Issue Comments

NA Issuer Bid: Premia on NA.PR.N, NA.PR.O, NA.PR.P are Deemed Dividends

The National Bank issuer bid for NA.PR.N, NA.PR.O and NA.PR.P, announced in February is very rich and holders are urged to take advantage – the prices equate to yields of 1.98% and there are better things to hold!

However, it should be noted that the Issuer Bid Circular, published on SEDAR dated March 4, 2011, has the following information:

A Shareholder that is an individual (including a trust) (“Individual Resident Shareholder”) and who sells a Preferred Share to the Bank pursuant to the Offers will be deemed to receive a taxable dividend (on a deemed separate class of shares comprised of shares of a series of the Preferred Shares so sold by all Shareholders) equal to the excess of the amount paid by the Bank for the Preferred Share over its paid-up capital for purposes of the Tax Act. The Bank estimates that on the Expiration Time and Date the paid-up capital per Preferred Share Series 21 will be equal to approximately $25, per Preferred Share Series 24 will be equal to approximately $25, and per Preferred Share Series 26 will be equal to approximately $25 for purposes of the Tax Act. The deemed dividend will be included in computing an Individual Shareholder’s income, and will generally be subject to the gross-up and dividend tax credit rules normally applicable to taxable dividends received by individual shareholders from a taxable Canadian corporation, including the enhanced gross-up and dividend tax credit if the dividend is properly designated by the Bank as an “eligible dividend”. The Bank shall designate any deemed dividends arising as a result of the sale of Preferred Shares to the Bank pursuant to the Offers as an “eligible dividend” for these purposes.

The difference between the amount paid by the Bank for a particular Preferred Share and the amount deemed to be received by an Individual Shareholder as a dividend in respect of the Preferred Share will be treated as proceeds of disposition of the Preferred Share for purposes of computing any capital gain or capital loss arising on the disposition of the Preferred Share.

Thus, those accepting the offer will compute their capital gain as the difference between their Adjusted Cost Base and $25, and include the premia paid over $25 in their dividend income.

This will have major consequence for some individuals.

Market prices do not fully reflect the bid: at the close last night, NA.PR.N was trading to yield 2.27% while the other two were in the 2.40%-2.50% range. It would appear that either the market is applying a rather large discount due to the tax treatment, or that it is not fully accounting for the dividend that will be earned by holders at the close of business April 5.

Trades executed on the ex-Dividend date of April 6 will settle on April 11, allowing purchasers on April 6 to tender to the offer (although I speak only of institutions; individuals should very definitely check this out with their brokers because the back-office will decide what timing they want). I believe that the most likely scenario is that on April 6 the prices for the issues will adjust to reflect the Issuer Bid price, less enough of a discount to make it worth-while for institutions to make a little money buying and tendering.

Thus, I suggest that individuals for whom the Deemed Dividend is an important tax consideration to be avoided should carefully consider planning to sell on April 6 … while remembering that I have no crystal ball and cannot guarantee that this will be an optimal strategy.

Update: Assiduous Reader AB writes in and says:

Was reading your post below and not sure what you mean by “This will have major consequence for some individuals.” and “would appear that either the market is applying a rather large discount due to the tax treatment”.

I own quite a bit of all the NBC Preferreds they have offered to buy (in a corporation) and am trying to decide what to do. Not sure what you mean by major consequences. We bought at the issue price of $25.

OK, first the “major consequences”. Let’s take NA.PR.P as an example – the issuer bid is at a price of 28.03. If you tender at this price, you will not declare a capital gain on your 2011 taxes: the entire premium of 28.03 – 25.00 (your ACB) = 3.03 wil be considered a dividend.

On the other hand, say you sell on the market at 28.03. In this case, you will declare a 3.03 capital gain, and none of the premium will be taxable as dividends.

Depending on your individual tax circumstances, one way may be much better than the other. Say, for instance, you have enormous capital losses available (incurred during the Credit Crunch, perhaps). You can use these capital losses to offset capital gains, but you can’t use them to offset dividends (deemed or regular). If you have a large amount of losses accumulated, then the difference between the two pathways will be about $0.60/share in 2011 taxes, based on a capital gains marginal rate of 20%. That’s quite substantial!

Other considerations apply if, for instance, you are subject to the OAS clawback. The 100% inclusion rate of dividend income, with the dividend gross-up added on top of that, could make tendering the shares to the bid – and taking your winnings as a deemed dividend – quite costly in terms of tax effects.

And since you hold these things in a corporation … that will have other effects and could be quite complex!

I will note that I am not a tax expert, have no wish to be, and don’t know your personal circumstances, or those of your corporation. I will say, as above, that there could be a big difference in what is best for you, so you should consult your personal tax advisor.

As for the other part of your question “would appear that either the market is applying a rather large discount due to the tax treatment”.

Well, let’s look at NA.PR.P again. If you hold the issue now and tender to the issuer bid, you will earn the dividend of $0.4125 that goes ex on April 6. So your total cash receipt per share will be $28.03 + 0.4125 = 28.4425.

The closing quote today was $28.25-26. That’s a difference of nearly $0.20! It would seem to me that a LOT of people are deciding to sell into the market to avoid the deemed dividend, and there are not enough arbitrageurs, as yet, competing to take the business and reduce the premium to a more reasonable nickel or dime.

It is my guess (and note well the word “guess”!) that on April 6 you will have earned the dividend and the market price will only be be five to ten cents less than the issuer bid price of 28.03 … but as noted, there are no guarantees … the market price could be forty cents less than the issuer bid price, leaving you worse off than if you sold now. If it was my money we were discussing, I’d take the risk … but it’s not my money!

Update, 2011-3-16: Assiduous Reader AB writes in again and says:

When you talk about the difference between the two pathways being $.60 a share in 2011 taxes, I think you are not actually calculating the difference. 20% capital gains on $3 is 60 cents but you would pay about $1 of dividend tax on the $3 deemed dividend if selling to NBC (at a rate of 33%), so the difference is 40 cents, correct? You then also have to take into the cost per share for commission.

Well, what I was really thinking was the case in which the taxpayer has otherwise useless capital losses carried forward. If he sells on the market, taking the capital gain, he will be able to use these capital losses to offset it and thereby pay no tax on this transaction.

This will leave him with fewer capital losses going forward, of course, but as far as this transaction is concerned, taxes are zero. This is compared to a rate of about 20% if you take the dividend, or $0.60 per share.

Note that I am using a marginal rate of 20% on dividends for illustrative purposes – your figure of 33% seems very high to me (see the E&Y 2011 Tax Calculator) but again, I don’t know your personal circumstances.

And yes, I am ignoring commission in this discussion. If you hold “quite a bit” of stock through a discount brokerage, you can generally trade for $10 a trade, which is basically negligible. Naturally, if you are trading through a full service broker, costs will not be quite so neglible.

Update 2011-3-19: Assiduous Reader DJ writes in and says:

Can you comment on the situation where someone bought the shares for more than the issue price of 25$ (In my case NA.PR.P bought in 2009 at 28$). I would really appreciate your thoughts with respect to this situation to help me decide whether to tender my shares

In that case, tendering the shares will result in:

  • Capital Loss of $3 (the deemed sale price of $25 less the adjusted cost base of $28)
  • Dividend of $3.03 (the total consideration of $28.03 less the deemed sale price of $25)

I suggest that you if you decide against tendering these shares you should sell them on the market, since the issuer bid yield of 1.98% is very low; there are plenty of alternatives with both better credit quality and higher yield … unless your commission expense is unbelievably exhorbitant!

If you sell on the market, you will declare at capital gain or loss based on your actual sale price – there is no “deemed dividend” nonsense (although you will, of course. be taxed on the dividends you actually receive).

Market Action

March 14, 2011

He who pays the piper …:

Euro-area leaders rebuffed Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny’s bid for easier bailout terms, demanding that Ireland raise tax rates in return, as they rewarded Greece with a cut in its rescue-loan costs.

“We weren’t really satisfied yet today with what Ireland pledged,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel said after a summit that ended about 1:30 a.m. in Brussels. “We can only offer the interest-rate cut when we have something in return.”

Kenny, arriving for his first summit as Ireland’s leader, refused to buckle under pressure from Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy as he pushed for relief on the 5.8 percent interest rate the country pays on the 85 billion-euro ($115 billion) rescue package it received in November.

Ireland’s main corporate tax rate is 12.5 percent, compared with an EU average of about 23 percent and even higher rates in Germany and France, which it has used to lure companies such as Hewlett-Packard Co. to set up in the country.

“We’re not asking Ireland to put up their corporate taxes to the European average, but to make some effort,” Sarkozy said.

As for Greece, which now pays about 5 percent on loans in its 110 billion-euro rescue program, euro-area leaders agreed to cuts the rate by 1 percentage point and extend the maturity to 7 ½ from three years.

Greece has made major efforts, just look at the size of their privatization program,” Sarkozy said. “But you can’t ask others to contribute for you, when you won’t make an effort on your tax receipts.”

Remember the collateralization spread from the credit crunch, that meant that bonds that could be pledged to the central bank traded at a premium to bonds that couldn’t? This spread now has an Australian cousin:

Sales of bonds by top-rated overseas borrowers in Australia have evaporated following a record start to 2011 after the nation’s banking regulator ruled they don’t qualify under new international capital rules.

The World Bank, Germany’s Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau and other supranational and agency issuers have avoided the kangaroo bond market since the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority said Feb. 28 their notes can’t be considered liquid assets under Basel Committee on Banking Supervision rules. The AAA rated securities represented 27 percent of new bond sales in Australia in 2010, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

APRA’s decision spurred the nation’s banks to purchase federal and state government securities that do qualify, pushing Australian sovereign yields to the lowest in two months. The 10- year government bond has fallen 5 basis points since the guidelines were announced, while the extra yield investors demand to own New South Wales state debt instead of government notes is at a record low.

Americans are shocked by high dairy prices:

Cheddar cheese in supermarkets averaged $5.143 a pound in January, the highest since at least 1984, while a half gallon of ice cream sold for $4.74, the most since 1980, according to data collected from about 26,000 retailers by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Retail whole milk averaged $3.301 a gallon, 2 percent more than a year earlier.

We should be so lucky.

There was a downdraft in the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualDiscounts down 9bp, FixedResets losing 7bp and DeemedRetractibles dropping 13bp. Volume returned to average levels.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.8447 % 2,383.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.8447 % 3,585.3
Floater 2.52 % 2.32 % 42,465 21.46 4 -0.8447 % 2,574.0
OpRet 4.90 % 3.70 % 54,058 1.17 9 0.0303 % 2,391.8
SplitShare 5.08 % 2.83 % 185,355 1.02 5 0.0639 % 2,488.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0303 % 2,187.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.56 % 134,204 6.23 10 -0.1112 % 2,031.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.54 % 5.62 % 123,375 14.40 14 -0.0945 % 2,110.1
FixedReset 5.19 % 3.64 % 223,459 2.97 56 -0.0695 % 2,275.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.26 % 5.34 % 353,672 8.29 53 -0.1348 % 2,070.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -3.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-14
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 2.32 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-14
Maturity Price : 23.92
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-14
Maturity Price : 20.86
Evaluated at bid price : 20.86
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 5.58 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-14
Maturity Price : 22.90
Evaluated at bid price : 23.12
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
BMO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 123,845 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.88
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 107,090 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 81,001 RBC bought 22,600 from GMP at 25.32, then crossed 25,000 at 25.35. CIBC bought blocks of 10,600 and 10,900 from Desjardins at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-14
Maturity Price : 25.28
Evaluated at bid price : 25.33
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset 74,300 Issuer bid.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.20
Bid-YTW : 2.41 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 58,016 RBC crossed 50,000 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 52,081 RBC crossed 50,000 at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 25.40 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3456

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.21 – 25.69
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3397

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.16 – 24.49
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2020

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-14
Maturity Price : 23.92
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %

BMO.PR.O FixedReset Quote: 27.56 – 27.89
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2067

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.56
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.74 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1647

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-14
Maturity Price : 22.58
Evaluated at bid price : 22.74
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 25.82 – 26.19
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2827

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %

Interesting External Papers

BIS Quarterly Review, March 2011, Released

The Bank for International Settlements has released the March 2011 BIS Quarterly Review. The cover story is “Inflation pressures rise with commodity prices”, with special features:

  • Systemic importance: some simple indicators
  • Inflation expectations and the great recession
  • The use of reserve requirements as a policy instrument in Latin America
  • Foreign exchange trading in emerging currencies: more financial, more
    offshore

and the usual “Highlights of the BIS international statistics”.

There was a great table:

As of the end of the third quarter of 2010, the total consolidated foreign exposures (on an ultimate risk basis) of BIS reporting banks to Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain stood at $2,512 billion (Table 1). At $1,756 billion, foreign claims were equal to approximately 70% of that amount. The remaining $756 billion was accounted for by other exposures (ie the positive market value of derivatives contracts, guarantees extended and credit commitments).

Issue Comments

NEW.PR.C Warrants to Expire Shortly

These warrants were issued in September to Capital Uniholders and allow the purchase of a Whole Unit at 41.57, which may be compared to the March 10 NAV of 43.45.

Newgrowth has announced:

that it will be hosting an investor update conference call on Thursday, March 17, 2011, with Brian McChesney, President and CEO of Scotia Managed Companies Administration (the “Administrator”).

The conference call will provide an update on the Company’s portfolio and performance.

Investors and investment advisors are reminded that the Fund currently has warrants outstanding which expire on March 31, 2011 at 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time). Note that investment dealers may have deadlines earlier than March 31, 2011.

Conference Call
Thursday, March 17, 2011 at 2:00 p.m. (EST)
Featuring Brian McChesney, President and CEO of the Administrator
Dial-in Numbers: 416-695-7806 or 1-888-789-9572
Passcode: 2572843#

A replay of the conference call will be available at 905-694-9451 or 1-800-408-3053, passcode 2456065#.

Each warrant entitles the holder to purchase one Unit, each Unit consisting of one Capital Share and one Preferred Share, for a subscription price of $41.57 per Unit. The warrants are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol NEW.WT.

NEW.PR.C is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

BE.PR.A and DGS.PR.A to Merge?

Brompton Equity Split Corp. (“BE”) and Dividend Growth Split Corp. (“DGS”) have announced they:

will be holding shareholder meetings on April 8, 2011 to consider and vote upon special resolutions to merge BE and DGS by way of amalgamation (the “merger”). If the merger is approved, the merged entity will be named Dividend Growth Split Corp. and it will have the same investment objectives, strategies and restrictions as DGS as well as substantially the same preferred share and class A share attributes.

DGS invests on an equally weighted basis in a portfolio of 20 large capitalization Canadian equities that have among the highest dividend growth rates on the TSX. As both the BE and DGS portfolios are primarily invested in common shares of major Canadian issuers, under the merger BE will be able to smoothly transition its assets into a larger continuing fund with the ability to grow in size with lower administrative costs and increased trading liquidity for shareholders.

Shareholders of BE will also be provided with an opportunity to redeem their shares on April 28, 2011 which is earlier than the scheduled final redemption date of BE of May 31, 2011, provided that BE shareholders tender their shares for redemption by April 15, 2011 and the merger is approved by BE and DGS shareholders.

Details regarding the proposed merger will be contained in the joint management information circular which is expected to be mailed to BE and DGS shareholders on or before March 18, 2011. The circular will also be available on www.sedar.com and posted at www.bromptonfunds.com. In addition to the approval of the BE and DGS shareholders, the merger is subject to applicable regulatory approvals. Under the merger proposal, each issued and outstanding preferred share of BE will become one preferred share of DGS. Each issued and outstanding class A share of BE will become the number of class A shares of DGS determined by dividing the net asset value per class A share of BE by the net asset value per class A share of DGS, each calculated on April 28, 2011. In order to maintain the same number of class A and preferred shares outstanding, class A shares or preferred shares may be redeemed by BE on a pro-rata basis prior to the merger as outlined in the joint management information circular.

BE.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™ and this is its first mention on PrefBlog. DGS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ and was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it got bigger last December.

Readers will note that not only is the term extension entirely reasonable (DGS.PR.A has Asset Coverage of 1.9-:1), but that BE.PR.A holders who don’t like the idea are being offered the opportunity to redeem. This should not be noteworthy, but is in light of Manulife’s recent abusive behaviour.

It is not clear to me whether approval of the merger is required from all four sets of shareholders voting separately. I am endeavoring to find out.

Update: Brompton Group has confirmed that each of the four classes of shareholder involved will vote separately; each class has veto power over the deal.

Update, 2011-3-28: As noted in the comments section, I have read the information circular and recommend that preferred shareholders vote in favour of the merger.

PrefLetter

March PrefLetter Released!

The March, 2011, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The March edition discusses the Risk and Reward characteristics of DeemedRetractibles – the class of preferred shares with their eligibility for inclusion in Tier 1 Capital now subject to phase-out by OSFI.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the March, 2011, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the April, 2011, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close April 8 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on April 11.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

Regulation

Sweden to Impose Onerous Capital Requirements

The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority has announced:

According to the Basel Committee, the new requirements can be phased in over a period of several years, but after full phase-in the requirements for total capital will be between 10.5 and 13 per cent and for core Tier 1 capital between 7 and 9.5 per cent. Two additional components, one for requirements in accordance with so-called Pillar 2 (capital increases for other risks) and one for possible future extra requirements for systemically critical banks, will be added.

The major Swedish banks should prepare themselves for a faster implementation of the regulations in Sweden than what is proposed by the Basel Committee in the transition rules. The requirement for total capital for the major Swedish banks is expected to be 15-16 per cent in a few years, of which at least 10-12 percentage points shall consist of core Tier 1 capital. These are approximate figures since the Pillar 2 assessment is individual – it is partly based on stress tests – and the size of the countercyclical capital buffer per definition will vary over time.

Sweden needs high capital requirements for its major banks since a large banking sector can expose society to large risks. The total assets of the four major banks are approximately four times the size of Sweden’s GDP. If one of these banks experiences problems or fails, the costs for society may become very large, while the increase in the cost of capital as a result of the new regulations – and thereby any effects on lending rates – is small. In reality, the major banks already fulfil or are very close to fulfilling the new requirements today.

Four times GDP is a big number. In the post Banks: How Big is too Big?, the UK ratio was estimated as 440% and the Canadian number as 200%. .J. Masson of the Graziadio School of Business and Management at Pepperdine University, estimates 156% for Canada and 47% in the US, as of 2006.

Reaction was outraged:

Lenders condemned the proposal, claiming the plan will create an uneven playing field.

“Swedish banks have a very good capital situation and there is no reason to rush out separate rules, which create competitive disadvantages both for the banks and for Sweden as a country,” Kerstin af Jochnick, chief executive of the Swedish Bankers’ Association, said in a statement.

Thomas Backteman, head of corporate affairs at Swedbank AB (SWED-A.SK), told Dow Jones Newswires there is already a problem with regulation in the U.S. and Europe moving at different speeds, and that the situation would worsen if rules in EU countries also differ.

Nordea Bank AB’s (NDA.SK) CEO Christian Clausen said in a February interview that different rules within the EU would distort competition and harm Europe’s ability to promote economic growth.

Nordea Bank, the Nordic region’s largest bank, had a 10.3% core Tier 1 ratio at the end of 2010, while Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (SEB-A.SK) and Swedbank, the biggest lenders in the Baltics, had core Tier 1 ratios of 12.2% and 13.9%. Svenska Handelsbanken AB (SHB-B.SK), Sweden’s second-largest bank by market capitalization and the one deemed most overcapitalized by Goldman Sachs, has a 13.8% core Tier 1 ratio.

But Norway may follow:

Norway is signaling it may follow Sweden’s target of imposing some of the world’s toughest capital requirements on lenders as policy makers in Scandinavia embrace post-crisis measures that banks warn will undermine competition.

“There are good reasons for the level suggested by the Swedish authorities,” Bjoern Skogstad Aamo, the head of Norway’s Financial Supervisory Authority, said in an interview in Oslo yesterday. “I don’t have very different views.”

“We are in favor of consultation between the Nordic countries on the speed of the new capital requirements,” Skogstad Aamo said. “The most important banks have to expect higher capital requirements than others.”

Norway’s banks may also face a financial stability fee and taxes on bank profits and pay if proposals by the country’s Financial Crisis Commission are adopted by the Finance Ministry. The FSA wants banks to achieve capital and liquidity goals before looking into new taxes, Skogstad Aamo said.

“That proposal that will increase taxation should rather wait until we have strengthened capital and liquidity,” he said.

PrefLetter

March PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

The markets have closed and the March edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The March edition will contain an appendix discussing Risks, Rewards and DeemedRetractibles.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is now available to all residents of Canada.

The March issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the March issue.

Market Action

March 11, 2011

Spain got downgraded:

The downgrade of Spain’s debt only one day after Portuguese bond yields hit record highs is putting extra pressure on euro zone leaders to find a solution to the resurgent euro zone debt crisis.

Moody’s, the credit ratings agency, downgraded Spain’s sovereign debt by one notch, to Aa2. While the move was expected – Moody’s signalled in December that it would probably lower Spain’s rating – the Spanish government and some economists said it was unwarranted because of the progress the country has made in reducing its deficit and recapitalizing its banks.

There is some kind of push going on to increase regulation:

In a report issued Thursday, the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada (MFDA) recommended securities commissions expand protection for investors because the two key funds – the Investor Protection Corp. for mutual fund clients, and the Canadian Investor Protection Fund for brokerage industry clients – have significant gaps.

Both funds protect investors’ assets up to coverage limits in the event that financial firms go bankrupt.

But failed investment firms such as Portus Alternative Asset Management Inc. and Norshield Asset Management (Canada) Ltd. were not licensed as mutual fund dealers, which are covered by the IPF. Rather, they were licensed as portfolio and mutual fund managers, which are not covered at all, the report notes.

The MFDA recommends that both the fund manager and portfolio manager categories of firms be required to join either the IPC or the CIPF to ensure seamless coverage.

A spokeswoman for the Ontario Securities Commission said its staff do not agree that there are gaps in the regulation and oversight of fund managers and portfolio managers. “While mutual fund assets are not held at mutual fund dealers, these assets are held at qualified custodians which are IIROC members or Canadian financial institutions, such as banks,” Susan Silma said in an e-mail statement.

Last month, the Canadian Foundation for Advancement of Investor Rights issued a report looking at the country’s worst financial frauds. It called for all regulated firms – including portfolio managers and fund managers – to become members of a self-regulatory organization so they would be subject to more oversight and their clients would be covered by investor protection funds.

The MFDA report was written in 2008 at the request of the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), an umbrella organization of provincial securities commissions, but was not released publicly until now. It was prepared as part of a project to examine regulatory gaps in Canada.

I haven’t looked into this much – it sounds like just another way for the big players to ensure the cost of entry into the business is increased as much as possible.

Spanish banks need money:

Spanish banks that together need as much as 15.2 billion euros ($21 billion) to meet minimum capital levels now must persuade investors that their battered balance sheets offer the potential return to match the risk.

Twelve lenders, including eight savings banks and the Spanish units of Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) and Barclays Plc (BARC), are among the lenders that fell short of government-set capital requirements, the Bank of Spain said yesterday. The institutions whose levels are furthest from the required minimums include Bankia, which needs 5.8 billion euros, Novacaixagalicia, which requires 2.6 billion euros, CatalunyaCaixa and Unnim.

Yesterday’s announcement sets in motion a timetable that gives lenders as long as a year to raise funds or risk being taken over by a government bailout fund. Investors may be skeptical that the Bank of Spain’s estimates of how much capital the banks need fully reflect losses hidden on balance sheets, putting the onus on them find investors quickly, said Inigo Lecubarri, a fund manager at Abaco Financials Fund in London.

BIS has released a working paper by Ugo Albertazzi, Ginette Eramo, Leonardo Gambacorta and Carmelo Salleo titled Securitization is not that evil after all:

A growing number of studies on the US subprime market indicate that, due to asymmetric information, credit risk transfer activities have perverse effects on banks’ lending standards. We investigate a large part of the market for securitized assets (“prime mortgages”) in Italy, a country with a regulatory framework analogous to the one prevalent in Europe. Information on over a million mortgages consists of loan-level variables, characteristics of the originating bank and, most importantly, contractual features of the securitization deal, including the seniority structure of the ABSs issued by the Special Purpose Vehicle and the amount retained by the originator. We borrow a robust way to test for the effects of asymmetric information from the empirical contract theory literature (Chiappori and Salanié, 2000). Overall, our evidence suggests that banks can effectively counter the negative effects of asymmetric information in the securitization market by selling less opaque loans, using signaling devices (i.e. retaining a share of the equity tranche of the ABSs issued by the SPV) and building up a reputation for not undermining their own lending standards.

OSFI has released its newsletter Pillar, Winter 2011. Nothing new or interesting.

A gloomy day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 25bp, FixedResets losing 19bp and DeemedRetractibles getting off lightly with a loss of 7bp. Volume was high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3102 % 2,404.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3102 % 3,615.9
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 41,436 21.54 4 0.3102 % 2,595.9
OpRet 4.90 % 3.65 % 54,220 1.18 9 0.0529 % 2,391.1
SplitShare 5.08 % 2.81 % 192,957 1.03 5 0.1315 % 2,487.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0529 % 2,186.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.55 % 135,002 6.24 10 0.1332 % 2,033.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.54 % 5.65 % 124,036 14.48 14 -0.2478 % 2,112.1
FixedReset 5.18 % 3.60 % 224,729 2.98 56 -0.1888 % 2,277.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.25 % 5.34 % 357,634 8.31 53 -0.0743 % 2,073.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.B FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.59
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 388,199 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 203,885 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 126,416 Desjardins bought 100,000 from anonymous at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 93,556 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 30,000 shares, both at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 63,469 RBC crossed 50,000 at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 54,909 CIBC bought blocks of 10,500 and 31,000 from Desjardins, both at 24.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.85
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
There were 46 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 23.01 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 1.9800
Average : 1.4365

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-11
Maturity Price : 22.72
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 2.27 %

BAM.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 24.46 – 24.84
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2380

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-11
Maturity Price : 22.91
Evaluated at bid price : 24.46
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %

ALB.PR.B SplitShare Quote: 22.15 – 22.44
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1744

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-29
Maturity Price : 21.80
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 2.81 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.81 – 23.14
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2211

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-11
Maturity Price : 22.61
Evaluated at bid price : 22.81
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %

ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.40 – 22.87
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3738

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.40
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %

TDS.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 10.48 – 10.84
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2679

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.48
Bid-YTW : -1.07 %

Issue Comments

MFC.PR.F Closes Near Par on Acceptable Volume

Manulife Financial has announced:

that it has completed its offering of 8 million Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class 1 Shares Series 3 (the “Series 3 Preferred Shares”) at a price of $25 per share to raise gross proceeds of $200 million.

The offering was underwritten by a syndicate of investment dealers led by Scotia Capital Inc. and RBC Dominion Securities Inc. The Series 3 Preferred Shares commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today under the ticker symbol MFC.PR.F.

The Series 3 Preferred Shares were issued under a prospectus supplement dated March 7, 2011 to Manulife’s short form base shelf prospectus dated September 3, 2010.

The 4.20%+141 FixedReset was announced March 7.

The issue traded 203,885 shares in a range of 24.80-97 before closing at 24.93-97, 15×3.

Vital statistics are:

MFC.PR.F FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %

This issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ has been added to the FixedResets index. A hardMaturity at par dated 2022-1-31 has been added to the call schedule indicated by the prospectus to reflect an anticipated call due to the issues lack of a NVCC clause and OSFI’s refusal to grandfather such issues.