Archive for April, 2015

April 10, 2015

Friday, April 10th, 2015

Sometimes you just can’t win:

Vladimir Putin is facing a problem few could have anticipated: The ruble is becoming too strong.

Last year’s worst-performing major currency is this year’s best and while that’s buoying the nation’s bonds, driving yields to the lowest in four months, it’s also crimping Russia’s export revenue. Even though oil is little changed in dollars this year, the price when converted to rubles has plunged to the lowest since 2011.

The currency rout in 2014 helped Russia to keep its budget deficit within 1 percent of gross domestic product as the ruble weakened in lockstep with a 50 percent slump in oil. Now, with the cease-fire in Ukraine and the allure of higher-yielding assets attracting investors to ruble debt, the government is seeing the opposite effect.

“The current ruble level is already uncomfortable for the budget considering the oil price in rubles is already low,” Vladimir Bragin, head of research at Alfa Capital in Moscow, said by phone on Thursday. “In order to reach macroeconomic stability, Russia needs to limit its budget deficit and a weaker ruble is an easy way to do that.”

It looks like there will be another triumph for regulatory extortion:

Deutsche Bank AG is close to resolving a multi-year probe by U.S. and U.K. authorities into interest-rate manipulation, with a U.K. subsidiary expected to plead guilty, according to two people familiar with the matter.

Germany’s biggest bank will probably finalize a settlement this month, these people said. The unit expected to plead is Deutsche Bank Group Services, one of the people said.

The bank is also expected to pay penalties of more than $1.5 billion to wrap up probes by the U.S. Justice Department, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, New York’s Department of Financial Services and the U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority, according to one of the people. The penalty could be larger than those levied against other global banks for interest-rate rigging claims.

In October, the bank said it was in discussions with some authorities about a resolution. The German lender previously was fined 725 million euros ($773 million) by the European Union for manipulating yen Libor and the euro interbank offered rate.

Deutsche Bank set aside 3.6 billion euros in legal and operational risk provisions at the end of December. The bank doesn’t provide details on the reserves. Over the last three years, the bank’s litigation expenses totaled about 7.1 billion euros.

As an aside, I confess to being fascinated and horrified by the Valentina Lisitsa / Toronto Symphony Orchestra scandal. In the first place, I agree with Vinay Menon of the Toronto Star:

The TSO sacrificed its own artistic integrity. It was remarkably tone deaf. It set a dangerous precedent and, in doing so, made a mockery of the arts in this city. Canceling these concerts was about as absurd and unwarranted as that time mayor June Rowlands banned the Barenaked Ladies because the band’s name objectified women.

More to the point though is the TSO’s Jeff Melanson’s delusions of grandeur. If – as many fervently believe – she has crossed the line into hate speech … we have laws for that. Publicly available laws, with case law constructed from the precedents. We have a judicial system that will – publicly – make a finding based on the (publicly disclosed) facts of the case; we can attend the trial if we wish to, to verify that the decision is on the up-and-up. We have a police force that will perform any necessary investigation and many crown attorneys who will make a decision as to whether to proceed with charges on the basis of that investigation. We have a judicial system that will – publicly – make a finding based on the (publicly disclosed) facts of the case; we can attend the trial if we wish to, to verify that the decision is on the up-and-up. We do not need Jeff Melanson of the TSO to pin on his Junior Secret Policeman badge and indulge in a little career-wrecking in the apparent belief that artists are supposed to be nice people.

These vitriolic moral crusades harm the body politic more than anything Ms. Lisitsa has said and the promotion of two-bit bureaucrats to Official Moral Arbiters is even worse, as discussed on January 6, 2015 with respect to the Dalhousie dentists.

Update: This is delicious in light of the Valentina Lisitsa scandal with the TSO … at the height of the furor regarding the presence of Queers Against Israeli Apartheid in Toronto’s Gay Pride parade, a few institutions made a joint statement in support of the group:

As public institutions dedicated to artistic expression, we consider freedom of expression to be an essential element of our mandate.

… (signed) Andrew Shaw, Toronto Symphony Orchestra

Delicious.

Inspired by Easter, investors in Canadian preferred shares have participated in other religious ceremonies in the past week:

aztecSacrifice
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It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 5bp, FixedResets off 51bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 3bp. The Performance Highlights table is predictably enormous, dominated by low-spread FixedReset losers. Volume was extremely high.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150410
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 23.02 to be $0.96 rich, while TRP.PR.B, resetting 2015-6-30 at +128, is $0.76 cheap at its bid price of 13.79.

impVol_MFC_150410
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Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 23.45 to be $0.60 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.16 to be $0.91 cheap. The lowest spread issue, MFC.PR.F, is noticeably off the curve defined by its peers.

impVol_BAM_150410
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The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 19.07 to be $1.26 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 23.30 and appears to be $1.03 rich.

impVol_FTS_150410
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This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 15.40, looks $1.65 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 22.59 and is $0.95 rich.

pairs_FR_150410
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Investment-grade pairs other than TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F now predict an average over the next five years of about 0.25%, a slight decrease from yesterday’s value of 0.30%. TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F remains an outlier, predicting 1.46%. The DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair is still off the charts and now predicts an average bill rate over the next 4 3/4 years of -2.05%.

pairs_FF_150410
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Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.5428 % 2,171.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.5428 % 3,796.1
Floater 3.34 % 3.46 % 58,792 18.64 4 -2.5428 % 2,308.1
OpRet 4.43 % -1.13 % 35,753 0.14 2 0.0394 % 2,761.0
SplitShare 4.57 % 4.66 % 62,346 3.43 3 -0.0801 % 3,223.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0394 % 2,524.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.32 % 0.45 % 65,660 0.09 25 -0.1058 % 2,523.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.08 % 5.04 % 148,157 15.09 9 0.0469 % 2,806.4
FixedReset 4.53 % 3.77 % 269,807 16.43 85 -0.5093 % 2,355.7
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % 2.83 % 106,746 0.29 37 0.0331 % 2,659.0
FloatingReset 2.53 % 2.97 % 75,919 6.27 8 -0.0746 % 2,352.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -5.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 16.50
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
ENB.PF.G FixedReset -3.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 20.02
Evaluated at bid price : 20.02
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -3.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 16.10
Evaluated at bid price : 16.10
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
ENB.PF.E FixedReset -2.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 20.08
Evaluated at bid price : 20.08
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
ENB.PF.A FixedReset -2.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 20.03
Evaluated at bid price : 20.03
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -2.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.15
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset -2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.28
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 13.79
Evaluated at bid price : 13.79
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -1.99 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 17.26
Evaluated at bid price : 17.26
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
ENB.PR.J FixedReset -1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 19.90
Evaluated at bid price : 19.90
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 14.50
Evaluated at bid price : 14.50
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset -1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 20.10
Evaluated at bid price : 20.10
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 18.90
Evaluated at bid price : 18.90
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 15.66
Evaluated at bid price : 15.66
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.10
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.10
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 14.45
Evaluated at bid price : 14.45
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
PWF.PR.T FixedReset -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
ENB.PR.T FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 959,404 RBC crossed two blocks of 443,800 each and another two of 30,300 each, all at 16.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 16.21
Evaluated at bid price : 16.21
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 136,416 RBC crossed 82,300 at 23.34.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.98
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 130,935 TD crossed blocks of 43,500 and 64,600, both at 22.91.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.82
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 126,709 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 19.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 19.01
Evaluated at bid price : 19.01
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 101,894 TD crossed 83,100 at 22.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.86
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 90,791 Scotia crossed 14,600 at 24.95; RBC crossed 70,000 at 24.98.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
There were 60 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 16.50 – 18.25
Spot Rate : 1.7500
Average : 1.1921

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 16.50
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %

PWF.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 24.50 – 25.30
Spot Rate : 0.8000
Average : 0.5885

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 16.10 – 17.00
Spot Rate : 0.9000
Average : 0.7418

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 16.10
Evaluated at bid price : 16.10
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 24.81 – 25.09
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1821

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 24.57
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 23.72 – 24.07
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2639

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.91
Evaluated at bid price : 23.72
Bid-YTW : 3.84 %

GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 17.15 – 17.46
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2249

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.15
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %

PPL.PR.I Closes: Relatively Unscathed on Good Volume

Friday, April 10th, 2015

Pembina Pipeline Corporation has announced:

that it has closed its previously announced public offering of cumulative redeemable rate reset class A preferred shares, Series 9 (the “Series 9 Preferred Shares”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $225 million (the “Offering”).

The Offering was announced on March 31, 2015 when Pembina entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters co-led by Scotiabank and RBC Capital Markets. A total of 9,000,000 Series 9 Preferred Shares, which includes 1,000,000 Series 9 Preferred Shares issued pursuant to the partial exercise of the underwriters’ option, were sold under the Offering.

Proceeds from the Offering will be used to reduce indebtedness under the Company’s credit facilities, which indebtedness was incurred in connection with Pembina’s 2015 capital expenditure program.

The Series 9 Preferred Shares will begin trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today under the symbol PPL.PR.I.

Dividends on the Series 9 Preferred Shares are expected to be $0.2969 quarterly, or $1.1875 per share on an annualized basis, payable on the 1st day of March, June, September and December, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Pembina, for the initial fixed rate period to but excluding December 1, 2020. The first dividend, if declared, will be payable September 1, 2015, in the amount of $0.4685 per share.

All of Pembina’s dividends are designated “eligible dividends” for Canadian income tax purposes.

PPL.PR.I is a FixedReset, 4.75%+391, announced March 31. It will be tracked by HIMIPref™ but relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

The issue traded 654,760 shares today (consolidated exchanges) in a range of 24.40-68 before closing at 24.45-50. Vital statistics are:

PPL.PR.I FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-10
Maturity Price : 22.93
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 4.75 %

The price drop of roughly 2% from the issue price as of March 31 isn’t really all that bad – on the month-to-date price-index, TXPR is down 2.41% and TXPL is down 3.46%. Price indices are pretty silly, but they’re available for free and the difference (from total return indices) in April to date is not particularly large.

The calculated level of Implied Volatility has dropped substantially from the 33% calculated at announcement time to a more reasonable but still extremely high 24%. This implies that we should expect Implied Volatility to drop, which implies the calculated curve will flatten, which implies we should expect high-reset issues to outperform low-reset issues over the period.

impVol_PPL_150410
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April 9, 2015

Thursday, April 9th, 2015

Shareholder activism is rearing its head:

Bond investors face growing risk as activist shareholders are targeting more companies in 2015 than last year, threatening further damage to corporate credit quality, according to Moody’s Investors Service.

Investors have sought change at 54 companies including General Motors Co. and MGM Resorts International this year, up from 43 during the same period in 2014, Moody’s said. The record 222 companies targeted last year was up from 220 in 2013. Assets managed by activist hedge funds increased to about $120 billion in 2014 from about $105 billion in 2013, according to Hedge Fund Research data cited by Moody’s.

They’re lured by the “huge cash pile” at U.S. non-financial companies, which had $1.65 trillion on their balance sheets in October 2014, according to the report. Technology companies, which as of October carried more than half of the cash held by the largest non-financial U.S. companies, accounted for 20 percent of shareholder activism last year. Along with its cash, the sector’s minimal dividends and low debt levels will continue to draw attention from these investors, Moody’s said.

The bureaucrats at the IMF have recommended hiring more bureaucrats:

Bond funds may be exposing customers and the financial system to more risk than some investors realize as money managers seek higher returns in less liquid assets, the International Monetary Fund said in a report recommending improved oversight.

“The role of fixed-income funds, which entail larger contagion risks than traditional equity investment, has expanded considerably,” the IMF said Wednesday in a chapter on asset managers in its latest Global Financial Stability Report.

While the U.S. mutual fund industry’s regulation regime is based primarily on disclosure, the IMF proposed enhancing “liquidity rules, the definition of liquid assets, investment restrictions, and reporting and disclosure rules.” Not enough is known about the use of leverage and derivatives, said Gaston Gelos, chief of the IMF division that worked on the chapter.

While asset managers act as a “spare tire” in world’s financial system, providing financing even when banks are distressed, the industry raises risks that call for changes in regulated and oversight, the IMF said.

“Easy redemption options can create risks of runs because of the presence of a first-mover advantage,” the IMF said. “The destabilization of prices in certain asset segments (particularly bonds) can affect other parts of the financial system through funding markets and balance sheet and collateral channels.”

I have tried several times to download the report, but it appears that all their technology budget got spent on junkets; the download hangs pretty quickly. It might work in a couple of days.

Meanwhile it appears that yes, next time might be different:

The gap between how easy it is to trade mutual-fund shares and how hard it is to buy and sell assets such as high-yield bonds and leveraged loans is widening.

In 2015 alone, a year in which the Federal Reserve says it’s still planning to raise interest rates, investors have poured $46 billion into mutual funds and exchange-traded funds focused on corporate bonds, according to data compiled by Wells Fargo & Co.

They now own about 22 percent of outstanding high-yield bonds, up from about 12 percent in 2006, data compiled by JPMorgan Chase & Co. show.

While the size of the U.S. bond market has swelled 23 percent since the end of 2007 through the end of last year, trading has fallen 28 percent in the period, according to data compiled by the Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association.

Warnings about potential scarcity of liquidity when it’s at a premium have moved from academic circles and crackpot blogs to the mainstream:

JPMorgan Chase & Co. head Jamie Dimon said last year’s volatility in U.S. Treasuries is a “warning shot” to investors and that the next financial crisis could be exacerbated by a shortage of the securities.

The Oct. 15 gyration, when Treasury yields fluctuated by almost 0.4 percentage point, was an “unprecedented move” that would have serious consequences in a stressed environment, Dimon, the New York-based bank’s chairman and chief executive officer, said in a letter Wednesday to shareholders. Treasuries are supposed to be among the most stable securities.

Dimon, 59, cited the incident as he waded into a debate about whether bank regulations implemented after the 2008 financial crisis exacerbate price declines by limiting the ability of Wall Street banks to make markets. It’s just a matter of time until some political, economic or market event triggers another financial crisis, he said, without predicting one is imminent.

Hat tip to Assiduous Reader JP for bringing the above to my attention. JP sends me many interesting links, unlike you other bums.

Power Financial sees an opportunity in the robo-advisor business:

Power Financial Corp., which has built an empire around financial planning and investment advice, is now plugging into the world of robots by investing up to $30-million in Wealthsimple Financial Inc.

The partnership of the robo-adviser firm and a major financial institution is the first of its kind in Canada. It will help Power Financial to target more millennials and other Canadians who are less likely to invest through traditional channels, and instead opt for low-cost robo-advisers that provide automated online portfolio management. Under the agreement, pending regulatory approval, Power Financial will initially invest $10-million into Wealthsimple, with an option to put in another $20-million over the next 12 months. Power Financial could potentially make further investments over the next three years under the deal.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 12bp FixedResets down 15bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 2bp. The Performance Highlights table continues to reflect a lot of churn in the market. Volume was slightly above average.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150409
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 23.18 to be $0.89 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-01-30 at +154, is $0.69 cheap at its bid price of 15.90.

impVol_MFC_150409

Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.M, resetting at +236 on 2019-12-19, bid at 24.25 to be $0.49 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.20 to be $0.93 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150409
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The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 19.14 to be $1.32 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 23.51 and appears to be $1.38 rich.

Click for Big

impVol_FTS_150409

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 15.35, looks $1.73 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.60 and is $0.91 rich.

pairs_FR_150409
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs other than TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F now predict an average over the next five years of about 0.30%, a slight decrease from yesterday’s value of 0.35%. TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F remains an outlier, predicting 1.24%. The DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair is still off the charts and now predicts an average bill rate over the next 4 3/4 years of -1.66%.

pairs_FF_150409
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.8934 % 2,227.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.8934 % 3,895.2
Floater 3.25 % 3.40 % 59,628 18.79 4 1.8934 % 2,368.3
OpRet 4.43 % -1.11 % 33,191 0.15 2 -0.2162 % 2,759.9
SplitShare 4.57 % 4.76 % 58,710 3.44 3 0.0534 % 3,225.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2162 % 2,523.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.31 % 2.07 % 63,078 0.09 25 0.0853 % 2,525.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.09 % 5.02 % 143,120 15.08 9 -0.1171 % 2,805.1
FixedReset 4.51 % 3.67 % 269,244 16.46 85 -0.1494 % 2,367.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % 2.27 % 107,992 0.14 37 0.0219 % 2,658.1
FloatingReset 2.48 % 2.89 % 77,091 6.28 8 -0.1330 % 2,353.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset -2.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.66
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 17.61
Evaluated at bid price : 17.61
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset -2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.22
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.44
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.35
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 19.22
Evaluated at bid price : 19.22
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
ENB.PF.A FixedReset -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 20.50
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 17.50
Evaluated at bid price : 17.50
Bid-YTW : 2.87 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 14.09
Evaluated at bid price : 14.09
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
MFC.PR.N FixedReset -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 19.85
Evaluated at bid price : 19.85
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 15.90
Evaluated at bid price : 15.90
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 22.42
Evaluated at bid price : 23.15
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
BAM.PF.G FixedReset 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 24.66
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 14.45
Evaluated at bid price : 14.45
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 2.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 14.64
Evaluated at bid price : 14.64
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 4.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 14.76
Evaluated at bid price : 14.76
Bid-YTW : 3.40 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 202,150 RBC crossed 30,000 at 25.00 and 49,300 at 25.05. TD crossed 100,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 111,330 TD crossed 35,000 at 24.78; RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 3.12 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 80,055 Will reset at 1.82% effective April 26.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.66
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 68,244 TD crossed 40,500 at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.48
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
TD.PF.B FixedReset 60,228 TD crossed 25,000 at 24.50; Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset 59,632 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 28,500 and 25,000, both at 24.80; YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 24.78
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRP.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 23.18 – 23.99
Spot Rate : 0.8100
Average : 0.5532

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 22.40
Evaluated at bid price : 23.18
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %

SLF.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 21.44 – 22.00
Spot Rate : 0.5600
Average : 0.3462

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.44
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %

ENB.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 19.40 – 19.88
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3128

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 19.40
Evaluated at bid price : 19.40
Bid-YTW : 4.45 %

MFC.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 23.22 – 23.72
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3353

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.22
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 17.61 – 18.06
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3015

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-09
Maturity Price : 17.61
Evaluated at bid price : 17.61
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %

NA.PR.Q FixedReset Quote: 24.91 – 25.25
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2150

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %

April 8, 2015

Wednesday, April 8th, 2015

Another day in which nothing happened, including me getting caught up on my responses to comments.

But I did get a call from a novice investor. His discount brokerage gave him my number and told him that I was the guy who could tell him about the dividend specifications for IGM.PR.B. I’m sure I’ll get my commission cheque shortly.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 37bp, FixedResets up 4bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 2bp. The Performance Highlights table is quite lengthy, considering the modest nature of the overall movement. Volume was high.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.02%, equivalent to 6.53% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 3.6% (maybe a little over) so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 290bp, unchanged from the April 1 report.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150408
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 23.25 to be $1.00 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-01-30 at +154, is $0.92 cheap at its bid price of 15.67.

impVol_MFC_150408
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 23.72 to be $0.64 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.15 to be $0.91 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150408
Click for Big

The fit on this series has suddenly become atrocious. It will be most interesting to see how long it takes for things to readjust.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 19.12 to be $1.32 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 23.70 and appears to be $1.59 rich.

impVol_FTS_150408
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 15.40, looks $1.73 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.78 and is $0.97 rich.

pairs_FR_150408
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs other than TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F now predict an average over the next five years of about 0.35%, holding the increase of last week. TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F is an outlier, predicting 1.08%. The DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair is still off the charts and now predicts an average bill rate over the next 4 3/4 years of -2.12%.

pairs_FF_150408
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4889 % 2,186.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4889 % 3,822.8
Floater 3.31 % 3.51 % 58,924 18.53 4 -1.4889 % 2,324.3
OpRet 4.42 % -3.96 % 30,739 0.15 2 -0.0982 % 2,765.9
SplitShare 4.57 % 4.80 % 59,087 3.44 3 -0.3856 % 3,224.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0982 % 2,529.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.31 % 0.91 % 60,750 0.09 25 -0.0821 % 2,523.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.08 % 5.02 % 142,858 15.12 9 -0.3733 % 2,808.4
FixedReset 4.50 % 3.64 % 268,816 16.46 85 0.0355 % 2,371.3
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % 2.51 % 110,819 0.14 37 0.0224 % 2,657.5
FloatingReset 2.48 % 2.88 % 77,338 6.28 8 0.0426 % 2,357.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -3.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 14.10
Evaluated at bid price : 14.10
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.80
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 14.29
Evaluated at bid price : 14.29
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 19.56
Evaluated at bid price : 19.56
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 15.40
Evaluated at bid price : 15.40
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 22.28
Evaluated at bid price : 22.82
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 23.08
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.18
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
PWF.PR.T FixedReset 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 23.27
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
MFC.PR.N FixedReset 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.99
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 16.97
Evaluated at bid price : 16.97
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.Q FixedReset 248,320 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 122,238 RBC crossed 56,900 at 22.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
NA.PR.W FixedReset 104,600 Nesbitt crossed 95,700 at 24.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 23.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.68
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 99,548 Desjardins bought 71,800 from anonymouse at 19.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 19.16
Evaluated at bid price : 19.16
Bid-YTW : 4.47 %
HSE.PR.E FixedReset 86,554 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.24 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset 76,000 Scotia crossed 66,000 at 25.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.40 %
There were 48 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 19.80 – 20.70
Spot Rate : 0.9000
Average : 0.6274

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %

FTS.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 22.78 – 23.63
Spot Rate : 0.8500
Average : 0.6344

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.78
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 14.10 – 14.50
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2251

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 14.10
Evaluated at bid price : 14.10
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %

BAM.PF.G FixedReset Quote: 24.28 – 24.70
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.2767

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 22.88
Evaluated at bid price : 24.28
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %

ENB.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 19.65 – 20.00
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2206

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 19.65
Evaluated at bid price : 19.65
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 19.56 – 19.80
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1455

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-08
Maturity Price : 19.56
Evaluated at bid price : 19.56
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %

LBS.PR.A Closes Treasury Offering

Wednesday, April 8th, 2015

Brompton Group has announced:

Life & Banc Split Corp. (the “Company”) is pleased to announce that it has completed a treasury offering of 1,300,000 class A shares and 1,300,000 preferred shares for aggregate gross proceeds of approximately $25.5 million. The class A shares and preferred shares will continue to trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the existing symbols LBS (class A shares) and LBS.PR.A (preferred shares).
The Company invests in a portfolio of common shares of the six largest Canadian banks (“Banks”) and the four major publicly traded Canadian life insurance companies (“Lifecos”). Currently, the portfolio consists of common shares of the following Banks and Lifecos:

The Bank of Nova Scotia Royal Bank of Canada
National Bank of Canada Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc.
The Toronto-Dominion Bank Great-West Lifeco Inc.
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Manulife Financial Corporation
Bank of Montreal Sun Life Financial Inc.

The class A shares were offered at a price of $9.55 and the preferred shares were offered at a price of $10.05. The final class A and preferred share offering prices were determined so as to be non-dilutive to the net asset value per unit of the Company on March 26, 2015, as adjusted for dividends accrued prior to or upon settlement of the offering.

The syndicate of agents for the offering was led by RBC Capital Markets, CIBC, Scotiabank, and TD Securities Inc., and includes BMO Capital Markets, National Bank Financial Inc., GMP Securities L.P., Raymond James Ltd., Canaccord Genuity Corp., Desjardins Securities Inc., Dundee Securities Ltd., Haywood Securities Inc., Industrial Alliance Securities Inc. and Mackie Research Capital Corporation.

Not bad, considering that the April 2 NAVPU was $18.59! I previously reported on the offering.

LBS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Update, 2015-04-23: Small over-allotment:

Life & Banc Split Corp. (the “Company”) is pleased to announce that it has completed the issuance of 22,000 class A shares and 22,000 preferred shares for aggregate gross proceeds of approximately $0.4 million. The issuance was pursuant to the exercise of the over-allotment option granted to the agents in connection with the Company’s recently completed treasury offering. Following the exercise of the over-allotment option, total gross proceeds raised pursuant to this offering are approximately $25.9 million.

April 7, 2015

Tuesday, April 7th, 2015

Nothing happened today, but there’s a rumour that preferred shares will soon come with warning labels:

pianoWarning_150407
Click for Big

It was another rough day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 5bp, FixedResets losing 53bp and DeemedRetractibles down 16bp. The Performance Highlights table is comprised entirely of losers, notably Floaters and FixedResets from TRP, ENB and BAM. Volume was extremely high.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150407
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 22.86 to be $0.66 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-01-30 at +154, is $1.00 cheap at its bid price of 15.55.

impVol_MFC_150407
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 23.68 to be $0.69 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.11 to be $0.90 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150407
Click for Big

The fit on this series has suddenly become atrocious. It will be most interesting to see how long it takes for things to readjust.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 19.06 to be $1.27 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 23.53 and appears to be $1.53 rich.

impVol_FTS_150407
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 15.62, looks $1.68 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.00 and is $0.99 rich.

pairs_FR_150407
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs now predict an average over the next five years of a little under 0.40%, continuing the increase of last week; the TRP.PR.A / TRP.PR.F pair is again an outlier, but this time on the high side. The DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair is still off the charts and now predicts an average bill rate over the next 4 3/4 years of -1.55%.

Alert Assiduous readers will note that during the past week of disaster, doom and destruction, the implied three month bill rate from FixedReset pairs has been increasing. This makes no sense, but since when has the preferred market made sense?

pairs_FF_150407
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.5666 % 2,219.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.5666 % 3,880.6
Floater 3.26 % 3.42 % 58,993 18.73 4 -2.5666 % 2,359.4
OpRet 4.42 % -4.89 % 31,196 0.15 2 -0.0392 % 2,768.6
SplitShare 4.55 % 4.67 % 61,107 3.45 3 0.2800 % 3,236.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0392 % 2,531.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.31 % 0.36 % 59,372 0.08 25 -0.1365 % 2,525.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.06 % 5.02 % 144,147 15.18 9 -0.0513 % 2,818.9
FixedReset 4.50 % 3.64 % 265,693 16.45 85 -0.5331 % 2,370.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % 1.66 % 112,402 0.14 37 -0.1569 % 2,656.9
FloatingReset 2.48 % 2.90 % 78,463 6.28 8 -0.1965 % 2,356.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -4.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 14.25
Evaluated at bid price : 14.25
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -3.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 14.35
Evaluated at bid price : 14.35
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -3.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 14.52
Evaluated at bid price : 14.52
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -3.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 14.64
Evaluated at bid price : 14.64
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset -2.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -2.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 15.55
Evaluated at bid price : 15.55
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -2.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 19.86
Evaluated at bid price : 19.86
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 15.62
Evaluated at bid price : 15.62
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset -2.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -2.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.82
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset -1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 17.41
Evaluated at bid price : 17.41
Bid-YTW : 4.47 %
ENB.PR.J FixedReset -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 20.32
Evaluated at bid price : 20.32
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset -1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.86
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset -1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.12
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 23.53
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Premium -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 24.32
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 16.20
Evaluated at bid price : 16.20
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 22.21
Evaluated at bid price : 22.78
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
ENB.PF.G FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 20.60
Evaluated at bid price : 20.60
Bid-YTW : 4.55 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.16
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.81
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSE.PR.E FixedReset 255,048 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
RY.PR.M FixedReset 117,000 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.64
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium 102,523 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 26.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-05-07
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 0.36 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset 78,905 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
TD.PF.D FixedReset 78,145 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset 64,400 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
There were 62 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 26.05 – 26.83
Spot Rate : 0.7800
Average : 0.4868

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 4.69 %

FTS.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 23.00 – 23.65
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.3980

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 3.26 %

TRP.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 22.86 – 23.50
Spot Rate : 0.6400
Average : 0.4600

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-07
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.86
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %

IFC.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 20.12 – 20.60
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3286

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.12
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %

MFC.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 24.00 – 24.55
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3995

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %

MFC.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 23.65 – 24.00
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2302

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.65
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %

April 6, 2015

Tuesday, April 7th, 2015

A weak jobs number pushed up Treasuries:

Treasuries surged, sending yields to two-month lows, after a report showed the economy added the fewest jobs since December 2013, damping the outlook for the timing of interest-rate increases by the Federal Reserve.

Futures showed traders pushed out expectations for central bank to begin tightening monetary policy into next year. The 126,000 increase in March was weaker than the most pessimistic forecast in a Bloomberg survey. Traders had speculated that the Fed could raise rates as soon as September with strength in the labor market offsetting weakness elsewhere.

Yields on benchmark 10-year notes fell seven basis points to 1.84 percent at 12:00 p.m. New York time, according to Bloomberg Bond Trader prices. The yield dropped as low as 1.80 percent, the least since Feb. 6. The 2 percent benchmark note due in February 2025 rose 21/32, or $6.56 per $1,000 face value, to 101 14/32.

The rate for fed funds futures for December fell four basis points to 0.34 percent, indicating about one-in-three odds of a rate increase by the Fed’s meeting that month.

The median forecast in a Bloomberg survey called for a 245,000 increase. The unemployment rate held steady at 5.5 percent. Average hourly earnings rose 2.1 percent from a year earlier.

Atlanta Fed president Lockhart suggests a Fed hike in late summer:

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Dennis Lockhart said while recent economic weakness probably won’t persist, he favors pushing out the central bank’s first rate increase beyond the next two meetings.

“I would probably be biased toward the July or September dates as opposed to June,” Lockhart, who votes on monetary policy this year, said in an interview Monday. “We will have more data and we will give the economy a little more time to prove out the thesis that I laid out, that the first quarter was anomalous again, just like a year ago.”

“I’m not ready yet to conclude a slowdown is underway,” Lockhart said. He said he still expects “a moderate pace of growth between 2.5 percent and 3 percent” with “continued progress on employment and a firming up of the price data.”

“I’m holding to the view that we will see a rebound in the second quarter and that we will see a resumption of stronger growth,” Lockhart said.

“It is still reasonable” for the Federal Open Market Committee to “deliberate about liftoff in the middle meetings of the year,” with June, July and September each meriting discussion. “I still think they should be on the table.”

New York Fed president Dudley is even more vague:

Federal Reserve Bank of New York President William C. Dudley said the path of interest-rate increases is likely to be “shallow” once the Fed starts to tighten, and recent economic weakness probably won’t persist.

The timing of the first rate increase since 2006 “will be data dependent and remains uncertain because the future evolution of the economy cannot be fully anticipated,” Dudley said in a speech Monday in Newark, New Jersey. “I anticipate that the path will be relatively shallow” as “headwinds in the aftermath of the financial crisis are still in evidence.”

If we raise interest rates and portfolios perform poorly, that’s likely to slow us down,” Dudley said in response to a question. On the other hand, “if financial market conditions do not tighten much in response to higher short-term interest rates, we might have to move more quickly,” he said in his prepared remarks.

Stocks rebounded after Dudley’s comments. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index climbed 0.8 percent to 2,083.87 at 12:23 p.m. after opening 0.5 percent lower.

I’m way behind on responding to comments. I will catch up.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 3bp, FixedResets down 25bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 7bp. FixedResets were dominant losers on the Performance Highlights table, particularly BAM issues. Volume was high.

For as long as the FixedReset market is so violently unsettled, I’ll keep publishing updates of the more interesting and meaningful series of FixedResets’ Implied Volatilities. This doesn’t include Enbridge because although Enbridge has a large number of issues outstanding, all of which are quite liquid, the range of Issue Reset Spreads is too small for decent conclusions. The low is 212bp (ENB.PR.H; second-lowest is ENB.PR.D at 237bp) and the high is a mere 268 for ENB.PF.G.

Remember that all rich /cheap assessments are:
» based on Implied Volatility Theory only
» are relative only to other FixedResets from the same issuer
» assume constant GOC-5 yield
» assume constant Implied Volatility
» assume constant spread

Here’s TRP:

impVol_TRP_150406
Click for Big

TRP.PR.E, which resets 2019-10-30 at +235, is bid at 23.25 to be $0.65 rich, while TRP.PR.C, resetting 2016-01-30 at +154, is $1.01 cheap at its bid price of 16.00.

impVol_MFC_150406
Click for Big

Another excellent fit, but the numbers are perplexing. Implied Volatility for MFC continues to be a conundrum, although it declined substantially today. It is still too high if we consider that NVCC rules will never apply to these issues; it is still too low if we consider them to be NVCC non-compliant issues (and therefore with Deemed Maturities in the call schedule).

Most expensive is MFC.PR.L, resetting at +216 on 2019-6-19, bid at 23.76 to be $0.64 rich, while MFC.PR.H, resetting at +313bp on 2017-3-19, is bid at 25.31 to be $0.76 cheap.

impVol_BAM_150406
Click for Big

The fit on this series has suddenly become atrocious. It will be most interesting to see how long it takes for things to readjust.

The cheapest issue relative to its peers is BAM.PR.R, resetting at +230bp on 2016-6-30, bid at 19.21 to be $1.30 cheap. BAM.PF.E, resetting at +255bp 2020-3-31 is bid at 23.90 and appears to be $1.72 rich.

impVol_FTS_150406
Click for Big

This is just weird because the middle is expensive and the ends are cheap but anyway … FTS.PR.H, with a spread of +145bp, and bid at 16.00, looks $1.65 cheap and resets 2015-6-1. FTS.PR.K, with a spread of +205bp and resetting 2019-3-1, is bid at 23.70 and is $1.29 rich.

pairs_FR_150406
Click for Big

Investment-grade pairs now predict an average over the next five years of about 0.35%, continuing the increase of last week. The DC.PR.B / DC.PR.D pair is still off the charts and now predicts an average bill rate over the next 4 3/4 years of -2.34%.

pairs_FF_150406
Click for Big

Shall we just say that this exhibits a high level of confidence in the continued rapacity of Canadian banks?

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.1678 % 2,277.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.1678 % 3,982.8
Floater 3.18 % 3.32 % 59,639 18.98 4 -2.1678 % 2,421.6
OpRet 4.42 % -4.81 % 31,428 0.16 2 0.0982 % 2,769.7
SplitShare 4.57 % 4.68 % 59,200 3.45 3 0.0534 % 3,227.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0982 % 2,532.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.27 % 2.88 % 59,248 0.09 25 0.0518 % 2,529.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.06 % 5.02 % 149,974 15.18 9 -0.0280 % 2,820.3
FixedReset 4.48 % 3.63 % 264,485 16.45 85 -0.2535 % 2,383.2
Deemed-Retractible 4.91 % 1.65 % 111,208 0.14 37 0.0737 % 2,661.1
FloatingReset 2.48 % 2.89 % 78,943 6.29 8 0.0521 % 2,360.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -4.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 17.01
Evaluated at bid price : 17.01
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -3.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 15.10
Evaluated at bid price : 15.10
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -2.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 15.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.00
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -2.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 14.85
Evaluated at bid price : 14.85
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 16.41
Evaluated at bid price : 16.41
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset -1.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.45
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset -1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 19.43
Evaluated at bid price : 19.43
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
BAM.PF.G FixedReset -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 22.89
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
ENB.PF.E FixedReset -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 20.81
Evaluated at bid price : 20.81
Bid-YTW : 4.47 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 22.23
Evaluated at bid price : 22.82
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
ENB.PF.G FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 20.83
Evaluated at bid price : 20.83
Bid-YTW : 4.50 %
MFC.PR.N FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Premium 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 24.69
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.M FixedReset 262,500 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 83,323 RBC bought blocks of 10,000 and 20,000 from GMP at 24.95, then crossed 39,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 24.68
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 77,981 Desjardins crossed 60,000 at 19.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 19.25
Evaluated at bid price : 19.25
Bid-YTW : 4.45 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset 60,910 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 55,009 Desjardins bought 39,300 from GMP at 25.30.
\YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-27
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 2.21 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 50,547 Called for redemption effective April 30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-05-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 2.06 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PVS.PR.B SplitShare Quote: 25.25 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.5479

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 17.01 – 17.47
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3255

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 17.01
Evaluated at bid price : 17.01
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 16.65 – 17.63
Spot Rate : 0.9800
Average : 0.8879

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 16.65
Evaluated at bid price : 16.65
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %

ENB.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 19.37 – 19.62
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1634

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 19.37
Evaluated at bid price : 19.37
Bid-YTW : 4.45 %

BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.71 – 25.97
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1796

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-05-28
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : -2.79 %

BIP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 24.62 – 24.82
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1271

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2045-04-06
Maturity Price : 23.01
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %

MAPF Performance: March, 2015

Monday, April 6th, 2015

The fund strongly outperformed in March, powered by gains in low-spread FixedReset issues (primarily GWO.PR.N, TRP.PR.F and IFC.PR.A) and hurt by holdings PVS.PR.D (SplitShare), GWO.PR.I (DeemedRetractible) and ENB.PR.T (FixedReset with suspect credit).

ZPR, is an ETF comprised of FixedResets and Floating Rate issues and a very high proportion of junk issues, returned +%, +% and +% over the past one-, three- and twelve-month periods, respectively (according to the fund’s data), versus returns for the TXPL index of -0.77%, -8.24% and -5.90% respectively. The fund has been able to attract assets of about $1,097-million since inception in November 2012; AUM increased by $43-million in March; given an index return of -0.77% a decrease of about $8-million was expected, so in March 2015 the fund was able to attract assets, bouncing back from its first outflow in January. I feel that the flows into and out of this fund are very important in determining the performance of its constituents.

TXPR had returns over one-, three- and twelve-months of -0.47%, -4.86% and -1.04% respectively with CPD performance within expectations.

Returns for the HIMIPref™ investment grade sub-indices for January were as follows:

HIMIPref™ Indices
Performance to March, 2015
Sub-Index 1-Month 3-month
Ratchet N/A N/A
FixFloat N/A N/A
Floater +2.88% -5.64%
OpRet +0.40% +0.58%
SplitShare +0.20% +0.27%
Interest N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium +0.36% +1.28%
PerpetualDiscount +0.89% +5.44%
FixedReset +0.16% -6.26%
DeemedRetractible +0.30% +0.97%
FloatingReset +1.42% -5.67%

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close March 31, 2015, was $9.9573 after a distribution of 0.113685

Returns to March 31, 2015
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Index TXPR
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month +0.95% -0.01% -0.47% N/A
Three Months -4.72% -4.86% -4.86% N/A
One Year +2.23% -1.87% -1.04% -1.41%
Two Years (annualized) +0.48% -1.46% -1.69% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +3.62% +0.97% +1.04% +0.56%
Four Years (annualized) +3.24% +2.19% +1.90% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +6.91% +4.29% +3.73% +3.17%
Six Years (annualized) +12.58% +7.68% +6.60%  
Seven Years (annualized) +11.86% +4.30% +3.41%  
Eight Years (annualized) +10.09% +2.81%    
Nine Years (annualized) +9.56% +2.96%    
Ten Years (annualized) +9.39% +3.19%    
Eleven Years (annualized) +9.07% +3.09%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +11.37% +3.72%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +10.15% +3.76%    
Fourteen Years (annualized) +10.56% +3.58%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.49%, -3.01% and +1.00%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +2.08%; five year is +4.40%
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.05%, -5.03% and -4.50% respectively, according to Morningstar. Three Year performance is -1.42%; five-year is +0.95%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Class Adv [into which was merged Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund)] (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.79%, -4.33% & N/A, respectively.
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -%, -% & +%, respectively. Three year performance is +%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are -0.38%, -4.63% and -1.50% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively.
The figure for BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF is -0.79%, -8.41% and -6.47% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively. Two year performance is -5.29%.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund (Dividend Tax Credit Class, the best performing) are +%, N/A% and +% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are -4.20% and -1.89% for the past three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for PowerShares Canadian Preferred Share Index Class, Series Fare -1.30%, -5.72% and -2.33% for the past one, three and twelve months, respectively. The three- and five-year figures are -0.48% and +2.11%, respectively.

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

A problem that has bedevilled the market over the past four years has been the OSFI decision not to grandfather Straight Perpetuals as Tier 1 bank capital, and their continued foot-dragging regarding a decision on insurer Straight Perpetuals has segmented the market to the point where trading has become much more difficult. Until the market became so grossly segmented, there were many comparables for any given issue – but now banks are not available to swap into (because they are so expensive) and non-regulated companies are likewise deprecated (because they are not DeemedRetractibles; they should not participate in the increase in value that will follow the OSFI decision I anticipate and, in addition, are analyzed as perpetuals). The fund’s portfolio has been, in effect ‘locked in’ to the low coupon DeemedRetractibles due to projected long-term gains from a future OSFI decision to the detriment of trading gains, particularly in May, 2013, when the three lowest-coupon SLF DeemedRetractibles (SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were the worst performing DeemedRetractibles in the sub-index, and in June, 2013, when the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles behaved like PerpetualDiscounts in a sharply negative market. Nowadays, the fund is ‘locked-in’ to the low-spread FixedResets from these companies: GWO.PR.N, MFC.PR.F, and SLF.PR.G.

In March, insurance DeemedRetractibles performed roughly equally with bank DeemedRetractibles:

insBankPerf_150331
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… and roughly equally to Unregulated Straight Perpetuals.

insUnregPerf_150331
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Correlations were very poor for all datasets.

A lingering effect of the downdraft of 2013 has been the return of measurable Implied Volatility but given my recent updates in recent daily market reports, I will not discuss them further in this post.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes it’s 50-50 … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’ – although for quite some time, noise trading has taken a distant second place to the sectoral play on insurance DeemedRetractibles; something that dismays me, particularly given that the market does not yet agree with me regarding the insurance issues! There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, without worrying about the level of monthly turnover.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is very often irrational and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
September 10.4601 5.28% 0.997 5.296% 1.0000 $0.5540
December, 2014 10.5701 4.83% 1.009 4.787% 1.0000 $0.5060
March, 2015 9.9573 4.99% 1.001 4.985% 1.0000 $0.4964
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The same reasoning is also applied to FixedResets from these issuers, other than explicitly defined NVCC from banks.

Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible, SplitShare and NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on March 31; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas (set at 1.40% for the December 31 calculation and 0.78% for the March 31 calculation) to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

I no longer show calculations that assume the conversion of the entire portfolio into PerpetualDiscounts, as the fund has only a small position in these issues.

Most funds report Current Yield. For instance, ZPR reports a “Dividend Yield” of 4.5% as of August 29, 2014, but this is the Current Yield, a meaningless number. The Current Yield of MAPF was 4.89% as of August 29, but I will neither report that with any degree of prominence nor take any great pleasure in the fact that it’s a little higher than the ZPR number. It’s meaningless; to discuss it in the context of portfolio reporting is misleading.

However, BMO has taken a significant step forward in that they are no longer reporting the “Portfolio Yield” directly on their website; the information is taken from the “Enhanced Fund Profile” which is available only as a PDF link. CPD doesn’t report this metric on the CPD fact sheet or on their website. I may have one less thing to mock the fundcos about!

It should be noted that the concept of this Sustainable Income calculation was developed when the fund’s holdings were overwhelmingly PerpetualDiscounts – see, for instance, the bottom of the market in November 2008. It is easy to understand that for a PerpetualDiscount, the technique of multiplying yield by price will indeed result in the coupon – a PerpetualDiscount paying $1 annually will show a Sustainable Income of $1, regardless of whether the price is $24 or $17.

Things are not quite so neat when maturity dates and maturity prices that are different from the current price are thrown into the mix. If we take a notional Straight Perpetual paying $5 annually, the price is $100 when the yield is 5% (all this ignores option effects). As the yield increases to 6%, the price declines to 83.33; and 83.33 x 6% is the same $5. Good enough.

But a ten year bond, priced at 100 when the yield is equal to its coupon of 5%, will decline in price to 92.56; and 92.56 x 6% is 5.55; thus, the calculated Sustainable Income has increased as the price has declined as shown in the graph:


Click for Big

The difference is because the bond’s yield calculation includes the amortization of the discount; therefore, so does the Sustainable Income estimate.

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the long-term results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance has generally been due to exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

Low Spread FixedResets: March, 2015

Sunday, April 5th, 2015

As noted in MAPF Portfolio Composition: March 2015, the fund now has a fairly large allocation to FixedResets, mostly of relatively low spread.

Many of these were largely purchased with proceeds of sales of DeemedRetractibles from the same issuer, it is interesting to look at the price trend of some of the Straight/FixedReset pairs. We’ll start with GWO.PR.N / GWO.PR.I; the fund sold the latter to buy the former at a takeout of about $1.00 in mid-June, 2014; relative prices over the past year are plotted as:

GWOPRN_GWOPRI_150331
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Given that the March month-end take-out was $5.74, this is clearly a trade that has not worked out very well.

In July, 2014, I reported sales of SLF.PR.D to purchase SLF.PR.G at a take-out of about $0.15:

SLFPRG_SLFPRD_150331
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There were similar trades in August, 2014 (from SLF.PR.C) at a take-out of $0.35. The February month-end take-out (bid price SLF.PR.D less bid price SLF.PR.G) was $6.16, so that hasn’t worked very well either.

November saw the third insurer-based sector swap, as the fund sold MFC.PR.C to buy the FixedReset MFC.PR.F at a post-dividend-adjusted take-out of about $0.85 … given a February month-end take-out of about $5.29, that’s another regrettable trade, although another piece executed in December at a take-out of $1.57 has less badly.

MFCPRF_MFCPRC_bidDiff_150331
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This trend is not restricted to the insurance sector, which I expect will become subject to NVCC rules in the relatively near future and are thus subject to the same redemption assumptions I make for DeemedRetractibles. Other pairs of interest are BAM.PR.X / BAM.PR.N:

BAMPRX_BAMPRN_bidDiff_150331
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… and FTS.PR.H / FTS.PR.J:

FTSPRH_FTSPRJ_bidDiff_150331
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… and PWF.PR.P / PWF.PR.S:

PWFPRP_PWFPRS_bidDiff_150331
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I will agree that the fund’s trades highlighted in this post may be decried as cases of monumental bad timing, but I should point out that in May, 2014, the fund was 63.9% Straight / 9.5% FixedReset
while in February 2015 the fund was 22% Straight / 64% FixedReset & FloatingReset (The latter figures include allocations from those usually grouped as ‘Scraps’). Given that the indices are roughly 30% Straight / 60% FixedReset & FloatingReset, it is apparent that the fund was extremely overweighted in Straights / underweighted in FixedResets in May 2014 but is now approximately index-weighted in FixedResets and underweighted in Straights (the balance being mostly SplitShares in the fund). HIMIPref™ analytics have been heavily favouring low-spread issues and the fund’s holdings are overwhelmingly of this type.

Summarizing the charts above in tabular form, we see:

FixedReset Straight Take-out
December 2013
Take-out
MAPF Trade
Take-out
December 2014
Take-out
February 2015
Take-out March 2015
GWO.PR.N
3.65%+130
GWO.PR.I
4.5%
($0.04) $1.00 $2.95 $6.25 $5.74
SLF.PR.G
4.35%+141
SLF.PR.D
4.45%
($1.29) $0.25 $2.16 $6.45 $6.16
MFC.PR.F
4.20%+141
MFC.PR.C
4.50%
($1.29) $0.86 $1.20 $5.29 $5.46
BAM.PR.X
4.60%+180
BAM.PR.N
4.75%
($2.06)   $0.17 $5.39 $4.76
FTS.PR.H
4.25%+145
FTS.PR.J
4.75%
$0.60   $5.68 $8.47 $8.86
PWF.PR.P
4.40%+160
PWF.PR.S
4.80%
($0.67)   $3.00 $6.63 $6.43
The ‘Take-Out’ is the bid price of the Straight less the bid price of the FixedReset; approximate execution prices are used for the “MAPF Trade” column. Bracketted figures in the ‘Take-Out’ columns indicate a ‘Pay-Up’

So why is all this happening? One should take care in explaining market movements, but it is my belief that in the latter half of 2013 we were dealing with the ‘taper tantrum’ – the market’s fears that Fed tapering and subsequent tapering would lead to massive spikes in yields; this led to a great preference for FixedResets over Straights. Now, with the economic news getting less inflationary with every news story and Europe and Japan desperately trying to reflate their sluggish economies, the market seems to think that these rate increases are still a long way off … leading to a great preference for Straights over FixedResets.

In addition, the graphs show a sharp spike in early December, during which the low-spread FixedResets were very badly hurt; I believe this to be due to a combination of tax-loss selling and a panicky response to the 29% reduction in the TRP.PR.A dividend.

And in January it just got worse with Canada yields plummeting after the Bank of Canada rate cut with speculation rife about future cuts although this has recently become less emphatic.

There was some good discussion about what is going on in the comments to the January 29 market action report. I take the view that we’ve seen this show before: during the Credit Crunch, Floaters got hit extremely badly (to the point at which their fifteen year total return was negative) because (as far as I can make out) their dividend rate was dropping (as it was linked to Prime) while the yields on other perpetual preferred instruments were skyrocketing (due to credit concerns). Thus, at least some investors insisted on getting long term corporate yields from rates based (indirectly and with a lag, in the case of FixedResets) on short-term government policy rates. And it’s happening again!

Here’s the March performance for FixedResets that had a YTW Scenario of ‘To Perptuity’ at mid-month. The correlations for both the Pfd-2 Group and the Pfd-3 Group improved this month: 12% and 25%, respectively:

FR_1MoPerf_150331A_IRS
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MAPF Portfolio Composition: March 2015

Saturday, April 4th, 2015

Turnover continued to be above average in March, at about 18%.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading. Another trend that hasn’t helped was the migration of PerpetualDiscounts into PerpetualPremiums (due to price increases) in early 2013 – many of the PerpetualPremiums had negative Yields-to-Worst and those that don’t aren’t particularly thrilling; speaking very generally, PerpetualPremiums are to be avoided, not traded! While market weakness since the peak of the PerpetualDiscount subindex in May, 2013, has mitigated the situation somewhat, the population of PerpetualDiscounts is still exceeded by that of PerpetualPremiums – most of which are trading at a negative Yield-to-Worst.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to further footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another two years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on March 31 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2015-3-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 8.5% (-2.1) 5.01% 5.59
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 1.0% (-0.8) 5.16% 15.21
Fixed-Reset 49.4% (+12.5) 5.17% 10.55
Deemed-Retractible 21.4% (-11.2) 5.02% 7.86
FloatingReset 7.1% (+0.6) 3.12% 19.40
Scraps (Various) 12.8% (+2.3) 5.23% 10.14
Cash -0.1% (-1.2) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 4.99% 10.18
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. (all recent editions have a short summary of the argument included in the “DeemedRetractible” section)

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The big shift during the month was from DeemedRetractibles into FixedResets; there were a number of trades:

Major Position Changes
Issue Portfolio Weight Average Price Sector DBRS Rating
Net Purchases
IFC.PR.A 4.3% 21.19 FixedReset Pfd-2(low)
HSE.PR.A 3.1% 17.06 FixedReset Pfd-2(low)
SLF.PR.H 2.0% 22.50 FixedReset Pfd-2(high)
PWF.PR.P 2.0% 18.96 FixedReset Pfd-1(low)
SLF.PR.G 1.5% 17.93 FixedReset Pfd-2(high)
TRP.PR.B 1.2% 15.34 FixedReset Pfd-2(low)
CPX.PR.C 1.1% 20.93 FixedReset (Scraps) Pfd-3(low)
Net Sales
IAG.PR.A (1.3%) 24.46 DeemedRetractible Pfd-2(high)
GWO.PR.I (1.6%) 24.23 DeemedRetractible Pfd-1(low)
BNS.PR.Z (1.6%) 23.35 FixedReset Pfd-2(high)
SLF.PR.D (2.0%) 23.72 DeemedRetractible Pfd-2(high)
SLF.PR.C (2.7%) 23.79 DeemedRetractible Pfd-2(high)

The market moved against these trades as of month-end (particularly with respect to HSE.PR.A, which closed with a bid price of 16.70), but not by enough overall to make the trading a disaster.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2015-3-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 21.0% (-0.6)
Pfd-2(high) 33.2% (-8.3)
Pfd-2 0%
Pfd-2(low) 35.0% (+10.0)
Pfd-3(high) 1.3% (-0.3)
Pfd-3 4.4% (-0.5)
Pfd-3(low) 4.0% (+1.0)
Pfd-4(high) 0.7% (0)
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0% (0)
Pfd-5(high) 0% (0)
Pfd-5 0.5% (0)
Cash -0.1% (-1.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.C, which is rated P-5 by S&P and is unrated by DBRS
A position held in NPI.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3(high)” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3(high).

The credit quality changes are largely explained by the table of issues with major weighting changes, above.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2015-3-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 10.2% (-1.3)
$50,000 – $100,000 3.0% (0)
$100,000 – $200,000 38.9% (+1.1)
$200,000 – $300,000 34.4% (+5.5)
>$300,000 13.6% (-4.1)
Cash -0.1% (-1.2)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is underweighted in other Straights
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is much more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets about equal to the index