Issue Comments

TDS.PR.B Redeemed; Refunded by TDS.PR.C

TD Split Inc. has announced:

that it has completed its treasury offering of 3,120,000 Class C Capital Shares, Series 1 (the “Capital Shares”) and 3,120,000 Class C Preferred Shares, Series 1 (the “Preferred Shares”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $87,360,000. The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares will trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols TDS.C and TDS.PR.C, respectively.

The Company also announced that it has redeemed all of its 712,861 Class B Preferred Shares (“Old Preferred Shares”) and 712,861 Class B Capital Shares (“Old Capital Shares”) currently outstanding in accordance with their terms. The Old Capital Shares were redeemed at a price of $45.2674 per share, in cash, or, if the holder had previously elected, by delivery of a pro rata share of the common shares of The Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD Shares”) together with a cash amount equal to the holder’s pro rata share of the other net assets of the Company. The Old Preferred Shares were redeemed at a price of $28.10 per share, in cash. The Old Capital Shares and the Old Preferred Shares have been de-listed from the Toronto Stock Exchange.

The Company holds TD Bank Shares in order to generate fixed cumulative preferential dividends for the holders of the Company’s Preferred Shares while providing the holders of the Capital Shares with a leveraged investment, the value of which is linked to the changes in the market price of the TD Bank Shares.

The Preferred Shares were offered at a price of $10.00 per share. Holders of Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly fixed cumulative preferential distributions equal to $0.11875 per Preferred Share, representing a dividend yield on the offering price of the Preferred Shares of 4.75%.

The Capital Shares were offered at a price of $18.00 per share. The Capital Shares will provide holders with a leveraged investment, the value of which is linked to changes in the market price of TD Bank Shares. Holders of Capital Shares will be entitled on redemption to the benefit of any capital appreciation in the market price of TD Bank Shares after payment of the dividends on the Preferred Shares.

There is no prospectus I can find on the company’s website, so I had to go to SEDAR.

The coupon on TDS.PR.C is 4.75%, or $0.475 p.a., paid quarterly in MJSD.

The provisional DBRS rating is Pfd-2(low).

There’s a monthly retraction, but it’s pretty horrible: the formula is (95%NAV – C – 1) which means that, effectively, there’s no point contemplating monthly retraction. There’s an Annual Retraction Date every November 15, but only for Capital Unitholders (who may also submit a preferred simultaneously to get full NAV, if they wish).

The issue matures 2015-11-15 at $10.00. The company can exercise calls at $10.00 to offset Capital Unit retractions on every Annual Retraction Date, or if net assets falls below $15-million.

There’s no NAV test per se, but company will only distribute income to the extent that it receives dividends on its TD holdings.

TDS.PR.B was tracked by HIMIPref™ but was relegated to the Scraps index on volume concerns. It was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was upgraded to Pfd-2(low) by DBRS. TDS.PR.C will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and will be initially assigned to the SplitShares index, although I suspect it will eventually get relegated as well.

Update: DBRS confirms at Pfd-2(low).

PrefLetter

November Edition of PrefLetter Released!

The November, 2010, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The November edition contains an appendix discussing Market Impact and the Flash Crash. Additionally, there is data on the amount of preferred share trading on the Pure ATS.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the November 2010, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the December, 2010, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close December 10 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on December 13.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

PrefLetter

November PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

The markets have closed and the November edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The November edition will contain an appendix discussing market impact and its relevance to portfolio management in general and the Flash Crash in particular.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The September issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the November issue.

Market Action

November 12, 2010

The Europeans have been distracted from the G-20:

Finance ministers from Germany, France and the U.K. met in Seoul to discuss Ireland’s debt crisis after bond yields soared on concern the European Union will need to step in with a bailout.

Ministers are monitoring developments and will probably issue a joint statement later today, said Steffen Seibert, a spokesman for German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

The premium investors charge to hold Irish debt over German bunds climbed to a record yesterday and the euro fell to the lowest level against the dollar since September. Yields on 10- year Irish bonds added 31 basis points to 9.07 percent. Bailing out Ireland’s financial system could cost as much as 50 billion euros ($68 billion) under a “stress case” scenario compiled by the finance ministry and central bank.

Germany is the biggest contributor to this year’s 860 billion euros in loans and pledges to stem Europe’s debt crisis. Bonds of the euro area’s so-called peripheral nations have tumbled since EU leaders on Oct. 29 backed Merkel’s demand to set up a permanent rescue system by 2013 that makes bondholders foot part of the cost of any future debt crisis.

Wow! Higher chance of default has brought with it higher yield demands! Who woulda thunk it? It must be those nasty hedge funds and short sellers at the bottom of this.

Charges have been laid in a tipping scandal. What I find most interesting is that the alpha-tipper (ground-zero tipper? primary tipper?), Mitchell Finkelstein, got his information in three of the four transactions by simply poking around in the Davies Ward Phillips Vineberg LLP document management system – I would have thought that material of this nature would be password protected with access logs maintained and reviewed. Who knows? It might have been; the OSC Statement of Allegations doesn’t go into much detail about it, but it’s an interesting question.

The Canadian preferred share market took a loss today on average volume, with PerpetualDiscounts down 18bp and FixedResets losing 2bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1143 % 2,234.0
FixedFloater 4.89 % 3.50 % 27,188 19.16 1 1.0904 % 3,441.5
Floater 2.66 % 2.34 % 63,145 21.39 4 0.1143 % 2,412.2
OpRet 4.78 % 2.84 % 82,077 1.86 9 0.1297 % 2,402.6
SplitShare 5.80 % -26.83 % 66,640 0.09 2 0.1202 % 2,425.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1297 % 2,196.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % 5.10 % 162,660 2.75 24 -0.1066 % 2,026.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.29 % 5.32 % 253,831 14.92 53 -0.1829 % 2,063.7
FixedReset 5.19 % 2.87 % 343,632 3.20 50 -0.0211 % 2,296.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-12
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-12
Maturity Price : 21.27
Evaluated at bid price : 21.27
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-12
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet 76,502 RBC bought 10,000 from Nesbitt at 25.65, then crossed 63,400 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 34,060 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-12
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 30,145 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-12
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 28,316 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.57
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 26,269 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-12
Maturity Price : 22.50
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 5.00 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 25,180 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

BCE.PR.R to Reset at 4.490%

BCE Inc. has announced that it:

will, on December 1, 2010, continue to have Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series R outstanding if, following the end of the conversion period on November 17, 2010, BCE Inc. determines that at least one million Series R Preferred Shares would remain outstanding. In such a case, as of December 1, 2010, the Series R Preferred Shares will pay, on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., a fixed cash dividend for the following five years that will be based on a fixed rate equal to the product of: (a) the yield to maturity compounded semi-annually (the “Government of Canada Yield”), computed on November 10, 2010 by two investment dealers appointed by BCE Inc., that would be carried by Government of Canada bonds with a 5-year maturity, multiplied by (b) the “Selected Percentage Rate”.

The “Selected Percentage Rate” determined by BCE Inc. is 207%. The “Government of Canada Yield” is 2.169%. Accordingly, the annual dividend rate applicable to the Series R Preferred Shares for the five-year period beginning on December 1, 2010 will be 4.490%.

The announcement of the Selected Percentage Rate was reported on PrefBlog. Data for the Pairs Equivalency Calculator have been updated, but as yet the RatchetRate complement to this issue, Series Q, does not exist.

BCE.PR.R is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Market Action

November 11, 2010

France has joined Germany in urging easy sovereign defaults:

French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde said investors must share the cost of sovereign debt restructurings, backing a German call that helped send yields on Irish and Portuguese bonds to record highs.

“All stakeholders must participate in the gains and losses of any particular situation,” Lagarde said during an interview yesterday in Paris for Bloomberg Television’s “On the Move” with Francine Lacqua. “There are many, many ways to address this point of principle.”

Lagarde’s comments mark France’s most explicit backing of German proposals to make bondholders contribute in bailouts, which deepened the slump in bonds of the so-called euro peripherals. Risk premiums that investors demand to buy their debt have risen since an Oct. 29 European Union summit when German Chancellor Angela Merkel sparred with European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet over her demand “to see that it’s not just taxpayers who are on the hook, but also private investors.”

Merkel’s views on sovereign default were reported on November 2.

The EU stands vigilant with a policy of quantitative wheezing:

The European Union said Thursday it is prepared to financially help Ireland as investors continued dumping bonds issued by the Irish government and other fiscally weak countries in the euro zone.

“We have all the necessary instruments,” European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso told reporters in South Korea, where he was attending the summit of the Group of 20 industrialized and emerging nations. “The EU is ready to support Ireland.” He declined to speculate on whether the EU’s new €440 billion sovereign rescue fund would be needed.

“With three countries in the euro area now having virtually lost access to capital markets, the implications for the region as a whole could easily become systemic again,” market analysts at the Royal Bank of Scotland said in a note.

RBS said the ECB’s government bond-purchasing program will “be scaled up meaningfully” by another €100 billion by early next year. “The more it waits the bigger the purchase program will have to be,” it said.

Econbrowser‘s Jim Hamilton highlights a paper by Ke Tang and Wei Xiong titled Index Investment and Financialization of Commodities:

This paper finds that concurrent with the rapid growing index investment in commodities markets since early 2000s, futures prices of different commodities in the US became increasingly correlated with each other and this trend was significantly more pronounced for commodities in the two popular GSCI and DJUBS commodity indices. This finding reflects a financialization process of commodities markets and helps explain the synchronized price boom and bust of a broad set of seemingly unrelated commodities in the US in 2006-2008. In contrast, such commodity price comovements were absent in China, which refutes growing commodity demands from emerging economies as the driver.

In his post Commodity inflation, Prof. Hamilton highlights the correlations against the USD.

My view has been that the Fed needs to prevent a repeat of Japan’s deflationary experience of the 1990s, but that it also needs to watch commodity prices as an early indicator that it’s gone far enough in that objective. In terms of concrete advice, I would worry about the potential for the policy to do more harm than good if it results in the price of oil moving above $90 a barrel.

And we’re uncomfortably close to that point already.

It was a restful, slightly negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, as PerpetualDiscounts were down 2bp on the day, while FixedResets lost 6bp. Volume was relatively low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1017 % 2,231.5
FixedFloater 4.94 % 3.55 % 26,950 19.11 1 0.0455 % 3,404.4
Floater 2.67 % 2.34 % 65,737 21.40 4 0.1017 % 2,409.4
OpRet 4.78 % 3.05 % 77,665 1.86 9 0.1144 % 2,399.5
SplitShare 5.81 % -24.66 % 67,053 0.09 2 0.4225 % 2,422.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1144 % 2,194.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.62 % 5.05 % 161,091 3.07 24 -0.0447 % 2,028.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.28 % 5.29 % 256,901 14.94 53 -0.0202 % 2,067.4
FixedReset 5.19 % 2.85 % 346,008 3.20 50 -0.0550 % 2,296.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.06
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-12-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : -13.20 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-11
Maturity Price : 22.77
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 62,650 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-11
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 62,203 TD crossed 57,400 at 26.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 55,002 RBC crosse 25,000 at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.06
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 43,550 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 17.11.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-11
Maturity Price : 17.11
Evaluated at bid price : 17.11
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 29,590 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-11
Maturity Price : 23.82
Evaluated at bid price : 24.11
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 21,550 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-11
Maturity Price : 22.91
Evaluated at bid price : 23.09
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
There were 24 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Market Action

November 10, 2010

People sometimes pretend that mutual fund MERs are too high. But that’s what people want:

Value of Canadian mutual fund assets: $720-billion

Value of Canadian-listed exchange-traded funds: $36.2-billion

Value of segregated fund assets in Canada: $83.3-billion

Value of hedge fund assets in Canada: $45.7-billion

Value of closed-end funds: $24.1-billion

The Financial Post reports that a real newspaper reports that RBC is too big to fail on a global basis:

Royal Bank of Canada has appeared on a list of banks that have been deemed by global authorities as being too big to fail, according to the Financial Times.

The G20 will put off a decision on whether to impose an international capital surcharge for the world’s most vital banks, which would force them to maintain additional capital buffers to help them withstand market shocks, the Financial Times report said.

While it may not be explicitly settled at this week’s G20 meeting, it is understood that the banks that are deemed too big to fail will need to raise even more capital than their peers as extra insurance against their sizable reach and influence over the world’s economy.

There are signs the US fiscal deficit is intractable:

The co-chairmen of President Barack Obama’s debt-reduction commission will propose cuts to Social Security and Medicare, as well as reductions in income tax rates in exchange for curbing tax breaks, according to a Republican aide who attended the meeting.

The chairmen’s plan is already causing some Democrats and Republicans on the 18-member commission to balk. The plan will be announced at 1 p.m. Washington time today, said commission spokesman Fred Baldassaro.

Fearless forecast: the problem will remain intractable until the President gets a call from the Treasury saying they’re having big problems selling a bond issue and can he please start working the ‘phones. Then whichever party’s in power will start showing some sense.

The 30-year Treasury auction was disappointing:

Treasury 30-year bonds declined for a sixth day as the U.S. sold $16 billion of the securities amid concern yields will continue to climb as the Federal Reserve focuses its purchases on shorter-maturity debt.

The bonds drew a yield of 4.32 percent, compared with the average forecast of 4.288 percent in a Bloomberg News survey of eight of the Fed’s 18 primary dealers. The bid-to-cover ratio, which gauges demand by comparing total bids with the amount of securities offered, was 2.31, the lowest since November 2009.

In a primer titled A Survival Guide to Bonds, by Rob Carrick of the Globe and Mail, there is a most interesting quote:

“For most of the time in the past 13 years or so, bonds have been negatively correlated to stocks,” explains Michael Herring, managing director and investment strategist at BMO Nesbitt Burns. “When stocks are down, bonds are up. So they provide a nice diversification effect, a counterbalance that dampens the volatility of the overall portfolio.”

That’s not what the Kansas City Fed thinks! In the construction of their Financial Stress Index, they indicate that the “Negative value of correlation between stock and Treasury returns” is an indicator of “Flight to Quality” and therefore a stress indicator. They cite other studies showing that this holds true for other government bond returns; specifically, the measure used is computed over rolling three month periods using the S&P500 and a 2-year Treasury bond index.

MSCI-BARRA published an interesting piece on stock-bond correlation in 2009.

The Canadian preferred share market showed little direction today – for a change! – although volume continued to be high. PerpetualDiscounts lost 3bp, while FixedResets gained 6bp, taking the median weighted average Yield to Worst on the latter index down to 2.84% – yet another new low.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.28%, equivalent to 7.39% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yiel about 5.3%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 210bp, a sharp tightening from the 230bp reported on November 3.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1270 % 2,229.2
FixedFloater 4.94 % 3.55 % 27,261 19.12 1 -0.2268 % 3,402.8
Floater 2.67 % 2.34 % 65,952 21.40 4 -0.1270 % 2,407.0
OpRet 4.78 % 2.89 % 80,621 1.86 9 0.0127 % 2,396.7
SplitShare 5.84 % -16.73 % 67,067 0.09 2 0.1007 % 2,412.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0127 % 2,191.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.62 % 5.07 % 162,883 2.75 24 0.0779 % 2,029.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.28 % 5.28 % 256,830 14.86 53 -0.0274 % 2,067.9
FixedReset 5.19 % 2.84 % 351,316 3.21 50 0.0557 % 2,297.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-10
Maturity Price : 21.60
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-10
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.42
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.72
Bid-YTW : -30.35 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-10
Maturity Price : 21.47
Evaluated at bid price : 21.47
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 122,290 RBC crossed blocks of 70,000 and 25,000, both at 26.61.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 2.75 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 110,555 Scotia crossed 97,900 at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 0.88 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 93,734 RBC crossed blocks of 32,000 and 27,400, both at 23.48, then another 24,500 at 23.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-10
Maturity Price : 23.27
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 76,481 RBC sold blocks of 10,000 and 21,400 to anonymous, both at 26.75, then crossed 10,700 at 26.72.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 73,532 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 44,033 TD crossed 35,000 at 27.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.92
Bid-YTW : 2.85 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Market Action

November 9, 2010

Here’s another exhibit regarding the reluctance of asset management firms to promote star managers:

Roger Guy and Guillaume Rambourg, Gartmore Group Ltd.’s two star managers, won European fund of the year at a black-tie gala at London’s Grosvenor House Hotel on Jan. 21. Ten months later, both have quit and the company is considering putting itself up for sale.

Rambourg and Guy together managed about a third of the company’s assets after its IPO. Three other managers have departed, prompting the company to hire Goldman Sachs Group Inc. to help find a buyer after investors including Skandia Investment Management Ltd. pulled or planned to pull 3.3 billion pounds ($5.3 billion), or about 14 percent of its assets under management, since Rambourg was suspended in March. The performance of their funds has lagged behind competitors this year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

… and here’s one about the usual effect of politicized regulation:

U.S. airlines canceled 4,754 flights in September, a 62 percent jump from the same month a year ago, as the government requires carriers to let passengers off stuck flights within three hours.

Carriers are seeking to avoid fines as high as $27,500 per customer stuck on a plane during a lengthy delay under the rule by Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. Airlines said the requirement would lead to cancellations, and as of September an additional 5,000 flights were scrapped, an 18 percent rise, since the rule took effect.

“Cancellations are a much worse result for passengers” than long delays, said David Stempler, president of the Air Travelers Association, an advocacy group in Chevy Chase, Maryland. “The time it takes them to get to their destinations may last up to days” after a flight is scrubbed, he said.

One of China’s major credit rating agencies has downgraded the US to A+:

China’s Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. reduced its credit rating for the U.S. to A+ from AA, citing a deteriorating intent and ability to repay debt obligations after the Federal Reserve announced more monetary easing.

The credit outlook for the U.S. is “negative,” as the Fed’s plan to buy government debt will erode the value of the dollar and “entirely encroaches” on the interests of creditors, analysts at Dagong, one of China’s five official ratings companies, said in a statement.

Dagong, seeking to become an alternative to S&P, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings, ranks China’s debt higher than that of the U.S. and Japan, citing widening deficits in the developed world. Global ratings methodology is “irrational,” Dagong Chairman Guan Jianzhong said in July, and “cannot truly reflect repayment ability.”

In September, the Securities and Exchange Commission denied the application of Dagong to become a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization in the U.S.

Life will become even more fun if the EU sets up its own captive credit rater!

I ran across an interesting essay … The Impact of High Frequency Trading on the Canadian Market by members of the BMO-CM Quantitative Execution Services, dated July 2009 … it’s filled with the familiar booHooHoos about Portfolio Managers having their lunch eaten. I mean, look at this:

Liquidity has become less obvious – As predatory high frequency trading creates extra volume without creating additional real liquidity, it become increasing difficult for fund managers to discern the real achievable liquidity in a given stock. To date we have witnessed many instances where portfolio managers looking at total trading volume attempt to buy (sell) too much of a given stock resulting in additional market impact. This cost is again shouldered by the individual end clients

They hired an incompetent manager and it cost them. I’m not wringing my hands.

We have had several discussions with Canadian buy side accounts who have noted the decreasing effectiveness of their pre-trade analytic tools. Typically these tools rely on volume and a number of other market metrics (e.g. spread, volatility) to predict the impact a given order will have on the market for that issue. As ‘real’ volume becomes less discernable these tools have greater difficulty determining this number. Portfolio managers, who have become increasingly reliant on these tools over the last several years, are becoming increasingly frustrated with their performance.

Not frustrated enough, apparently, to do a damn bit of work to fix the problem.

The Bank of Canada has released a working paper by Céline Gauthier, Zhongfang He and Moez Souissi titled Understanding Systemic Risk: The Trade-Offs between Capital, Short-Term Funding and Liquid Asset Holdings:

We offer a multi-period systemic risk assessment framework with which to assess recent liquidity and capital regulatory requirement proposals in a holistic way. Following Morris and Shin (2009), we introduce funding liquidity risk as an endogenous outcome of the interaction between market liquidity risk, solvency risk, and the funding structure of banks. To assess the overall impact of different mix of capital and liquidity, we simulate the framework under a severe but plausible macro scenario for different balance-sheet structures. Of particular interest, we find that (1) capital has a decreasing marginal effect on systemic risk, (2) increasing capital alone is much less effective in reducing liquidity risk than solvency risk, (3) high liquid asset holdings reduce the marginal effect of increasing short term liability on systemic risk, and (4) changing liquid asset holdings has little effect on systemic risk when short term liability is sufficiently low.

I don’t like it much becaue it does not address the role of the Central Bank in reducing liquidity risk.

Regulators continue to run amok in the UK, once best known as the home of Magna Charta:

Traders’ mobile-telephone calls may be taped in an effort to stamp out insider trading under new rules scheduled to be published by the U.K. financial regulator as soon as this week.

The Financial Services Authority has said cell phones used for business shouldn’t be exempt from rules requiring banks and brokerages to record employees’ calls so that they can be listened to later. In March, the agency said in draft proposals that around 22,000 phones would be covered.

The regulator in September warned companies to prevent leaks to the media as part of its effort to crack down on market abuse. The FSA started to cold-call traders to interview them under caution two years ago about possible insider trading, a strategy that fell prey to hoax calls.

“We continue to work to keep undesirable people out of our financial services industry,” FSA enforcement chief Margaret Cole said in a speech yesterday. “We use information and intelligence from a range of sources to consider whether those who own or run financial firms, as well as people in sensitive roles within those businesses, are ‘fit and proper.’”

There’s more about the cold-calling here. For now, it’s all to the good – I know some fine immigrants from the UK who came here out of disgust with the ubiquitous camera monitors, ASBOs and so on. But this trend will eventually hurt us all.

Another strong day on the Canadian preferred share market, but this time with a big difference in inter-sector performance. PerpetualDiscounts gained 41bp, while FixedResets lost 3bp; today’s performance takes the Bozo Spread (the difference between PerpetualDiscount and FixedReset Current Yields) down to a mere 9bp. I am all agog to see if this spread goes negative … it is my theory that this spread shows the retail perception of the interest rate risk inherent in a Straight Perpetual … but who knows? Maybe it doesn’t. Volume was very heavy.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1272 % 2,232.1
FixedFloater 4.93 % 3.53 % 27,559 19.14 1 -0.6757 % 3,410.6
Floater 2.67 % 2.34 % 64,550 21.40 4 0.1272 % 2,410.0
OpRet 4.78 % 2.87 % 80,881 1.87 9 -0.1875 % 2,396.4
SplitShare 5.84 % -14.84 % 66,296 0.09 2 -0.0403 % 2,410.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1875 % 2,191.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.62 % 5.01 % 160,386 3.08 24 -0.0805 % 2,028.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.28 % 5.27 % 257,751 14.96 53 0.4123 % 2,068.4
FixedReset 5.19 % 2.86 % 352,075 3.21 50 -0.0298 % 2,296.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.H OpRet -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-12-09
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : -8.13 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 22.57
Evaluated at bid price : 22.73
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 22.49
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 4.97 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 21.53
Evaluated at bid price : 21.53
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 21.46
Evaluated at bid price : 21.77
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 23.42
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 24.30
Evaluated at bid price : 24.57
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 22.41
Evaluated at bid price : 22.56
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 22.62
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 23.59
Evaluated at bid price : 23.85
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 21.79
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet 151,540 RBC bought 35,700 from Nesbitt at 25.59. RBC then crossed 24,300 at 25.59, while Nesbitt crossed 57,000 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 120,002 Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 25.09; RBC crossed 70,500 at 25.14. Anonymous crossed (?) 13,000 at 25.14.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-02-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 117,485 TD crossed 10,700 at 26.25, then sold 10,000 to Desjardins at 26.27. Finally, TD crossed 39,500 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 23.44
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 89,000 RBC crossed 76,500 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 88,487 RBC crossed 50,000 at 22.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 22.41
Evaluated at bid price : 22.56
Bid-YTW : 4.94 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 87,814 RBC crossed 47,900 at 22.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-11-09
Maturity Price : 22.62
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
There were 64 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Regulation

Dickson speaks against IFRS Exposure Draft

Julie Dickson spoke against the IFRS Exposure Draft on Insurance Contracts in a speech at the 2010 Life Insurance Invitational Forum:

On the “positive side”, the new approach might better capture financial risks of companies, particularly equity and interest rate risks, and thus provide more early warnings of risks. On the “negative” side, the discount rate change could potentially lead to extreme earnings volatility especially given the large blocks of long-duration guaranteed product liabilities on the books of Canadian insurance companies. As such, we think the proposals may go too far in terms of capturing short-term interest rate movements on long-term exposures. Consequently, we are working on options to help deal with this issue.

In fact we are encouraged by recent developments in this regard. One such development is that the IASB’s Insurance Working Group is meeting later this week to discuss possible ways to minimize the effects of any inappropriate volatility. This group’s objective is to analyze accounting issues relating to insurance contracts. The group brings together a wide range of interests and includes senior financial executives who are involved in financial reporting. Other developments closer to home are discussions by the Canadian Accounting Standards Board’s Insurance Accounting Task Force and the Canadian Institute of Actuaries group to develop their comment letters to the IASB. Both these groups are discussing the volatility issue.

OSFI is committed to continuing to work with industry and other international stakeholders as we complete our response to the IASB, which is due November 30th. We encourage the industry to contribute to this work; the more that we work together, the better the result will be.

See also the Canada Life and Health Insurance Association comment letter, discussed briefly in the post SLF Coy on Capital Rule Changes.

Interesting External Papers

FDIC Addresses Systemic Risk

Bloomberg reported today:

The FDIC board today approved two proposals for overhauling assessments for its deposit insurance fund, including one that would base the fees on banks’ liabilities rather than their domestic deposits. The fee proposal, a response to the Dodd- Frank financial-regulation law, would increase assessments on banks with more than $10 billion in assets.

The measure would increase the largest banks’ share of overall assessments to 80 percent from the present 70 percent, the FDIC said. The assessment increase would be in place by the second quarter of next year, according to the proposal.

“It’s a sea change in that it breaks the link between deposit insurance and deposits for the first time,” Acting Comptroller of the Currency John Walsh said today. “It is significant.”

The proposal would increase assessment rates on banks that hold unsecured debt of other lenders. That step was proposed to address risk that is retained in the system even as it is removed from one bank’s holdings.

It is this last bit that makes me happy. The Basel rules allow banks to risk-weight other banks’ paper as if was issued by the sovereign – which is simply craziness. The FDIC memorandum – which we can only hope will survive the comment period and spread to Canada, if not world-wide – is going to charge them extra deposit insurance premiums on the long-term portion of these assets:

Depositary Institution Debt Adjustment

Staff recommends adding an adjustment for those institutions that hold long-term unsecured liabilities issued by other insured depositary institutions. Institutions that hold this type of unsecured liability would be charged 50 basis points for each dollar of such long-term unsecured debt held. The issuance of unsecured debt by an IDI lesens the potential loss to the [Deposit Insurance Fund] in the event of an IDI’s failure; however, when such debt is hel by other IDIs, the overall risk in the system is not reduced. The intent of the increased assessment, therefore, is to discourage IDIs from purchasing the long-term unsecured debt of other IDIs.

There are many other adjustments and changes; I cannot comment on the specifics of the proposal because the data that would assist with the evaluation of the calibration of the adjustments is not available. The comments on this proposed rule will be most interesting!

Update, 2010-11-10: The FDIC has published the official notice.