Archive for September, 2007

HIMIPref™ Indices : August, 2001

Wednesday, September 26th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-08-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,606.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,914.1 13 2.0 5.36% 11.1 262M 5.82%
Floater 1,514.5 4 1.74 4.80% 14.3 51M 5.39%
OpRet 1,482.0 34 1.20 4.28% 1.6 58M 6.06%
SplitShare 1,494.5 9 1.89 5.80% 5.3 61M 6.19%
Interest-Bearing 1,741.8 7 2.00 6.43% 2.6 118M 7.69%
Perpetual-Premium 1,133.9 5 1.39 5.32% 5.8 127M 5.66%
Perpetual-Discount 1,295.5 9 1.55 5.64% 14.2 150M 5.72%

Index Constitution, 2001-08-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-08-31, Post-rebalancing

Senate Hearings on Credit Ratings Begin

Wednesday, September 26th, 2007

Senate Banking Committee hearings on the Credit Rating Agencies have commenced.

The committee has published remarks by the politicians and statements from witnesses on its website. Of great interest is the testimony from Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., of Columbia Law School. He criticizes Levitt’s proposals:

Although conflicts of interest are critical, it is far from clear that they can simply be eliminated. The fundamental conflict is that the issuer hires the rating agency to rate its debt (just as the issuer also hires the auditor to audit its financial statements). It is not easy to move to a different system. To be sure, until the early 1970s, the rating agencies were paid by their subscribers, not the issuer. But they barely broke even under this system. More generally, the deeper problem with subscription-funded ratings is that there is no way to tax the free rider.

Bureaucratic regulation faces other problems. It does not seem within the effective capacity of the SEC, or any more specialized agency, to define what an investment grade rating should mean or the process by which it is determined. Such efforts would only produce a telephone book-length code of regulations, which skilled corporate lawyers could easily outflank.

Sadly, he did not discuss Levitt’s five recommendations in detail. He did, however, make three recommendations of his own:

Proposal One: Disclose Default Rates On Each Rating Grade For Each Product. the SEC could calculate the five year cumulative default rates on different classes of financial products for each rating agency and disclose this data on one centralized web site. Admittedly, Moody’s already discloses such information on its own web site, but others do not, and it is the comparison that is critical.

Proposal Two: Forfeiture of NRSRO Status. In principle, rating agencies should compete in terms of their relative accuracy. But the market does not appear to penalize inaccuracy very heavily, and corporate issuers may prefer the rater with the most optimistic bias. The best response to this problem is to make the rating agency’s status as an NRSRO depend upon maintaining an acceptable level of accuracy. This proposal would not bar a rating agency from continuing to issue ratings during any period in which it was disqualified as an NRSRO, but such ratings would be useful only for their informative value, not their legal impact.

Proposal Three: A Transparency Rule: Encourage the Growth of Subscription-Based Rating Agencies By Giving Them Access to the Same Data Made Available By the Issuer to Any Other Rating Agency.

The point regarding Proposal Two is introduced earlier in his remarks:

In other markets, a professional whose advice was demonstrably inaccurate would lose business. But this does not necessarily hold true in the market for debt ratings, because the service providers in this market are not simply providing information through their ratings. They are also conferring a governmentally-delegated permission to buy upon institutional investors that are legally restricted to purchasing securities rated investment grade.6 This is the real significance of the SEC’s Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (or “NRSRO”) designation, because only a rating agency with this designation can render debt securities eligible for purchase by many investors. Put bluntly, an NRSRO can sell its services to issuers, even if the market distrusts the accuracy of its ratings, because it is in effect licensing the issuer to sell its debt to certain  regulated investors. This is a power that no other gatekeeper possesses.

I should point out that the statement In other markets, a professional whose advice was demonstrably inaccurate would lose business. is demonstrably false. There are many, many professionals in the business who are chronic underperformers and still do quite well, thank you very much. I suggest that if the regulators wish to intervene to improve capital market efficiency to such an extent, they would be better off imposing performance measurements on stockbrokers and portfolio managers. This will not happen; nor would I support it happening.

Dr. Lawrence J. White, Professor of Economics at NYW was the next to speak:

I would strongly prefer the simple elimination of the NRSRO designation and the concomitant withdrawal of the regulatory delegations of safety judgments that have given so much power to the SEC’s NRSRO decisions. The participants in the financial markets could then freely decide which bond rating organizations (if any) are worthy of their trust and dealings, while financial regulators and their regulated institutions could devise more direct ways of determining the appropriateness of bonds for those institutions’ portfolios. Also, I fear that some of the “good character” provisions of the Act might be used in the future to create new barriers to entry.

He analyzes the Agencies role in the current kerfuffle, stating:

Here, the story as to why the bond raters have been slow to downgrade is clearer. To a large extent — with only one new element — it is a repeat of the reasons for their delay in the Enron and other, earlier downgrades.

First, the bond rating firms have a conscious policy of not trying to adjust their ratings with respect to short-run changes in financial circumstances; instead, they try to “rate through the cycle”. Regardless of the general wisdom of such a philosophy, it does mean that when the short-run changes are not part of a cycle but instead are the beginning of a longer-run trend, the bond raters will be slow to recognize that trend and thus slow to adjust their ratings.

Fourth, and this is a new element in the current situation, the bond raters have had to deal with (for them) a new kind of risk. For their traditional ratings of corporate, municipal, and sovereign bonds, and even for rating simple MBS, they have focused solely on credit (or default) risk: the possibility that the borrower will fail to repay its obligations in full and in a timely manner. In rating collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), however, where the underlying collateral was MBS and other securities, an extra feature could affect the ability of the CDOs to be paid off in full and in a timely manner: liquidity risk, which is the risk that the markets for the underlying collateral will become illiquid (perhaps because of fears and uncertainties among market participants as to underlying repayment possibilities), leading to unusually wide spreads between bid and ask prices for those underlying securities. Those wider spreads, in turn, could trigger forced liquidations of the asset pools underlying the CDOs and lead to unexpected losses to the investors in the CDO securities, even if the underlying collateral were ultimately to perform with respect to credit risk along the lines that had been predicted.

Holders of, for instance, DG.UN, will know all about the fourth risk!

Readers will not be surprised at my rapturous applause for his conclusion:

I strongly urge the Congress not to undertake any legislative action that would attempt to correct any perceived shortcomings of the bond rating firms.

I base this plea on two grounds: First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to legislate remedies that could somehow command the bond raters to do a better job. One could imagine legislation that would mandate certain business models — say, forcing the industry back to its pre-1970s model of selling ratings to investors, because of concerns about potential conflicts of interest — or that would mandate certain standards of required expertise as inputs into the rating process. But such legislation risks doing far more harm than good, by rigidifying the industry and reducing flexibility and diversity.

Second, as was discussed above, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was signed just a year ago, and the final implementing regulations were promulgated only three months ago. Including the two firms that were newly designated in May 2007, just before the final regulations were promulgated, there are now seven NRSROs. The SEC’s more timely and transparent procedures under the Act should yield at least a few more. The financial markets — and equally important, financial regulators — should be given an opportunity to adjust to the new circumstances of a more competitive ratings market, with more choices, more business models, and more ideas.

More later.

September 25, 2007

Tuesday, September 25th, 2007

Today’s word is confidence. Sadly, it’s only a word:

Consumer confidence slumped to the lowest level in almost two years and home sales weakened, threatening U.S. household spending and bolstering the case for the Federal Reserve to keep cutting interest rates.

The Conference Board’s index of consumer confidence fell more than forecast in September, to 99.8 from 105.6.

The consequences of extreme lack of confidence are currently illustrated by the continuing Northern Rock saga, in which some possible bidders are thought to think it’s worth more dead than alive:

Former Goldman banker Chris Flowers may join the Cerberus Capital Management LP and Citadel Investment Group LLC hedge funds in splitting up Northern Rock, the Sunday Telegraph reported Sept. 23, citing an unidentified person familiar with the proposal.

A Northern Rock bail-out might cause some embarrassment with UK regulators :

The U.K.’s Financial Services Compensation Scheme has 4.4 million pounds to protect deposits, compared with $49 billion at a similar fund in the U.S., the London-based Independent reported today, without saying where it got the information.

Even that, though, is a huge bankroll compared to what we have in Canada: $1.4-billion as of 2006-3-31. The 2006 report is the one relevant to the 2007 Annual Public Meeting. Call the papers! I want to revise my confidence number!

The WSJ republished the IMF’s risk diagram, which is cool enough to be worth posting:

The further from the centre, the riskier the axis.

The S&P/Case-Shiller US Housing Price Indices were released today and flesh out the anecdotal descriptions of how bad the US market is:

10-City Composite was down 4.5% versus July of 2006, while the 20-City Composite was down 3.9% over the same time period.

This is the first significant yoy decline in these indices since the recession of Bush the Elder; the worst three cities for housing in the past year have been Detroit (-9.7%); Tampa (-8.8%); and San Diego (-7.8%). It’s Detroit that looks really ugly: the index level, set to a base of 100 in January 2000, is only 111.3 in July 2007, implying an annualized rate of return of less than 1.5%. So much for housing as a long term investment, in Detroit, anyway! For those who look at the detailed data and want a comparison, US Inflation data is available from the Bureau of Labour Labor Statistics: The Jan 2000 “All items less food and energy” index (US City Average, Not Seasonally Adjusted) was 100.3; July 2007 is 115.1, implying the average Case-Shiller index should be about 114.7 to stay even.

Since the 10-city composite is actually 215.9 and the 20-city composite is 198.4, there are two ways of looking at it: (i) What are those greedy Americans complaining about?, or (ii) Wow, they’ve got a lot further to fall. JDH at Econbrowser discusses the matter and worries about repercussions in the financial markets. If he’s not gloomy enough for your tastes, Dear Reader, try Nouriel Roubini:

So as JP Morgan rightly put it there is “no sign of a floor for housing”. The housing recession will continue throughout 2008 and the fall in home prices will continue into 2009 before any bottom is reached.

As an aside, the WSJ has highlighted some research by the Atlanta Fed showing that home ownership in the States increased from 64% in 1994 to 69% in 2005. The rate had been static from the mid-sixties to 1994.

Speaking of the CPI, a Bloomberg columnist has produced a column pandering to the ‘CPI Lie’ crowd. It’s certainly a pleasant change to see some actual meat on the bones of the slogan! He states, for instance:

Medical expenses are given short shrift as well. It wasn’t that long ago when employers could cover almost all of an employee’s health-care bills.

Now workers are shelling out an average of $3,281 from their paychecks for family medical coverage, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation, a non-profit organization based in Menlo Park, California. The average premium for a family policy is more than $12,000 annually.

So why is this a measure of inflation? It looks more like a cut in salary (via reduction in benefits) to me … which may come to the same thing to somebody attempting to maintain a standard of living with the same work, but should not be mis-labelled.

Willem Buiter took a break from writing for VoxEU to post to his own blog, criticizing Trichet for rising to Sarkozy’s bait. Buiter is quite right; Trichet should retain his dignity and leave the criticism of Sarkozy to me!

US equities were flat, with a few high-profile drops due to earnings-forecast revisions being greatly overemphasized by the media. Canadian equities were very slightly up, with a few advances desperately siezed on by reporters in dire need of something to report.

Treasuries had a good day, with predictions of further Fed cuts bringing some more highly-desirable term spread into the curve:

The difference in yield, or spread, between 10- and two-year yields was 63 basis points today, the widest since April 2005.

Canadas did nothing much.

It was an exciting day in the preferred share market today, almost certainly due to the BNS 5.25% Perp New Issue, which seems to have had the effect of repricing the entire spectrum of perpetuals. In other words, the universe has adjusted itself to the new issue, rather than the other way ’round.

Perpetuals dropped quite significantly, as perpetualDiscounts, yesterday priced to yield 5.09% suddenly dropped in price to yield 8bp more – exactly half of the distance between the universe and new issue yield, deciding 5.17% was a much better level.  The perpetualPremium index, formerly 5.13%, is now 5.29%. This figure is not only more than the new issue yield, but is more than the perpetualDiscount yield … I would normally expect discounts to yield more than premiums, to compensate for the greater – and more immediate – interest rate risk. Markets, however, sometimes don’t listen to me as well as they should.

The Claymore Preferred share ETF had a $0.35 drop in NAV today after a distribution of $0.2185. The fund offered by my firm, MAPF, did not have its most pleasant day ever recorded, but is now well ahead of CPD on the month to date. We’ll see what the last three trading days bring!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.73% 4.69% 1,105,201 15.86 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.86% 4.78% 97,108 15.77 8 -0.0711% 1,030.4
Floater 4.48% 1.82% 82,420 10.76 3 -0.1495% 1,048.6
Op. Retract 4.84% 4.15% 76,872 3.30 15 -0.0621% 1,028.7
Split-Share 5.14% 4.85% 97,204 3.84 13 +0.1852% 1,046.2
Interest Bearing 6.28% 6.71% 64,702 4.25 3 -0.4104% 1,038.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.52% 5.29% 90,888 7.43 24 -0.5628% 1,025.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.12% 5.17% 242,292 15.20 38 -1.3334% 972.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -3.9556% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.61 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.8621% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 22.40 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -2.8073% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.00% based on a bid of 22.85 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -2.4268% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 23.32 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.H OpRet -2.3864% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 25.77 and a softMaturity 2012-3-30 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -2.3510% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 24.09 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -2.3068% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 25.41 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.1825% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 22.41 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -2.1638% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 23.06 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.9772% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.07% based on a bid of 22.31 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.9772% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 22.31 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.9707% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 23.38 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.9583% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.96% based on a bid of 23.03 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.9071% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.14% based on a bid of 23.66 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.7954% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 23.52 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.7734% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 22.71 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.7105% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 22.41 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.5537% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 22.81 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.5284% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.98% based on a bid of 22.55 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.3573% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 24.71 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.2605% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.07% based on a bid of 23.50 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.2444% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 22.22 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualPremium -1.2006% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 25.51 and a call 2013-3-27 at 25.00.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1553% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 23.10 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.0855% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 22.78 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.0806% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 23.80 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.0412% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.98% based on a bid of 22.81 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount -1.0056% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 24.61 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.0031% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.95% based on a bid of 22.70 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.3500% Asset coverage of just over 2.5:1 as of September 14, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.50% based on a bid of 10.51 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 81,650 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.25, then another 20,000 at 24.20. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 24.09 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.N OpRet 32,260 National Bank crossed 30,000 at 26.27. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.83% based on a bid of 26.27 and a softMaturity 2014-1-30 at 25.00.
IGM.PR.A OpRet 30,130 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.47% based on a bid of 26.94 and a call 2009-7-30 at 26.00.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 27,525 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 24.61 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 24,983 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 23.32 and a limitMaturity.

There were seventeen other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMIPref™ Indices : July, 2001

Tuesday, September 25th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-07-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,589.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,907.1 12 2.0 5.39% 9.8 161M 5.78%
Floater 1,498.0 4 1.75 4.95% 13.8 68M 5.56%
OpRet 1,462.2 36 1.22 4.40% 1.8 62M 6.20%
SplitShare 1,493.4 8 1.87 5.78% 6.9 69M 6.19%
Interest-Bearing 1,724.5 7 2.00 6.22% 2.7 127M 7.77%
Perpetual-Premium 1,130.0 4 1.25 5.01% 5.6 226M 5.70%
Perpetual-Discount 1,285.5 10 1.60 5.78% 14.2 134M 5.75%

Index Constitution, 2001-07-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-07-31, Post-rebalancing

BNS New Issue : 5.25% Perpetual

Tuesday, September 25th, 2007

Scotia has announced:

a domestic public offering of 12 million, 5.25% non-cumulative preferred shares Series 16 (the “Preferred Shares Series 16”) at a price of $25.00 per share, for an aggregate amount of $300 million.
    The Bank has agreed to sell the Preferred Shares Series 16 to a syndicate of underwriters led by Scotia Capital Inc. on a bought deal basis. The Bank has granted to the underwriters an over allotment option to purchase up to an additional $45 million of the Preferred Shares Series 16 at any time up to 30 days after closing.
    Closing is expected to occur on or after October 12, 2007. This domestic public offering is part of Scotiabank’s ongoing and proactive management of its Tier 1 capital structure.

This will get the money into Tier 1 prior to Scotia’s year-end on October 31. I certainly don’t think Scotia’s in any trouble, but I suspect that all the banks will have seen their balance sheets bulk up over the past six weeks (as their sometime customers find it more difficult or too expensive to borrow on the money market) and who knows? We might even see some more issuance from those banks that have the room.

Come on TD! Let’s see a good big batch of TD Perps!

Anyway:

Size: 12-million shares (= $300-million), underwriters’ option for additional 1.8-million shares (= $45-million)

Issue Price: $25.00 

Dividend: 5.25% = $1.3125 p.a.  Paid on third-last business day of Jan, April, July, Oct. Long first dividend of $0.39195 anticipated, to be paid Jan 29.

Redemption: Redeemable commencing third-last business day in January, 2013, at $26.00. Redemption price declines by $0.25 p.a. until January 27, 2017; redeemable at $25.00 thereafter.

Seniority: On parity with all other preferred shares, senior to common, junior to everything else.

On the whole, the issue looks pretty good and I suspect that it will trade at an immediate premium:

Comparables
Issue Fair Value
Estimated
by HIMIPref™
Quote 9/24
BNS.PR.J 26.05 26.01-10
BNS.PR.K 24.29 24.67-73
BNS.PR.L 23.51 23.49-55
BNS.PR.M 23.51 23.51-57
Series 16 25.93 Not yet trading

The new issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database with the securityCode P50013.

Update, after close: What a difference a day makes! As briefly discussed in the September 25 Review, the new issue appears to have been the cause (or at least the trigger!) for a mass repricing of perpetuals. A revised table of comparibles is:

Comparables
Issue Fair Value
Estimated
by HIMIPref™
Quote 9/25
BNS.PR.J 25.40 25.41-60
BNS.PR.K 24.03 24.09-20
BNS.PR.L 23.10 23.03-24
BNS.PR.M 23.10 22.85-90
Series 16 25.45 Not yet trading

Update, 2007-10-10: As of the close today, fair value is estimated as $24.52.

Update, 2007-10-11: As of the close today, fair value is estimated at $24.43.

HIMIPref™ Indices : June 2001

Monday, September 24th, 2007

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-06-29
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,592.5 1 1.00 5.38% 14.9 31M 5.35%
FixedFloater 1,909.1 13 2.0 5.43% 14.5 142M 5.76%
Floater 1,507.4 4 1.75 5.18% 13.7 66M 5.73%
OpRet 1,449.6 37 1.24 5.04% 1.8 63M 6.23%
SplitShare 1,481.2 8 1.87 6.08% 5.4 78M 6.20%
Interest-Bearing 1,692.4 7 2.00 6.92% 2.8 132M 7.92%
Perpetual-Premium 1,113.8 4 1.25 5.26% 5.7 104M 5.76%
Perpetual-Discount 1,264.3 10 1.60 5.75% 14.2 117M 5.84%

Index Constitution, 2001-06-29, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-06-29, Post-rebalancing

September 24, 2007

Monday, September 24th, 2007

The WSJ has reported on an interview of Greenspan by a German newspaper, in which the question of Credit Rating Agency regulation arose. The information given is too interesting to be simply reported here and too small to deserve its own post: I have updated a recent post with the new opinion.

Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers has written a short op-ed piece on moral hazard, pooh-poohing those who feel it should be a major consideration when central banks take action.

Charles Goodhart of the LSE has written a summary of his recent research into the ever-popular topic of downward-sloping yield curves and recessions. He suggests that:

historically, the additional predictive power of the spread for future output growth –over and above that already encoded in other macroeconomic variables – often appeared during periods of uncertainty about the underlying monetary regime.

On the other hand, when the monetary regime becomes (at least partly) uncertain, an increased risk premium will have to be added to expectations of future short rates. According to this view, part of the cause of the subsequent output decline is not that the yield curve is negatively sloping, but that it is insufficiently so, i.e. long rates are above those consistent with the subsequent resolution of the uncertainty, thereby imparting additional downwards pressure on output.

He has found a counter-example in the Anglo-Saxon bloc of the early 2000’s, but suggests that there might be some other factor at work. It’s an interesting idea …

Brad Setser has a guest blogger with an interesting thesis:

It is a basic assumption on my part that globalization cycles, of which by my count there have been six in the past two hundred years, are driven largely by new developments or structural changes in the financial system that cause a significant increase in global liquidity and a concomitant increase in risk appetite. Because of rising risk appetite this newly-abundant capital flows into a variety of risky countries or ventures – financing canals in the 1820s, railroads in the 1860, long-distance communication media in the 1920, the internet in the 1990s – and sets off the growth in international trade, capital flows, technological development (and, for some reason, the rebirth of liberal economic theory) that we associate with globalization.

His first ‘real post’ provides some background on China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund. Such funds, usually abbreviated SWF to make me feel like I’m reading a personals ad, have attracted some controversy in recent times, with quite a few calls for their regulation. There will probably be some kerfuffle in the papers tomorrow about PrimeWest’s Abu Dhabi honeymoon*:

Abu Dhabi National Energy Co., the state-controlled power generator and oil producer, agreed to buy Canada’s PrimeWest Energy Trust for about C$4 billion ($4 billion) in the biggest-ever North American takeover by a United Arab Emirates company.

James Hamilton has commented on the monetary implications of the Fed Rate cut. He reviews the meaning of the term ‘printing money’ and the actual mechanisms involved to conclude:

This is not to insist that concerns about higher inflation are unfounded. But, if one wanted to motivate such concerns from a monetarist perspective, one could not point to money that has been printed so far. Instead, the story would have to be that, in order to achieve the path for the fed funds rate that the Fed is now likely to set for the following year, the Fed will eventually need to add more reserves that do end up as more cash in circulation. In this scenario, markets have been reacting to an anticipation of future money creation and not to something that has already happened.

There can be no more doubt regarding the motivation for Sarkozy’s hostility towards credit rating agencies and ECB President Trichet … his Prime Minister has let the cat out of the bag:

French Prime Minister Francois Fillon warned Monday that the country’s public finances were in a “critical” state and need drastic action to reduce worrying deficits.

Fillon urged France to “change its attitude” towards state spending two days before his centre-right government presents its 2008 draft budget, which is expected to show a deficit of 41.5 billion euros (58.5 billion dollars).

It was the second time in three times that he has sounded the alarm. On Friday, the prime minister said France was in a “situation of bankruptcy”.

France’s debt is over 60% of GDP, about the same as Canada’s, but their budget balance is headed in the other direction – fast. It will get faster:

But opposition Socialists said the budget had been aggravated by President Nicolas Sarkozy’s tax cuts — voted through after his May election — which is estimated to cost between 11 and 16 billion euros a year.

  It would appear that Sarkozy’s attempt to distract has the same motivation as that of an underperforming portfolio manager.

Things aren’t much better in Britain:

The U.K. had a larger budget deficit than economists forecast in August as spending jumped and revenue from profits fell, piling pressure on the government to save money as income from financial services dwindles.

The 9.1 billion-pound ($18.4 billion) shortfall was the highest for the month since records began in 1993, the Office for National Statistics said in London today. It exceeded the median 6.5 billion pounds forecast in a Bloomberg survey of 20 economists.

Debt stood at 36.7 percent of GDP in August.

The US Treasury is currently executing a three week test of pandemic preparedness:

One of the biggest challenges financial institutions will face is how to cope with absenteeism. In week one, the Treasury exercise directs the financial organizations to assume that 25 per cent of their work force is not coming to work, either because of illness or because of fear of being infected or because they are staying home to take care of children who can’t go to school because the schools have closed.

To decide who is absent, the Treasury directs the institutions to assume that everyone whose last name begins with certain letters, which could cover the bank president down to the local teller, cannot come to work. The 25 per cent absentee rate will jump to 49 per cent in week two.

Holy smokes! The mind boggles at the thought of 49% absenteeism across the entire financial sector … as, I guess, it’s supposed to do. Something on this level will definitely uncover a few weak links … let’s hope we never find out if they were all fixed.

Accrued Interest has posted a fascinating discourse on CDOs and I am very hopeful that the comments will help me understand what all the fuss is about. I’ve also referenced this post on my post about the IMF’s recommendation.

In one of the Harper government’s finest moments of leadership, Flaherty has announced a committee:

In his speech to a gathering of derivatives specialists, Flaherty also reiterated his call for the creation of a common securities regulator that would replace Canada’s 13 regulators.

Flaherty said he expects to name in the next two or three weeks members of an expert panel being created to advise the federal, provincial and territorial governments on how to address the issue. He would expect to hear recommendations from the panel within eight months of its creation.

I’m holding my breath, Mr. Flaherty! Please tell them to hurry!

US equities fell a bit which was blamed on the market’s astonishment that the credit crunch isn’t over yet. And it’s been going on for almost six weeks! Fortunately, the sad news did not reach the TSX.

Treasuries were quiet and Canadas were quieter.

Preferreds also had a quiet day but volume, while restrained, remained within normal boundaries.

*Senior moment alert! Does the phrase “Abu Dhabi Honeymoon” ring a bell with anybody besides me? I was convinced it was a movie title, but it’s not listed on IMDB. Maybe it was a fake movie that the Flintstones went to see, or something? Please help!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.75% 4.71% 1,151,159 15.82 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.78% 98,879 15.78 8 -0.1950% 1,031.2
Floater 4.47% 1.82% 83,411 10.78 3 +0.1914% 1,050.1
Op. Retract 4.83% 3.95% 75,702 3.04 15 -0.0168% 1,029.4
Split-Share 5.15% 4.86% 96,480 3.84 13 -0.0402% 1,044.3
Interest Bearing 6.26% 6.63% 65,200 4.26 3 +1.1958% 1,043.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.48% 5.13% 90,394 5.68 24 +0.0733% 1,030.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.05% 5.09% 242,321 15.33 38 -0.0528% 985.3
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixFloat -1.4845%  
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +3.0405% Asset coverage of slightly under 1.8:1 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.59% (almost all as interest) based on a bid of 9.15 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BAM.PR.H OpRet 74,967 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.19% based on a bid of 26.40 and a call 2008-10-30 at 25.75.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 23,200 National Bank crossed 20,000 at 23.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.93% based on a bid of 23.12 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 21,150 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.85% based on a bid of 23.51 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount 20,400 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.90% based on a bid of 22.90 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 14,900 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.90% based on a bid of 22.80 and a limitMaturity.

There were nine other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

DW.PR.A, DC.PR.A Not Directly Affected by CI Financial Bid

Monday, September 24th, 2007

CI Financial has announced an unsolicited bid for Dundee Wealth:

for a price equal to $20.25 per share, representing a premium of approximately $6.94 or 52% per common share based on today’s closing price of DundeeWealth of $13.31.

The preferred shares are not mentioned in the press release.

DW.PR.A soared on September 18, presumably on the grounds that the deal with Scotiabank made them a much better credit than their current Pfd-3 rating from DBRS.

DC.PR.A (which used to be DBC.PR.A) has not moved much in the past week, but that might change – Dundee (DC) owns 50% of Dundee Wealth (DW). Making a fat chunk of change on DW and monetizing the asset could possibly affect the current Pfd-3(low) [DBRS] credit rating on DC.PR.A.

Who knows? It’s certainly not the kind of thing I like to bet on, but the Credit Anticipation players will be sharpening their pencils tonight. The following language from the prospectus of DW.PR.A is interesting:

On and after March 13, 2007, the Company may, at its option, upon not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days prior written notice, redeem for cash the Series 1 Shares, in whole at any time or in part from time to time, at $27.25 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2007, but before March 13, 2008, at $27.00 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2008, but before March 13, 2009, at $26.75 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2009, but before March 13, 2010, at $26.50 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2010, but before March 13, 2011, at $26.25 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2011, but before March 13, 2012, at $26.00 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2012, but before March 13, 2013, at $25.75 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2013, but before March 13, 2014, at $25.50 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2014, but before March 13, 2015, at $25.25 per share if redeemed on or after March 13, 2015, but before March 13, 2016 and at $25.00 thereafter (each, a “Redemption Price”), plus, in each case, all accrued and unpaid dividends up to but excluding the date fixed for redemption, provided that any redemptions prior to March 13, 2012 shall be limited to circumstances in which the Series 1 Shares are entitled to vote separately as a class or series by law. Notice of any such redemption to occur prior to March 13, 2012 may be provided by the Company at any time and from time to time prior to a meeting of shareholders of the Company at which holders of Series 1 Shares are entitled to vote separately as a class or series and for which a record date has been established, and during the period of 10 days following the holding of such meeting. On and after March 13, 2007 and prior to March 13, 2017, the Company may, at its option, upon not less than 30 days and not more than 60 days prior written notice, subject, if required, to regulatory approvals, convert the outstanding Series 1 Shares into freely tradeable Common Shares, provided that any conversions rior to March 13, 2012 shall be limited to circumstances in which the Series 1 Shares are entitled to vote separately as a class or series by law.

I do not believe the preferred shareholders will be entitled to vote separately on anything that has been announced to date … but I am neither a lawyer nor a clairvoyant!

S&P Downgrades BCE – Preferreds Unaffected

Monday, September 24th, 2007

S&P has announced:

it lowered its long-term corporate credit ratings on Montreal, Que.-based holding company BCE Inc. and wholly owned subsidiary Bell Canada to ‘BB-‘ from ‘A-‘. The ratings on both companies remain on CreditWatch with negative implications where they were placed April 17, 2007.

The ratings on BCE’s C$2.77 billion preferred shares are also unchanged because we expect these to be redeemed as well. Once the tender is completed, we will withdraw these ratings. However, the ratings on these securities could
be lowered if they are not redeemed as planned.

In addition, we lowered the ratings on about C$4.9 billion of Bell Canada senior unsecured debentures outstanding (which we do not expect will be redeemed) to ‘BB+’ from ‘A-‘, reflecting what we think is the best possible outcome based on publicly available information on the LBO.

The multinotch downgrade reflects our view that BCE no longer possesses an investment-grade financial policy given the high degree of certainty that the LBO will be finalized shortly. On a pro forma basis, the company will have a highly leveraged capital structure, weakened credit measures, and significantly reduced cash flow-generating capability owing to its LBO and associated heavy interest burden.

S&P has had BCE on Credit Watch negative for quite some time. The BCE/Teachers deal was last reviewed here on August 10.

IMF Calls for New Credit Rating Scale

Monday, September 24th, 2007

As reported today by Bloomberg:

The IMF, which is charged with promoting global economic stability and lends to financially distressed nations, blamed the crisis on “benign economic and financial conditions” which “weakened incentives to conduct due diligence on borrowers and counterparties.”The fund also said the methodology of credit-rating companies, some of which gave high ratings to subprime mortgage securities that have plummeted in value, needs to be examined. The complexity of many of these securities may have made it difficult for investors to assess their worth based on the assigned ratings.

“In the case of complex structured credit products, investors need to look behind the ratings,” the report said.

Regulators and investors will have to work together to strengthen financial markets to prevent a recurrence, and develop ways to improve the spread of accurate and timely information to help markets assess risk, the report said.

Parts of this report are available at the IMF site. In Chapter 1 they urge:

The need for a differentiated scale of credit ratings has
again been made apparent.

The fallout in the mortgage market has drawn attention to the role of credit ratings agencies in structured credit markets. Less sophisticated investors, who were content to delegate the risk assessment of their positions to the credit ratings agencies, were negatively surprised by the intensity of downgrades. Previous GFSRs have pointed out that structured credit products are likely to suffer more severe, multiple-notch downgrades relative to the typically smoother downgrade paths of corporate bonds (IMF, 2006). The experience of the past year has underscored the need for further efforts to inform investors of these risks, but better still would be the introduction by ratings agencies of a more differentiated scale for structured credit products. For example, a special rating scale for structured credits could be introduced to highlight to investors that they should expect a higher speed of migration between ratings than on a traditional corporate bond.

The section (page 37 of the PDF) ends with some sound advice for institutional investors; sadly, it does not advocate that institutional investors who bought CDOs without understanding them seek retraining as ditch diggers. The closest they get to advocating this urgently needed market reform is elsewhere in the document:

Finally, credit ratings evaluate only default risk, and not market or liquidity risks, and this seems to have been underappreciated by many investors.

Which isn’t really very close, is it? Ah, well, perhaps someday.

Update: Accrued Interest has some explanations and suggestions for the CDO market.