Issue Comments

Moody's Downgrades BMO Prefs 4 Notches to Baa1

Moody’s Investors Service has announced it has:

downgraded the long-term ratings of the Bank of Montreal (BMO) and its subsidiaries. BMO’s deposit rating dropped to Aa2 from Aa1 and its bank financial strength rating (BFSR) fell to B- from B.

Moody’s Senior Vice President, Peter Routledge, said “the downgrade of BMO reflects our view that the bank’s wholesale investment bank exposes the bank to greater earnings volatility than previously incorporated in its ratings and the fact that BMO allocates substantial capital to this business…”

The 2007-08 credit crisis exposed vulnerabilities in the wholesale investment banking business model and intensified Moody’s view of the riskiness of this business. Such vulnerabilities include risk management weaknesses, high leverage, confidence-sensitivity, excessive concentrations, and opacity of risk.

Moody’s downgraded BMO’s preferred stock securities (which include non-cumulative preferred shares and other hybrid capital instruments) four notches to Baa1 from Aa3. The first notch reflects the downgrade of BMO’s unsupported/stand-alone BFSR. The next three notches are a consequence of implementing Moody’s revised methodology for rating bank hybrid securities which reflects the changing role of hybrids as loss absorbing capital instruments. Published in June 2009, Moody’s special comment titled “Canadian Bank Subordinated Capital Ratings” summarized the potential ratings impact of implementing this revised methodology.

There have been rumours of something like this, as I posted on Moody’s May Massacre Hybrid Ratings.

The loss absorption potential for preferreds is a matter of great pith and moment; the current system is ad hoc, but there are strong indications that the process will be formalized with Contingent Capital rules.

BMO has the following preferred share issues currently outstanding: BMO.PR.H, BMO.PR.J, BMO.PR.K, BMO.PR.L, BMO.PR.M, BMO.PR.N, BMO.PR.O and BMO.PR.P.

Market Action

January 21, 2010

Sheila Bair criticized the size of banks’ prop trading books in her Crisis Committee testimony. Comrade Peace Prize is going one step further:

President Barack Obama will offer proposals to limit financial institutions’ size and trading activities as a way to reduce risk-taking, an administration official said.

Obama will announce the rules today after meeting with former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker at the White House. The proposals will be part of an overhaul of regulations and will specifically address firms’ proprietary trading, the official said yesterday on the condition of anonymity.

Hedge funds here we come! The above was written last night when the first news came out; I devoted a post to the actual announcement.

The Bank for International Settlements has released a massive collection of papers titled Monetary Policy and the Measurement of Inflation, Prices, Wages and Expectations.

The Bank of Canada has released the January 2010 Monetary Policy Report.

PerpetualDiscounts got slapped down today, losing 33bp, while FixedResets kept on trucking with a gain of 3bp. Heavy volume!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1553 % 1,707.7
FixedFloater 5.66 % 3.75 % 34,381 19.34 1 2.1277 % 2,791.3
Floater 2.30 % 2.63 % 109,730 20.68 3 -0.1553 % 2,133.5
OpRet 4.86 % -2.73 % 112,233 0.09 13 -0.0207 % 2,312.2
SplitShare 6.36 % -1.28 % 171,093 0.08 2 -0.1969 % 2,113.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0207 % 2,114.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.82 % 5.79 % 151,576 6.92 12 -0.1327 % 1,885.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.76 % 5.80 % 178,072 14.19 63 -0.3324 % 1,824.5
FixedReset 5.40 % 3.57 % 344,996 3.83 42 0.0279 % 2,181.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-21
Maturity Price : 23.43
Evaluated at bid price : 23.62
Bid-YTW : 5.58 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-21
Maturity Price : 20.26
Evaluated at bid price : 20.26
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-21
Maturity Price : 21.20
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.65
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-21
Maturity Price : 21.87
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.15
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-21
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.I FixedReset 192,310 Scotia crossed 10,000 at 27.61, then another 10,000 at 27.65. Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 27.75. Scotia crossed 20,000 at 27.75. RBC crossed blocks of 49,600 and 28,400, both at 27.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.72
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 172,087 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from TD at 26.30, then crossed blocks of 75,000 and 36,000 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 84,750 Nesbitt crossed 15,000 at 23.00, then sold 20,000 to RBC at 23.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-21
Maturity Price : 22.77
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 72,000 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-21
Maturity Price : 24.62
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 66,500 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 10,000 and 20,000 at 26.35, then crossed 15,000 at 26.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 61,221 RBC crossed 52,000 at 26.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
There were 62 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Indices and ETFs

POW.PR.C: Yes, CPD is the Buyer

Today’s spreadsheet (dated 2010-1-21) from CPD discloses a holding of 0.72% in POW.PR.C compared to the January 19 figure of 0.25% … so we may conclude that CPD is the culprit behind the stupid dumb trading in the TXPR Rebalancing Issues … Assiduous Reader to_be_frank wins a kewpie doll for first spotting the pattern.

Nesbitt – it looks like they are CPD’s agents in this horrific display of gross incompetence – bought 30,000 shares of POW.PR.C today at 25.443 while selling 25,000 at 25.45 (the sale was a single cross, so there’s one institutional investor with a smile on his face, anyway. Give the man a bonus! The other implication is that Nesbitt only bought 5,000 from retail). POW.PR.C closed the day at 25.08-20, 2×10 … so who knows? Maybe things are getting back to normal. POW.PR.C is still trading about 25bp through POW.PR.B at the closing bids, however – despite having significantly more call risk – so they’re still extremely ridiculously expensive.

Fearless Prediction: CPD will show its normally low Trading Expense Ratio on its next financials (the TER shows only commission cost, and makes no attempt to capture the generally much much higher market impact and spread costs). Regulators are very particular about funds reporting their TER, because it’s so VERY VERY important.

Update, 2010-1-22: I have uploaded three charts from HIMIPref™ for your edification and amusement. They compare POW.PR.B (which should normally trade to yield less, due to the lower value of the embedded option) with POW.PR.C:

New Issues

New Issue: FFH FixedReset 4.75%+216

Fairfax Financial Holdings has announced:

that it will issue in Canada 8 million Preferred Shares, Series E at a price of $25.00 per share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $200 million, on a bought deal basis to a syndicate of Canadian underwriters.

Holders of the Preferred Shares, Series E will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.75% annually for the initial five year period ending March 31, 2015. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the then current 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.16%.

Holders of Preferred Shares, Series E will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Preferred Shares, Series F, subject to certain conditions, on March 31, 2015, and on March 31st every five years thereafter. Holders of the Preferred Shares, Series F will be entitled to receive cumulative quarterly floating dividends at a rate equal to the then current three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.16%.

Fairfax has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part at any time up to 48 hours prior to closing, to purchase an additional 2 million Preferred Shares, Series E at the same offering price for additional gross proceeds of $50 million.

Fairfax intends to use the net proceeds of the offering to augment its cash position, to increase short term investments and marketable securities held at the holding company level, to retire outstanding debt and other corporate obligations from time to time, and for general corporate purposes. The offering is expected to close on or about February 1, 2010.

The first dividend will be payable March 31 for $0.1887, assuming a 2010-2-1 closing.

Regulation

Obama Proposes Flat Prohibitions on Banks' Activities

The White House has published Remarks by the President on Financial Reform:

That’s why we are seeking reforms to protect consumers; we intend to close loopholes that allowed big financial firms to trade risky financial products like credit defaults swaps and other derivatives without oversight; to identify system-wide risks that could cause a meltdown; to strengthen capital and liquidity requirements to make the system more stable; and to ensure that the failure of any large firm does not take the entire economy down with it. Never again will the American taxpayer be held hostage by a bank that is “too big to fail.”

Now, limits on the risks major financial firms can take are central to the reforms that I’ve proposed. They are central to the legislation that has passed the House under the leadership of Chairman Barney Frank, and that we’re working to pass in the Senate under the leadership of Chairman Chris Dodd. As part of these efforts, today I’m proposing two additional reforms that I believe will strengthen the financial system while preventing future crises.

First, we should no longer allow banks to stray too far from their central mission of serving their customers. In recent years, too many financial firms have put taxpayer money at risk by operating hedge funds and private equity funds and making riskier investments to reap a quick reward. And these firms have taken these risks while benefiting from special financial privileges that are reserved only for banks.

I’m proposing a simple and common-sense reform, which we’re calling the “Volcker Rule” — after this tall guy behind me. Banks will no longer be allowed to own, invest, or sponsor hedge funds, private equity funds, or proprietary trading operations for their own profit, unrelated to serving their customers. If financial firms want to trade for profit, that’s something they’re free to do. Indeed, doing so –- responsibly –- is a good thing for the markets and the economy. But these firms should not be allowed to run these hedge funds and private equities funds while running a bank backed by the American people.

In addition, as part of our efforts to protect against future crises, I’m also proposing that we prevent the further consolidation of our financial system. There has long been a deposit cap in place to guard against too much risk being concentrated in a single bank. The same principle should apply to wider forms of funding employed by large financial institutions in today’s economy. The American people will not be served by a financial system that comprises just a few massive firms. That’s not good for consumers; it’s not good for the economy. And through this policy, that is an outcome we will avoid.

Wow. This came out of the blue. But Comrade Peace-Prize needs to do something dramatic to regain the political momentum after his recent debacle.

We’re back to the days of Bush! Something this sweeping should have been announced multilaterally, and only if the world’s other big players (like, f’rinstance, the UK just for starters) agreed. Ideally it would have been done through BIS.

But it will get the political momentum back – who cares whether or not it’s unilateral?

Update: Bloomberg has picked up on the unilateralism aspect:

“This is absolutely unilateral,” said Simon Gleeson, a regulatory lawyer at Clifford Chance LLP in London. “This is Glass-Steagall Mark Two,” he added. “Banks can take just as much risk in commercial lending as they can in proprietary trading as Northern Rock and HBOS show,” he said referring to two lenders bailed out by the U.K. government.

Obama’s call “is moving a long way from the existing Basel recommendations on capital charges, which is another way of dealing with this issue,” said David Green, a former Bank of England and U.K. Financial Services Authority official who now advises regulators outside Britain.

The big problem is going to be defining “propietary”:

President Obama’s plan to curb risk- taking by banks hinges on how rigidly regulators define proprietary trading at firms such as Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co.

Goldman Sachs, which generated at least 76 percent of 2009 revenue from trading and principal investments, gets the “great majority” of transactions from customers, according to Chief Financial Officer David Viniar. About “10-ish percent” of the New York-based firm’s revenue comes from “walled-off proprietary business that has nothing to do with clients,” he said on a conference call yesterday.


The White House defines proprietary trades as those not done for the benefit of customers, according to a senior administration official. Regulators would have the power to ask banks whether certain trades are related to client business, the official said. If they’re not, the regulators could order firms to exit the positions.

At banks such as Goldman Sachs, drawing the line isn’t easy, Viniar said.

“If a client wants to sell us a security, we’ll buy the security,” Viniar said. “That risk, which is principal risk, ends up on our balance sheet. It’s the great bulk of what we do all day long in all of our products for all our clients.”

Update 2010-1-22: I didn’t stress this before, given my shock at the concrete proposals, but I will draw attention to the deprecating phrase:

These are rules that allowed firms to act contrary to the interests of customers

Why shouldn’t firms act contrary to the interests of their counterparties? There is no fiduciary duty in a counterparty relationship when trading as principal. Zip, Zero, Zilch. Those who expect otherwise should go back to kiddie school and play some nurturing non-competitive games.

Market Action

January 20, 2010

There was another big whack of retail-sized trades today in POW.PR.C, with Nesbitt buying 20,900 shares on the TMX (against total volume of 34,297) at an average price of 25.555. If CPD is behind the buying, this will almost certainly hurt performance.

Another day of good volume with the FixedResets scoring yet another shut-out on the volume table as – presumably – some players rejigged their portfolios with the closing of the AER.PR.A and BPO.PR.N issues.

PerpetualDiscounts lost 15bp on the day, while FixedResets lost 10bp.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.75%, equivalent to 8.05% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.9% (maybe a hair more), so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 215bp, a widening from the 205bp reported January 13.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3507 % 1,710.4
FixedFloater 5.78 % 3.86 % 34,732 19.20 1 0.0000 % 2,733.2
Floater 2.29 % 2.62 % 110,263 20.73 3 0.3507 % 2,136.8
OpRet 4.86 % -2.88 % 113,845 0.09 13 0.2225 % 2,312.7
SplitShare 6.35 % -1.51 % 177,622 0.08 2 0.1973 % 2,117.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2225 % 2,114.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.81 % 5.75 % 150,364 6.01 12 -0.1953 % 1,888.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.74 % 5.75 % 178,241 14.23 63 -0.1495 % 1,830.6
FixedReset 5.40 % 3.58 % 349,787 3.84 42 -0.0956 % 2,180.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Premium -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 22.28
Evaluated at bid price : 22.43
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 20.02
Evaluated at bid price : 20.02
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 22.11
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 23.81
Evaluated at bid price : 24.02
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.P FixedReset 205,052 Desjardins crossed two blocks of 100,000, at 28.10 and 28.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.02
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 131,634 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 101,315 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 95,248 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 28.20; TD crossed 30,000 at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 87,101 RBC crossed 50,000 at 28.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.18
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 77,100 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 28.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.92
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
There were 54 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

AER.PR.A Settles at Slight Premium on Good Volume

Groupe Aeroplan has announced:

that it has closed its previously announced bought deal public offering of 6,000,000 cumulative rate reset preferred shares, Series 1 (the “Series 1 Preferred Shares”) for gross proceeds of C$150 million, purchased by a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Dominion Securities Inc. and TD Securities Inc., acting as co-Bookrunners.

Groupe Aeroplan Inc. has also granted the underwriters an option to purchase up to an additional 900,000 Series 1 Preferred Shares to cover over-allotments, exercisable in whole or in part at any time up to 30 days following closing of the offering. If the over-allotment option is exercised in full, the aggregate gross proceeds to Groupe Aeroplan Inc. will be C$172.5 million.

The net proceeds of the issue will be used by Groupe Aeroplan Inc. to repay indebtedness, and for general corporate purposes.

This is the FixedReset 6.50%+375 issue announced January 12.

The issue traded 279,498 shares on the TMX in a range of 24.86-22 before closing at 25.09-10, 4×9.

Vital statistics are:

AER.PR.A FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 25.04
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %

AER.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

BPO.PR.N Settles Flat on Good Volume

Brookfield Properties announced a FixedReset 6.15%+307 issue on January 11.

It will not have escaped notice that the initial fixed-rate period on this issue is six and a half years, just as was the slightly earlier BAM.PR.R new issue. In distinction to other commenters, I feel that the longer term has a lot more to do with the reset rate than the initial rate lock-in period … by extending term the reset can be set against the longer term Canadas rather than the five-year (or five-and-a-half year, as most of the banks did).

This is becoming a much more important consideration now that the chances that this and future issues will indeed be perpetual are increasing.

There’s no necessity for this: the banks have to calculate their reset in such a way or else OSFI will determine that a step-up exists and possibly disallow the issue as Tier 1 Capital. OSFI’s rules do not apply to BPO or BAM – they could set the reset to negative 20bp if they felt like it and thought it would sell – but presumably the dealers are trying to maintain the integrity of the FixedReset structure.

One way or the other, BPO.PR.N traded 333,903 shares on the TMX in a range of 24.90-09 before closing at 24.95-01, 25×30. Vital Statistics are:

BPO.PR.N FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-01-20
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %

BPO.PR.N is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

Indices and ETFs

TXPR Rebalancing Effect on Market

Yesterday I posted regarding the remarkable performance of POW.PR.C in the past two days and new commenter to_be_frank suggested that it might be due to the TXPR rebalancing.

So, I thought I’d have a look at the index changes in systematic manner:

TXPR Revision 2010/1
Additions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
Total
Return
12/31 – 1/19
Index
Return
12/31 – 1/19
ACO.PR.A OpRet +1.04% -1.12%
CZP.PR.B Scraps
(FixedReset)
-1.79% +0.24%
DC.PR.A Scraps
(OpRet)
+10.32% -1.12%
DC.PR.B Scraps
(FixedReset)
+3.78% +0.24%
DW.PR.A Scraps
(OpRet)
+4.31% -1.12%
FFH.PR.C Scraps
(FixedReset)
+5.29% +0.24%
GWO.PR.J FixedReset +2.31% +0.24%
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Premium +0.92% +0.03%
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Discount +2.06% +1.56%
NA.PR.O FixedReset +2.45% +0.24%
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount +6.37% +1.56%
TCL.PR.D Scraps
(FixedReset)
+1.09% +0.24%
TRP.PR.A FixedReset +3.02% +0.24%
YPG.PR.C Scraps
(FixedReset)
+1.46% +0.24%

TXPR Revision 2010/1
Deletions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
Total
Return
12/31 – 1/19
Index
Return
12/31 – 1/19
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Premium -3.79% +0.03%
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -2.82% +0.03%
NA.PR.N FixedReset -1.37% +0.24%
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount -2.28% +1.56%
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -3.04% +1.56%

So, for the year to date, all but one of the adds have outperformed their benchmark (note that lower quality issues are not included in their benchmark) and all of the deletions have underperformed.

This is a very interesting result: it is a reversal of the previously established pattern in which adds would outperform pre-rebalancing and underperform post-rebalancing (although I used a different methodology in the publication; I can’t use the prior method as a template until the current post-rebalancing period ends at the end of February).

While I must bow to the data, of course, I must say I am surprised and will not yet accept the hypothesis (that POW.PR.C et al. owe their relative performance to TXPR) as proven. The trading in POW.PR.C continues to be haywire today, with bazillions of small trades lifting the offer. This method is virtually guaranteed to be an expensive way to rebalance: normally an institutional buyer or seller would take a more gradual approach, adjusting an iceberg order by a nickel or so per day until the whole thing gets filled.

But there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in my philosophy! I’ve said it before – I’ll say it again: I find it quite challenging enough to determine what’s rich and what’s cheap … figuring out why is quite beyond me.

I just hope it actually is CPD doing the buying, though … these distortions will cost it money and make it easier to beat!

However, it must be borne in mind that while CPD is rapidly achieving gorilla status ($378-million AUM) this does not necessarily mean huge market impact. CPD’s holdings of POW.PR.C were 0.25% of assets on January 19, or a little less than $1-million, about 40,000 shares. It will be most interesting to check this tomorrow and compare with the day’s trading!