Market Action

March 12, 2013

The What-Debt? government has given more help to its buddies at Air Canada:

The federal government has approved Air Canada’s request for a reprieve from funding its pension deficit, but has imposed a host of conditions – including a freeze on executive pay and a ban on dividends or share repurchases.

The deal requires the airline to make contributions to the plan of at least $150-million a year totalling at least $1.4-billion over seven years. The special contributions would be on top of the current service payments required by the pension plan.

More micro-managing and more interference in labour relations! This follows a suspension of the right to strike and protection from competition.

It was a fine day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums up 9bp, FixedResets winning 20bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 7bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2523 % 2,616.1
FixedFloater 4.09 % 3.44 % 28,906 18.41 1 -0.4292 % 3,971.7
Floater 2.54 % 2.86 % 88,982 20.01 5 0.2523 % 2,824.7
OpRet 4.80 % 2.34 % 51,224 0.30 5 -0.0540 % 2,599.5
SplitShare 4.29 % 4.04 % 727,784 4.22 4 -0.0299 % 2,934.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0540 % 2,377.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.20 % -0.27 % 90,484 0.09 31 0.0949 % 2,357.9
Perpetual-Discount 4.81 % 4.85 % 150,511 15.63 4 0.0506 % 2,659.5
FixedReset 4.88 % 2.52 % 290,115 3.31 80 0.1955 % 2,515.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 3.31 % 139,108 0.62 44 0.0679 % 2,446.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-03-12
Maturity Price : 24.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.36
Bid-YTW : 2.15 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.69
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 116,365 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-03-12
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 107,475 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 35,000, both at 26.40. TD crossed 15,000 at 26.43.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.40
Bid-YTW : 1.80 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 103,475 Desjardins crossed 45,500 at 25.40. RBC crossed 36,500 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 94,520 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 91,085 TD crossed 10,000 at 25.64; Scotia crossed 50,000 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.68
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 72,085 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 40,000 and 12,500, both at 26.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 1.94 %
There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 23.66 – 24.50
Spot Rate : 0.8400
Average : 0.7551

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-03-12
Maturity Price : 23.37
Evaluated at bid price : 23.66
Bid-YTW : 2.20 %

BMO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.24 – 26.44
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1250

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.24
Bid-YTW : 1.58 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 27.07 – 27.27
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1268

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.07
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Premium Quote: 51.20 – 51.46
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1951

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-15
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 51.20
Bid-YTW : 2.58 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 52.10 – 52.30
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1400

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-05
Maturity Price : 50.00
Evaluated at bid price : 52.10
Bid-YTW : 1.89 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.89 – 26.47
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.5231

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-11
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.89
Bid-YTW : -2.04 %

Issue Comments

RON.PR.A Downgraded to Pfd-4(high), Trend Negative by DBRS

DBRS has announced that it:

downgraded the Issuer Rating and Senior Unsecured Debt rating of RONA inc. (RONA or the Company) to BB (high) from BBB (low) and the Preferred Shares rating to Pfd-4 (high) from Pfd-3 (low), maintaining the Negative trend. DBRS has also assigned a recovery rating of RR2 to the Company’s Senior Unsecured Debt.

On May 30, 2012, DBRS confirmed RONA’s Senior Unsecured Debt and Preferred Shares ratings at BBB (low) and Pfd-3 (low), respectively, and maintained the Negative trend. Such rating actions considered the Company’s announced restructuring plans as well as the change in capital structure undertaken with the early repurchase of debentures, but also reflected continued uncertainty with respect to RONA’s ability to improve its operating performance in a challenging consumer and competitive environment. At that time (Q1 F2012), DBRS stated that should RONA not be successful in improving its credit metrics due to weakness in operating income and/or more aggressive-than-expected financial management, a downgrade would likely result.

Subsequent to that statement, RONA released year-end F2012 results, which delivered a net sales increase of 1.7%, flat same-store sales and a significant 40% decline in EBITDA to $171 million versus $285 million in 2011. EBITDA margins were negatively affected by weaker gross margins due to promotional activity in a highly competitive environment and higher selling, general and administrative costs. This marks the third consecutive year of declining EBITDA and EBITDA margins.

As such, combined with an increase in balance-sheet debt to approximately $328 million at year-end 2012 from $257 million the previous year (at least partially due to incremental debt used to complete $67 million of share repurchases in 2012), lease-adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR increased to approximately 3.77 times (x) versus 2.54x in 2011 and 2.80x in 2010 (the improvement in lease-adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR in 2011 was largely attributable to the Company’s repurchase of a portion of its outstanding debentures), while lease-adjusted EBIT coverage declined to 1.51x in 2012 versus 2.26x in 2011 and nearly 3.7x in 2010. Furthermore, the Company’s ability to deleverage over time has weakened considerably as indicated by its free cash flow as a percentage of debt (nearly 18% in 2012 versus approximately 42% in 2011 and 25% in 2010).

DBRS believes that the continued deterioration in operating performance, which has prevented the Company from delivering growth in sales (coupled with margin expansion and weakness in key credit metrics), has resulted in a credit risk profile that is no longer consistent with a BBB (low) Issuer Rating. DBRS believes that the consumer and competitive environment in Canada will remain difficult going forward as The Home Depot, Inc. (rated A (low), Stable) continues its strong performance (five consecutive quarters of positive comparable store sales in Canada) and Lowe’s Companies, Inc. examines continued expansion in Canada to gain necessary scale.

On February 21, 2013, RONA announced further restructuring efforts in the form of its Transformational Strategy, which is expected to span from 2013 to 2015. The plan builds on previous restructuring efforts and includes a rationalization of the Company’s administrative support model, which could ultimately benefit EBITDA by 15% in the near-to-medium term. In addition, RONA plans to enhance the customer experience by improving its merchandising, pricing strategy and in-store service. The Company also plans to optimize its stronger commercial and professional market division and rationalize its underperforming big-box network outside of Québec. Finally, the Company will seek to strengthen and better leverage core markets where profitability has been strong (i.e., distribution to dealers, proximity stores and banners in Québec).

In terms of outlook, DBRS has maintained the trend at Negative as we continue to believe meaningful recovery will remain challenging. RONA is expected to face intense competition in an environment that should remain highly promotional, with consumers facing significant challenges. Although DBRS recognized the merits of RONA’s Transformational Strategy and the cost savings that could result, DBRS expects that a significant improvement in performance will be difficult to realize over the near-to-medium term.

In order for the trend on its credit risk profile to stabilize, RONA would need to demonstrate signs of stabilizing and/or expanding same-store sales and margins leading to a recovery in operating income and return on invested capital, within the context of the Company’s consolidation efforts.

If the Company’s plans and performance lead to stabilization of same-store sales, operating income and key credit metrics, the ratings outlook could stabilize. Continued and meaningful deterioration in same-store sales and/or operating margins and key credit metrics (i.e., lease-adjusted EBIT coverage, free cash flow as a percentage of debt and lease-adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR over 4.0x) in the near-to-medium term could result in another downgrade to BB and Pfd-4.

RON.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was downgraded to Pfd-3(low) in November 2011. RON.PR.A is a FixedReset, 5.25%+265. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns. It closed on 2013-3-11 at 25.61-70 to yield 4.01%-3.99% to perpetuity.

It was also mentioned in the December, 2012, PrefLetter as being a rather peculiar issue for ZPR to be holding (0.51% of portfolio) since the TXPL methodology states:

Rating. Preferred shares must have a minimum rating of P-3 or its equivalent by Standard & Poor’s, Dominion Bank Ratings Service or Moody’s Investor Service.1 If more than one of the ratings agencies has issued a rating on the stock, the lowest rating is used to determine eligibility.

New Issues

New Issue: AX FixedReset 4.75%+330

Artis Real Estate Investment Trust has announced:

that it has entered into an agreement to sell to a syndicate of underwriters led by RBC Capital Markets and CIBC (the “Underwriters”), on a bought deal basis, 2,000,000 Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Trust Units, Series E (“Series E Units”) at a price of $25.00 per Series E Unit for gross proceeds to Artis of $50,000,000 (the “Financing”). Artis has also granted the Underwriters an option, exercisable at any time up to 48 hours prior to the closing of the Financing, to purchase a further 300,000 Series E Units at the issue price which, if fully exercised, would result in additional gross proceeds of $7,500,000.

The Series E Units will pay fixed cumulative preferential distributions of $1.1875 per Series E Unit per annum, yielding 4.75% per annum, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, for the initial period ending September 30, 2018. The first quarterly distribution, if declared, shall be payable on June 30, 2013 and shall be $0.3286 per Series E Unit, based on the anticipated closing of the offering of Series E Units of March 21, 2013. The distribution rate will be reset on September 30, 2018 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield and 3.30%. The Series E Units are redeemable by Artis, at its option, on September 30, 2018 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter.

Holders of Series E Units will have the right to reclassify all or any part of their Series E Units as Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Trust Units, Series F (the “Series F Units”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2018 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter. Such reclassification privilege may be subject to certain tax considerations (to be disclosed in the prospectus supplement). Holders of Series F Units will be entitled to receive a floating cumulative preferential distribution, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of trustees of Artis, at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus a spread of 3.30%.

DBRS Limited (“DBRS”) has assigned a provisional rating of Pfd-3 (low) to the Series E Units.

The Financing is being made pursuant to the REIT’s base shelf prospectus dated June 15, 2012. The terms of the offering will be described in a prospectus supplement to be filed with Canadian securities regulators. The Financing is expected to close on or about March 21, 2013 and is subject to regulatory approval.

Artis intends to use the net proceeds from the Financing to repay indebtedness, fund future acquisitions, and for general trust purposes.

This issue joins AX.PR.A, a 5.25%+406 FixedReset which was recently added to HIMIPref™ and which closed yesterday at 26.05-15, for a YTW of 4.50%-4.40% to its next Exchange Date.

There will probably be funny taxation of the distributions – see the last paragraph of the first post about AX.PR.A.

Update: As noted by Assiduous Reader adrian2 in the comments the deal has been super-sized to $100-million.

Update, 2013-3-13: Rated Pfd-3(low) by DBRS.

Market Action

March 11, 2013

Moody’s points out that the stock of US investment grade corporate bonds is heavily weighted towards lesser credits:

It would be remiss not to add that the risk profile of the US investment-grade corporate bond market also has risen considerably. Given how the share of investment-grade bonds outstanding rated either A3 or Baa has soared from year-end 2007’s 31% to year-end 2012’s record 62%, it’s unlikely that the investment-grade bond yield spread might quickly return to its medians of the two previous recoveries of 103 bp for industrial companies and of 78 bp for financial companies. According to Barclays Capital, these spreads were recently at 135 bp for the industrials and 138 bp for the financials. (Figure 8.)

In conclusion, this very much remains a subpar recovery of above-average risk. What happens to business sales and profits will not only determine the durability of the latest equity rally, it will also have much to say about whether or not Treasury bond yields rise and credit spreads narrow.


Click for Big

The Too-Big-To-Fail Banks, not surprisingly, claim there is no Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy:

Lobby groups for the largest U.S. banks pushed back against claims that they remain too big to fail, rebutting assertions by lawmakers and regulators that they enjoy a “taxpayer subsidy” because of their size.

The Dodd-Frank Act, passed by Congress in response to the 2008 credit crisis, greatly diminished whatever advantage the biggest lenders held over smaller rivals, five industry groups wrote today in a brief on the issue. Senator Elizabeth Warren, a Massachusetts Democrat, used outdated information when she raised the matter at a hearing last month, the groups said.

“There is substantial evidence that the market recognizes the impact Dodd-Frank has had on investor expectations,” the Clearing House, Financial Services Forum, Financial Services Roundtable, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and American Bankers Association said in their brief. “Given the sizable costs associated with new regulations, together with the new orderly liquidation framework, any purported TBTF-related funding advantage has clearly been reduced or even eliminated.”

I can’t find the actual brief, even when looking at tweets from the Financial Services Roundtable – the links don’t work. Perhaps they’re waiting for the recipients to publish it before making it public.

Bloomberg published a good article on complexity:

A highly unusual collaboration between economists and scientists offers an important insight for those who want to fix the world’s crisis-prone financial system: There’s no simple way to understand a complex network.

This month’s issue of the research journal Nature Physics features a handful of papers in which physicists, other natural scientists and leading experts in economics and finance — including prominent banking regulators and Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz — put their minds together to figure out finance. What the scientists bring to the table is experience in studying networks, bewildering tangles of interlinked and interdependent things such as an ecological food web or the Internet.

Fifty years ago, ecologists interested in the stability of food webs at first mistakenly concluded that more complexity — more species and a greater density of links among them — would tend to make an ecosystem more stable. This turned out to be wrong. Later work by noted ecologist Robert May demonstrated that while healthy ecological networks are rich and diverse, too much complexity tends to make them unstable and prone to collapse. Loosely speaking, networks with too much complexity can go wrong in too many ways.

One of the papers referenced was by Caccioli, Marsili and Vivo, titled Eroding market stability by proliferation of financial instruments:

We contrast Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), the theoretical basis for the development of financial instruments, with a dynamical picture of an interacting market, in a simple setting. The proliferation of financial instruments apparently provides more means for risk diversification, making the market more efficient and complete. In the simple market of interacting traders discussed here, the proliferation of financial instruments erodes systemic stability and it drives the market to a critical state characterized by large susceptibility, strong fluctuations and enhanced correlations among risks. This suggests that the hypothesis of APT may not be compatible with a stable market dynamics. In this perspective, market stability acquires the properties of a common good, which suggests that appropriate measures should be introduced in derivative markets, to preserve stability.

This basic thesis has been known for some time. One of the reasons the US long bond futures contract was designed the way it was – with Cheapest To Deliver options for the seller, as well as a certain amount of leeway in delivery times – was to make it more complex. More complexity makes it harder to analyze, which encourages liquidity since there will be a range of views regarding the fair price of the instrument given the same data from the physical market.

In practice, markets are never perfectly liquid. The very fact that information can be aggregated into prices, requires that prices respond to trading (see e.g. [6] for evidence on FX markets or [5] for equity markets). In other words, it is because markets are illiquid that they can aggregate information into prices. Liquidity indeed is a matter of time scale and volume size [4, 5]. This calls for a view of financial markets as interacting systems. In this view, trading strategies can affect the market in important ways. Both theoretical models and empirical research, show that trading activity implied by derivatives affects the underlying market in non-trivial ways [10].

The aim of this paper is to contrast, within a simple framework, the picture of APT with a dynamical picture of a market as an interacting system. We show that while the introduction of derivatives makes the market more efficient, competition between financial institutions naturally drives the market to a critical state characterized by a sharp singularity. Close to the singularity the market exhibits the three properties alluded to above: 1) a strong susceptibility to small perturbations and 2) strong fluctuations in the underlying stock market. Furthermore 3) while correlations across different derivatives is largely negligible in normal times, correlations in the derivative market are strongly enhanced in stress times, when the market is close to the critical state. In brief, this suggests that the hypothesis of APT may not be compatible with the requirement of a stable market.

But it is precisely because these models are simple that one is able to point out why theoretical concepts such as efficient or complete markets and competitive equilibria have non-trivial implications. The reason being that these conditions hold only in special points of the phase diagram where singularity occurs (phase transitions). It is precisely when markets approach these ideal conditions that instabilities and strong
fluctuations appear [13, 14]. Loosely speaking, this arises from the fact that the market equilibrium becomes degenerate along some directions in the phase space. In a complete, arbitrage-free market, the introduction of a derivative contract creates a symmetry, as it introduces perfectly equivalent ways of realizing the same payoffs. Fluctuations along the direction of phase space identified by symmetries can grow unbounded. Loosely speaking, the financial industry is a factory of symmetries, which is why the proliferation of financial instruments can cause strong fluctuations and instabilities. In this respect, the study of competitive equilibria alone can be misleading. What is mostly important is their stability with respect to adaptive behavior of agents and the dynamical fluctuations they support and generate.

It has been recently suggested that market stability appears to have the properties of a public good [22]. A public good is a good i) whose consumption by one individual does not reduce its availability for consumption by others (non-rivalry) and ii) such that no one can be e ectively excluded from using the good (non-excludability). At the level of the present stylized description, the expansion in the repertoire of traded assets introduces an externality which drives the market to unstable states. This suggests that systemic instability may be prevented by the introduction of a tax on derivative markets, such as that advocated long ago for foreign exchange markets by Tobin [23], or by the introduction of “trading permits”, similar to those adopted to limit Carbon emissions [25]. The stabilizing effect of a Tobin tax has already been shown within a model of a dynamic market which is mathematically equivalent to the one presented here [24].

The proliferation of financial instruments makes the market look more and more similar to an ideal arbitrage-free, efficient and complete market. But this occurs at the expense of market stability. This is reminiscent of the instability discussed long ago by Sir Robert May [20] which develops in ecosystems upon increasing bio-diversity13. For ecologies this result is only apparently paradoxical. Indeed the species which populate an ecosystem can hardly be thought of as being drawn at random, but are rather subject to natural selection. Indeed, on evolutionary time scales stability can be reconciled with bio-diversity, as shown e.g. in Ref. [21]. The diversity in the ecosystem of financial instruments has, by contrast, been increasing at a rate much faster than that at which selective forces likely operate.

While I suspect that a Tobin Tax might indeed work, it’s rather a blunt instrument. Far better to allow selective forces to operate, by allowing bankruptcies and firing incompetents. But nobody ever lost his job in the financial industry for incompetence.

Closer to home, Moody’s is taking care to be cautious:

A severe economic shock, such as the kind that hit Japan in the early 1990s and California and Nevada in 2006, could knock Canadian housing prices down by 44%, according to a formula devised by Moody’s Investors Service to rate securities linked to mortgages.

Such a decline would be driven primarily by the phenomenal upswing in Canadian home prices over the past decade, Moody’s said.

While house prices in Spain could plummet by a more severe 52%, Canada joins Spain, as well as the United Kingdom and Australia, in the ratings agency’s assessment of countries where growth in housing prices over the past 10 years has driven their values away from sustainable market fundamentals and into “overheated” territory.

but TD emphasizes the central distribution of probabilities:

Canada’s real estate bonanza of the past decade has come to end and the long-term trend as one of the most profitable places to invest is also not encouraging, a new research paper from the TD Bank argues.

The “special report” from one of Canada’s largest banks makes the case that gains in housing prices have been exceptionally strong over the last 10 years, even when accounting for a sharp drop during the 2008-09 recession. But now is the time for a bit of a payback.

The report does not predict a collapse in house prices as some analysts have suggested. In fact, it sees prices rebounding after a few years of a correction to as high as eight per cent.

However, the longer term trend is for home price gains to average about two per cent over the next 10 years — flat once inflation is taken into account, says TD chief economist Craig Alexander.

The problem with the housing collapse scenario, says Alexander, is that typically a sharp correction needs a trigger in terms of a steep increase in interest rates or unemployment, both of which appear unlikely at this point.

Somewhat surprisingly, the report predicts Vancouver and Toronto, along with Victoria, Edmonton and Calgary will continue to outpace the national average in terms of home prices over the next 10 years.

Vancouver and Toronto are regarded as cities with the most inflated prices — despite recent corrections — but TD argues that the two cities will realize the biggest influx of immigrants, so demand will remain higher. The Alberta cities will do well because of both population growth and higher than average income growth.

Alexander says the two biggest factors in trend home prices are population growth and housing formation, which both favour Toronto and Vancouver.

CU Inc., proud issuer of CIU.PR.A, CIU.PR.B and CIU.PR.C was confirmed at Pfd-2(high) by DBRS:

DBRS has today confirmed the Issuer Rating, Commercial Paper, Unsecured Debentures & Medium-Term Notes and Cumulative Preferred Shares of CU Inc. (CUI or the Company) at A (high), R-1 (low), A (high) and Pfd-2 (high), respectively, all with Stable trends. The rating confirmations are based on CUI’s low business risk, which stems from the regulated nature of its operations supported by a reasonable regulatory environment; strong portfolio of diversified regulated businesses; and solid financial profile.

The Company’s business risk profile is viewed as strong as all of its earnings are generated from regulated electricity and gas businesses, which operate under a relatively stable, albeit evolving, regulatory framework.

CUI is the highest rated publically owned utility and continues to grow through its investments in low risk assets. The Company has a conservative strategy of funding a significant portion of its capex with internally generated cash flows, conservative dividend payouts and equity injections from its parent (Canadian Utilities Limited; rated “A”). CUI has a proven track record of funding equity in a timely manner to remain in line with its regulatory capital structure. DBRS expects the parent to continue to provide support to CUI, if needed.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums off 4bp, FixedResets up 10bp and DeemedRetractibles down 8bp. Volatility was below average. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6267 % 2,609.5
FixedFloater 4.08 % 3.42 % 28,945 18.45 1 0.4310 % 3,988.8
Floater 2.55 % 2.86 % 90,891 20.01 5 -0.6267 % 2,817.6
OpRet 4.79 % 2.52 % 49,779 0.30 5 0.2165 % 2,600.9
SplitShare 4.29 % 4.51 % 117,336 4.23 4 0.1540 % 2,935.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2165 % 2,378.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.21 % 1.58 % 90,152 0.14 31 -0.0431 % 2,355.7
Perpetual-Discount 4.82 % 4.86 % 139,343 15.63 4 0.0202 % 2,658.1
FixedReset 4.89 % 2.61 % 290,650 3.33 80 0.0980 % 2,510.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.87 % 3.37 % 139,025 0.55 44 -0.0810 % 2,444.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 2.21 %
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.11
Bid-YTW : 2.17 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Premium -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 4.40 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 232,131 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 94,712 RBC crossed blocks of 33,800 and 50,000, both at 24.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.88
Bid-YTW : 2.84 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 63,757 RBC crossed 37,400 at 26.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.40
Bid-YTW : 2.00 %
TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible 55,060 TD crossed 50,000 at 26.68.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-10
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.53
Bid-YTW : -12.05 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 41,054 Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 25.92 and 24,800 at 26.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.87
Bid-YTW : 2.33 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount 30,706 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-03-11
Maturity Price : 24.59
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 23.55 – 24.50
Spot Rate : 0.9500
Average : 0.6620

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 2.21 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.76 – 26.38
Spot Rate : 0.6200
Average : 0.4608

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %

GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.34 – 25.66
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2218

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.34
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %

TD.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 26.62 – 26.85
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1496

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.62
Bid-YTW : 2.02 %

TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 24.11 – 24.40
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2129

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-03-11
Maturity Price : 23.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.11
Bid-YTW : 2.17 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.43 – 25.76
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2530

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : -4.94 %

PrefLetter

March PrefLetter Released!

The March, 2013, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The February edition has no special appendix, but contains the usual detailed updates of the DeemedRetractible and FixedReset segments of the market.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the March, 2013, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the April, 2013, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close April 12 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on April 15.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

Issue Comments

FTN Annual Report 2012

Financial 15 Split Corp. has released its Annual Report to November 30, 2012.

FTN / FTN.PR.A Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Five
Years
Since
Inception
Whole Unit +14.66% +1.99% -3.12% +2.24%
FTN.PR.A +5.38% +5.38% +5.38% +5.37%
FTN +44.61% -4.85% -12.28% -2.19%
S&P/TSX Financial Index +17.82% +8.12% +1.69% +8.20%
S&P 500 Financial Index +21.90% +1.89% -10.88% -6.35%
2/3 Canada
+1/3 US
[JH Calc]
+19.18% +6.04% -2.50% +3.35%

Figures of interest are:

MER: 0.99%

Average Net Assets: We need this to calculate portfolio yield. Use the Average of the beginning and end of year figures: ($133.2-million + $120.8-million)/2 = $127.0-million.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Dividends received (net of withholding) of 4,385,579 divided by average net assets of 127.0-million is 3.45%

Income Coverage: Net Investment Income of 3,100,744, divided by Preferred Share Distributions of 4,857,410 is 64%.

These figures are close to the previously reported and calculated semi-annual figures.

Issue Comments

LFE.PR.B 2012 Annual Report

Canadian Life Companies Split Corp. has released its Annual Report to November 30, 2012.

LFE / LFE.PR.B* Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Five
Years
Since
Inception
Whole Unit +16.82% -1.11% -9.39% -2.29%
LFE.PR.B* +5.82% +5.83% +5.47% +5.43%
LFE +110.82% -25.04% -32.07% -17.87%
S&P/TSX Financial Index +17.82% +8.12% +1.69% +6.26%
* LFE.PR.B performance includes pre-reorganization LFE.PR.A. It is not clear whether there is an allowance for value of the warrants received on reorganization

It will be noted that LFE invests in insurance companies, which have had performance far worse than indicated by the S&P/TSX Financial Index, which is dominated by banks.

Figures of interest are:

MER: Calculation of the MER is complicated by the reorganization. Management reports a base figure of 1.59% “excluding any one time secondary offering expenses”, but significant expenses were incurred due to the reorganization which are included in this figure. As an approximation, I have assumed expenses going forward will be the same as in 2012 except that “Shareholder Reporting Costs” will be equal to the 2011 figure of $48,952, not the 2012 figure of $504,603. This results in total adjusted expenses of $1,323,904, divided by average net assets (see below) of $109.9-million = 1.20%. This figure is nicely in the range defined by the MER for the years 2008 – 2011, inclusive.

Average Net Assets: We need this to calculate portfolio yield. Use the Average of the beginning and end of year figures: $103.7-million + $116.1-million = $109.9-million. Note that warrant exercise and retractions will make this figure a nightmare calculation for the next two years.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Dividends received of 4,536,584 divided by average net assets of 109.9-million is 4.13%

Income Coverage: Net Investment Income of 2,757,029, adjusted for excess reporting costs (see MER, above) of 455,651 is $3,212,680 divided by Preferred Share Distributions of 5,195,633 is 62%.

The reorganization of LFE was discussed on PrefBlog.

PrefLetter

March PrefLetter Now In Preparation

The markets have closed and the March edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The March edition may contain an appendix updating the data regarding tax effects on high-coupon FixedResets. Or it may not! I’ll know for sure late on Sunday …

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is now available to all residents of Canada.

The March issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the March issue.

Market Action

March 8, 2013

The US reported a good jobs number:

ob growth surged last month as automakers, builders and retailers pushed the unemployment rate to a four-year low, defying concerns that budget battles in Washington would harm the economic expansion.

Employment rose 236,000 last month after a revised 119,000 gain in January that was smaller than first estimated, Labor Department figures showed today in Washington. The median forecast of 90 economists surveyed by Bloomberg projected an advance of 165,000. The jobless rate dropped to 7.7 percent, the lowest since December 2008, from 7.9 percent.

This was echoed in Canada:

Canada’s see-sawing labour force swung back into job-creation mode in February, with a net 50,700 people finding work. Most of those new hires were aged 55 or older — continuing a trend from January.

There’s a kerfuffle about revolving door regulation in the US:

“There’s a basic resistance to seeing things from the investor point of view,” said Barbara Roper, director of investor protection at the Consumer Federation of America. “It all goes back to the same thing — the degree to which the industry dominates this whole conversation.”

It’s a cultural problem as Roper sees it: Regulators and the regulated operate in a setting where people with the same pedigree move back and forth between government and private- sector jobs and outside views carry little weight. SEC spokesman Kevin Callahan said in an e-mail that investor protection is at the core of all the agency’s actions, and that until an investor advocate is appointed, existing SEC offices are performing the roles required by Dodd-Frank.

A study released last month by the Project on Government Oversight, a nonprofit watchdog group, stirred up a discussion about the revolving door of lawyers who alternate between government and industry, where they defend banks and brokers. Sorting through documents filed by 419 SEC alumni who had recently left the agency, the Project found 2,000 cases in which alumni planned to represent a client or an employer before the SEC between 2001 and 2010.

That’s a lot of meetings among lawyers who used to work down the hall from one another, but who now — officially, anyway — are adversaries. In the view of SEC critics, it is part of the clubby state of affairs that pushes government watchdogs and banks to see things the same way. Callahan said that the U.S. Government Accountability Office studied the revolving-door issue and concluded that the SEC’s controls were as strong as those of other government agencies. What a relief.

The problem is not so much that these guys know each other; I suspect that this helps as much as it hurts in terms of lawyers having a known reputation and encourages a little more frankness than might otherwise be the case. The problem is that the regulatory guys are representing their current employer against their future employer.

Instead of addressing the issues, the SEC is busily enforcing Brazilian laws:

A published report says the Brazilian operations of Brookfield Asset Management Inc. are under investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission over allegations that it used bribes to get approval for construction deals.

The Wall Street Journal report said the SEC is expected to interview former Brookfield executive Daniela Gonzalez, who worked in its Sao Paulo unit, over allegations she made.

The Great White Fathers at the SEC evidently believe that Brazilian savages can’t enforce their own laws.

Fitch downgraded Italy:

Fitch Ratings-London-08 March 2013: Fitch Ratings has downgraded Italy’s Long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDR) to ‘BBB+’ from ‘A-‘. The Outlook on the Long-term IDRs is Negative. Fitch has simultaneously affirmed the Short-term foreign currency IDR at ‘F2’ and the common eurozone Country Ceiling for Italy at ‘AAA’.
KEY RATING DRIVERS
The downgrade of Italy’s sovereign ratings reflects the following key rating factors:

– The inconclusive results of the Italian parliamentary elections on 24-25 February make it unlikely that a stable new government can be formed in the next few weeks. The increased political uncertainty and non-conducive backdrop for further structural reform measures constitute a further adverse shock to the real economy amidst the deep recession.
– Q412 data confirms that the ongoing recession in Italy is one of the deepest in Europe. The unfavourable starting position and some recent developments, like the unexpected fall in employment and persistently weak sentiment indicators, increase the risk of a more protracted and deeper recession than previously expected. Fitch expects a GDP contraction of 1.8% in 2013, due largely to the carry-over from the 2.4% contraction in 2012.
– Due to the deeper recession and its adverse impact on headline budget deficit, the gross general government debt (GGGD) will peak in 2013 at close to 130% of GDP compared with Fitch’s estimate of 125% in mid-2012, even assuming an unchanged underlying fiscal stance.
– A weak government could be slower and less able to respond to domestic or external economic shocks.

Spend-Every-Penny continued his centrally planned micromanaging approach to banking:

Canada’s Finance Minister has taken his battle against a housing bubble an extraordinary step further, issuing rare praise for the country’s banks for not matching Bank of Montreal’s cut-rate mortgage.

Jim Flaherty said Friday he also spoke with BMO this week after it cut its five-year, fixed-rate mortgage last weekend to 2.99 per cent, expressing how troubled he was by the cut from 3.09 per cent.

“I spoke with them about that this week and expressed my concern … in two ways,” Mr. Flaherty told reporters in Ottawa.

There is not any mention in the article of the FedGov’s policy of pouring gasoline onto the housing market fire by increasing the amount of federal mortgage insurance available through the CMHC.

Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund returned 13.4% last year. The fund has recently formalized its rebalancing policy and has returned +2.57% p.a. real return since 1998; note, however that this does not appear to be as good as the OTPP returns. If a pension plan wants good returns, it needs a captive asset manager.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums off 3bp, FixedResets down 12bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 2bp. Volatility was nil. Volume was on the high side of average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3289 % 2,626.0
FixedFloater 4.09 % 3.43 % 30,117 18.42 1 0.0000 % 3,971.7
Floater 2.53 % 2.86 % 89,704 20.01 5 0.3289 % 2,835.3
OpRet 4.80 % 2.49 % 50,592 0.31 5 -0.0464 % 2,595.3
SplitShare 4.29 % 4.50 % 118,979 4.23 4 0.3441 % 2,930.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0464 % 2,373.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.21 % 1.57 % 86,531 0.15 31 -0.0268 % 2,356.7
Perpetual-Discount 4.82 % 4.85 % 139,254 15.65 4 -0.1111 % 2,657.6
FixedReset 4.89 % 2.72 % 292,536 3.33 80 -0.1175 % 2,508.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.86 % 1.73 % 140,574 0.22 44 0.0247 % 2,446.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
No issues gained or lost more than 1% today
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 96,900 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.40; Desjardins crossed 38,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.39
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 88,320 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-03-08
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
GCS.PR.A SplitShare 61,500 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 53,359 TD crossed 50,000 at 26.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.58
Bid-YTW : 2.03 %
RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 52,630 TD crossed 49,600 at 26.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.40
Bid-YTW : -1.00 %
ABK.PR.C SplitShare 39,900 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-10
Maturity Price : 31.64
Evaluated at bid price : 31.89
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
There were 35 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.31 – 26.63
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1842

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.31
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.91 – 26.31
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2862

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-07
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : -3.60 %

BAM.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 26.26 – 26.52
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1572

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.50 – 24.85
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2507

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %

PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.56 – 25.83
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1979

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %

RY.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.51 – 25.73
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1551

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %

Issue Comments

ABK.PR.C Achieves Good Premium on Decent Volume

Scotia Managed Companies has announced:

allBanc Split Corp. (the “Company”) (TSX:ABK.A)(TSX:ABK.PR.C) is pleased to announce that is has completed its public offering of Class C preferred shares, series 1 (“Preferred Shares”) and Class A capital shares (“Capital Shares”), raising $60,713,709 through the issuance of 1,177,652 Preferred Shares and 560,000 Capital Shares at a price per share of $31.64 and $41.88, respectively. In addition, the Company has redeemed all of its outstanding Class B preferred shares. The Preferred Shares and Capital Shares were offered to the public on a best efforts basis by a syndicate of agents led by Scotiabank which included CIBC, RBC Capital Markets, TD Securities Inc., BMO Capital Markets, National Bank Financial Inc., Canaccord Genuity Corp., Macquarie Private Wealth Inc., Raymond James Ltd., GMP Securities L.P., Mackie Research Capital Corporation, Burgeonvest Bick Securities Limited, Desjardins Securities Inc. and Manulife Securities Incorporated.

allBanc Split Corp. is a mutual fund corporation created to hold a portfolio of common shares of the Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, The Bank of Nova Scotia, Royal Bank of Canada and The Toronto Dominion Bank.

The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares of allBanc Split Corp. are listed for trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols ABK.A and ABK.PR.C, respectively.

ABK.PR.C is a SplitShare paying 4.00% Eligible Dividends, maturing March 9, 2018. As reported earlier, proceeds are being used to refund ABK.PR.B, which matured today. This issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and assigned to the SplitShares subindex. Par value is, rather oddly, $31.64. The company’s website is at http://www.scotiamanagedcompanies.com/smc/profile.do?company=ABK.

DBRS rates the issue Pfd-2(low):

The Pfd-2 (low) rating of the Class C Preferred Shares is primarily based on the downside protection available to holders of the Class C Preferred Shares (55.0%), the Class C Preferred Share distribution coverage ratio (2.0 times) and the credit quality of the underlying companies in the Company’s portfolio.

The issue traded 39,900 shares today in a range of 31.51-32.50 (rather a wide range!) before closing at 31.89-99, 10×10. Vital statistics are:

ABK.PR.C SplitShare YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-10
Maturity Price : 31.64
Evaluated at bid price : 31.89
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %