 2,420.7
SplitShare 5.20 % -1.52 % 66,290 0.60 6 0.0849 % 2,500.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1499 % 2,213.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.52 % 133,247 2.33 9 0.0573 % 2,061.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.53 % 5.54 % 117,105 14.48 15 0.3054 % 2,148.8
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.29 % 208,473 2.87 57 0.1092 % 2,306.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.19 % 4.96 % 302,096 8.07 53 0.2298 % 2,115.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-10
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-10
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 23.73
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 923,250 RBC crossed 811,100 at 25.95; Nesbitt crossed 92,000 at 26.03; RBC crossed 13,900 at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
FTS.PR.C OpRet 334,434 Raymond James bought 22,400 from anonymous at 26.00 and 20,600 from Scotia at the same price. Scotia crossed 242,500 and 45,600 at the same price again. Scotia is a relatively infrequent name on this table; I bet they’re pissed RBC stole their thunder on today’s very nice tickets with the bigger deal shown above.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -1.29 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 160,075 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 135,470 Desjardins crossed blocks of 100,000 and 30,000, both at 26.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.91
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
CM.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 119,390 Nesbit crossed 100,000 at 25.50; RBC crossed 15,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 98,340 RBC crossed 82,300 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.95 – 28.25
Spot Rate : 1.3000
Average : 0.7263

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.33 – 26.99
Spot Rate : 0.6600
Average : 0.5025

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %

RY.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.50 – 27.02
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3684

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.50
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %

BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 26.88 – 27.20
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1994

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.88
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.60 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2969

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.60 – 24.95
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2601

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %

Market Action

May 9, 2011

One thing that may be helping the US economy is squatters’ rent:

Millions of Americans have more money to spend since they fell delinquent on their mortgages amid the worst housing collapse since the Great Depression. They are staying in their homes for free about a year and a half on average, buying time to restructure their finances and providing an unexpected support for consumer spending, which makes up about 70 percent of the economy.

So-called “squatter’s rent,” or the increase to income from withheld mortgage payments, will be an estimated $50 billion this year, according to Michael Feroli, chief U.S. economist at JPMorgan Chase & Co. in New York. The extra cash could represent a boost to spending that’s equal to about half the estimated savings generated by cuts to payroll withholding in December’s bipartisan tax plan.

Even after all the carnage, the situation is still deteriorating:

More than 28 percent of U.S. homeowners owed more than their properties were worth in the first quarter as values fell the most since 2008, Zillow Inc. said today.

Homeowners with negative equity increased from 22 percent a year earlier as home prices slumped 8.2 percent over the past 12 months, the Seattle-based company said. About 27 percent of homes were “underwater” in the fourth quarter, according to Zillow, which runs a website with property-value estimates and real-estate listings.

Home prices fell 3 percent in the first quarter and will drop as much as 9 percent this year as foreclosures spread and unemployment remains high, Zillow Chief Economist Stan Humphries said. Prices won’t find a floor until 2012, he said.

Thinking of protesting your credit card bill? Don’t:

Three Citibank debt collectors allegedly killed Irzen Octa, 50, secretary general of the National Unity Party (PPB), on Tuesday after he protested an increased credit card bill, the police said on Thursday.

“The motive of the murder is due to debt [issues], a credit card bill that didn’t fit [the formerly-given figure],” South Jakarta Police chief detective Adj. Sr. Comr. Budi Irawan said on Thursday.

Budi said the victim objected to his Citibank credit card bill, which had grown to Rp 100 million (US$11,500) from the Rp 48 million of which Irzen had been expecting.

Irzen only learned of the “unfitting” bill as he was about to pay it at the Citibank office branch at Jamsostek Tower in South Jakarta on Tuesday, the police said.

“We’ve found evidence at the crime scene in form of blood traces on the curtains and on the walls of the room on the fifth floor,” he added.

Budi said Citibank debt collectors A., H. and D., now named suspects, attacked Irzen because they were angered by his protest.

Forensic results show broken blood vessels in the victim’s brain.

SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro used an opportunity to vilify High Frequency Trading in a speech to the Investment Company Institute:

In thinking through our next steps, we need to consider several important questions:

  • First, what is “excessive short-term volatility?” Put another way, what level of volatility is appropriate in continuous trading, and at what point should circuit breakers or limit up/limit down take effect?
  • Second, how does excessive volatility affect – and how is it affected by – different market participants, including traders, investors, individual securities and mutual funds?
  • And finally, should high-frequency traders, who often derive significant benefit from their role as de facto market makers, also have the obligations of market makers as well as other responsibilities with respect to the impact of their technology and trading strategies on the markets?

There are a number of similarities between 1962 and 2010. For example, neither of these severe price moves could be readily explained by a particular news event. On both days, some market data systems were overwhelmed by the heavy volume.

And, in both instances, the sudden declines struck at investor confidence, leading them to question the stability and integrity of the equity markets.

But the differences between those two events are even more striking.

First, the magnitude of the declines, both at the broad market index level and for worst-hit individual securities, was much more severe in 2010 than 1962. In ‘62, the Dow declined to intraday lows of 6.3 percent compared to 9.9 percent on May 6. And one of the worst-hit individual securities in 1962 dropped 9.3 percent in a 12-minute period. In 2010, many securities lost 100 percent of their value in a matter of seconds.

Perhaps the biggest difference – and one that may help explain the difference in the magnitudes of the declines – is the volume and trading behavior of the professional traders who were expected to be the primary liquidity providers.

In ’62, the specialists who were then the primary liquidity providers, represented approximately 17 percent of market volume and were net buyers in aggregate during the decline. In 2010, the high frequency traders who are today’s liquidity providers represented well more than 50 percent of market volume and were net aggressive sellers during the broad index price decline.

High frequency traders turned what was a very down day for many investors into a very profitable one for themselves by taking liquidity rather than providing it. I think their activity that day should cause us to thoroughly examine their current role.

Also, if the plan is approved, these pauses could provide a period in which market participants have an opportunity to assess the market and decide whether and at what prices they wish to buy or sell. The result should be trading driven less by momentum-seeking algorithms and more by rational trading based on fundamentals.

We need to continue examining the effects of high speed trading on the markets and on buy-side and fundamental investors. The role of these traders, whose prominence in the markets seems only to increase, should be subject to further scrutiny. The possibility of imposing obligations during times of potential turmoil must remain on the table. And we need to pay attention to other potential flaws that could bring about equally disruptive events.

I’m sure that anybody offered the chance to get the deal that market-makers got in 1962 would jump at the chance. Fixed Commissions! One-eighth ticks! Preferential access to the order book!

She continues to ignore the impact of Stop-Loss orders – and it is Stop-Loss orders, I remain convinced, that turned a hiccup into a rout. There’s an example of a “momentum-seeking algorithm” if ever there was one!

It is also interesting that she refers to profits of HFT – I haven’t seen the question of HFT profitability addressed before. I’m sure that there are some players who made good money – but where are the figures?

The other statement of interest is the notion of imposing obligations on HFT to make markets. Generally, market makers have obligations for which they are paid in privileges. I find it very difficult to believe that the SEC intends to grant privileges to HFT, so the SEC will have to recast some otherwise normal elements of market activity as privileges. This is a very slippery slope; and there is still nothing being done about the Stop-Loss Orders.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City has released the May 2011 Edition of Fed Letter:

The May 2011 issue of Fed Letter contains the following articles: Ag finance conditions strengthen, databook finds; Community Affairs newsletter now available; District manufacturing moderates in April; Latest Economic Review research available; and Regulatory Developments.

Remember Basis Yield Alpha Fund? It was one of the first hedge funds to go under during the credit crunch, despite the managers’ assurances that they were pretty smart cookies. But the whining continues:

The day after the United States Senate released what has been described as a “scathing report” on the activities of Goldman Sachs leading up to and during the financial crisis, Australian-based Basis Yield Alpha Fund (which has waged a legal battle with the investment bank over its Timberwolf CDO), released a comment saying “Yesterday’s Senate Report confirms that in fact Goldman made a concerted effort to mislead and defraud investors, including Basis.”

The Basis Fund suit was filed in June 2010 after the fund saw an $80m investment into Timberwolf disintegrated in a matter of weeks (the suit alleges the fund lost $50m in losses and margin calls). The fund is arguing that Goldman used aggressive sales tactics and assurances that the secondary CDO market was stable, knowing that these statements were false. In August 2010, Goldman submitted a motion asking that the case be thrown out entirely due to jurisdiction because The Basis Fund executives are based in Australia. That motion was denied and the case is still working itself through the US Federal Court System.

In Thursday’s statement the Basis Fund legal team says that having asked Goldman executives questions regarding the Timberwolf security “they were met with carefully constructed lies and non-disclosures.” Eric Lewis, lead counsel for the fund says “Goldman created Timberwolf to fail, so Goldman could bet against it, and Goldman then sold the security to Basis as stable and well priced, when its own internal analysis showed that Timberwolf’s value was sinking like a stone. It is time for Goldman to be held accountable.”

I last mocked the fund and its crybaby principals on 2010-5-18. In essence, these superstars of analytical prowess bought the issue with clients’ money because Goldman said it was good. They should lose their licenses, if they still have them.

David Papell, Professor of Economics at the University of Houston, writes an interesting guest-post on Econbrowser, titled The Taylor Rule and QE2:

What are the implications of our research for current policy? With Taylor’s original rule, the prescribed federal funds rate for 2009 – 2010 is zero or slightly negative. With a variant of the Taylor rule that doubles the size of the output gap coefficient, it is about negative four percent. This is important because, with the constraint of a zero lower bound on the federal funds rate, large negative prescribed interest rates provide a rationale for the Fed’s quantitative easing in 2009 (QE1) and 2010-2011 (QE2). Our paper does not say whether or not QE1 and QE2 were good policies, a topic that is beyond the scope of our research. It does say that, if you are going to use negative prescribed interest rates to justify quantitative easing, you need to use a rule that can be justified by historical experience. Taylor’s original rule, which can be justified by historical experience, does not produce negative prescribed interest rates for 2009-2011. Variants of Taylor rules with larger output gap coefficients, which do produce negative interest rates, cannot be justified by historical experience. The Taylor rule does not provide a rationale for quantitative easing.

Strange things are happening with the TMX-LSE deal:

Traders who profit from mergers and acquisitions are betting for the first time a higher offer will trump the London Stock Exchange Group Plc (LSE)’s deal for Toronto- based TMX Group Inc. (X), leaving both bidders as losers.

A group of Canadian banks is in talks with the nation’s pension funds on alternatives to LSE’s $3.1 billion bid to keep the Toronto Stock Exchange under local ownership, the head of the pension plan in Alberta said last week. The discussions caused TMX’s share price to rise above LSE’s all-stock offer on May 6 for the first time since it was announced in February, as arbitragers bet a competing bid will emerge once LSE gains regulatory approval, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

S&P has downgraded Greece:

  • Under our sovereign ratings criteria, a commercial debt rescheduling typically constitutes a default.
  • In our view, there is increased risk that Greece will take steps to restructure the terms of its commercial debt, including its previously-issued government bonds.
  • Accordingly, we are lowering both the long- and short-term ratings on Greece to ‘B’ and ‘C’, respectively.
  • We are leaving both ratings on CreditWatch

Greek bonds reacted:

The premium investors demand to hold Greek 10-year securities instead of benchmark German bunds rose 27 basis points to 1,261 basis points. The cost of insuring Greek debt for five years rose 30 basis points to a record 1,371 basis points, according to CMA prices for credit-default swaps. The Portuguese 10-year yield increased 12 basis points to 9.67 percent, while the equivalent-maturity Spanish yield advanced 8 basis points to 5.32 percent.

European leaders had an unscheduled meeting over the weekend, with Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker saying Greece “does need a further adjustment program.” Another credit-rating cut would make Greece the lowest-rated country in Europe as today’s reduction, the fourth by S&P since April 2010, left it even with Belarus.

And it was a good day of across the board strength in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 16bp, FixedResets gaining 14bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 19bp. Not a lot of volatility, with only three entries in the Performance Highlights table. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0235 % 2,438.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0235 % 3,667.0
Floater 2.47 % 2.26 % 39,160 21.62 4 0.0235 % 2,632.6
OpRet 4.86 % 3.68 % 61,056 1.17 9 -0.1411 % 2,417.1
SplitShare 5.20 % -0.06 % 66,767 0.60 6 -0.0628 % 2,498.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1411 % 2,210.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.52 % 137,847 2.33 9 -0.0022 % 2,060.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.54 % 5.55 % 117,991 14.50 15 0.1643 % 2,142.2
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.34 % 208,185 2.87 57 0.1419 % 2,304.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.20 % 4.99 % 306,161 8.12 53 0.1945 % 2,110.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.71
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 104,232 Desjardins crossed three blocks 24,900 at 23.87, followed by 45,000 and 25,000 at 23.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.91
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 60,500 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 58,570 Scotia crossed 15,000 at 24.62; Desjardins crosed 10,900 and 11,900 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
CM.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 54,200 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-06-08
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : -3.16 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 52,860 TD bought 10,000 from anonymous at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 49,135 Desjardins crossed blocks of 22,400 and 10,100, both at 24.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.18
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.35 – 26.80
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3299

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.61 – 22.99
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2941

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-09
Maturity Price : 22.45
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %

BAM.PR.H OpRet Quote: 25.29 – 25.57
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1980

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.60 – 25.87
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1971

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.80 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3328

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %

NA.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.60 – 26.80
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1403

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 2.44 %

Regulation

US Covered Bond Legislation Moving Forward

Jim Hamilton of Jim Hamilton’s World of Securities Regulation reports House Marks Up Bi-Partisan US Covered Bond Legislation:

The House Capital Markets Subcommittee marked up legislation creating a covered bond market for the US. This is bi-partisan legislation with a good chance of passing Congress this year. The U.S. Covered Bond Act of 2011 was introduced by Rep. Scott Garrett (R-NJ), Chairman of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY), Ranking Member of the Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit. H.R. 940 will help facilitate a robust covered bond market in the U.S. to add liquidity and certainty to the capital markets. The legislation was passed out of the subcommittee by voice vote and will now be considered by the full Financial Services Committee and is expected to garner wide bipartisan support.

According to recent testimony from the US Covered Bond Council, the public supervision of covered-bond programs by a federal regulator, whose mission is the protection of covered bondholders, is central to any legislative framework. In the European Union, this feature is enshrined in the Directive on Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (the UCITS Directive), compliance with which is what has given covered bonds their unique status in Europe, including privileged risk weighting under the Capital Requirements Directive and preferential treatment by the European Central Bank in Eurosystem credit operations. Issuances by regulated financial institutions is another fundamental element of covered bonds that is also recognized in the UCITS Directive. One other indispensable feature of covered bonds is a cover pool that contains performing assets and that is replenished and kept sufficient at all times to fully secure the claims of covered bondholders. This too receives specific mention in the UCITS Directive.

With covered-bond programs subject to rigorous public supervision, investors will be well protected. As a result, an expansion of existing securities-law exemptions may be appropriate.

I wrote a very brief primer on covered bonds a while ago. The proposed and defeated federal budget promised covered bond legislation, but so did the prior year’s: you can’t take these clowns too seriously.

Regulation

SEC Grinding Forward on MMF Regulation

The Securities and Exchange Commission has announced:

the panelists and final agenda for the Money Market Funds and Systemic Risk Roundtable to be held May 10.

The roundtable will address:

  • The potential for money market funds to pose a systemic risk to broader financial markets – what makes money market funds vulnerable to runs and how should the role of money market funds be viewed through the prism of systemic risk analysis.
  • Possible options for further regulatory reform and their implications, including floating NAV, bank regulation, and options that reflect a hybrid of these regulatory approaches: a private liquidity bank; mandatory reserve or capital requirements; and liquidity fees.

The agenda and list of panelists can be found on the SEC website.

The roundtable discussion will begin at 2 p.m. and be available by webcast on the SEC website. The webcast also will be archived for later viewing.

I am very pleased to see Paul Volcker on the list of participants. It was his discussion of the issue and plan for regulation that got me interested in the subject, which I subsequently addressed in an article.

The sessions won’t be particularly long, but will serve as a basis for further discussion:

2:20-3:05 p.m. Discussion — Potential for Money Market Funds to Pose a Systemic Risk to Broader Markets

  • What makes money market funds vulnerable to runs?
  • How should the role of money market funds in the short-term funding market be viewed through the prism of systemic risk analysis?


3:20-5:00 p.m. Discussion — Regulatory Options and their Implications

  • Floating NAV vs. Bank regulation
  • Hybrid approaches to regulation: Private liquidity bank
  • Hybrid approaches to regulation: Mandatory reserve/capital requirements
  • Hybrid approaches to regulation: Liquidity fees

On this general topic, the Chicago Fed notes:

Firms face increasing pressure to weigh the value proposition MMFs offer over the intermediate term. Budget projections factor MMF waivers well into next year. While MMF fee waivers have been subsidized by higher asset management fee revenues a second abrupt market decline could cause further strain.

MMFs have reduced their holdings of CP in favor of repos and government debt. At the same time, CP issuers seek to lock in longer term funding rates due to Basel III higher liquidity standards. Net result is a more limited, concentrated pool of eligible CP debt offerings for MMFs. MMFs are a major funding source for bank issued CP, comprising 40% of all CP issuances.

Update, 2011-5-11: The stable NAV is the focus of criticism:

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair called money-market mutual funds “destabilizing” to the financial system and said investors would be served just as well if share prices floated.

“Money-market funds are maintaining a fiction of a stable” net-asset value, as shown by the September 2008 failure of the $62.5 billion Reserve Primary Fund, Bair said yesterday at a round-table meeting of fund-company executives and regulators arranged by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington. “That is skewing investment dollars into a structure that is highly unstable in a crisis.”

Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker called a floating share price the “simplest” solution to the risk posed by money funds, which trade at a constant $1 a share.

This may be because it’s the only possible measure that can be introduced that won’t cost anybody any money!

Market Action

May 6, 2011

Remember the good old days of 2008-09? When every Friday night we could make a batch of popcorn and watch the parade of bankrupts? This weekend might have some interesting European news:

European finance officials are meeting in Luxembourg for an unscheduled session that may address proposals for restructuring Greek debt, said two European officials familiar with the situation.

A German official said the discussions would include a German paper on options for confronting Greece’s growing debt load, which has spurred speculation by investors that a restructuring was likely.

Earlier, Spiegel magazine reported that ministers are convening an emergency meeting after Greece threatened to withdraw from the euro region. Greece rejected the report, according to a finance ministry statement. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s chief spokesman “categorically” denied that any discussions on a Greek exit were under way. He declined to comment when asked whether officials were meeting tonight.

Looks like the Bloc Quebecois can envy Scotland:

First Minister Alex Salmond’s pro- independence party won an unprecedented majority in elections to the Scottish Parliament, handing him a second term and a mandate to push for greater autonomy for Scotland.

British Prime Minister David Cameron vowed to defend the U.K. from potential breakup even as he congratulated Salmond on an “emphatic win” in yesterday’s vote. Salmond’s Scottish National Party crossed the 65-seat threshold for the first overall majority since the 129-member parliament in Edinburgh was established in 1999.

It was a strong day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts roaring ahead by 29bp, FixedResets gaining 5bp and DeemedRetractibles picking up 10bp. There were only three entries in the Performance Highlights table – one from each of the main classes, oddly enough – but all were positive. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1411 % 2,437.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1411 % 3,666.2
Floater 2.47 % 2.26 % 39,321 21.61 4 -0.1411 % 2,632.0
OpRet 4.85 % 3.63 % 61,560 1.18 9 0.1199 % 2,420.5
SplitShare 5.20 % -1.49 % 69,539 0.61 6 -0.0463 % 2,499.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1199 % 2,213.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.53 % 142,596 1.03 9 0.1441 % 2,060.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.55 % 5.59 % 119,270 14.48 15 0.2888 % 2,138.7
FixedReset 5.16 % 3.35 % 205,568 2.88 57 0.0548 % 2,301.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.21 % 5.02 % 308,926 8.13 53 0.0950 % 2,106.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.67
Bid-YTW : 6.43 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-06
Maturity Price : 22.45
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 60,929 TD crossed blocks of 40,000 and 10,000, both at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 49,300 Desjardins crossed 35,400 at 24.92 and 10,000 at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-06
Maturity Price : 23.08
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 39,184 RBC crossed 25,000 at 23.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 34,483 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 27.32.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.31
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium 25,610 CIBC crossed 17,900 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 24,292 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.C OpRet Quote: 26.06 – 26.48
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.2477

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : -2.70 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.42 – 23.87
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2939

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-06
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 23.42
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %

BAM.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 27.55 – 27.85
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2007

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %

SLF.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 27.10 – 27.45
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2545

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %

NA.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.16 – 26.48
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2248

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 24.95 – 25.29
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2620

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %

Market Action

May 5, 2011

Surprise! Increased regulation lead to migration to non-regulated channels:

For Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and Morgan Stanley, two of Wall Street’s biggest commodities-trading firms, the year’s largest initial public offering represents a nightmare come true: the rise of unregulated rivals.

Glencore International AG’s IPO probably will catapult the Baar, Switzerland-based commodities firm from relative obscurity onto London’s FTSE 100 list of most valuable stocks this month. Chief Executive Officer Ivan Glasenberg, 54, a former coal trader, owns a 16 percent stake in Glencore worth $9.6 billion if the sale assigns the firm a mid-range value of $61 billion.

Glencore, like rivals such as Hong Kong-based Noble Group Ltd. (NOBL) and Amsterdam-based Trafigura Beheer BV, can take bigger trading risks in the commodities markets, helping to make them more profitable and more appealing as employers for top traders.

“Prop trading remains as a potent incentive to join Glencore, Noble, Trafigura and any of the major trading firms not restricted by banking rules,” said George H. Stein, managing director of Commodity Talent LLC, a recruitment firm in New York.

Glencore’s average 2010 value-at-risk, a measure of how much the firm’s traders could lose in a single day, jumped to $43 million from $27 million in 2009, according to the firm’s annual report. Goldman Sachs’s commodity price value-at-risk dropped to $33 million in 2010 from $36 million in 2009, company data show.

I don’t think that’s the end of the story, however. I suspect that the regulators will find a way to go after Glencore if there’s the slightest possibility of villainizing them. The end-game, I suspect, is a system with a multitude of small shops, each having $0.5-1.0-billion under management. This won’t do anything for financial stability because, by and large, all these guys will be making the same bets; but it will make everybody feel better that Something Was Done, and that’s what counts, isn’t it?

On cue, Bernanke delivered a warning:

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke said the government must avoid imposing burdensome rules on financial companies as it carries out the biggest regulatory overhaul in seven decades.

“No one’s interests are served by the imposition of ineffective or burdensome rules that lead to excessive increases in costs or unnecessary restrictions in the supply of credit,” Bernanke said today in a speech in Chicago. “Regulators must aim to avoid stifling reasonable risk-taking and innovation in financial markets, as these factors play an important role in fostering broader productivity gains, economic growth, and job creation.”

But the immediate issues du jour are not directly related to Glencore et al:

U.S. banks have mounted a campaign against one Fed regulation under Dodd-Frank to cap “swipe” fees on debit cards. Bernanke said in March that the Fed would miss an April deadline for the rule, telling lawmakers the issues raised in more than 11,000 comment letters are “complex and difficult.”

Last week, the Treasury Department proposed exempting foreign-exchange swaps and forwards from most of the derivatives rules required under the Dodd-Frank Act, saying the market already meets many of the law’s objectives.

A coalition of 20 firms, including Deutsche Bank AG, Bank of New York Mellon Corp. and UBS AG, asked Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner to grant an exemption in a November letter.

The TMX / LSE deal is getting more interesting:

:Banks opposed to the planned combination of TMX Group Inc. (X-T39.53-0.01-0.03%) and London Stock Exchange Group PLC are looking for ways to thwart the deal, and are seeking the backing of Canada’s biggest pension funds.

Talks among large Canadian financial institutions searching for an alternative to the merger of the Toronto and London stock market operators have been going on for weeks. Options under consideration include a potential counterbid for TMX, which is valued at almost $3-billion.

Call me paranoid, but I’m convinced there’s more to this than meets the eye. It may have something to do with power … with the present situation, the banks can quite reasonably expect the TMX to kowtow to them on demand, since all employees, from the CEO on down, have to worry about their future career prospects. This will not be the case if the TMX is part of a pugnacious international group. But who knows?

And anyway, commodities aren’t fashionable this week:

Commodities plunged the most since 2008, stocks worldwide posted the biggest three-day drop since March and the dollar rallied after American jobless claims unexpectedly rose and the European Central Bank signaled it will wait until after June to raise interest rates.

The Standard & Poor’s GSCI index of 24 commodities sank 7.3 percent at 3:19 p.m. in New York and has lost 11 percent this week. Silver tumbled 11 percent, extending its decline since April 29 to 28 percent. Oil sank 9.7 percent, falling below $100 a barrel for the first time since March 17. The MSCI All-Country World Index of shares in 45 nations fell 1.4 percent. The dollar gained 2.2 percent against the euro, making commodities quoted in the greenback more expensive for holders of other currencies.

Desjardins is raining all over the Maple parade:

There’s chatter in the bond world that the maple market is coming back, driven by increased issuance over the past four weeks.

However, at this point, the perceived strength is all hype. The numbers prove otherwise.

In 2011 maple issuers — which are foreign entities that raise debt issued in Canadian dollars — have financed $2.2-billion here in Canada. That’s just a fraction of the $17-billion raised in 2007 when the maple market was hot.

“Not only does this clearly put things into perspective, but also shows how far we are from a true ‘renaissance’ of the maple bond market,” Jean-François Godin of Desjardins Securities notes.

It was a restful day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 5bp, FixedResets down 3bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 4bp. Volatility remained low, and volume was light.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1648 % 2,441.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1648 % 3,671.3
Floater 2.47 % 2.25 % 38,833 21.64 4 0.1648 % 2,635.7
OpRet 4.86 % 3.67 % 62,297 1.18 9 -0.0770 % 2,417.6
SplitShare 5.20 % -1.48 % 72,409 0.61 6 0.0662 % 2,500.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0770 % 2,210.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.73 % 5.53 % 143,406 2.34 9 0.1168 % 2,057.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.56 % 5.62 % 120,556 14.46 15 -0.0482 % 2,132.5
FixedReset 5.16 % 3.37 % 207,709 2.88 57 -0.0305 % 2,299.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.21 % 5.02 % 312,934 8.13 53 0.0397 % 2,104.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 158,930 RBC crossed 30,000 at 23.90; Desjardins crossed 40,000 at the same price; TD crossed 75,000 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %
BMO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 132,865 TD crossed blocks of 83,000 and 40,000, both at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 110,819 RBC crossed 100,000 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 57,885 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.59
Bid-YTW : 4.93 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 55,000 RBC crossed 50,000 at 26.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 53,100 Desjardins crossed 48,900 at 26.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.04
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.45 – 25.94
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3018

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %

POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.52 – 23.89
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2433

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-05
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 23.52
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %

BMO.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 26.12 – 26.46
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2391

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.12
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %

GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 24.60 – 24.90
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1996

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.05 – 24.30
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1871

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-05
Maturity Price : 23.74
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.43 – 21.62
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1360

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-05
Maturity Price : 21.43
Evaluated at bid price : 21.43
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %

Issue Comments

RF.PR.A: Special Resolution Passes

CA Bancorp Canadian Realty Finance Corporation has announced:

that the Class A and Series 1 Preferred Shareholders of the Corporation, each voting separately as a class, voted today to approve a special resolution to effect the following proposed transaction (the “Transaction”):

  • •the acquisition of all of the issued and outstanding shares of C.A. Bancorp Ltd., the manager of the Corporation, (the “Manager”) by Green Tree Capital Management Corp. (“Green Tree”);
  • •an amendment to the commitment agreement (the “Commitment Agreement”) dated January 31, 2008 between the Corporation and C.A. Bancorp Inc., the parent corporation of the Manager, (the “Parent”) to permit the assignment by the Parent of the Commitment Agreement to Green Tree and the release of the Parent from any further obligations under the Commitment Agreement; and
  • •an amendment to the management agreement between the Manager and the Corporation to provide that the Manager is not entitled to payment of a termination fee where the management agreement is terminated by the Corporation in the context of a material breach or default.

The Transaction is expected to be completed on or about May 11, 2011.

I had recommended a “No” vote Ah, well, we’ll just have to see what happens.

RF.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Interesting External Papers

Some Good Papers on Regulatory Capture

Nicholas Dorn, Erasmus University Rotterdam – Erasmus School of Law, Ponzi Finance, Regulatory Capture and the Credit Crunch:

The unfolding financial market instability provokes questions about the safety of all financial investments and, in doing so, reveals some large investment frauds, which can flourish only in buoyant markets. More broadly, as is now recognized by market regulators, there has been insufficient attention to fraudulent practices, conflicts of interest and evasion of regulatory controls, notably in relation to promotion of sub-prime mortgages, the role of ratings agencies, the packaging and selling on of the resulting debt instruments to investors worldwide, and circumvention of risk controls. So, where were the regulators? This paper proposes that institutional capture of the regulators by the market – in terms of adoption by the regulators of technical assumptions, ‘models’ and data defined as relevant by the private sector – provides a narrative on ‘what went wrong’. Moving towards a vision of the way forward for regulatory reform, the paper argues against the exclusionary notion of regulation that makes it a matter of coordination between those possessing technical expertise, separated off from moral questions, public politics and debate amongst citizens. The literature on security governance and ‘public goods’ is explored as one way of opening up the debate on financial regulation, reversing regulatory capture.

Daniel C. Hardy, Monetary and Financial Systems Department, International Monetary Fund, Regulatory Capture in Banking:

Banks will want to influence the bank regulator to favor their interests, and they typically have the means to do so. It is shown that such “regulatory capture” in banking does not imply ineffectual regulation; a “captured” regulator may impose very tight, costly prudential requirements to reduce negative spillovers of risk-taking by weaker banks. In these circumstances, differences in the regulatory regime across jurisdictions may persist because each adapts its regulations to suit its dominant incumbent institutions.

The Report of the Second Warwick Commission, The Warwick Commission on International Financial Reform: In Praise of Unlevel Playing Fields:

Capture was helped by the emergent view that public agencies ought to be independent of politics. As part of this process, a policy role for the private sector was legitimised. Intellectual capture, in turn, also relates to the ‘group-think’ that has taken hold in the making of financial policy. Regulatory and supervisory arrangements are discussed and agreed in expert and apolitical terms, bringing like-minded individuals who, whether in the official, private or academic sphere, can reach common understandings based on shared training, practice and access to economic ideas. Both in the national arena and, increasingly, in the international fora around the Basel process, such networks are technocratic, informal, politically unaccountable and have a narrowly defined understanding of financial policy. They are also often de-coupled from other economic considerations or broader questions about the role of finance.

It is important to break ‘group-think’ and introduce new voices and interests to debates about financial regulation.

Independent Evaluation Office of the International Monetary Fund, IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis IMF Surveillance in 2004–07:

On the other side, the report ultimately ascribes the failure to warn about the crisis to “groupthink,” which is as much a description as an explanation. The report could have looked more at the extent to which staff considered contrarian views (arguably, they did) and how they judged these positions against the much larger evidence marshaled by the mainstream (clearly, they judged incorrectly). This also speaks to the IEO recommendation to increase financial expertise and staff diversity—which undoubtedly is correct, and indeed a goal of the institution, but does not follow from the pre-crisis experience: the vast majority of financial experts, from a diversity of countries and backgrounds, also failed to see the crisis coming. (Ironically, the prescient individuals cited by the report are from remarkably undiverse backgrounds—i.e., macroeconomists with PhDs from U.S.-U.K. universities.) That said, the recommendation to access thoughtful and diverse opinion is a very important one, and one that we return to below.