Archive for March, 2014

LFE.PR.B Releases 2013 Annual Report

Sunday, March 16th, 2014

Canadian Life Companies Split Corp. has released its Annual Report to November 30, 2013.

LFE / LFE.PR.A & LFE.PR.B Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Five
Years
Whole Unit +22.71% +5.22% +2.67%
LFE.PR.A & LFE.PR.B +6.43% +5.88% +5.68%
LFE +89.62% -5.02% -8.35%
S&P TSX Financial Index +25.17% +12.64% +15.34%

I won’t ding them for underperforming their chosen index over the past five years because banks have strongly outperformed insurers through the period – but I will ding them for not using an index comprised of insurers only!

Figures of interest are:

MER: 2.31% of the whole unit value, excluding one time initial offering expenses. However, “Warrant Subscription Fees” … according to the Management Information Circular (SEDAR, 2012-3-21):

The Company will pay a subscription fee of $0.25 per Unit in respect of each subscription procured by a CDS Participant on behalf of their clients.

which is nice work if you can get it.

Average Net Assets: We need this to calculate portfolio yield; unfortunately the number of units changed dramatically over the year, which makes it more approximate. The Total Assets of the fund at year end was $196.0-million, compared to $112.2-million a year prior, so call it an average of $154.1-million. Total Preferred Share Distribution was $6.799-million, at $0.625/share implies an average of 10.88-million units, at an average NAV of ((14.34 + 12.48) / 2 = 13.41, so call it $145.9-million. Which is actually reasonably close, so let’s call the Average Net Assets $150-million.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Dividends received of $4.51-million divided by average net assets of $150-million is 3.01%.

Income Coverage: Dividends of 4.51-million less expenses before Warrant Subscription Fees (because they aren’t recurring) of 1.61-million is 2.90-million, to cover preferred dividends of 6.80-million is 43%

LBS.PR.A 13H1 Semi-Annual Report

Sunday, March 16th, 2014

Life & Banc Split Corp. has released its Semi-Annual Report to June 30, 2013.

Figures of interest are:

MER: 1.03% of the whole unit value, “excluding the Preferred share distributions and issuance costs”.

Average Net Assets: We need this to calculate portfolio yield. The Total Assets of the fund at year end was $225.8-million, compared to $234.8-million on June 30, so call it an average of $230-million.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Income received of $4.736-million divided by average net assets of $230-million, multiplied by two because it’s semiannual is 4.12%.

Income Coverage: Net investment income of $3.576-million divided by preferred share dividends of $3.582-million is 100%.

CGI Releases 2013 Annual Report

Sunday, March 16th, 2014

Morgan Meighen & Associates has released the 2013 Annual Report for Canadian General Investments, Limited.

The closed-end fund has two series of preferred shares outstanding, CGI.PR.C and CGI.PR.D, which I consider to be Split Shares as they are backed by an investment portfolio rather than by an operating company.

MER: The Management Expense Ratio, excluding leverage costs (dividends on preference shares and interest and financing charges) is 1.66%

Average Net Assets: We need this to calculate portfolio yield and MER. The capital transactions (refunding of preferred shares) were a wash, so we’ll just take the average of the beginning and end of year assets (including preferred shares): [(454,782+150,000) + (533,397 + 148,210)]/2 = $643.2-million

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Total Income of $14.8-million divided by average net assets of $643.2-million is 2.3%.

Income Coverage: Net income of $6.723-million (after expenses, before preferred dividends) preferred dividends of $6.019-million is 112%.

Asset Coverage: Because CGI doesn’t have a “unit value”, in the sense that one unit is one capital unit and one preferred share, it is convenient to work this out every six months and make any necessary adjustments from this figure. At December 31, 2013, the fund has net assets (for the capital units) of 533,397-million and preferred shares of 148,210-million, so asset coverage is almost exactly 4.6:1

BNS.PR.T & BNS.PR.X Called For Redemption

Sunday, March 16th, 2014

The Bank of Nova Scotia has announced:

that it intends to exercise its right to redeem all outstanding Non-cumulative Preferred Shares Series 26 (“Series 26 Shares”) and Non-cumulative Preferred Shares Series 28 (“Series 28 Shares”) of Scotiabank on April 26, 2014 at a price equal to $25.00 per share (the “Redemption Price”). As April 26, 2014 is a Saturday, the Redemption Price will be paid on Monday, April 28, 2014. Formal notice will be issued to shareholders in accordance with the share conditions.

The redemptions have been approved by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions and will be financed out of the general funds of Scotiabank.

On March 4, 2014, the Board of Directors of Scotiabank declared quarterly dividends of $0.390625 per Series 26 Share and $0.390625 per Series 28 Share. These will be the final dividends on the Series 26 Shares and Series 28 Shares, respectively, and will be paid in the usual manner on April 28, 2014 to shareholders of record at the close of business on April 1, 2014, as previously announced. After April 28, 2014, the Series 26 Shares and the Series 28 Shares will cease to be entitled to dividends.

Neither of these redemption calls should come as a surprise. Series 26 (BNS.PR.T) has an Issue Reset Spread of 414bp; Series 28 (BNS.PR.X) resets at 446bp.

March 14, 2014

Friday, March 14th, 2014

Some little kids want Mommy to make everything nice:

For nearly a year, a group of major bond investors has been looking for answers to a seemingly simple question — who among Canada’s many regulators is in charge of Cdor [Canadian Dealer Offered Rate], a benchmark rate affecting some $6-trillion bonds, corporate loans, derivatives and other securities held by investors across the country. They have yet to get an answer.

“It’s kind of exasperating,” said Joe Morin, chair of the Canadian Bond Investors Association, which represents some 30 fixed income funds with more than $300-billion of assets. “Nobody has stepped up to take responsibility.”

On Aug 20, nearly five months [after whimpering to Mommy], they received a reply from the OSC, referring the group to a “review” of Cdor published by another regulator, the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada, made public in Jan 2013. The review found that the Cdor rate setting process had the “potential” for manipulation. It also found that none of this country’s regulators had proper jurisdiction over the rate.

In January of this year the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions appeared to clear away the regulatory cobwebs, announcing it would “assume a role” in the oversight of Cdor, which was interpreted by many as a declaration that it was taking responsibility for the rate.

But it turned out that was not the case.

“We would like to clarify that OSFI is not the regulator of Cdor,” a spokesman for the regulator said in an email to the Financial Post on Feb 20.

Assiduous Readers will recognize that these are the same box-tickers who want bond covenants standardized in order to reduce the chance they might have to read a term sheet and, even worse, have to take a view on the value difference between slightly different covenants, as discussed on March 10.

Capital Power Corporation, proud issuer of CPX.PR.A, CPX.PR.C and CPX.PR.E, has been confirmed at Pfd-3(low) [Stable] by DBRS:

CPC’s preferred shares rating is based on the credit quality of its subsidiary, Capital Power L.P. (CPLP; rated BBB). The one-notch differential in the ratings of CPC and CPLP reflects structural subordination at CPC.

CPC has no bonds/debentures issued at the parent level and is not expected to issue any debt in the foreseeable future. CPC currently has $464 million of preferred shares outstanding, of which $73 million is treated as debt by DBRS in CPC’s adjusted debt-to-capital calculation (adjusted debt-to-capital ratio was approximately 3% in 2013). In the adjusted debt-to-capital calculation, the amount of preferred shares over the 20% preferred shares-to-equity threshold (defined as the percentage of preferred shares outstanding divided by total equity, excluding preferreds and minority interest) is treated as debt. CPC’s adjusted debt-to-capital ratio remains in line with its rating category. In addition, the pro forma unconsolidated fixed charge coverage ratio is expected to remain high, at around four times.

It was a mildly negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 3bp, FixedResets off 1bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. Volatility was not just minimal, it just reversed yesterday’s. Volume was below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3534 % 2,443.1
FixedFloater 4.76 % 4.37 % 35,022 17.66 1 -0.4988 % 3,563.8
Floater 2.98 % 3.08 % 53,390 19.55 4 -0.3534 % 2,637.8
OpRet 4.65 % 0.12 % 85,784 0.22 3 0.0129 % 2,683.4
SplitShare 4.83 % 4.43 % 61,477 4.33 5 -0.3265 % 3,064.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0129 % 2,453.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % -1.60 % 92,020 0.08 11 0.0036 % 2,352.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.46 % 5.50 % 126,118 14.40 26 -0.0317 % 2,436.1
FixedReset 4.72 % 3.55 % 220,086 6.84 79 -0.0077 % 2,501.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 2.20 % 159,622 0.19 42 0.0019 % 2,466.3
FloatingReset 2.57 % 2.61 % 202,548 7.10 5 -0.0805 % 2,436.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-14
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 21.44
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-14
Maturity Price : 21.51
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PF.A FixedReset 274,531 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-14
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 128,625 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 100,000 and 23,800, both at 22.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-14
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 118,650 TD crossed 114,000 at 25.34.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 1.73 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 109,104 Nesbitt crossed 100,700 at 21.47.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.46
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 104,140 Scotia crossed 100,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 2.69 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 78,960 Desjardins crossed 76,600 at 21.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-14
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.30 – 23.61
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2132

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-14
Maturity Price : 22.99
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 23.11 – 23.39
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1960

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-14
Maturity Price : 22.76
Evaluated at bid price : 23.11
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %

BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.61 – 20.84
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1461

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-14
Maturity Price : 20.61
Evaluated at bid price : 20.61
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %

BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.74 – 20.99
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1814

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-14
Maturity Price : 20.74
Evaluated at bid price : 20.74
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %

RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.61 – 25.79
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1135

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-13
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 1.81 %

SLF.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 24.76 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1781

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %

March 13, 2014

Thursday, March 13th, 2014

Nothing happened today.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 34bp, FixedResets off 3bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 3bp. Volatility was low. Volume was average, with the highlights comprised entirely of FixedResets.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2679 % 2,451.7
FixedFloater 4.74 % 4.34 % 32,471 17.70 1 -0.6442 % 3,581.7
Floater 2.97 % 3.06 % 52,875 19.59 4 -0.2679 % 2,647.2
OpRet 4.66 % -0.03 % 86,267 0.22 3 -0.0259 % 2,683.1
SplitShare 4.82 % 4.25 % 59,920 4.33 5 0.1835 % 3,074.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0259 % 2,453.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % -1.79 % 91,647 0.08 11 0.0322 % 2,352.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.45 % 5.50 % 126,675 14.54 26 0.3395 % 2,436.9
FixedReset 4.72 % 3.60 % 227,319 6.84 79 -0.0324 % 2,501.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 1.90 % 163,002 0.20 42 0.0347 % 2,466.2
FloatingReset 2.59 % 2.62 % 200,235 7.10 5 -0.1286 % 2,438.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 21.40
Evaluated at bid price : 21.73
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 21.47
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PF.A FixedReset 496,550 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 342,100 RBC crossed 72,000 and two blocks of 135,000 each, both at 21.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 21.43
Evaluated at bid price : 21.43
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 127,398 TD crossed blocks of 33,000 shares, 56,600 and 35,000, all at 25.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 1.21 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset 78,180 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 22.97
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 67,111 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 13,600 and 46,400, both at 24.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 23.02
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset 56,440 Nesbitt crossed 37,800 at 24.69.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.70 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1762

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 24.46
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 22.28 – 22.55
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1760

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 21.78
Evaluated at bid price : 22.28
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 21.43 – 21.88
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3640

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 21.43
Evaluated at bid price : 21.43
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %

ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.25 – 25.50
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1758

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : -4.39 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.36 – 23.60
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1842

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 23.36
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %

IFC.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.30 – 25.50
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1460

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %

BAM.PF.E Sinks on Light Volume

Thursday, March 13th, 2014

Brookfield Asset Management Inc. has announced:

the completion of its previously announced Class A Preference Shares, Series 38 (“Series 38 Preferred Shares”) issue in the amount of C$200,000,000. The offering was underwritten by a syndicate led by TD Securities Inc., CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank.

Brookfield issued 8,000,000 Series 38 Preferred Shares at a price of C$25.00 per share, for total gross proceeds of C$200,000,000. Holders of the Series 38 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.40% annually for the initial period ending March 31, 2020. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.55%. The Series 38 Preferred Shares will commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange this morning under the ticker symbol BAM.PF.E.

BAM.PF.E is a FixedReset, 4.40%+255, announced March 6. It will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset subindex.

The issue traded 78,180 shares today in a range of 24.60-84 before closing at 24.60-64, 37×60. Vital statistics are:

BAM.PF.E FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 22.97
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %

ENB.PF.A Firm On Decent Volume

Thursday, March 13th, 2014

Enbridge Inc. has announced:

that it has closed its previously announced public offering of Cumulative Redeemable Preference Shares, Series 9 (the “Series 9 Preferred Shares”) by a syndicate of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc., CIBC, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank. Enbridge issued 11 million Series 9 Preferred Shares for gross proceeds of $275 million. The Series 9 Preferred Shares will begin trading on the TSX today under the symbol ENB.PF.A. Proceeds will be used to partially fund capital projects, reduce existing indebtedness and for other general corporate purposes of the Corporation and its affiliates.

ENB.PF.A is a FixedReset, 4.40%+266, announced March 4. The issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset subindex.

The issue traded 496,550 shares today in a range of 24.85-97 before closing at 24.95-96, 23×50. Vital statistics are:

ENB.PF.A FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-13
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %

Update, 2014-3-26: It is interesting to note that Enbridge has issued 50-year paper at 4.56%.

How to Dissect a Housing Bubble

Thursday, March 13th, 2014

An article in the Globe and Mail brought to my attention a paper by the eponymous Will Dunning Inc. titled How to Dissect a Housing Bubble which seems highly worthy of close attention:

This report begins (in section 2.0) by looking at one of the key pieces of evidence that is brandished by those who believe a housing bubble exists in Canada: data on the ratio of house prices to rents, which has been created by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”). To be blunt, while the OECD has relied on data that it might consider the best available for the purpose, the data in reality is badly flawed and results in wildly inaccurate estimates.

The subsequent section (3.0 A Better Dataset) utilizes an alternative dataset, from the Royal LePage House Price Survey2. This analysis finds that the price to rent ratio in Canada has indeed increased, although the rise in the ratio is much less than was estimated by the OECD.

Section 4.0 (Housing Affordability Indicators) takes a slightly different approach, looking at evolving mortgage costs in relation to incomes. Several organizations publish housing affordability indexes. These generally indicate that housing affordability has deteriorated in Canada, and this has become an important part of the discussion. In this author’s opinion, these indexes share a major flaw: they rely on a measure of interest rates (“posted rates”) that exists only for administrative purposes and is divorced from the interest rates that can be found in the marketplace.

Well! That’s provocative enough, but I’ll grant him more credibility than the usual purveyors of shadow-statistics. The mortgage and GIC rates posted by the Bank of Canada are nonsensical (perhaps the legacy of some plan hatched by the Feds and executed by Lapdog Carney) – a five year mortgage is listed as costing 5.24% for the last three weeks of February and 4.99% for the first two weeks of March. Give me a break. Those are the posted rates – the banks have found that by having a posted rate and applying a discount, they can issue mortgages at the discounted price, but force buy-backs at the posted price when mortgagors exit early. Nice work, if you can get it, but why is the BoC participating in this charade? They’ve been reporting 5-Year GICs at 1.63% for the past five weeks, which will surprise anybody with access to the Financial Post web page or any of the myriad web sites which are able to report financial data more accurately than Parakeet Poluz and his fellow lackeys.

Actually, it’s even worse than it looks – Dunning claims:

Posted rates exist for administrative purposes only: lenders must use them in the calculation of debt service costs for some mortgages that receive federally guaranteed mortgage insurance. In mortgage contracts, interest rates and options for future interest rates are sometimes expressed as the posted rate minus a discount. In addition, when lenders calculate the penalties that borrowers pay for repaying early, posted rates (minus a pre-determined discount) are often in input into the calculations.

Dunning charges that:

The OECD calculates the Canadian house price to rent ratio using:

  • • For house prices – the Teranet/National Bank National Composite House Price Index from 1999Q2. Prior to that date, data are from the Canadian Department of Finance.
  • • For rents, the rent component of the Consumer Price Index (“CPI”)


For the years prior to 1999 (during which it appears that the CREA average national resale price is used), the rates of price growth have likely been distorted upwards by changes in the quality of the housing inventory.

Looking at the rent data used in the calculation (the rent component of Statistics Canada’s Consumer Price Index), rates of rent growth are badly under-estimated.

Data from rental surveys conducted by Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (“CMHC”) hint at the degree to which rent increases have been under-estimated in the Statistics Canada data that has been used by the OECD. It is clear in this data that the methodology change made in 2009 did not fully cure the data quality issues, and that the CPI rent index remains highly inaccurate.

The chart to the right presents CMHC data on average rents for apartments (units with two bedrooms) in Canada. To permit comparison to the rent component of the Consumer Price Index, the author has converted both datasets to indexes that equal 100 in 1992. Over the entire period covered, the CMHC data shows a total increase of 57.4% (2.2% per year); the CPI data shows a total rise of 32.7% (1.4% per year). Even for the period subsequent to the 2009 methodology revision, the CPI data shows a significantly slower rate of rent growth (1.3% per year) compared to the CMHC data (2.4% per year).

It can be argued that the CMHC data is not “constant quality” (because of additions to the inventory through new construction as well as due to renovations) and therefore the CMHC data might be distorted compared to the CPI (which attempts to measure rent change for constant quality accommodation). However, it should be noted that there are few additions to the inventory that is covered by the CMHC rental market survey – during the time period covered in the chart most growth of rental inventory has been in rented condominiums and other housing forms that are not included in the survey. Therefore, the degree of distortion from new supply is likely to be very small.

rentGrowth
Click for Big

Interesting, indeed! This indicated long-term underestimation of rental growth is given credence by the OECD figures that are so fraught with interest:

priceToRentOECD
Click for Big

Now, I’m reserving judgement on whether we’re in a housing bubble or not. I won’t even express a view as to whether houses are currently either rich or cheap. But I will not believe, not for one New York minute, that the Price-to-Rent ratio has quintupled since 1970. And, while I realize that Toronto is not actually equivalent to Canada (there are still a few unfortunate districts in the country), I will not believe, not for one New York minute, that the Price-to-Rent ratio has doubled since the bubble I remember of the late eighties, when one of my fellow clerks – making a clerical salary and not blessed with independent wealth – owned four houses, each of them mortgaged to hell ‘n’ gone (she got wiped out).

Of particular interest is his comparison of CMHC figures and the rent component of inflation:

rentIncreaseMeasures
Click for Big

This may well give the conspiracy theorists some live ammunition about CPI underestimation, at long last, but there’s more too it than simply academic discussions of price-rent ratios – the CPI is used to increment rent-control limits. One does not need to be a rabid partisan of Mike Harris to believe that rent control destroyed traditional rental housing in Toronto; a long term underestimate of rent increases just makes it more obvious.

That’s the meat of the report I found most interesting … I’ll just reproduce two more charts:

affordability
Click for Big

capRate
Click for Big

The current calculated cap rate of 4-5% looks right to me. In one building with which I am familiar, two-bedrooms sell for about $140,000, or can be rented for about $1,200 monthly – and this is roughly average for the area according to the CMHC. There’s a $600 maintenance fee, so the landlord’s cap rate is … just under 5%.

Anyway, this report is fraught with interest, what with us being told daily that we’re in imminent danger of a crash. The OECD and its fellow travellers need to address these issues and explain why they believe their figures to be accurate indicators of the Canadian housing market.

March 12, 2014

Wednesday, March 12th, 2014

The robots are taking over:

When Minneapolis attorney William Greene faced the task of combing through 1.3 million electronic documents in a recent case, he turned to a so-called smart computer program. Three associates selected relevant documents from a smaller sample, “teaching” their reasoning to the computer. The software’s algorithms then sorted the remaining material by importance.

“We were able to get the information we needed after reviewing only 2.3 percent of the documents,” said Greene, a Minneapolis-based partner at law firm Stinson Leonard Street LLP.

The advances, coupled with mobile robots wired with this intelligence, make it likely that occupations employing almost half of today’s U.S. workers, ranging from loan officers to cab drivers and real estate agents, become possible to automate in the next decade or two, according to a study done at the University of Oxford in the U.K.

“These transitions have happened before,” said Carl Benedikt Frey, co-author of the study and a research fellow at the Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology. “What’s different this time is that technological change is happening even faster, and it may affect a greater variety of jobs.”

This is exacerbated by the good old WASP work ethic:

About a dozen years ago, one of his biggest competitors started using undocumented Mexican laborers. At the time, the landscaper’s firm suffered high turnover and low productivity, and finding employees to do the actual landscaping — his company’s bread and butter — was difficult.

“We’ve never had anyone come in here looking for work,” he told me, on condition that I withhold his name. He found many of the Americans he has hired over the years to be unreliable and unwilling to work hard. Sometimes they quit; other times he has fired them.

Gradually, he started hiring Mexican laborers. All of them were able to provide Social Security numbers, though he understood they were bogus. “We have to have paperwork on these guys,” he said. “We just don’t have to have it be legitimate.”

In not entirely unrelated news, Fischer is indicating continued expansionary monetary policy:

Stanley Fischer, the nominee to be Federal Reserve vice chairman, said the world’s largest economy still needs the central bank’s unprecedented accommodation as joblessness remains elevated.

“At 6.7 percent, the unemployment rate remains too high,” Fischer, a former Bank of Israel governor and Citigroup Inc. vice chairman, said in remarks prepared for his confirmation hearing tomorrow before the Senate Banking Committee.

“Achievement of both maximum employment and price stability requires the continuation of an expansionary monetary policy — even though the degree of expansion is being gradually and cautiously cut back as the Fed reduces its monthly purchases” of securities, said Fischer, 70.

I’m told I’m not employing enough regulators, but that will change soon enough:

Under NI 31-103, OBSI’s membership will more than double to almost 1600 firms in the financial industry, including:

  • •Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC) member firms
  • •Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada (MFDA) member firms
  • •Mutual fund companies
  • •Exempt market dealers
  • •Portfolio managers
  • •Scholarship plan dealers
  • •Forex trading services
  • •Domestic and foreign-owned banks
  • •Credit unions
  • •Federal trust and loan companies and other deposit-taking organizations

Fabulous Fab has been fined for selling investments to dumb people:

Ex-Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) vice president Fabrice Tourre, found liable for his part in a failed $1 billion investment, was ordered to pay more than $825,000 in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission case.

U.S. District Judge Katherine Forrest in Manhattan ruled today that Tourre must pay $650,000 in civil penalties and give up $175,463 of his 2007 bonus, plus interest. He can’t seek reimbursement of the penalties from Goldman Sachs, the judge ruled.

Tourre, 35, was found liable Aug. 1 after a jury trial at which the SEC claimed he intentionally misled investors in a subprime-mortgage vehicle called Abacus 2007-AC1. Tourre lied about the role played by billionaire John Paulson’s Paulson & Co. hedge fund, which helped choose the securities underlying Abacus then made a billion-dollar bet it would fail, the agency said.

… and the SEC weenies are high-fiving each other for their role in making the world a safer place for grossly incompetent professionals:

“We’re pleased that the judge’s decision imposes the disgorgement amount we recommended as well as other significant penalties for providing false marketing materials to investors. The ruling reflects the SEC’s intent of pursuing meaningful sanctions to punish individuals responsible for misconduct and deter others from violating the federal securities laws.”

Assiduous Readers will remember that the Feds are cancelling five hundred years of bankruptcy law by forcing banks to issue bail-in bonds, as discussed on November 14, 2013; following Lap-Dog Carney’s parroting of the official line without any research whatsoever. So what will be the effect of this? Logically, bail-in bonds will be riskier than banks’ current senior debt; therefore they should be more expensive to issue; therefore the banks will issue less of them and rely more on large-scale deposit notes, which have a shorter term. What will be the effect of all this? Teodora Paligorova and João Santos have written a paper titled Rollover Risk and the Maturity Transformation Function of Banks:

This paper shows that banks that rely heavily on short-term funding engage less in maturity transformation in an attempt to decrease their exposure to rollover risk. These banks shorten both the maturity of their portfolio of loans as well as the maturity of newly issued loans. We find that the loan yield curve becomes steeper with banks’ increasing use of short-term funding. The loan maturity shortening is driven by banks and affects borrowers’ financing choices – they turn to the bond market for long-term funding. To the extent that borrowers do not manage to compensate for the undesirable shortening of loan maturities by going to the bond market, they may become more exposed to rollover risk due to banks. This potential synchronization of banks’ and borrowers’ rollover risk can be a source of financial instability once short-term funding suddenly disappears.

Our results also help to explain the downward trend in the average maturity of outstanding bank loans over the past two decades, documented by Mian and Santos
(2011). [Footnote reads: While average maturity is close to four years in 1988, it declines to just over two-and-a-half-years in 2010.

The paper focusses on money-market instruments as ‘short-term funding’, but the implications are there. It would be really nice to see some research focussed on bail-in bonds as a major change in the structure of bank financing and the implications of this for lending and financial stability, but I don’t think the BoC will be doing much – not with the Parakeet in charge.

Speaking of Lapdog Carney, he his political puppetmasters have given him authority to identify risk as quickly as six years afterwards!

Senior bankers may be forced to pay back bonuses as long as six years after they cash the checks under proposed Bank of England rules to curb short-term financial risk-taking.

The central bank is readying rules that would take effect in 2015, Katherine Braddick, director for policy at the central bank’s Prudential Regulation Authority, said in a speech in London today. Braddick didn’t specify the circumstances under which the clawbacks would be enforced.

“The ability to apply clawback should further encourage the avoidance of excessive risk taking and the alignment of incentives with firms’ longer-term interests,” Braddick said.

The war on traders will have far-reaching consequences, none of which have ever been thought about.

If there’s one thing welfare bums love to do, it’s complain about poor service:

“They have made these changes to reduce their operating costs,” [Western Grain Elevator Association head] Mr. Sobkowich said. “This manifests itself as inadequate service – especially in circumstances when service requirements are higher because of a larger than normal crop and when operating conditions are difficult because of cold weather.“

Excess capacity and system robustness costs money. I wonder who’s going to pay for it. I know! Ottawa! Then Ottawa can write cheques to the railway companies for not shipping the grain that the farmers have been paid not to grow! Everybody wins!

Assiduous Reader DR brings a piece on no-contest settlements to my attention:

No-fault deals would give miscreants credit for co-operating with the OSC and allow the regulator to end enforcement action by simply levying a financial penalty. “These initiatives will allow us to resolve enforcement matters more quickly and issue more protective orders earlier, which would benefit both investors and the capital markets,” is how Tom Atkinson, the OSC’s director of enforcement justified the idea. In other words, these types of settlements will streamline the watchdog’s case log, conserve resources, claim more scalps and burnish its enforcement image. Market players and defence lawyers love it chiefly because it’s preferable to pay a fine than make high-risk admissions that can be used against them in other jurisdictions, such as the civil courts.

For that reason, investor protection advocates and class-action lawyers oppose the idea. OSC enforcement proceedings don’t result in direct compensation, thus fleeced investors and victims of fraud rely on admissions extracted by the regulator to get restitution through litigation, namely class-action lawsuits. “By dispensing with admission, enforcement staff would be leaving investors completely in the cold,” warned a submission filed by class-action law firm Siskinds LLP.

DR asks:

I confess I am confused, I don’t know if this is going to be for better or worse

I am unequivocally against no-contest settlements. If a company has done something wrong, they should be nailed to the wall – that’s the OSC’s putative job. If they haven’t done anything wrong, then the OSC should shut up.

No-contest settlements make it easier for the OSC to indulge in regulatory extortion … ‘OK, Mr. X, we can go after you for ten million dollars and we’ll tell our lawyers – who we have to pay anyway, so there’s no marginal cost on our side – to make it as expensive for you to fight it as they possibly can. Or we can agree on no-contest for $100,000.’ So the company agrees, because just fighting the charges will cost more than $100,000, and the regulator pads his resume with yet another impressive victory.

Enbridge was confirmed at Pfd-2(low) by DBRS:

EGD’s financial profile reflects an “A” rating, with all credit metrics remaining solidly within the current rating range. However, two concerns over the near to medium term are as follows: (1) Significant liquidity is required to finance EGD’s volatile working capital (mostly gas inventory for winter distributions). EGD’s liquidity is currently viewed as adequate to meet its operational needs given low natural gas prices. Should natural gas prices increase significantly, DBRS expects EGD to properly manage its liquidity to cope with that situation. (2) Large free cash flow deficits are expected over the next two years because of the $686.5 million GTA Expansion project. EGD’s parent (Enbridge Inc.) is expected to continue providing financial support for EGD. DBRS expects EGD to finance its cash flow shortfalls while maintaining the debt leverage within the regulatory capital structure and all other credit metrics within the DBRS “A” rating range. This project has been approved by the OEB and should provide good earnings growth once it is in service, which is expected to occur by the end of 2015.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 13bp, FixedResets gaining 5bp and DeemedRetractibles up 6bp. Volatility was basically zero – the only performance highlights are Floating Rate issues, which have been jumping around a lot lately according to the scheduling of global hyperinflation. Volume was slightly below average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.55%, equivalent to 7.22% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.55%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 265bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) tightening from the 270bp reported March 5.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7113 % 2,458.3
FixedFloater 4.71 % 4.30 % 30,103 17.75 1 -3.6754 % 3,604.9
Floater 2.96 % 3.05 % 53,437 19.62 4 0.7113 % 2,654.3
OpRet 4.65 % -0.03 % 87,423 0.22 3 0.0483 % 2,683.8
SplitShare 4.83 % 4.41 % 60,283 4.33 5 -0.0797 % 3,068.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0483 % 2,454.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % -0.25 % 92,185 0.08 11 -0.0751 % 2,351.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.47 % 5.55 % 130,851 14.41 26 0.1292 % 2,428.6
FixedReset 4.72 % 3.55 % 227,580 6.83 77 0.0543 % 2,502.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 1.66 % 163,903 0.20 42 0.0638 % 2,465.4
FloatingReset 2.59 % 2.57 % 194,589 7.11 5 0.0724 % 2,441.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -3.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.18
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-12
Maturity Price : 17.17
Evaluated at bid price : 17.17
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.L FixedReset 138,400 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.36
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BNS.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 64,812 Nesbitt crossed 60,800 at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-26
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 1.86 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium 56,150 Nesbitt crossed 46,000 at 25.58.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : -13.00 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 44,640 Scotia crossed 30,000 at 25.34.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 1.14 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 38,532 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 23.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-12
Maturity Price : 22.27
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
ENB.PR.J FixedReset 37,955 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-12
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 25.41 – 25.86
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3127

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 20.18 – 20.52
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2081

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.18
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.82 – 25.18
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2585

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-12
Maturity Price : 24.57
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %

TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.45 – 25.69
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1547

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-11
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 1.39 %

RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.65 – 25.86
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1346

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-11
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : -0.25 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.61 – 22.90
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2147

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-03-12
Maturity Price : 22.28
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %