Dr Joachim Nagel, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, gave a speech:
The unemployment rates in the European Union and the euro area, at currently (January) 6.1% and 6.7%, respectively, are around their lowest levels since the start of this data series in 1998. Employment in the EU (European Union) and the euro area fell only slightly during the pandemic and was, in the final quarter of 2022, well above the 2019 level. In Germany at the end of last year, more people (45.9 million) were in paid employment than ever before.
The labour market has also proven very robust in the United Kingdom and especially in Scotland. At 3.7% the UK (United Kingdom) unemployment rate for November to January was clearly lower than in the euro area. The Scottish unemployment rate even stands at 3.1%. Employment in the UK (United Kingdom) has recovered swiftly from the pandemic. And from November to January, the number of vacancies was still at high levels despite continuing its downward trend. Furthermore, the Scottish employment rate has reached its highest figure on record, at over 76%.
…
Let me quote the chief economist of the Bank of England in this context. Huw Pill recently said in a speech: “In an attempt to protect their own real income from the unavoidable impact of higher external prices, the longer that firms try to maintain real profit margins and employees try to maintain real wages at pre-energy price shock levels, the more likely it is that domestically-generated inflation will achieve its own selfsustaining momentum even as the external impulse to UK (United Kingdom) inflation recedes.”To illustrate what Pill said with German data: In Germany in 2022, the price index of gross value added rose more strongly than unit labour costs. This is an indicator that profit margins increased. The German ifo (Information und Forschung) Institute noted recently: “In the fourth quarter of 2022, some German companies continued to increase their sales prices more than was indicated by the development of purchase prices.” It seems plausible that pent-up demand due to the pandemic enabled such price-setting behaviour in some sectors. Nevertheless, firms’ pricing power is likely to diminish, as inflation has been increasingly eroding consumers’ purchasing power.
Last year, nominal wages and salaries per employee climbed in the EU (European Union) by 5½%, in the euro area and in Germany by more than 4½%. For Germany, it was the largest increase in 30 years, which came on the heels of German reunification. However, due to high inflation, employees suffered the largest loss in real wages since the beginning of monetary union: a decrease of more than 3½% from the previous year.
It is now understandable that workers and trade unions are trying to compensate for the loss of purchasing power in wage negotiations. These wage negotiations are entirely up to the social partners. Having said that, the wage deals currently reached in Germany are, overall, not compatible with price stability for the euro area in the medium term. There are signs of second-round effects from inflation-induced higher wage increases back to prices.
Wage growth constitutes an important component of “homemade” inflation. In particular, elevated services inflation is likely to partly counterbalance abating upstream price pressures on goods inflation. On the one hand, stronger wage growth is necessary for burden sharing. It prevents employees from bearing too much of the high inflation. On the other hand, wage developments are likely to prolong the prevailing period of high inflation rates. In other words: Inflation will become more persistent.
To be clear: Preventing inflation to become persistent via the labour market requires that employees accept sensible wage gains and that firms accept sensible profit margins. Despite signs of second-round effects, we have not observed a destabilising price-wage spiral in Germany so far. From the Bundesbank’s view, it is necessary to avoid such a price-wage spiral.
Ms Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank, also gave a speech:
On 1 March, the ECB started quantitative tightening (QT) after eight years of balance sheet expansion. At the peak in 2022, the Eurosystem held monetary policy assets corresponding to around 56% of euro area GDP. This was substantial both from a historical perspective and in international comparison (Slide 2, left-hand side).
The first wave of balance sheet expansion was a response to the low-inflation environment prevailing in the aftermath of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Between 2014 and 2016 headline inflation ran persistently below our target of 2%, averaging just 0.3% (Slide 2, right-hand side).
…
The second wave of balance sheet expansion came with the ECB’s response to the pandemic. The launch of the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) and adjustments to the third series of TLTROs resulted in a further large increase of our monetary policy assets. These measures were necessary to protect the euro area economy from falling into a full-blown financial crisis and economic depression.
…
Last July, balance sheet growth came to a halt when we ended net asset purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP). Since autumn, the size of the balance sheet has been declining as banks began repaying their outstanding TLTRO loans. The balance sheet has declined further since the beginning of March, when we stopped fully reinvesting maturing securities bought under the APP.Further TLTRO repayments and a gradual run-down of our monetary policy bond portfolio imply that our balance sheet is expected to decline meaningfully over the coming years, thereby reducing excess liquidity.
…
When we launched the APP in 2015 and excess liquidity started to grow rapidly, we effectively
moved from a “corridor” towards a “floor” system.Conceptually, the supply curve shifted further and further to the right, now crossing the demand curve at its flat, highly elastic part, where discrete changes in liquidity have very little effect on the level of shortterm interest rates (Slide 6).
Balance sheet run-down will reverse this shift, progressively moving the supply curve back towards the steep part of the demand curve. In the current situation, the large volume of excess reserves means that we should still be at a significant distance from that point. Yet, uncertainty about the exact location of the “kink” is very high.
One reason for this is that years of large excess reserves have blurred our understanding of banks’ underlying demand for liquidity. The aggregate level of reserves has been largely determined by thequantity of asset purchases rather than by banks’ liquidity choices.
Should the demand for reserves have shifted more fundamentally, then upward pressure on interest rates may well start earlier than estimates of the historical relationship between the level of excess reserves and market rates would suggest (Slide 7).
This is broadly what happened in the United States in the autumn of 2019, when interest rate volatility spiked unexpectedly although the supply of reserves was still considerably above what banks had indicated in surveys as their lowest comfortable level.
…
The ability to effectively steer overnight rates in the pre-2008 corridor framework relied heavily on two features.The first was our ability to accurately predict the reserves needed to steer the operational target towards the middle of the corridor. In the steep part of the demand curve, even small changes in the supply of, or demand for, reserves can lead to large swings in interest rates.
The second feature was a well-functioning interbank market that distributed central bank reserves efficiently across the euro area banking system. The standing facilities were not designed to be used on a regular basis but were supposed to accommodate unforeseen liquidity shocks.
Over the past decade, however, the environment in which central banks operate has changed fundamentally.
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, large excess reserves and prevailing fragmentation have considerably reduced the volume of reserves intermediated through the unsecured interbank market (Slide 8).
It is not clear whether the interbank market will recover once excess reserves become scarcer.
A structural decline in banks’ risk tolerance may have permanently reduced the capacity of the euro area interbank market to efficiently distribute reserves across banks all over the euro area. And while tighter financial regulation has made our financial system safer and more resilient, it has made interbank lending more costly.
Banks might also want to hold much higher liquidity buffers than in the past. The recent experience of Sveriges Riksbank is a case in point.
In recent weeks, it regularly issued certificates amounting to the estimated liquidity surplus of the banking system to steer the Swedish Krona short-term rate to the middle of the interest rate corridor.
However, banks often decided to hold on to about one fifth of excess reserves which they placed in the deposit facility that pays a lower rate of remuneration, so that the short-term rate remained stuck to the floor of the corridor (Slide 9).
This points to banks’ strong preference for reserves, which may affect the ability of central banks toeffectively steer short-term rates in a large corridor system, such as the one we had before 2008.
There are two main reasons as to why banks may today wish to hold a higher level of excess reserves.
One relates to regulatory changes. The introduction of Basel III has resulted in a measurable increase in the demand for high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) that banks need to hold to comply with the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR).
Many euro area banks currently use excess reserves to meet regulatory requirements, especially in those countries with high excess liquidity. For the euro area as a whole, excess reserves currently account for 60% of HQLA holdings (Slide 10).
The second factor relates to banks’ precautionary behaviour in guarding against liquidity risks, as the turbulent events in the past few weeks forcefully underline.
Overnight deposits at euro area banks have shown an upward trend in relation to banks’ total deposits until about mid-2022 (Slide 11, left-hand side).
As a result, the risk of withdrawals or portfolio rebalancing has increased.
And here’s part of a speech by Mr Andrew Bailey, Governor of the Bank of England:
UK Consumer price inflation is currently at 10.4%. This is much too high, and we need to, and will, bring it back down to the 2% target. That is why last Thursday the Monetary Policy Committee increased Bank Rate at the eleventh meeting in a row, to 4.25%. We have increased Bank Rate by more than 4 percentage points since December 2021. These increases are being felt by households and businesses across the country.
…
In the New Keynesian models that have dominated monetary macroeconomics over the past three decades, monetary policy has real effects because market prices are sticky. So when nominal interest rates change, the real interest rates that determine real consumption and investment decisions change with them. And markets may operate with ‘excess supply’ or ‘excess demand’ for as long as it takes wages and prices to adjust to shifts in either demand or supply.
…
Chart 4, reproduced from our latest Monetary Policy Report, shows that there has been a marked and sustained fall in productivity growth in the United Kingdom following the global financial crisis in particular.
…
Whatever the reason, when productivity growth is weak, companies gain less from installing new capital. So weaker productivity growth has meant that firms have sought to borrow less to finance investments at a given interest rate. This reduction in the demand for capital has lowered the equilibrium rate.The second important factor is population ageing.
…
As people accumulate savings over their working life to fund their retirement, wealth in the economy increases as the age distribution shifts towards older cohorts (indicated in this chart by bars in different colours).So ageing households have sought to lend more at a time when less productive firms have sought to borrow less. The only way to establish an equilibrium between the supply and demand in the market for investable funds – that is, to incentivise firms to invest this additional wealth into productive capital – has been for the price of those funds, the real interest rate, to fall.
The trend equilibrium rate, R*, is like a long-term anchor for monetary policy. As R* has fallen, monetary policy has moved with it. This is an important point. The low level of interest rates over the past few decades reflects deep underlying factors on the supply side of the economy. As these underlying factors – trends in technology and demographics – only move slowly, it is not unreasonable to expect that R* will remain low.
This means that, even as we now respond to rising inflation by raising Bank Rate, interest rates will not necessarily have to return fully to, and remain around, the higher levels they once had.
The New York Fed has released the 2023 SCE Housing Survey:
- Households expect home price growth to decline to 2.6 percent over the next twelve months, down sharply from 7.0 percent a year ago. This marks the lowest such reading since the series’ inception in 2014. Expectations over the five-year horizon rose, with households anticipating average annualized price growth of 2.8 percent from 2.2 percent.
- Households expect rents to increase by 8.2 percent over the next twelve months, compared with 11.5 percent in February 2022.
- Renters put the probability of owning a home in the future at 44.4 percent, up slightly from 43.3 percent a year ago.
- Households expect mortgage rates to rise to 8.4 percent a year from now and 8.8 percent in three years’ time.
… as well as the more general and more frequent SURVEY OF CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS:
Sharp Fall in Short-Term Inflation Expectations; Labor Market Expectations Improve
Median one-year-ahead inflation expectations declined by 0.8 percentage point to 4.2 percent, according to the February Survey of Consumer Expectations. Three-year-ahead expectations remained at 2.7 percent, while the five-year-ahead measure increased by 0.1 percentage point to 2.6 percent. Labor market expectations improved, with unemployment expectations and perceived job loss risk decreasing and job finding expectations increasing. Expectations for voluntary job quits reached the highest level since the start of the pandemic.
And there’s more scandal from the Bankman-Fried investigation:
Federal prosecutors added a foreign bribery charge to the growing list of crimes already pending against the FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried, according to a new indictment filed in federal court in Manhattan on Tuesday.
Federal prosecutors said that in 2021 Mr. Bankman-Fried instructed those working for him to pay a bribe of $40 million to one or more Chinese officials to help unfreeze trading accounts maintained by Alameda Research, FTX’s sister company, that held about $1 billion in cryptocurrencies.
The bribe money was paid to the Chinese officials in cryptocurrency, the document said. The indictment said the effort to pay off the unnamed Chinese officials was successful in getting the trading accounts unfrozen.
And what should we think of central bankers?
Central bankers of industrialized countries have fallen tremendously in the public’s estimation. Not long ago they were heroes, supporting feeble growth with unconventional monetary policies, promoting the hiring of minorities by allowing the labor market to run a little hot, and even trying to hold back climate change, all the while berating paralyzed legislatures for not doing more. Now they stand accused of botching their most basic task, keeping inflation low and stable. Politicians, sniffing blood and mistrustful of unelected power, want to reexamine central bank mandates.
…
Long periods of low interest rates and high liquidity prompt an increase in asset prices and associated leveraging. And both the government and the private sector leveraged up. Of course, the pandemic and Putin’s war pushed up government spending. But so did ultralow long-term interest rates and a bond market anesthetized by central bank actions such as quantitative easing. Indeed, there was a case for targeted government spending financed by issuing long-term debt. Yet sensible economists making the case for spending did not caveat their recommendations enough, and fractured politics ensured that the only spending that could be legislated had something for everyone. Politicians, as always, drew on unsound but convenient theories (think modern monetary theory) that gave them license for unbridled spending.Central banks compounded the problem by buying government debt financed by overnight reserves, thus shortening the maturity of the financing of the government and central bank’s consolidated balance sheets. This means that as interest rates rise, government finances—especially for slow-growing countries with significant debt—are likely to become more problematic.
…
The private sector also leveraged up, both at the household level (think Australia, Canada, and Sweden) and at the corporate level. But there is another new, largely overlooked, concern—liquidity dependence. As the Fed pumped out reserves during quantitative easing, commercial banks financed the reserves largely with wholesale demand deposits, effectively shortening the maturity of their liabilities. In addition, in order to generate fees from the large volume of low-return reserves sitting on their balance sheets, they wrote all sorts of liquidity promises to the private sector—committed lines of credit, margin support for speculative positions, and so on.The problem is that as the central bank shrinks its balance sheet, it is hard for commercial banks to unwind these promises quickly. The private sector becomes much more dependent on the central bank for continued liquidity. We had a first glimpse of this in the UK pension turmoil in October 2022, which was defused by a mix of central bank intervention and government backtracking on its extravagant spending plans. The episode did suggest, however, a liquidity-dependent private sector that could potentially affect the central bank’s plans to shrink its balance sheet to reduce monetary accommodation.
…
High asset prices, high private leverage, and liquidity dependence suggest that the central bank could face financial dominance—monetary policy that responds to financial developments in the private sector rather than to inflation. Regardless of whether the Fed intends to be dominated, current private sector forecasts that it will be forced to cut policy rates quickly have made its task of removing monetary accommodation more difficult. It will have to be harsher for longer than it would want to be, absent these private sector expectations. And that means worse consequences for global activity. It also means that when asset prices reach their new equilibrium, households, pension funds, and insurance companies will all have experienced significant losses—and these are often not the entities that benefited from the rise. Bureaucrat-managed state pension funds, the unsophisticated, and the relatively poor get drawn in at the tail end of an asset price boom, with problematic distributional consequences for which the central bank bears some responsibility.
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.2008 % | 2,388.2 |
| FixedFloater | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.2008 % | 4,580.5 |
| Floater | 9.44 % | 9.47 % | 49,127 | 10.00 | 2 | -0.2008 % | 2,639.8 |
| OpRet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.0987 % | 3,321.4 |
| SplitShare | 5.06 % | 7.38 % | 53,480 | 2.68 | 7 | -0.0987 % | 3,966.4 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.0987 % | 3,094.8 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.2728 % | 2,770.5 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 6.16 % | 6.26 % | 56,886 | 13.52 | 35 | 0.2728 % | 3,021.1 |
| FixedReset Disc | 5.72 % | 7.38 % | 93,253 | 12.31 | 61 | -0.0948 % | 2,146.9 |
| Insurance Straight | 6.07 % | 6.14 % | 70,506 | 13.71 | 20 | 0.2435 % | 2,960.2 |
| FloatingReset | 10.19 % | 10.60 % | 29,344 | 9.11 | 2 | 0.8415 % | 2,431.7 |
| FixedReset Prem | 6.62 % | 6.41 % | 247,174 | 12.82 | 2 | -0.3364 % | 2,337.2 |
| FixedReset Bank Non | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.0948 % | 2,194.6 |
| FixedReset Ins Non | 5.64 % | 6.97 % | 73,459 | 12.46 | 13 | -0.0560 % | 2,339.3 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| CU.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | -3.85 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 20.72 Evaluated at bid price : 20.72 Bid-YTW : 6.42 % |
| BN.PF.B | FixedReset Disc | -3.17 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 16.20 Evaluated at bid price : 16.20 Bid-YTW : 8.54 % |
| BN.PF.I | FixedReset Disc | -2.67 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 20.39 Evaluated at bid price : 20.39 Bid-YTW : 7.90 % |
| IFC.PR.K | Perpetual-Discount | -1.94 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 21.28 Evaluated at bid price : 21.28 Bid-YTW : 6.21 % |
| BN.PR.Z | FixedReset Disc | -1.66 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 19.52 Evaluated at bid price : 19.52 Bid-YTW : 7.69 % |
| CCS.PR.C | Insurance Straight | -1.65 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 19.72 Evaluated at bid price : 19.72 Bid-YTW : 6.38 % |
| BIK.PR.A | FixedReset Disc | -1.30 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 22.09 Evaluated at bid price : 22.75 Bid-YTW : 7.54 % |
| BN.PF.A | FixedReset Disc | -1.30 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 19.00 Evaluated at bid price : 19.00 Bid-YTW : 7.71 % |
| BN.PR.R | FixedReset Disc | -1.24 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 13.50 Evaluated at bid price : 13.50 Bid-YTW : 8.85 % |
| CM.PR.T | FixedReset Disc | -1.19 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 22.80 Evaluated at bid price : 23.32 Bid-YTW : 6.59 % |
| BIP.PR.B | FixedReset Disc | -1.15 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 21.50 Evaluated at bid price : 21.50 Bid-YTW : 8.29 % |
| MFC.PR.Q | FixedReset Ins Non | -1.13 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 19.30 Evaluated at bid price : 19.30 Bid-YTW : 7.17 % |
| TD.PF.J | FixedReset Disc | -1.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 21.45 Evaluated at bid price : 21.45 Bid-YTW : 6.69 % |
| CU.PR.E | Perpetual-Discount | 1.01 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 20.00 Evaluated at bid price : 20.00 Bid-YTW : 6.20 % |
| TRP.PR.B | FixedReset Disc | 1.14 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 10.63 Evaluated at bid price : 10.63 Bid-YTW : 8.96 % |
| BN.PR.X | FixedReset Disc | 1.38 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 14.65 Evaluated at bid price : 14.65 Bid-YTW : 8.08 % |
| FTS.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | 1.47 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 20.75 Evaluated at bid price : 20.75 Bid-YTW : 5.98 % |
| SLF.PR.J | FloatingReset | 1.72 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 14.80 Evaluated at bid price : 14.80 Bid-YTW : 9.98 % |
| IFC.PR.F | Insurance Straight | 1.83 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 21.86 Evaluated at bid price : 22.20 Bid-YTW : 5.99 % |
| RY.PR.Z | FixedReset Disc | 2.17 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 17.45 Evaluated at bid price : 17.45 Bid-YTW : 7.32 % |
| BIP.PR.F | FixedReset Disc | 2.84 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 19.55 Evaluated at bid price : 19.55 Bid-YTW : 7.50 % |
| MIC.PR.A | Perpetual-Discount | 3.15 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 20.94 Evaluated at bid price : 20.94 Bid-YTW : 6.49 % |
| IAF.PR.B | Insurance Straight | 5.00 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 19.95 Evaluated at bid price : 19.95 Bid-YTW : 5.80 % |
| POW.PR.B | Perpetual-Discount | 10.79 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 21.05 Evaluated at bid price : 21.05 Bid-YTW : 6.38 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| TRP.PR.E | FixedReset Disc | 73,702 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 14.95 Evaluated at bid price : 14.95 Bid-YTW : 8.72 % |
| MFC.PR.J | FixedReset Ins Non | 27,000 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 21.88 Evaluated at bid price : 22.35 Bid-YTW : 6.23 % |
| RY.PR.J | FixedReset Disc | 21,700 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 18.40 Evaluated at bid price : 18.40 Bid-YTW : 7.31 % |
| NA.PR.C | FixedReset Prem | 20,772 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 23.37 Evaluated at bid price : 25.60 Bid-YTW : 6.41 % |
| BMO.PR.Y | FixedReset Disc | 19,400 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 18.25 Evaluated at bid price : 18.25 Bid-YTW : 7.25 % |
| TD.PF.E | FixedReset Disc | 12,000 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2053-03-28 Maturity Price : 18.65 Evaluated at bid price : 18.65 Bid-YTW : 7.29 % |
| There were 1 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||
| Wide Spread Highlights | ||
| Issue | Index | Quote Data and Yield Notes |
| BMO.PR.W | FixedReset Disc | Quote: 16.90 – 24.95 Spot Rate : 8.0500 Average : 6.4866 YTW SCENARIO |
| CU.PR.J | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 19.22 – 22.00 Spot Rate : 2.7800 Average : 1.5554 YTW SCENARIO |
| SLF.PR.D | Insurance Straight | Quote: 18.95 – 21.00 Spot Rate : 2.0500 Average : 1.2902 YTW SCENARIO |
| BIP.PR.A | FixedReset Disc | Quote: 16.80 – 18.49 Spot Rate : 1.6900 Average : 0.9585 YTW SCENARIO |
| BN.PF.J | FixedReset Disc | Quote: 22.10 – 23.99 Spot Rate : 1.8900 Average : 1.1772 YTW SCENARIO |
| CU.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | Quote: 20.72 – 22.00 Spot Rate : 1.2800 Average : 0.7729 YTW SCENARIO |