Market Action

July 15, 2014

I was sent a link to an article from 2007 by Keith Ambachsheer and Rob Bauer titled Losing ground: Do Canadian mutual funds produce fair value for their customers?:

The study specifically compares the net excess returns produced by a large sample of Canadian mutual funds with domestic equity mandates against the net excess returns produced by a large sample of the domestic equity components of Canadian pension funds. An important study finding is that, over the nine-year period from 1996 to 2004, the Canadian equity components of Canadian pension funds outperformed their Canadian equity market benchmark by an average +1.2% per annum, net of expenses. Over the same nine-year period, Canadian equity mutual funds with domestic mandates underperformed their Canadian equity market benchmark by an average -2.6% per annum, net of management fees, but before any applicable sales charges. Any such sales charges would reduce mutual fund net returns even further.

Very sweet, but nowhere does the article attempt to attribute reported outperformance of Canadian pension funds, which I suggest was due to enormous post-Tech-Wreck outperformance overcompensating for pre-Tech-Wreck underperformance. In addition, it does not attempt to address the outperformance itself, which any first-year B-School student will be pleased to tell you cannot be persistent.

The authors then ask:

Why would Canadian mutual fund investors subject themselves to an average wealth-loss of 3.8% per annum relative to implementing the same basic investment policy through Canadian pension funds? Or equivalently, why would Canadian mutual fund investors pay an average 2.75%(or more including sales charges)for an investment service that is available to Canadian pension fund participants for an average 0.25%, and which produced inferior investment results even before the far greater expenses?

… but of their four hypotheses, only one seems plausible:

Mutual funds are sold, not bought: the market for investment management services is highly asymmetric, with the buyers of these services knowing far less about what they are buying than the sellers know about what they are selling. Information economics predicts that in such a market buyers will pay too much for too little. Research results from the field of behavioural finance support this conclusion. This research shows people to be generally unsophisticated, inconsistent, hesitant, and even irrational regarding financial matters, which creates the opportunity for the for-profit financial services industry to proactively step in and sell their products and services at too-high prices.8 The veracity of his third explanation is supported by the findings of a recent survey of 1865 Canadian mutual fund investors. When asked why they had bought mutual funds, 85% said they were persuaded by “someone who provided me with advice and guidance.”9 In our view, it is the combined effects of informational asymmetry and behavioural dysfunction on the part of the customers, and opportunistic acuity on the part of the suppliers, that best explains the findings summarized in Table 1. Mahoney(2004)reaches similar conclusions in a paper titled “Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds.”

This emphasis on prices is reasonable, but there is no attempt to reconcile the fees charged with the performance gap. In addition, the authors conveniently ignore the investment environment of the first half of their period: tech sold! Dividends were old-fashioned; managers had a choice between throwing a good portion of their mutual fund assets into tech or, alternatively, just stay home and catch up on sleep. Without tech on offer, nobody would come to the office and the ‘phones wouldn’t ring.

All this is meant to tout the idea of Government Investment Management:

We favour a middle way: the “paternalistic libertarian” approach currently in the process of being adopted in the UK. The basic idea is to create a number of arm’s-length, expert, pension delivery organizations, and then to automatically enroll the entire non-covered part of the workforce into one of them. People can elect to opt out if they do not wish to participate.

A key assumption in these calculations is that the pension delivery organizations operate in the sole best interests of plan participants, with expense ratios of 0.3%.

I wonder if Mr. Ambachsheer is involved with the proposed Ontario Pension Plan? It sounds rather similar …

The battle to make life easier for incompetent bond investors is heating up:

The Canadian Securities Administrators, a coalition of the country’s provincial and territorial securities regulators, announced last month it’s starting a review of transparency in the $390-billion corporate bond market. The CSA questioned whether the private sector-led transparency model currently in place is working, and if more active regulation is needed.

The move comes as bond trading falls under closer scrutiny worldwide with the top regulator in the U.S. calling for more public information on private trading, and the European Union seeking to build a system to publicly disclose prices in real time.

Unlike stocks, bonds aren’t traded on public exchanges but as private transactions with securities dealers acting as middlemen, giving the brokerages — many of whom are owned by banks — an informational advantage.
It’s historically been more profitable for firms to trade bonds than stocks because the debt markets are less transparent, making it easier for brokers to take a bigger fee for each exchange.

“We have a sort of oligopolistic banking system where the banks kind of set their own rules, and there’s been a lack of transparency in the bond market forever,” said Ed Waitzer, chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission from 1993 to 1997 and a senior partner at Toronto-based law firm Stikeman Elliot LLP. “It sounds like the commission is feeling a little bit of heat again because the rest of the world is kind of shining a light on dark markets.”

Yellen is still dovish on rates:

Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen told lawmakers the central bank must press on with record monetary stimulus to combat persistent job-market weakness.

“There are mixed signals concerning the economy,” Yellen said in response to questions during testimony to the Senate Banking Committee today. “We need to be careful to make sure that the economy is on a solid trajectory before we consider raising interest rates.”

While her “overall view is more positive,” Yellen said low wages are one sign of “significant slack” in labor markets, even after the jobless rate fell to an almost six-year low.

In prepared testimony, Yellen repeated that interest rates are likely to stay low for a “considerable period” after the Fed ends its asset-purchase program, which she said could happen following the October meeting.

“A high degree of monetary policy accommodation remains appropriate,” Yellen said in her semi-annual testimony. “Although the economy continues to improve, the recovery is not yet complete.”

She also commented on irrational exuberance:

Ms. Yellen delivered her observation during off-script Congressional testimony on Tuesday. Well, sort of: She was actually singling out social media and biotech stocks – along with lower-rated corporate debt – as pockets of the market that look frothy and are vulnerable to setbacks, particularly when the Fed starts raising its key interest rate.

The fact that a Fed chair would discuss stock valuations of any kind is highly unusual and should push investors into evaluating market conditions after a 190 per cent rally by the S&P 500 over the past five-and-a-half years.

Dubai’s making an effort to attract the hated hedge funds:

When Ahmad Zuaiter started a frontier-markets hedge fund, the former Soros Fund Management LLC money manager chose Dubai over New York and London.

Zuaiter’s Jadara Capital Partners LP and VY Capital Management Co. Ltd. opened in the emirate in the past year, bringing to three the number of hedge-fund firms in the Dubai International Financial Centre, according to Dechert LLP, a law firm that helped establish both companies in the sheikhdom.

“If you want to run a boutique model, the best way is to be located in a centrally positioned hub like Dubai and use it as a nexus to travel extensively and frequently to your target markets,” Zuaiter, 46, said in an interview in his office, close to celebrity chef Marco Pierre White’s Wheeler’s of St James’s restaurant.


For Dubai to rival London as a finance and hedge-fund capital, it must overcome concerns about political instability in the region and 50 degree Celsius (122 degrees Fahrenheit) temperatures that drive residents to seek refuge in Geneva and other European cities during the summer. Still, zero tax, office rents one-third the price of London’s West End and an airport that connects with 90 percent of frontier markets make it attractive to startups, Zuaiter said.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 19bp, FixedResets up 13bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 8bp. Volatility was reasonable, highlighted by FixedReset winners. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.16 % 3.15 % 21,951 19.34 1 0.0000 % 2,516.0
FixedFloater 4.17 % 3.39 % 29,778 18.66 1 -0.2188 % 4,163.9
Floater 2.84 % 2.94 % 46,108 19.90 4 0.4627 % 2,782.8
OpRet 4.00 % -9.45 % 80,441 0.08 1 0.4708 % 2,731.8
SplitShare 4.26 % 3.98 % 48,616 4.04 6 -0.1794 % 3,112.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4708 % 2,497.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.52 % -3.72 % 79,129 0.09 17 -0.0208 % 2,428.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.24 % 5.08 % 107,470 15.23 20 0.1900 % 2,579.7
FixedReset 4.38 % 3.56 % 196,859 4.61 76 0.1275 % 2,566.2
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.49 % 126,241 0.30 43 0.0787 % 2,551.9
FloatingReset 2.66 % 1.92 % 107,335 0.16 6 0.3614 % 2,526.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -2.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.71
Evaluated at bid price : 22.17
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
BNA.PR.F SplitShare -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.14
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.93
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
SLF.PR.I FixedReset 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 1.75 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 105,916 RBC crossed 29,100 at 25.52. TD crossed 45,000 at 25.55; Scotia sold 19,500 to Nesbitt at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 92,735 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.72; TD crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 81,916 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 25.52; Desjardins crossed 20,000 at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
BNA.PR.F SplitShare 63,860 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.14
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 47,640 Called for redemption July 29.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 36,835 TD crossed 10,300 at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 22.17 – 22.83
Spot Rate : 0.6600
Average : 0.4463

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.71
Evaluated at bid price : 22.17
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %

BAM.PR.E Ratchet Quote: 23.75 – 24.14
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2401

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-15
Maturity Price : 23.42
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 21.37 – 21.72
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2617

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.37
Evaluated at bid price : 21.37
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %

BAM.PF.E FixedReset Quote: 24.83 – 25.07
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1645

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-15
Maturity Price : 23.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.90 – 26.19
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2159

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %

BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.07 – 26.24
Spot Rate : 0.1700
Average : 0.1057

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-14
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.07
Bid-YTW : -1.35 %

Market Action

July 14, 2014

Fitch is urging government micromanagement of housing:

Canadian home prices remain overvalued relative to historical macroeconomic fundamental drivers, Fitch Ratings says. Despite government efforts to moderate growth, home prices rose 7.1% in May (on a year-over-year basis) according to the Canadian Real Estate Association. In addition, both property sales and building permits for residential construction have picked up in recent months. Home prices also continue to be supported by historically low interest rates and a lack of supply in the major metropolitan areas; these factors have propped up affordability and drive demand. According to Fitch’s sustainable home price model, which measures home prices relative to long-term fundamentals, Canadian home prices remain approximately 20% overvalued in real terms.
We believe high household debt relative to disposable income has made the market more susceptible to market stresses like unemployment or interest rate increases. The ratio reached a high of 164.1% in third-quarter 2013 before declining slightly in the following two quarters. Fitch projects unemployment will likely remain in its current 7% range. But low interest rates are unlikely to fall further. Rising interest rates could pressure the market more than others given high borrower leverage and the short-term structure of Canadian mortgages.

Fitch believes the Canadian government has taken several proactive steps in recent years to mitigate some of the risks to the housing market. The underwriting guidelines for loans insured by the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) have been tightened. CMHC has also pulled back on the amount of low-ratio portfolio insurance offered to lenders and limited securitization of insured mortgages to CMHC-administered programs. Furthermore, The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions has issued a guideline for prudent bank underwriting that must be adhered to for bank originations as well as those purchased from nonbank lenders. However, the long-term impacts remain unclear, and policy makers may be required to take additional steps over the short term to engineer a soft landing.

Sadly, there is nothing in today’s Ontario budget about buying us all new houses. They missed that one:

Most of the budget, however, lays out long-term plans for new spending.

It provides for $29-billion in new funds for transit, roads and bridges over the next decade, plus tens of billions more for other capital costs, including schools. The budget puts more than a billion dollars into various social programs, with raises for personal support workers and more funds for programs for people with developmental disabilities.

A new $2.5-billion fund for businesses is meant to help lure corporations to the province and encourage existing operations to expand.

The plan also allocates a billion for a new road or rail link to the Ring of Fire, a Northern Ontario mineral deposit that the government estimates will yield $60-billion worth of economic activity.

The document further introduces the Ontario Retirement Pension Plan, a pension system for people who do not already have one through their employer, that aims to double the benefits of the Canada Pension Plan for retirees.

There have been an interesting couple of articles lately on US employment trends. The first approves of extreme pickiness when hiring:

Since the recession, many employers halted widely distributed cost-of-living raises. Instead, they’re giving big bonuses and salary boosts to a select few. The average pay raise might be 2 percent, but the extra cash is shared among a small group of employees who have leverage, says Thomas Gimbel, chief executive officer of Chicago-based staffing company LaSalle Network. For them, he says, “Things are better than they’ve ever been.”

These wily pay strategies may also explain why there are so many open jobs. According to data released July 8, there were 4.6 million job openings in the U.S. in May, up from 3.9 million a year before. For key positions, companies are letting job openings stay open until they find exactly the right person, Gimbel says. In the meantime, existing employees must work harder to fill the gap. Then, for the perfect job candidate, they’ll pay up, he says. For example, a job listed for a $125,000 salary might be vacant for a year but then filled by someone who demands — and receives — $140,000.

The second one blames it on algorithms (beloved of Human Resources departments):

Expanding use of technology that uses ultra-specific criteria to screen and winnow candidates may be perpetuating one of the most unusual features of the slow rebound in the U.S. labor market: Despite a steady increase in openings since the recession ended in 2009, these positions are being matched with job seekers less efficiently than in the past. For each 100,000 new openings, for example, companies have hired about 48,000 people, compared with about 54,000 following the 2001 recession.

Software provided by Taleo, a unit of Oracle Corp. (ORCL), allows recruiters to conduct “precision matching” through a “profile-based recruiting system” that uses “advanced search and artificial intelligence to find and short list top talent,” according to a brochure on Oracle’s website.

For workers and job-seekers with exactly the right skills industries need today, the software programs can be a boon, filling their e-mail with notes from recruiters, talent scouts said. There’s also a benefit for companies in lower talent-acquisition and training costs.

There are also disadvantages for other job prospects: A candidate with some, but not all, of the required attributes may be eliminated or moved down the list. This may be one reason why people out of work for 27 weeks or more still represent about a third of the total unemployed, compared with an average of 19 percent between 2004 and 2007. The share is down from about 37 percent in June 2013.

Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating and I would be loathe to pontificate about the evils of HR algorithms. But I will bet a nickel that over the long run, it is more costly for a company to be too lean than it is for it to be slightly over-staffed, with guys who are familiar with InventoryMaster 8.0, but – critically – unfamiliar with InventoryMaster 9.1.

Housing pundit Will Dunning, who I featured in the post How to Dissect a Housing Bubble, is in the news again, criticizing government micro-management of housing:

“If and when there is a correction in the condo market, the severity will have been aggravated by the actions of the federal government, which elected to depress demand at a time when demand was already beginning to weaken organically and a wave of supply has been developing,” Mr. Dunning writes in a new research note.

He sketched out a scenario in which Toronto’s condo prices would fall by about 10 per cent, as a result of rising supply and falling demand.

“I believe that the federal mortgage insurance policy changes of the past few years will continue to weigh on demand, for both owner-occupants and investors,” Mr. Dunning writes.

His 10-per-cent-price-correction scenario also assumes that job creation does not bounce back to a healthier rate in Canada’s most populous city, and that interest rates remain constant.

“The timing of this process is highly uncertain – it probably won’t start for at least a half-year, and if there are further delays in (condo construction) completions, it could be a long way off,” he writes.

But micro-management is all the rage:

Banks shouldn’t count on a fresh round of European Central Bank cash to trade sovereign debt and reap big profits, Mario Draghi said.

“The convenience to use the ECB cheap money to buy government bonds is much less” than in a previous funding round which started in 2011, the ECB president said in testimony to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France yesterday. “The general situation is such that these carry trades are going to be much less profitable.”

As spreads on government debt from Spain to Italy over similar German securities have fallen to record lows, a carry trade that was lucrative two years ago may now yield less, Draghi said. In a liquidity drive that pins cash to banks’ performance in extending loans to the economy, the Frankfurt-based ECB could extend as much as 1 trillion euros ($1.36 trillion) in its so-called TLTRO program starting in September.

A condition of that program is that banks have to meet a benchmark on lending to businesses and households, excluding mortgages, or else hand back the money in 2016.

“If banks don’t lend to the non-financial private sector, they’ll have to repay,” Draghi said.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 13bp, FixedResets up 9bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 8bp. Volatility looks pretty good at first – until you realize it’s half Floaters, which always bounce around a lot. Still, the Performance Highlights table is comprised exclusively of winners! Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.16 % 3.15 % 21,896 19.34 1 -0.6276 % 2,516.0
FixedFloater 4.16 % 3.38 % 28,978 18.68 1 0.3513 % 4,173.0
Floater 2.86 % 2.96 % 46,632 19.85 4 1.1842 % 2,770.0
OpRet 4.02 % -4.06 % 83,161 0.08 1 -0.1176 % 2,719.0
SplitShare 4.25 % 4.01 % 50,620 4.04 6 -0.0422 % 3,118.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1176 % 2,486.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.52 % -2.46 % 81,951 0.09 17 0.0786 % 2,429.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.25 % 5.10 % 107,435 15.23 20 0.1304 % 2,574.8
FixedReset 4.39 % 3.58 % 196,522 4.76 76 0.0942 % 2,562.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.48 % 126,906 0.12 43 0.0824 % 2,549.9
FloatingReset 2.67 % 2.12 % 108,859 3.88 6 0.0526 % 2,517.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-14
Maturity Price : 17.83
Evaluated at bid price : 17.83
Bid-YTW : 2.96 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 2.84 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-14
Maturity Price : 22.49
Evaluated at bid price : 22.83
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-14
Maturity Price : 17.78
Evaluated at bid price : 17.78
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 2.36 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-14
Maturity Price : 17.70
Evaluated at bid price : 17.70
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible 150,500 Scotia crossed 150,000 at 26.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-13
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : -9.78 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 139,622 RBC bought two blocks of 10,000 each from anonymous at 23.29. Desjardins crossed blocks of 24,400 and 21,400, both at 23.30. RBC crossed two blocks of 20,000 each, both at 23.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-14
Maturity Price : 22.42
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 77,444 Nesbitt crossed 44,600 at 25.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 63,961 Scotia crossed blocks of 19,400 and 40,000, both at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 53,462 TD crossed two blocks of 25,000 each, both at 26.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-13
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : -1.05 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 53,051 RBC crossed blocks of 23,600 and 25,000, both at 26.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.32
Bid-YTW : 2.68 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 25.62 – 25.94
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2016

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 22.53 – 22.85
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2108

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.53
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 23.11 – 23.39
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1847

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-14
Maturity Price : 22.73
Evaluated at bid price : 23.11
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %

MFC.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 25.16 – 25.48
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2291

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 24.83 – 25.14
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2230

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-14
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

GWO.PR.S Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.50 – 25.73
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1470

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %

PrefLetter

July PrefLetter Released!

The July, 2014, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The regular appendices reporting on DeemedRetractibles and FixedResets are included.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the July, 2014, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the August, 2014, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close August 8 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on August 11.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

Note: Assiduous Reader DG informs me:

In case you have any other Apple users: you need to install a free App from the apple store called “FileApp”. It comes with it’s own tutorial and allows you to download and save a PDF file.

Issue Comments

DFN.PR.A 2013 Annual Report

Dividend 15 Split Corp. has released its Annual Report to November 30, 2013.

DFN / DFN.PR.A Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Five
Years
Whole Unit +20.70% +10.88% +13.44%
DFN.PR.A +5.38% +5.38% +5.38%
DF +39.44% +17.09% 23.58%
S&P/TSX 60 Index +13.40% +4.36% +9.65%

Using the S&P TSX 60 index rather than “Dividend Aristocrats” seems a little odd to me – but we’ll let them choose their benchmark!

Figures of interest are:

MER: 1.49% of the whole unit value (As reported)0.

Average Net Assets: The average of the beginning and end of year figures is ($378.1-million + $307.8-million) / 2 = $343-million. Total preferred share dividends = $8,890,054 at 0.525 / share implies average of 16.93-million units outstanding, at an average NAVPU of ($18.22 + $18.45) / 2 = 18.34, implies average net assets of $310-million. Not very good agreement! But call it about $327-million

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Dividends received of $12.13-million divided by average net assets of 327-million is 3.7%

Income Coverage: Net Investment Income of 7.23-million divided by Preferred Share Distributions of 8.89-million is 81%.

Market Action

July 11, 2014

Tammy Schirle of Wilfrid Laurier writes a good piece titled Six questions Ontario must answer before it starts a pension plan (although the headline writer confused ‘exhortations’ with ‘questions’):

  • 1. Be clear about the market failures you are trying to address.
  • 2. Be precise about the policy target.
  • 3. Be clear about any redistribution that will occur.
  • 4. Notice that low-income families won’t benefit from a simple expansion of benefits
  • 5. How are you going to deal with interprovincial migration and interprovincial employment arrangements?
  • 6. Enhancing the CPP remains the Ontario government’s preferred solution.

It was mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 1bp, FixedResets off 7bp and DeemedRetractibles up 2bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was extremely low.

And now it’s time to start work on the July PrefLetter!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.14 % 3.13 % 21,886 19.40 1 0.0000 % 2,531.9
FixedFloater 4.17 % 3.40 % 27,277 18.66 1 0.4694 % 4,158.4
Floater 2.89 % 2.99 % 47,081 19.78 4 -0.8330 % 2,737.5
OpRet 4.02 % -5.85 % 83,269 0.08 1 0.0784 % 2,722.2
SplitShare 4.25 % 3.94 % 52,705 4.05 6 0.1397 % 3,119.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0784 % 2,489.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % -4.80 % 84,342 0.09 17 0.0671 % 2,427.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.25 % 5.11 % 109,101 15.23 20 0.0086 % 2,571.5
FixedReset 4.39 % 3.58 % 193,323 4.62 76 -0.0651 % 2,560.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.91 % 129,476 0.12 43 0.0222 % 2,547.8
FloatingReset 2.67 % 2.12 % 107,909 3.89 6 0.0658 % 2,516.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-11
Maturity Price : 21.84
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-11
Maturity Price : 17.43
Evaluated at bid price : 17.43
Bid-YTW : 3.03 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-11
Maturity Price : 17.65
Evaluated at bid price : 17.65
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 76,399 Scotia crossed two blocks of 30,000 each, both at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 75,221 RBC bought blocks of 11,400 and 10,400 from TD, both at 25.55. Desjardins crossed 16,000 at the same price; Scotia crossed 21,600 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 56,124 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.07.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
BNA.PR.F SplitShare 29,738 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2021-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 28,267 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.49
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 23,038 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 22.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-11
Maturity Price : 22.18
Evaluated at bid price : 22.47
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
There were 11 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.09 – 26.09
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.6089

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 0.38 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 22.11 – 22.51
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2474

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-11
Maturity Price : 21.84
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.87 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2693

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.87
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.52 – 25.88
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2688

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.52
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %

MFC.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 25.12 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2796

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.17 – 23.45
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1963

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.17
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %

Contingent Capital

Royal Bank Issues NVCC-Compliant Sub-Debt

Royal Bank of Canada has announced:

an inaugural Basel III-compliant offering of $1 billion of subordinated debentures (“the Notes”) through its Canadian Medium Term Note Program.

The Notes bear interest at a fixed rate of 3.04 per cent per annum (paid semi-annually) until July 17, 2019, and at the three-month Banker’s Acceptance Rate plus 1.08 per cent thereafter until their maturity on July 17, 2024 (paid quarterly). The expected closing date is July 17, 2014 and RBC Capital Markets is acting as lead agent on the issue.

The bank may, at its option, with the prior approval of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada, redeem the Notes on or after July 17, 2019 at par, in whole at any time or in part from time to time, on not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days notice to registered holders.

We routinely undertake funding transactions to maintain strong capital ratios and a cost effective capital structure. Net proceeds from this transaction will be used for general business purposes.

It’s not clear to me how the floating rate of BAs+108bp was calculated. The Canada 10-year is trading at around 2.20%, the five year around 1.55% and three-month BAs a little above 1.20%. None of these values fits very well with the 3.04% initial rate to provide a 108bp increment.

However, the important thing – for some – is the fact that a clear demarcation exists between the five-year pretend-maturity and the ten-year actual maturity. This will make it easier for the sleazy to sell the debt to the stupid.

Not much meat on those bones. The heart of the matter is the conversion feature, as noted by Moody’s:

Moody’s assigned a rating of Baa1 (hyb) to Royal Bank of Canada’s (RBC, Aa3 Negative, C+/a2 Stable) 3.04% CAD1 billion Basel III compliant NVCC subordinated debt. Proceeds from the issuance will be added to the bank’s general funds and utilized for general banking purposes. The NVCC subordinated debt provides loss absorption as it is subject to automatic conversion into common shares, based on a predetermined conversion formula, at the point of non-viability, as defined by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada (OSFI), subject to regulatory discretion. This incremental loss absorption feature is credit positive for holders of senior securities of RBC, as a layer of loss absorbing securities will reduce the risk of losses incurred higher in the capital hierarchy if the bank gets into financial distress.

This marks the first issuance in Canada of contractual non-viability subordinated debt. The rating is positioned 2 notches below the a2 adjusted baseline credit assessment (adjusted BCA) of RBC, in line with Moody’s standard notching guidance for contractual non-viability subordinated debt. An additional notch is added relative to the notching for “plain vanilla” subordinated debt with normal loss severity (currently 1 notch below adjusted BCA) to capture the potential uncertainty related to the timing of loss absorption.

By way of comparison, Moody’s has the NVCC-compliant Royal Bank preferreds at Baa3:

This marks the first issuance in Canada of contractual non-viability preferred securities. The rating is positioned 4 notches below the a2 adjusted baseline credit assessment (adjusted BCA) of RBC, in line with Moody’s standard notching guidance for contractual non-viability preferred securities. An additional notch is added relative to the notching for legacy Canadian non-cumulative preferred shares (currently 3 notches below adjusted BCA) to capture the potential uncertainty related to the timing of loss absorption.

Standard and Poor’s explains what makes them more creditworthy than preferreds (bolding added):

The ‘A-‘ rating is two notches below the stand-alone credit profile (SACP), incorporating:

  • •A deduction of one notch from the SACP for subordination, reflecting our belief that the Canadian legal and regulatory framework insulates senior debt from defaults on the subordinated debt; and
  • •The deduction of an additional notch to reflect that the subordinated notes feature a mandatory contingent conversion trigger provision. Should a trigger event occur (as defined by The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions’ [OSFI] guideline for Capital Adequacy Requirements, Chapter 2), each subordinated note outstanding will automatically and immediately be converted, without the holder’s consent, into a number of fully paid and freely tradable common shares of the bank, determined in accordance with a conversion formula.

The following constitute trigger events:

  • •OSFI publicly announces it has advised RBC that it believes the bank has ceased, or is about to cease, to be viable and that, after converting the preferred shares and all other contingent instruments RBC has issued, and taking into account any other relevant factors, it is reasonably likely that the bank’s viability will be restored or maintained; or
  • •The federal government or a provincial government in Canada publicly announces that RBC has accepted a capital injection, or equivalent support, from a government or agency, without which the bank would be nonviable, according to OFSI.

Because we expect this instrument’s conversion to occur at or near the point of the banks’ nonviability, we view this mechanism as a nonviability trigger.

We expect to assign “minimal” (as our criteria describe the term) equity content to these subordinated notes because we do not consider notes that have only nonviability features to be able to absorb losses prior to the bank’s point of nonviability.

By way of comparison, S&P has the NVCC-compliant preferreds at BBB+, one notch lower on the global scale than the Sub-Debts A-.

So OSFI gets a lot of discretion in determining conversion – surprise, surprise! Since bond management firms are typically much larger than preferred share management firms (I believe there’s only one of these in Canada!), and since bond investors are typically much bigger than preferred share investors (aka, “retail scum”) I believe that in a crisis there will be frenzied and successful lobbying of OSFI personnel by their future employers to convert preferreds but to ‘just wait a bit’ before forcing sub-debt conversion.

Blair Keefe, David Seville and Thomas Yeo of Tory’s Law Firm recently wrote an article titled The Preferred Share Market Finally Re-Opens For Canadian Banks:

The market is still waiting for the first offering of NVCC subordinated debt. There are a few reasons why the banks have remained hesitant to tap that market. One reason relates to changes in capital ratios mandated by Basel III, which reduce the need for subordinated debt on a bank’s balance sheet. Prior to the introduction of Basel III, subordinated debt could account for almost one-third of the total capital of a bank. With the new minimum total capital requirement of 10.5%2 (including a countercyclical capital buffer of 2.5%) of risk-weighted assets and a 8.5% minimum for tier 1 capital, effectively the most that can be satisfied with subordinated debt is 2% of the bank’s risk-weighted assets. As well, under Basel III, most deductions from capital must be made from common share equity, whereas in the past, certain deductions could be made from total capital. Effective January 1, 2015, the leverage or asset-to-capital ratio in Canada will be based on tier 1 capital as opposed to total capital. This requirement is particularly important for smaller deposit-taking institutions because they tend to be limited by their asset-to-capital multiples. As a result, we expect that subordinated debt will be eliminated from the capital structure of many smaller institutions—and will form a significantly smaller portion of the capital structure of larger institutions than it has historically.

Market uncertainty also remains over how the proposed “bail-in” debt regime will interact with NVCC instruments. In October 2011, the Financial Stability Board issued a paper providing that regulators should have the power to convert (or write off) all or part of the unsecured and uninsured creditor claims of a financial institution under resolution into equity or other ownership instruments. It was proposed that such a conversion would be done in a manner that respects the hierarchy of claims in liquidation. The 2013 Canadian federal government budget includes a proposed plan to implement a “bail-in” regime for systemically important banks3; Canadian banks and the market generally are still waiting for details as to how the federal government intends to implement this regime. The institutional investors that make up the vast majority of the market for subordinated debt are particularly concerned with how the bail-in regime will function and the effect of further dilution after NVCC instruments are converted, resulting in a “wait-and-see” approach to investor interest in NVCC subordinated debt offerings.

The precise conversion formula to be adopted by the banks for NVCC subordinated debt is not yet known. Under OSFI’s requirements, conversion formulas for both NVCC preferred shares and subordinated debt need to be set to ensure respect for the relative hierarchy of claims between the two types of instruments in the event of a triggering event. In other words, since debt ranks ahead of equity in the traditional capital structure, in the event of a triggering event, holders of subordinated debt should receive more common shares on conversion than holders of preferred shares on a dollar-for-dollar basis. The banks have put substantial effort in the development of a formula used in the preferred share offerings which addresses concerns about potential market manipulation and death spirals in situations where conversion appears to be a possibility. As of the date this article was written, all offerings of NVCC preferred shares have used the same formula based on the issue price of the preferred shares, plus declared and unpaid dividends, divided by the volume- weighted average trading price over the 10 trading days before a triggering event, subject to a $5.00 floor price. It is unlikely that other banks will depart from this formula. The preferred share formula would suggest that the conversion formula for subordinated debt will use some multiple of the principal amount of the debt, together with accrued interest, to achieve the hierarchy of claims desired by OSFI. Issuers of NVCC subordinated debt should consider obtaining an advance income tax ruling from the Canada Revenue Agency confirming the deductibility by the bank of the interest payments, although we anticipate no difficulty in banks obtaining that ruling.

So my guess is that not only will the sub-debt benefit by delayed conversion, but the floor on the conversion price to equity will be lower – say, $3-4 instead of the now-standard $5 floor for preferreds. Senior “debt”, presumably, will be lower still.

The next matter of interest is whether this non-debt gets included in the bond indices; given that they’re bank issues, and the banks own TMX, and TMX runs the standard index (this arrangement has been blessed by the regulators, in exchange for regular payments), I’d say it’s a slam-dunk. But I have no information yet.

Update, 2014-7-12: OK, so I found the term sheet on SEDAR. It’s not under Prospectus, it’s under “Marketing Materials”, dated July 9. The conversion is:

The “Contingent Conversion Formula” is (Multiplier x Note Value) ÷ Conversion Price = number of Common Shares into which each Note shall be converted.

The “Multiplier” is 1.5.

The “Note Value” of a Note is the Par Value plus accrued and unpaid interest on such Note.

The “Conversion Price” of each Note is the greater of (i) a floor price of $5, and (ii) the Current Market Price of the Common Shares. The floor price of $5 will be subject to adjustment in the event of (i) the issuance of Common Shares or securities exchangeable for or convertible into Common Shares to all holders of Common Shares as a stock dividend, (ii) the subdivision, redivision or change of the Common Shares into a greater number of Common Shares, or (iii) the reduction, combination or consolidation of the Common Shares into a lesser number of Common Shares. The adjustment shall be computed to the nearest one-tenth of one cent provided that no adjustment of the Conversion Price shall be required unless such adjustment would require an increase or decrease of at least 1% of the Conversion Price then in effect.

“Current Market Price” of the Common Shares means the volume weighted average trading price of the Common Shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange (the “TSX”), if such shares are then listed on the TSX, for the 10 consecutive trading days ending on the trading day preceding the date of the Trigger Event. If the Common Shares are not then listed on the TSX, for the purpose of the foregoing calculation reference shall be made to the principal securities exchange or market on which the Common Shares are then listed or quoted or, if no such trading prices are available, “Current Market Price” shall be the fair value of the Common Shares as reasonably determined by the board of directors of the Bank.

It’s interesting that they’re implementing this with a conversion factor, rather than changing the floor price. Just what the implications of that might be is something that will bear thinking about.

Update, 2014-7-18: DBRS rates at A(low) [Stable].

Market Action

July 10, 2014

Looks like Canadian shadow banking is picking up:

Canada’s banks developed their commercial banking arms over decades by lending to companies that typically generate annual revenue of $50-million or less, nurturing scores of client relationships. Since the financial crisis, however, private equity firms have been scooping up smaller companies, shaking up their historical banking relationships.

Anatol von Hahn, Bank of Nova Scotia’s head of personal and commercial banking, said he would be “be very surprised if we don’t have double, triple” the number of small Canadian companies that are owned by private equity firms twenty years from now. Because they are flush with cash that they simply can’t sit on, private equity firms are often willing to pay big multiples to buy small businesses. “They’re playing a huge role,” he said.

To adapt to the changing dynamics, Scotiabank has gone so far as to invest in certain private equity funds in order to get access to the companies they acquire, according to Mr. von Hahn, allowing the bank to pitch itself as a potential banking partner.

The trend isn’t playing out in Canada alone. U.S. firms are looking for mid-market acquisitions north of the border. In May, New Jersey-based private equity player Swander Pace Capital acquired Montreal’s Recochem, marking its 10th acquisition north of the border in the past decade. More acquisitions could come because the firm recently raised a brand new $350-million fund.

Could we be heading towards European banking crisis redux?

Shares in Banco Espírito Santo SA … were suspended from trading Thursday after falling an additional 17%. Shares of the lender’s controlling shareholder, Espírito Santo Financial Group SA, were also suspended because, it said, of “ongoing material difficulties” at its parent company, Espírito Santo International. “ESFG is currently assessing the financial impact of its exposure to ESI.”

A spokesman for Espírito Santo International declined to comment.

This week’s downward spiral has knocked 32% off the bank’s market value and has dragged down Portugal’s main stock index with it.

On Thursday, the turmoil spread elsewhere in Southern Europe, illustrating how investors remain nervous about the fragility of the continent’s financial system. In Spain, a bank and a construction company each called off planned bond sales. In Italy, a drug company pulled its stock offering. In Greece, a government-bond sale came in smaller than expected. And stock markets across the continent fell, along with the euro.

It has been more than a year since fears about the health of a European bank rattled markets. Lately, after years of crisis, investors, bankers and regulators have been growing more confident about the stability of the continent’s financial system. Regulators hoped the banking industry’s improving health would be on display in coming months as they conduct so-called stress tests on more than 120 large banks.

Instead, Espírito Santo’s rapid descent, and the collateral damage in other European markets, suggests that conditions remain precarious.

Critics of Espírito Santo’s complex corporate structure have worried for years about the linkages among companies within the conglomerate. Among the concerns: whether the group’s nonfinancial companies—including a hotel chain and a hospital operator—were using the bank and its customers to raise funds.

Here in Ontario, our wise masters are protecting us from lower prices:

Ontario’s governing Liberals say they want to remove barriers to interprovincial trade, but suggest they’re reluctant to lift some restrictions that give Ontario companies an advantage.

Finance Minister Charles Sousa says there are a number of sectors within Ontario’s economy that are strong because they’re protected.

Sousa says he’s open to talks on how to grow the economy, but he doesn’t want to jeopardize the livelihood of Ontario companies.

Sousa’s comments come after the leaders of three western provinces called for the removal of trade barriers to reduce the cost of doing business and help provincial economies grow.

As far as I can tell, Mr. Sousa did not explain why strong companies need protection.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 4bp, FixedResets gaining 14bp and DeemedRetractibles off 3bp. Volatility was average, but uniformly positive. Volume was below average overall, and concentrated in a handful of issues.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.14 % 3.13 % 22,179 19.40 1 0.0000 % 2,531.9
FixedFloater 4.15 % 3.43 % 28,342 18.45 1 -0.2179 % 4,138.9
Floater 2.87 % 2.95 % 46,425 19.86 4 0.1367 % 2,760.5
OpRet 4.02 % -5.05 % 86,525 0.08 1 0.0785 % 2,720.0
SplitShare 4.26 % 3.99 % 54,773 4.05 6 -0.0333 % 3,115.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0785 % 2,487.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % -4.30 % 85,467 0.09 17 0.0417 % 2,425.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.25 % 5.18 % 110,158 15.23 20 -0.0449 % 2,571.2
FixedReset 4.39 % 3.59 % 200,106 4.61 76 0.1436 % 2,562.2
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.94 % 131,236 0.12 43 -0.0278 % 2,547.2
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.15 % 109,597 3.89 6 -0.0723 % 2,514.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.C FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 2.65 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 2.77 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-10
Maturity Price : 22.24
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-10
Maturity Price : 17.85
Evaluated at bid price : 17.85
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.A FixedReset 318,878 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.50. TD crossed blocks of 14,700 and 84,900 at the same price. Desjardins crossed 100,000 at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 212,720 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, both at 25.45. Scotia crossed blocks of 32,000 and 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 192,599 RBC crossed blocks of 10,000 and 11,600 at 25.60. TD crossed 25,000 at 25.70. Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 69,300, both at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.73
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 184,573 Called for redemption July 31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 181,858 Called for redemption July 31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 176,412 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 144,299 Called for redemption July 31..
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset 135,592 Scotia crossed blocks of 35,400 and 25,000, both at 25.56. National sold 28,400 to anonymous at 25.60. TD crossed 24,700 at 25.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-05-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 126,715 Desjardins crossed 26,500 at 25.50 and blocks of 25,000 and 15,000 at 25.55. Scotia crossed 30,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 125,406 RBC crossed 75,000 at 25.43; Desjardins crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-10-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.44
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.15 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2062

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 2.67 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 20.00 – 20.30
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2133

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-10
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.33 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1942

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.33
Bid-YTW : 2.49 %

SLF.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 26.13 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.2059

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.13
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 23.16 – 23.38
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1769

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-10
Maturity Price : 22.75
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %

HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 23.10 – 23.22
Spot Rate : 0.1200
Average : 0.0805

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-10
Maturity Price : 22.72
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %

Issue Comments

DGS.PR.A To Get Bigger

Brompton Group has announced:

Dividend Growth Split Corp. (the “Company”) is pleased to announce it has filed a preliminary short form prospectus with respect to a treasury offering of class A and preferred shares. The class A and preferred share offering prices will be set at levels that ensure that existing unitholders are not diluted.
Dividend Growth Split Corp. invests in a portfolio of common shares of high quality, large capitalization companies, which have among the highest dividend growth rates of those companies included in the S&P/TSX Composite Index. Currently, the portfolio consists of common shares of the following 20 companies:

Great-West Lifeco Inc. The Bank of Nova Scotia AGF Management Limited Shaw Communications Inc.
Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce IGM Financial Inc. TELUS Corporation
Manulife Financial Corporation National Bank of Canada Power Corporation of Canada Canadian Utilities Limited
Sun Life Financial Inc. Royal Bank of Canada Manitoba Telecom Services Limited Enbridge Inc.
Bank of Montreal The Toronto-Dominion Bank Rogers Communications Inc. TransCanada Corporation

The investment objectives for the class A shares are to provide holders with regular monthly cash distributions targeted to be $0.10 per class A share and to provide the opportunity for growth in the net asset value per class A share.

The investment objectives for the preferred shares are to provide holders with fixed cumulative preferential quarterly cash distributions, currently in the amount of $0.13125 per preferred share, representing a yield on the original issue price of 5.25% per annum, and to return the original issue price to holders of preferred shares on the original November 30, 2014 maturity date.

On October 1, 2013, the Company announced an extension of the maturity date of the class A and preferred shares of the Company for an additional 5 year term to November 28, 2019, subject to extension for successive terms of up to 5 years. The preferred share dividend rate for the extended term will be announced at least 60 days prior to the original November 30, 2014 maturity date. The new dividend rate will be determined based on then-current market yields for preferred shares with similar terms.

The syndicate of agents for the offering is being led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC, Scotiabank and TD Securities Inc. and includes BMO Capital Markets, National Bank Financial Inc., GMP Securities L.P., Raymond James Ltd., Canaccord Genuity Corp., Desjardins Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Ltd., Mackie Research Capital Corporation, and Manulife Securities Incorporated.

DGS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when there was a similar offering in January.

DGS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Market Action

July 9, 2014

The National Securities Regulator has just gotten a little more national:

Two more provinces have agreed to join a voluntary national securities regulator expected to begin operations in the fall of 2015, bringing the total number on board to four and giving the upcoming capital markets watchdog a more pan-Canadian scope.

Sources say Saskatchewan and New Brunswick will sign on to the Cooperative Capital Markets Regulator Wednesday in a ceremony in Ottawa with federal Finance Minister Joe Oliver, embracing a plan backed by Ontario and British Columbia last September.

Marketwatch has a nice chart on market trends:

This chart shows how much money is flooding into investment vehicles — index mutual funds and exchange-traded funds — that track stock indexes. These two types of funds have grabbed about 24% of the U.S. mutual fund and ETF market, down from less than 5% in 1998, according to Deutsche Bank data.

Big full-service brokerages, “which control 50% of all invested household wealth in America, have successfully pushed the majority of their advisors’ practices toward more hands-off investing approaches,” said Josh Brown of The Reformed Broker in a recent blog post, referring to charging a flat percentage fee on assets, rather than commissions. “At the same time, do-it-yourselfers have made Vanguard, State Street and BlackRock’s iShares three of the world’s largest asset managers — and they are primarily purveyors of passive indexing products.”

cashFlows

There were modest gains for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 7bp, FixedResets gaining 1bp and DeemedRetractibles up 2bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.17%, equivalent to 6.72% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.3%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 240bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) narrowing from the 245bp reported July 2.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.14 % 3.13 % 22,987 19.41 1 -0.0418 % 2,531.9
FixedFloater 4.14 % 3.42 % 28,662 18.47 1 2.6846 % 4,148.0
Floater 2.87 % 2.98 % 46,793 19.80 4 0.2605 % 2,756.8
OpRet 4.02 % -4.25 % 87,763 0.08 1 -0.0392 % 2,717.9
SplitShare 4.26 % 4.01 % 56,618 4.05 6 0.0603 % 3,116.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0392 % 2,485.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.53 % -2.41 % 85,341 0.09 17 -0.0231 % 2,424.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.25 % 5.17 % 111,585 15.23 20 0.0663 % 2,572.4
FixedReset 4.39 % 3.62 % 199,089 4.62 76 0.0076 % 2,558.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.98 % 1.63 % 136,042 0.13 43 0.0202 % 2,548.0
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.13 % 110,761 3.86 6 0.0526 % 2,516.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 22.95
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 334,546 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 100,000 each, both at 25.45. RBC crossed blocks of 10,000 shares, 12,300 and 50,000, all at 25.45. TD crossed 40,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.44
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset 201,900 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 168,241 TD crossed 100,000 at 25.47. Desjardins crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 164,150 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.45. TD crossed 30,000 at the same price; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price. CIBC sold 10,000 to anonymous at the same price again.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 133,597 Scotia crossed 75,400 at 25.12. RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 132,946 RBC crossed 88,600 and 40,000, both at 25.46.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 2.84 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 17.70 – 18.20
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3060

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 17.70
Evaluated at bid price : 17.70
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 22.95 – 23.95
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.8072

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 22.95
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 22.25 – 22.84
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.4280

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %

RY.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.41 – 26.84
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2895

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %

BAM.PR.C Floater Quote: 17.60 – 17.95
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2904

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-07-09
Maturity Price : 17.60
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %

GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.87 – 24.05
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1219

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.87
Bid-YTW : 5.47 %

Issue Comments

Moody's Assesses Canadian Banking System: Outlook Negative

In a report available only to clients, Moody’s has stated:

Our outlook for the Canadian banking system has been changed to negative from stable to reflect the evolving support environment in Canada. The outlook expresses our expectation of how bank creditworthiness will evolve in this system over the next 12-18 months.

Our outlook for the Canadian banking system has been changed to negative from stable. This change reflects our view that the Canadian government’s plan to introduce a bail-in regime for senior debt combined with the accelerating global trend towards explicit inclusion of burden-sharing with senior debt holders as a means of reducing the public cost of bank resolutions could reduce the predictability of support being provided to the senior debt holders and uninsured depositors of the large Canadian banks.

Most rated Canadian banks’ long-term ratings benefit from at least two notches of uplift due to systemic support, which reflects our currently very high expectation that the government would provide support if required. On June 11, 2014 we affirmed the long-term ratings of the seven largest Canadian banks but changed the outlook to negative from stable on the supported senior debt and uninsured deposit ratings of these banks, to reflect the fact that the balance of risk has shifted to the downside for unsecured bank creditors given the Canadian government’s plans to implement a “bail-in” regime for domestic systemically important banks and the evolving global support environment.

The above-noted actions do not reflect any change in our assessment of the standalone credit profiles of the Canadian banks, all but one of which maintain their stable outlooks (see page 3).