Archive for September, 2010

ENB Issues 30-Year Bonds at 5.12%

Friday, September 24th, 2010

The Wall Street Journal reports:

Pipeline operator Enbridge Inc. (ENB) raised a total of C$300 million from two bond issues, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Enbridge raised C$200 million from an issue of 10-year bonds maturing in February 2021. The offering was priced at 138 basis points over the revelant benchmark curve, or at the low-end of the guidance, for a yield of 4.266%. The bonds carry a coupon of 4.26%.

The Calgary-based company raised another C$100 million from an issue of 30-year bonds maturing in September 2040. The bonds were priced at 170 basis points over the government of Canada 5% 2037 benchmark, or in line with guidance, for a yield of 3.420%. The bonds carry a coupon of 5.12%.

Additonally, DBRS notes:

DBRS has today assigned a rating of “A” with a Stable trend to Enbridge Inc.’s $200 million 4.26% unsecured medium-term notes (Notes) issue maturing February 1, 2021 and its $100 million 5.12% Notes issue maturing September 28, 2040. The issues are expected to settle on September 28, 2010.

The Notes rank equally with all of Enbridge Inc.’s other senior unsecured indebtedness. Net proceeds from the issue will be used for general corporate purposes, which may include repayment of outstanding indebtedness and financing capital expenditures and investments of Enbridge Inc.

This is interestng in light of ENB.PR.A, a straight perpetual issued in December 1998 with a coupon of 5.5%, now quoted at 25.35-43 for a current yield of 5.42% and a YTW of -7.12% based on an immediate call at par.

If we say that the Seniority Spread should be 220bp for an Enbridge straight (a little tighter than the 245bp reported September 22 to account for its scarcity value as a non-financial) and tack on another 25bp for option effects on a par issue, we come up with a projected new issue for ENB at 5.12% + 225bp + 25bp = 7.62% interest equivalent or 5.44% as dividend … which means that, insofar as you can trust the 225bp and 25bp wild guesses estimates, ENB.PR.A is fairly priced relative to their bonds.

Whether Enbridge is happy about the 225 Seniority Spread is, of course, another question entirely.

September 23, 2010

Thursday, September 23rd, 2010

I’m not the only one who thinks that the SEC’s extortion of $550-million from Goldman was conveniently timed:

Republican lawmakers asked SEC Inspector General H. David Kotz earlier this year to investigate how the SEC decided to file its April suit against Goldman, which settled the case in July for $550 million. The federal lawsuit alleged wrongdoing in a sale of mortgage securities called Abacus 2007 AC-1, and was filed as Senate Democrats were taking up the financial-regulation bill.

On the same day, the SEC released a scathing report by Mr. Kotz that concluded the agency had repeatedly missed chances to detect an alleged $7 billion fraud run by R. Allen Stanford, a money manager indicted by a federal grand jury last year. Mr. Stanford denies wrongdoing.

At a Senate Banking Committee hearing Wednesday, Mr. Kotz was questioned about the timing of the Goldman suit. He responded: “It would strain credulity to think it was coincidental.” He added: “I can’t give you a conclusion right now, but it was suspicious.”

Fabulous Fab is still in danger of losing his career over that thing … but that’s OK. He’s just a salesmen, while the SEC decision makers are heroic and selfless defenders of truth, beauty and small furry animals.

The boo-hoo-hoo brigade is practicing for contingent capital conversions:

Leona Miller, an 84-year-old retired beautician, says she was seeking safe and steady income from bonds two years ago when her Wachovia Corp. broker recommended she buy securities paying 9 percent interest.

Within six months, Miller had lost about 30 percent of her $20,000 investment and the bonds were converted into shares of Merck & Co. in a falling stock market. The San Diego resident, who still doesn’t understand what happened to her money, had purchased bonds known as structured notes that include built-in derivatives.

Sales to Miller and thousands of other individuals have driven structured note offerings up 58 percent to $31.9 billion through August, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. With U.S. interest rates near zero percent, investors are snapping up bonds such as reverse-convertible notes with knock-in put options or Leveraged CMS Curve and S&P 500 Index Linked Callable Notes, some with face values of as little as $10.

As everybody knows:

Breeden Capital Management manages a long-only equity investment fund utilizing active engagement to help undervalued, and often underperforming, portfolio companies improve performance and shareholder value.

Most people, however, are not aware that a lifetime in regulation equips one to have a keen – almost uncanny – knack for securities valuation:

Mr. Breeden has served since 2005 as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Breeden Capital Management LLC, the manager of a series of affiliated investment funds. He has also served since 1996 as Chairman of Richard C. Breeden & Co., LLC, a professional services firm specializing in strategic consulting, financial restructuring and corporate governance advisory services. Mr. Breeden graduated from Stanford University in 1972, and the Harvard Law School in 1975. After practicing law in the field of corporate financial transactions, Mr. Breeden worked in several senior government positions in the Administrations of Presidents Ronald W. Reagan, George H.W. Bush (41) and William Clinton. In 1989, Mr. Breeden served as Assistant to the President, and in that capacity he led successful efforts to develop a restructuring program for the U.S. savings and loan industry. From 1989-1993 Mr. Breeden served as Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, after nomination by President Bush and unanimous confirmation by the U.S. Senate.

Sadly, there are some who still don’t get it:

The Employee Retirement System board of trustees voted via e-mail May 25 to terminate Greenwich, Connecticut-based Breeden Capital Management, according to information obtained from the city comptroller’s office under a public records request by Bloomberg News.

As of June 30, the value of the city’s $136.5 million investment was $133.3 million. That was 2.3 percent less than what it gave Breeden since October 2008. The Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index lost 2.5 percent in the period.

The pension fund has paid the firm $6.2 million in fees, according to the comptroller’s records.

That’s over 2.00% p.a. Nice work if you can get it!

But all the schmoozing pays off:

Breeden also manages money for the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, or Calpers, and Maryland’s State Retirement and Pension System. The so-called activist investor buys stock in publicly traded companies and then presses for management changes to boost share prices.

Since investing with Breeden in September 2007, Maryland has lost 12.8 percent compared with a 7.45 percent decline for the S&P 500, according to state pension records. The value of Maryland’s investment with Breeden was $134.1 million as of July 31.

Calpers has lost 4.5 percent investing with Breeden’s U.S. fund since June 2006, according to investment records for the quarter ending June 30. The market value of California’s investment in Breeden’s U.S. fund was $347.9 million.

The Boston Fed has released a working paper by José L. Fillat and Stefania Garetto titled Risk, Returns, and Multinational Production:

This paper starts by unveiling a new empirical regularity: multinational corporations systematically tend to exhibit higher stock market returns and earnings yields than non-multinational firms. Within non-multinationals, exporters tend to exhibit higher earnings yields and returns than firms selling only in their domestic market. To explain this pattern, we develop a real option value model where firms are heterogeneous in productivity, and have to decide whether and how to sell in a foreign market where demand is risky. Firms can serve the foreign market through trade or foreign direct investment,
thus becoming multinationals. Multinational firms are more exposed to risk: following a negative shock, they are reluctant to exit the foreign market because they would forgo the sunk cost that they paid to start investing abroad. We calibrate the model to match U.S. export and FDI dynamics, and use it to explain cross-sectional differences in earnings yields and returns.

DBRS has released its Methodology: Rating Sovereign Governments. It’s a little shy on specifics and examples to be of much interest.

The Canadian preferred share market continued its advance on continued heavy volume today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 12bp while FixedResets gained 4bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1459 % 2,117.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1459 % 3,207.6
Floater 2.88 % 3.30 % 79,335 18.98 3 -0.1459 % 2,286.2
OpRet 4.87 % 0.64 % 79,796 0.18 9 -0.3709 % 2,377.2
SplitShare 5.92 % -28.92 % 66,077 0.09 2 0.2046 % 2,377.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3709 % 2,173.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.65 % 5.04 % 142,470 5.34 14 0.2892 % 2,004.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.49 % 5.52 % 198,631 14.57 63 0.1155 % 1,985.9
FixedReset 5.21 % 2.89 % 297,607 3.29 47 0.0387 % 2,281.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-23
Maturity Price : 22.71
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 2.24 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
NA.PR.P FixedReset 224,840 RBC crossed three blocks, 49,000 shares, 50,000 and 94,200, all at 28.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.35
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 117,731 RBC crossed 100,000 at 28.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.28
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 108,330 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, both at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 2.51 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 105,521 RBC crossed 72,400 at 27.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.51
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 84,469 Desjardins crossed 71,000 at 20.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-23
Maturity Price : 20.15
Evaluated at bid price : 20.15
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 81,165 RBC crossed 73,100 at 21.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-23
Maturity Price : 21.68
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
There were 55 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

FRBB Looks at Dynamic Provisioning

Thursday, September 23rd, 2010

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has released Working Paper No. QAU10-4 by José L. Fillat and Judit Montoriol-Garriga titled Addressing the pro-cyclicality of capital requirements with a dynamic loan loss provision system:

The pro-cyclical effect of bank capital requirements has attracted much attention in the post-crisis discussion of how to make the financial system more stable. This paper investigates and calibrates a dynamic provision as an instrument for addressing pro-cyclicality. The model for the dynamic provision is adopted from the Spanish banking regulatory system. We argue that, had U.S. banks set aside general provisions in positive states of the economy, they would have been in a better position to absorb their portfolios’ loan losses during the recent financial turmoil. The allowances accumulated by means of the hypothetical dynamic provision during the cyclical upswing would have reduced by half the amount of TARP funds required. However, the cyclical buffer for the aggregate U.S. banking system would have been depleted by the first quarter of 2009, which suggests that the proposed provisioning model for expected losses might not entirely solve situations as severe as the one experienced in recent years.

This is a useful, if not particularly earth-shattering, paper. If the banks had held more reserves prior to the crisis, they would have had more reserves during the crisis. So?

What I found interesting was the discussion of Citibank:

Figure 8, shows that Citibank would have depleted the newly created general allowance in the fourth quarter of 2007—much earlier than the rest of the institutions and earlier than the aggregate of the U.S. financial system. From that date on, Citibank would have been in the same situation as without the dynamic provision. That is, total provisions for loan losses would be equal to the specific allowance (ALLL) during the last 2 years, as observed. The results are driven by a relatively poor performance of the Citibank loan portfolio during the 2000 to 2005 period. During this period, the ratio of specific provisions to loans is above the banking system long-run average. Citibank would have started to build up the stock of reserves in 2006, too late to serve the purpose of attenuating the problems caused by increased loan losses in Citibank’s books with the recession.

The figures below show the general allowance, the specific allowance and the total:

The dynamic provisioning system attempts to create an a-cyclical loan loss provision that reduces the chances of the amplification of an economic crisis through the banking sector. We follow the same approach and calibrate the parameters of the Spanish dynamic provision for the U.S. banking system using publicly available data. We show that if U.S. banks had funded provisions in expansion periods using this provisioning model, they would have been in a better position to absorb loan portfolio losses during the financial turmoil.


Click for Big


Click for Big


Click for Big

One thing that makes Dynamic Provisioning important is that it truly is a buffer. After all, if the minimum capital requirement is 4% and you have 5% … then your effective room isn’t really 5%, is it? If you fall below 4% the regulators will sieze your bank and either liquidate or sell it, so your room for mistakes is only 1%. This was the major problem during the crisis – not that capital would fall below 0% – insolvency – but that it would fall below 4% – regulatory siezure.

One thing I would like to see addressed in future papers on this topic is an analysis of how JPM and BAC would have reacted to the dynamic provisioning requirements estimated here. After all, the proposed rules are not truly countercyclical unless they actually reduce lending during boom times.

September 22, 2010

Wednesday, September 22nd, 2010

Lord Adair Turner, of Turner Report fame, has some things to say about bank regulation:

“If we were philosopher kings designing a banking system entirely anew for a greenfield economy, should we have set still higher capital ratios than in the Basel III regime? Yes I believe we should,” the Financial Services Authority’s Adair Turner told bankers at the Mansion House dinner in London’s financial district. “But starting from where we actually are, the Basel III reforms will significantly improve the resilience of our banking systems.”

Turner said inadequate regulation was more to blame for the near collapse of the banking system than excessive leverage and bonuses.

“We do need appropriate regulation of bonuses to reduce incentives for excessive risk taking,” Turner said. “We also need to move beyond the demonization of overpaid traders and their unnecessary CDO-squareds.”

The CBOE is attempting to resurrect Credit Default Options:

CBOE Holdings Inc. is seeking to resurrect credit-default options, or contracts that pay off when companies fail to repay their debt, as regulators try to shift some trading of over-the-counter derivatives onto exchanges.

The owner of the largest U.S. options exchange first created the derivatives in 2007. Trading volume amounted to 56 contracts in 2007 and 2008, and none changed hands last year, CBOE said. To generate interest, the settlement price for contracts would be less than the $100,000 value on the original options, according to a proposal filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

CBOE is trying to win business from the $29.6 trillion credit-default swap market, where contracts are traded over the counter. Among changes mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law in July, are requirements that standardized interest- rate, credit-default and other swaps be processed by clearinghouses and traded on exchanges or similar systems.

We don’t have to worry about another bank crisis, because the Basel Committee did a great job! We know that, because they say so themselves:

The new rules are “extremely demanding” and “radically transform the regulatory capital framework,” Nout Wellink, chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and president of the Bank of the Netherlands, said at a meeting in Singapore of officials who regulate the financial industry.

“If, prior to the crisis, banks had the levels of capital we are asking for, we likely would not have experienced such a deep crisis,” Mr. Wellink said, according to the text of his speech.

I continue to believe that the problem is not so much with capital, the numerator of the Pillar 1 ratios, but with the denominator – mainly risk-weighted assets. But those fixes would be harder to explain politically.

Daniel K Tarullo, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, gave a speech at the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity, Washington DC, 17 September 2010. In contrast to my complaint about the Bail Outs and Financial Fragility paper, he draws a clear distinction between “illiquid” and “insolvent”:

But when the value of whole classes of the underlying collateral was drawn into serious question, initially by the collapse of the subprime housing market, participants’ lack of information about the collateral they held led to a shattering of confidence in all the collateral.

In the absence of the regulation and government backstop that have applied to the traditional banking system since the Depression, a run on assets in the entire repo market ensued. The resulting forced sale of assets into an illiquid market turned many illiquid institutions into insolvent ones. The fallout has been such that, to this day, the amount of repo funding available for non-agency, mortgage-backed securities, commercial mortgage-backed securities, high-yield corporate bonds, and other instruments backed by assets with any degree of risk remains substantially below its pre-Lehman levels.

He’s concerned about the potential for crowding out of the banks:

Where competition from unregulated entities is permitted, explicitly or de facto, capital and other requirements imposed on regulated firms may shrink margins enough to make them unattractive to investors. The result, as we have seen in the past, will be some combination of regulatory arbitrage, assumption of higher risk in permitted activities, and exit from the industry. Each of these outcomes at least potentially undermines the original motivation for the regulation.

Government apologist and sycophant Mark Carney gave a variation of the standard precious handwringing speech about productivity last March:

There are two imperatives–one domestic, one international–to secure strong, sustainable, and balanced economic growth for Canada. Both recall Aesop’s fable of the ant and the grasshopper, the moral of which can be best summed up as “idleness brings want.” In short, in a wicked world, Canada needs productive virtue.

I filled in yet another government form today – which took time away from programming – and found out that the super-cool fillable form was encrypted: which meant I could not save the completed version electronically or print it to a PDF. Instead I have to print it onto paper, fax it to the recipient, fax it to myself and (since I try to be productive and receive my faxes electronically) save the fax, then dispose of the idiotic and unnecessary paper.

Do you want to know the first step to productivity, Mr. Carney? How about morons on the government payroll thinking about what they’re doing?

The Globe’s in a tizzy about the potential cost of dementia care, but I don’t know what they’re worried about. Here’s the plan:

  • Hire the cheapest caregivers (nurses, health aides) you possibly can
  • Then cut their pay even more (make sure they’re all part-timers!)
  • Give them more beds to look after than even the most competent practitioner could handle
  • Keep the patients drugged up so they’re less work (make sure the doctor knows which side his bread’s buttered on!)
  • Have a huge number of extremely detailed rules about patient care, endorsed by big-name practitioners
  • Talk about the rules incessantly.
  • Ensure all employees sign a statement that they have read, understood and will comply with all rules.
  • Ignore the rules (ridiculous even to try, given patient load, staff and facilities)
  • Every now and then, hang some poor sucker of a nurse who gave standard treatment to the wrong person. Wring your hands. Talk about the rules

I’m not saying it’s a good plan, but we all know that that’s what will happen eventually so why not start getting used to it now?

How ’bout that Canadian preferred share market, eh? It continues to move from strength to strength, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 21bp today while FixedResets managed to eke out a 1bp win. Volume was very heavy. Nesbitt wrote some very nice tickets today, but that’s not necessarily the same thing as making good money. It depends on what kind of crosses they were.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.54%, equivalent to 7.76% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.3% so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) now stands at about 245bp, a continued tightening from the 255bp reported September 15

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0182 % 2,120.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0182 % 3,212.2
Floater 2.87 % 3.32 % 80,056 18.95 3 0.0182 % 2,289.5
OpRet 4.85 % -0.21 % 80,063 0.19 9 0.0256 % 2,386.0
SplitShare 5.93 % -27.57 % 62,852 0.09 2 -0.9927 % 2,372.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0256 % 2,181.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.66 % 5.05 % 144,221 5.34 14 0.0946 % 1,998.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.49 % 5.54 % 200,622 14.52 63 0.2111 % 1,983.6
FixedReset 5.21 % 2.95 % 300,698 3.29 47 0.0116 % 2,280.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-22
Maturity Price : 19.50
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-22
Maturity Price : 22.06
Evaluated at bid price : 22.18
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Premium -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-22
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.23
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-22
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.84
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Premium 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-22
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 1.26 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-22
Maturity Price : 20.55
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-22
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 506,720 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 241,200 and 250,000, both at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-22
Maturity Price : 24.39
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 337,570 Nesbitt crossed 321,400 at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.71
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 156,190 Scotia crossed 29,300 at 26.30; then crossed blocks of 54,500 shares, 20,000 shares, 26,000 shares and 14,400 shares, all at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-22
Maturity Price : 23.48
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 145,645 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 22.53 and 100,000 at 22.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-22
Maturity Price : 22.30
Evaluated at bid price : 22.44
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 126,350 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 15,000 and 99,900, both at 26.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.82
Bid-YTW : 2.93 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 109,550 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 15.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-22
Maturity Price : 15.77
Evaluated at bid price : 15.77
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 104,475 Desjardins crossed 100,100 at 15.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-22
Maturity Price : 15.80
Evaluated at bid price : 15.80
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
There were 64 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BSC.PR.B Offering Completed

Wednesday, September 22nd, 2010

BNS Split Corp II has announced:

that it has completed its public offering of 1,238,954 Class B Preferred Shares, Series 1 (“Series 1 Preferred Shares”), raising approximately $23.4 million. The Series 1 Preferred Shares were offered to the public by a syndicate of agents led by Scotia Capital Inc. In addition, the Company has redeemed all of its outstanding Class A Preferred Shares and 1,105,950 of its Class A Capital Shares.

The Series 1 Preferred Shares were offered in order to maintain the leveraged “split share” structure of the Company following the successful reorganization of the Company approved at a special meeting of holders of Class A Capital Shares on July 5, 2010, which among other things, extended the redemption date of the Class A Capital Shares for an additional five year term. At the close of business on September 22, 2010 there will be 2,477,908 Class A Capital Shares and 1,238,954 Series 1 Preferred Shares issued and outstanding.

The refunding was reported on PrefBlog in the post BSC.PR.A Refunding Approved. BSC.PR.B will not be tracked by HIMIPref™ – too small! The company has published the prospectus for the issue.

Update, 2010-9-23: DBRS Rates BNS Split Corp. II Class B Preferred Shares, Series 1 Pfd-2 (low):

As of September 14, 2010, the downside protection available to the holders of the Class B Preferred Shares was 62%. Based on the current dividend yield on the Portfolio, the initial Class B Preferred Share dividend coverage ratio is approximately 1.9 times.

The Pfd-2 (low) rating of the Class B Preferred Shares is primarily based on the downside protection and dividend coverage available, as well as on the credit quality and consistency of dividend distributions of the Portfolio holdings.

The main constraints to the rating are the following:

1) The downside protection provided to holders of the Class B Preferred Shares is dependent on the value of the shares in the Portfolio.

2) Volatility of price and changes in the dividend policies of The Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) may result in significant reductions in downside protection from time to time.

3) The concentration of the entire Portfolio in the common shares of BNS.

Bail-Outs and Financial Fragility

Wednesday, September 22nd, 2010

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has released a staff report by Todd Keister titled Bailouts and Financial Fragility:

How does the belief that policymakers will bail out investors in the event of a crisis affect the allocation of resources and the stability of the financial system? I study this question in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When a crisis occurs, the efficient policy response is to use public resources to augment the private consumption of those investors facing losses. The anticipation of such a “bailout” distorts ex ante incentives, leading intermediaries to choose arrangements with excessive illiquidity and thereby increasing financial fragility. Prohibiting bailouts is not necessarily desirable, however: it induces intermediaries to become too liquid from a social point of view and may, in addition, leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis. A policy of taxing short-term liabilities, in contrast, can correct the incentive problem while improving financial stability.

I can’t help but think that the author – and perhaps the entire Fed and US political establishment – has lost his way a little:

The optimal response to this situation is to decrease public consumption and transfer resources to these investors – a “bailout.” The efficient bailout policy thus provides investors with (partial) insurance against the losses associated with a financial crisis.

In a decentralized setting, the anticipation of this type of bailout distorts the ex ante incentives of investors and their intermediaries. As a result, intermediaries choose to perform more maturity transformation, and hence become more illiquid, than in the benchmark allocation. This excessive illiquidity, in turn, implies that the financial system is more fragile in the sense that a self-fulfilling run can occur in equilibrium for a strictly larger set of parameter values. The incentive problem created by the anticipated bailout thus has two negative effects in this environment: it both distorts the allocation of resources in normal times and increases the financial system’s susceptibility to a crisis.

A policy of committing to no bailouts is not necessarily desirable, however. Such a policy would require intermediaries to completely self-insure against the possibility of a crisis, which would lead them to become more liquid (by performing less maturity transformation) than in the benchmark efficient allocation.

I am disturbed that the above does not distinguish between a bail-out (which would apply to insolvent institutions) and use of the discount window (which applies to illiquid institutions). It is becoming apparent that the Panic of 2007 was more of a liquidity crisis than a solvency crisis; but questions of solvency were exacerbated by regulatory requirements that minimum capital be kept on hand at all times (as has been said before, on at least one occasion by Willem Buiter, having a fixed capital requirement doesn’t really help in a crisis, because breaching that barrier means you’re bust, no matter what that fixed requirement might have been).

An optimal policy arrangement in the environment studied here requires permitting bailouts to occur, so that investors benefit from the efficient level of insurance, while offsetting the negative effects on ex ante incentives. One way this can be accomplished is by placing a Pigouvian tax on intermediaries’ short-term liabilities, which can also be interpreted as a tax on the activity of maturity transformation. In the simple environment studied here, the appropriate choice of tax rate will implement the benchmark efficient allocation and will decrease the scope for financial fragility relative to either the discretionary or the no-bailouts regime.

I would say that another way of accomplishing the same thing (albeit ex-post rather than ex-ante) would be to ensure that draws from the discount window are done at a penalty rate; but the opposite tack was taken during the crisis by providing the banks with sovereign guarantees for their debt.

September 21, 2010

Tuesday, September 21st, 2010

Ireland looks like it’s heading for the debt trap:

Ireland will today try to sell as much as 1.5 billion euros ($1.96 billion) in bonds as the government tries to convince investors the country can avoid a European Union bailout.

One day after the premium on Irish 10-year debt over German equivalents rose to a record, the Dublin-based National Treasury Management Agency is offering between 1 billion euros and 1.5 billion euros of four- and eight-year bonds. The auction results will be announced after 10 a.m.

Investors’ concerns about the fiscal health of some euro nations are resurfacing four months after the EU announced an almost $1 trillion rescue package to stamp out contagion from Greece’s fiscal crisis. The spread on Irish debt over bunds yesterday exceeded 400 basis points as the government struggles to cap the cost of bailing out its banking system. In Portugal, the spread climbed as high as 399 basis points.

The Bank Act review cycle has started again:

The Honourable Jim Flaherty, Minister of Finance, today launched the scheduled review of legislation governing federally regulated financial institutions.

“The Government reviews the statutes that govern federally regulated financial institutions every five years to ensure Canada remains a global leader in financial services,” said Minister Flaherty. “This practice sets Canada apart from almost every other country in the world.”

“Some fine-tuning to the system may be required, but wholesale change is not necessary,” he said. “The Government would like to hear the views of all Canadians on how to improve our financial system.”

My wish-list includes greater clarity on the status of Bankers’ Acceptances in bankruptcy (are they covered bonds? Can investors look through the bank guarantee to the actual issuer of the paper?) and a requirement that the seniority of instruments within the “general” bucket be specified … if I own a BDN, is that more or less senior than a BA?

The FOMC Statement was gloomy:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August indicates that the pace of recovery in output and employment has slowed in recent months. Household spending is increasing gradually, but remains constrained by high unemployment, modest income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Business spending on equipment and software is rising, though less rapidly than earlier in the year, while investment in nonresidential structures continues to be weak. Employers remain reluctant to add to payrolls. Housing starts are at a depressed level. Bank lending has continued to contract, but at a reduced rate in recent months. The Committee anticipates a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability, although the pace of economic recovery is likely to be modest in the near term.

and accordingly:

The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period. The Committee also will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings.

This had an effect:

Gold rose to a record, Treasury two-year yields slid to an all-time low while the dollar weakened as the Federal Reserve said it’s willing to ease monetary policy further if needed to boost the economy. Most U.S. stocks fell.

Gold futures surged as much as 0.9 percent to $1,292.40 an ounce as of 4 p.m. in New York as the dollar depreciated against 15 of 16 major counterparts. The 10-year Treasury yield lost 13 basis points to 2.58 percent and the 2-year yield slid to a record low of 0.4155 percent.

Quadravest, purveyor of SplitShare funds, has announced:

Dividend Select 15 Corp. (“The Company”) is pleased to announce the filing of a preliminary prospectus dated September 17, 2010 for a proposed new offering of equity shares at $10.00 per share.
The Company has been created to provide investors with an opportunity to invest in a portfolio (the “Portfolio”) of 15 high quality Canadian companies (the “Portfolio Companies”) whose shares provide an attractive dividend yield, and which have shown solid earnings growth and have a history of capital appreciation. The Company will employ a covered call writing strategy to generate additional income to the Portfolio. The 15 Portfolio Companies will be selected from among the following 20 companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange: [Usual suspects – JH]

Interestingly, the prospectus makes the flat statement:

The Company will not borrow money or use leverage as part of its investment strategies.

In accordance with the usual state of affairs, the prospectus fully discloses the investment managers’ experience, but is completely silent regarding the investment managers’ performance.

The Canadian preferred share market continued to move from strength to strength on heavy volume today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 27bp and FixedResets gaining 18bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5688 % 2,120.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5688 % 3,211.7
Floater 2.87 % 3.30 % 74,074 18.98 3 0.5688 % 2,289.1
OpRet 4.86 % 0.83 % 82,825 0.19 9 0.2522 % 2,385.4
SplitShare 5.88 % -30.85 % 62,709 0.09 2 -0.1012 % 2,396.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2522 % 2,181.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.67 % 5.23 % 149,005 5.35 14 0.2512 % 1,997.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.50 % 5.60 % 197,520 14.51 63 0.2694 % 1,979.4
FixedReset 5.21 % 2.94 % 292,739 3.30 47 0.1778 % 2,280.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-21
Maturity Price : 15.70
Evaluated at bid price : 15.70
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Premium 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-21
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-21
Maturity Price : 21.21
Evaluated at bid price : 21.21
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-21
Maturity Price : 23.74
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-21
Maturity Price : 19.74
Evaluated at bid price : 19.74
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-21
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : -31.13 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 208,169 RBC crossed blocks of 55,000 and 40,000, both at 22.35. Nesbitt crossed 23,600 at 22.40. RBC crossed 42,600 at 22.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-21
Maturity Price : 22.20
Evaluated at bid price : 22.33
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 159,704 Desjardins crossed 119,000 at 28.40 and 25,000 at 28.41.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.36
Bid-YTW : 2.92 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 151,890 TD crossed 100,000 at 24.41; RBC crossed 40,000 at 24.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-21
Maturity Price : 24.25
Evaluated at bid price : 24.48
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 140,375 RBC crossed blocks of 65,000 and 54,100, both at 23.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-21
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 23.34
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 139,631 TD crossed blocks of 100,000 and 25,000, both at 24.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-21
Maturity Price : 24.35
Evaluated at bid price : 24.58
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 85,232 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 27.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.96
Bid-YTW : 2.66 %
There were 56 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

European FixedReset Bonds

Tuesday, September 21st, 2010

RWE AG, a German utility sold some hybrids:

RWE AG, Germany’s second-biggest utility, sold 1.75 billion euros ($2.3 billion) of hybrid bonds in the biggest offering of the equity-like securities in Europe since 2006.

RWE’s perpetual notes were priced to yield 265 basis points more than the five-year benchmark swap rate, according to a banker involved in the sale. The Essen-based company can redeem the fixed-rate notes in 2015 and 2020. If the notes aren’t called within 10 years, the coupon changes to a floating rate equal to the initial spread plus 100 basis points more than the euro interbank offered rate.

In another Euro deal Scottish and Southern Energy plc issued a big whack of similar instruments:

The Euro Securities will bear interest from (and including) the Issue Date to (but excluding) 1 October 2015 at a rate of 5.025 per cent. per annum, payable annually in arrear on 1 October in each year. The first payment of interest, to be made on 1 October 2011, will be in respect of the period from (and including) the Issue Date to (but excluding) 1 October 2011 and will amount to A51.76 per A1,000 in principal amount of the Euro Securities. Thereafter, unless previously redeemed, the Euro Securities will bear interest from (and including) 1 October 2015 to (but excluding) 1 October 2020 at a rate per annum which shall be 3.150 per cent. above the then prevailing euro 5 year Swap Rate, payable annually in arrear on 1 October in each year. From (and including) 1 October 2020, the Euro Securities will bear interest at a rate reset annually of 4.150 per cent. per annum above the Euro interbank offered rate for 12-month deposits in euro, payable annually in arrear on the Interest Payment Date falling in October in each year, all as more particularly described in ‘‘Terms and Conditions of the Euro Securities — Interest Payments’’.

The Issuer may redeem all, but not some only, of the relevant Securities on the First Call Date, the Second Call Date or any Interest Payment Date thereafter at their principal amount together with any accrued and unpaid interest up to (but excluding) the redemption date and any outstanding Arrears of Interest.

FixedReset Index YTW Now Through 3.00%

Monday, September 20th, 2010

It seems like only yesterday that I was excited that the FixedReset Index YTW had hit an all-time low of 3.26% … but no, that happened on August 19. It only took another month to hop over the next milestone, as the median weighted average Yield-to-Worst of the FixedReset index is now firmly below 3.00%.


Click for Big

To celebrate, I am publishing the FixedReset index constituent list, sorted three ways:

Short corporates now yield about 2.7%, so one can certainly make a case for the idea that a yield below 3.0% for FixedResets is fair and reasonable – that allows 150bp for extension and credit risk on a pre-tax interest-equivalent basis – but I don’t think the market thinks like that and I think the market will receive a rude shock when the issuers start calling these things.

I was interviewed today by a reporter for a major Canadian newspaper and talked about what I liked for 15 minutes … then told her ‘wait a minute, you have to put something about FixedResets in this article or you’ll get about 100 eMails following publication, because a lot of people love these things.’ Not to worry – apparently the other experts she interviewed for the piece strongly recommended FixedResets. Hopefully, I’ll get a look at the article later this week.

How about that PWF.PR.P, eh? It’s a 4.40%+160 FixedReset issued in June …. now trading at 26.23-34, but given a 5-Year GOC yield of 2.11%, it’s not expected to be called 2016-1-31.

September 20, 2010

Monday, September 20th, 2010

Stub quotes will be butted out:

NYSE Euronext, Nasdaq OMX Group Inc. and Bats Global Markets sought permission from regulators yesterday to eliminate stub quotes, or bids and offers as low as pennies or as high as thousands of dollars provided by market makers that were blamed for worsening the May 6 crash.

Stub quotes are placeholders provided by market makers at prices as low as 1 cent to satisfy a regulatory obligation to submit both bids and offers. Transactions aren’t meant to occur at those levels.

I don’t understand why stub quotes were ever allowed in the first place. As some HFT firms have pointed out:

In exchange for meeting stricter obligations, market makers are generally given advantages over other market participants, which act like subsidies,” RGM, Hudson River, Allston and Quantlab said in their letter. “These advantages have typically involved preferential access to the markets, lower fees and informational advantages. These advantages come at a substantial cost for all investors as they degrade competition and raise barriers to entry for new participants.”

Why market makers would be permitted to pay for these presumably valuable privileges with stub quotes is quite beyond me.

The pointless nature of financial journalism was well illustrated by two stories published back to back. The first was Fed Will Retain Policy on Assets, Low-Rate Pledge, Survey Shows:

The Federal Reserve next week is likely to affirm its pledge to keep interest rates low for an “extended period” and maintain the floor on its holdings of securities, say economists surveyed by Bloomberg News.

The Fed’s Open Market Committee at its Sept. 21 meeting will hold off from expanding the balance sheet by purchasing securities, according to 60 of 64 analysts surveyed Sept. 16-17. Fifty-four of 63 economists said the Fed will leave unchanged a sentence saying high unemployment and low inflation warrant “exceptionally low” rates for an “extended period.”

… and the second was Treasury Notes Gain on Bets Fed’s Statement Will Signal More Accommodation:

Treasury 10-year notes rose for the first time in four weeks as traders speculated the Federal Reserve will be more accommodative in its policy statement next week as the economic recovery showed signs of stalling.

A rally in two-year notes pushed yields down this week the most since May after the central bank bought shorter-maturity government debt and as investors bet that Japan’s purchases of securities will favor the front end of the U.S. yield curve after it sold the yen to weaken its currency. Notes climbed before the Sept. 21 Fed meeting as the annual rate of inflation excluding food and energy stayed at a 44-year low.

There’s a negative CDS basis in bank bonds:

Gaps between credit-default swaps and bonds have widened to 25 basis points from less than 2 basis points about three months ago, according to Citigroup Inc. Pimco, the manager of the world’s largest bond fund is finding as much as 1 percent of extra yield even after paying to insure bank debt, said Mark Kiesel, a managing director at the Newport Beach, California- based firm.

A rally that started in June may gain momentum as the divergence between swaps and yields gives investors extra incentive to own corporate debt. The increase in the so-called negative basis is attracting buyers that seek to profit by buying the debt while also purchasing credit swaps.

The 100-basis-point gaps Pimco is identifying in bank bonds and 25 basis points in the broader market compare with the average difference of more than 250 basis points after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. two years ago, just before bonds posted a record rally. The all-time wide gaps emerged as credit markets seized up, causing bond spreads to soar while demand for swap protection failed to keep up.

“When capital is scarce, the basis becomes more negative,” said Alberto Gallo, a New York-based strategist at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. He said the basis should narrow as monetary policy and regulation reduce risk in the financial system and stabilize funding costs.

Negative-basis CDS spreads were discussed in Canadian Bond Liquidity Premia

I have sent the following communication to Canada Post and True North Public Affairs, where James Roche, Chairman of the Canada Post Foundation for Mental Health, has his day-job:

Sirs,

One of your clerks advised me that you were “collecting for mental health” today while I was purchasing stamps and requested a donation.

I strongly object to being importuned by beggars while going about my business and wish to advise you that I will have my first class mail serviced by your competitors in future.

I have often observed that precious little do-gooders tend to behave as thugs and therefore have a question: do you make it clear to your front-line staff that participation in this disgraceful exhibition of poor manners is entirely voluntary and there will be no repercussions on those who do not wish to humiliate themselves by begging? Or are they forced to participate as a condition of employment?

Sincerely,

Beggars! It’s enough to make a strong man go postal!

Hellzapoppin’ on the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 55bp and FixedResets gaining 12bp on heavy volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6278 % 2,108.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6278 % 3,193.5
Floater 2.89 % 3.33 % 74,914 18.92 3 0.6278 % 2,276.2
OpRet 4.87 % -0.20 % 85,589 0.19 9 -0.4130 % 2,379.4
SplitShare 5.87 % -27.57 % 63,073 0.09 2 -0.0809 % 2,398.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4130 % 2,175.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.68 % 5.29 % 137,820 5.35 14 0.1649 % 1,992.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.51 % 5.60 % 194,338 14.47 63 0.5511 % 1,974.1
FixedReset 5.22 % 2.96 % 294,601 3.30 47 0.1158 % 2,276.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.I OpRet -4.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-20
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : -13.04 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 23.08
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 15.52
Evaluated at bid price : 15.52
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 22.15
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 21.49
Evaluated at bid price : 21.81
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Premium 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-10-20
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.69
Bid-YTW : 0.53 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 23.01
Evaluated at bid price : 23.29
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 22.17
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 22.72
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-01-05
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 15.73
Evaluated at bid price : 15.73
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 21.75
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 21.95
Evaluated at bid price : 22.06
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 21.95
Evaluated at bid price : 22.06
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 19.41
Evaluated at bid price : 19.41
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 23.45
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 22.11
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 22.66
Evaluated at bid price : 22.85
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 212,890 TD crossed 65,000 at 26.70; RBC crossed two blocks of 64,800 each, both at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : 2.98 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 78,219 RBC bought 12,600 from Scotia at 24.64; TD crossed 29,200 at 24.61. Desjardins bought 12,000 from Scotia at 24.63.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 24.34
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 69,698 RBC sold 11,100 to anonymous at 19.98; ITG Canada (who?) crossed 13,500 at 20.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 59,500 TD crossed 50,000 at 26.73.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 55,145 Scotia crossed 14,000 at 21.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-09-20
Maturity Price : 22.11
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 51,400 Nesbitt crossed 49,900 at 27.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.09 %
There were 68 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.