Archive for December, 2010

LBS.PR.A: Warrant Offering

Thursday, December 16th, 2010

Brompton Group has announced:

that it has filed a preliminary prospectus relating to an offering of warrants to Class A shareholders of the Company. Each Class A shareholder will receive one half of a warrant for each Class A share held on a record date which will be set upon filing of the final prospectus.

One warrant will entitle the holder to purchase a Unit (consist ing of one Class A share and one Preferred share of the Company) upon payment of the subscription price, which will be determined as the lesser of:
(i) $18.87 (which is the sum of (a) the most recently calculated NAV per Unit prior to the date hereof and
(b) the estimated per Unit fees and expenses of the offering), and (ii) the most recently calculated NAV per Unit prior to the date of filing the final prospectus plus the estimated per Unit fees and expenses of the offering. The Company has applied to list the warrants and the Class A shares and Preferred shares issuable on the exercise thereof on the TSX.

Successful completion of the warrants offering will provide the Company with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities and it is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A shares and Preferred shares and reduce the ongoing management expense ratio of the Company.

There is no word yet regarding the exercise date of the warrants, but with the last one the warrants were outstanding for about a month.

LBS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog at the time of their warrant offering five months ago, which was something of a fizzle. LBS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

December 15, 2010

Wednesday, December 15th, 2010

The Financial Post published an interesting factoid on Canadas:

Canadian 10-year yields gained 47 basis points to 3.28% today, from 2.81% on Nov. 4, the day after the Fed unveiled plans to buy US$600-billion in Treasuries through June to spur economic growth. The yields are rising so fast they exceed all 18 of the March 2011 forecasts of economists in a Bloomberg survey. The highest, from Kurt Karl, Swiss Re’s chief U.S. economist, calls for yields at 3.2% by then. The weighted average estimate is 2.95%.

The Boston Fed has released a four-part video lecture on the Great Recession. I must say, I’m pleased and impressed at this sort of outreach programme – I prefer written commentary myself, but I know most people prefer video. We never see anything like this in Canada … pity.

TD CEO Ed Clark announced today that he is an enthusiastic proponent of moral hazard:

If policy makers want Canadians to stop borrowing too much, it’s up to Ottawa, not financial institutions, to force a change in behaviour, says one of Bay Street’s longest-serving senior bankers.

Toronto-Dominion Bank chief executive officer Ed Clark acknowledged Canadians’ alarming debt levels, but said the issue is a matter of public policy and would be best resolved by a tighter government rules on residential mortgages.

In an interview with The Globe and Mail, Mr. Clark said that no bank wants to be the first to impose stricter requirements on borrowers out of fear that it will suffer a major loss of customers to rivals. Personal banking “is a highly competitive industry,” Mr. Clark said. “If we said ‘Look, we’re going to be heroes and save Canada from itself, and we’ll impose a whole new [mortgage] regime on everyone else,’ the other four [large] banks would say ‘Let’s carve them up.’ ”

Listen up, Mr. Clark! Nobody wants or needs you to save Canada from itself. You’re being paid a rather fat salary to save TD Bank from itself. Why are you so eager to make mortgage loans to poor credits? Why are you so worried that the poor credits will stampede to other banks, leaving TD in the miserable position of having a high quality mortgage portfolio?

Mr. Clark proposes government action, citing rules on credit cards as an example of where the banks follow whatever guidelines are provided. The Canadian banking system is run by “adults” who are able to come together and work with the government to guide the process, he said, so there is no trouble sitting everyone down at the same table.

The Canadian banking system is run by weak-kneed oligarchy of idiots, who have the idea that tough management consists of begging Mama to tell them what to do.

Naturally, the Globe and Mail is quick to urge arbitrary measures:

From Gordon Nixon of Royal Bank of Canada, to Ed Clark of Toronto-Dominion Bank, to William Downe of Bank of Montreal, chief executives of big banks are all on the record with some version of the same refrain: Something needs to be done to slow the growth in consumer debt.

So who can do it? The banks, you say? They could just turn down customers seeking loans more often. It’s not going to happen. Saying no would make the banks the bad guys. Plus, the bank executives are wont to point out, probably rightly, that competitive pressures mean that even if one says no, another will probably say yes.

If the government is to do anything, it has two logical measures: tighten up the rules on the risk-weighting of loans (via OSFI) and/or charge more to insure risky mortgages (via the CMHC). Early on in the US housing crunch, I suggested a regime whereby 25% (or so) capital was required on mortgages. If the consumer didn’t put it up as a down payment, then the required amount gets deducted, dollar for dollar, from the bank’s tier 1 capital. That’s the capital part of the loan. Then the rest gets risk-weighted as a normal mortgage.

More and more, I’m seeing a move towards central planning. It always sounds good and it never works.

Good news on the Canadian preferred share market today, as investors lost less than usual on continued elevated volume. PerpetualDiscounts were down 15bp, while FixedResets managed to gain a whopping 3bp.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.48%, equivalent to 7.67% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.6%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 210bp, a widening from the 200bp reported December 8 as long corporate yields increased but interest-equivalent PerpetualDiscount yields increased more.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0130 % 2,280.8
FixedFloater 4.73 % 3.22 % 27,886 18.99 1 0.0000 % 3,557.5
Floater 2.62 % 2.40 % 51,467 21.23 4 -0.0130 % 2,462.6
OpRet 4.80 % 3.20 % 73,752 2.39 8 0.2991 % 2,387.0
SplitShare 5.35 % 1.12 % 1,117,248 0.98 4 0.0303 % 2,441.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2991 % 2,182.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.73 % 5.62 % 155,957 6.42 27 0.2459 % 1,998.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.47 % 5.48 % 275,113 14.65 51 -0.1474 % 1,992.7
FixedReset 5.27 % 3.68 % 363,640 3.10 52 0.0268 % 2,244.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-15
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-15
Maturity Price : 21.43
Evaluated at bid price : 21.43
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-15
Maturity Price : 22.65
Evaluated at bid price : 22.84
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-15
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-15
Maturity Price : 19.84
Evaluated at bid price : 19.84
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 7.16 % Merely a reversal of yesterday‘s nonsense.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-15
Maturity Price : 24.19
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 169,481 Nesbitt crossed 150,000 at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 126,400 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-15
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 105,906 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.82
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 103,553 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.77
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 72,203 Nesbitt crossed 35,000 at 25.65; then bought 17,500 from TD at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.64
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 69,003 Nesbitt crossed 26,000 at 19.66 and 25,000 at 19.69.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-15
Maturity Price : 19.68
Evaluated at bid price : 19.68
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

EN.PR.A To Be Redeemed on Schedule, December 16

Wednesday, December 15th, 2010

Energy Split Corp. II has announced:

that the redemption prices for all outstanding Capital Yield Shares and ROC Preferred Shares to be paid on December 16, 2010 are as follows:

Redemption Price per ROC Preferred Share: $13.74

Redemption Price per Capital Yield Share: $9.86

The Capital Yield Shares and ROC Preferred Shares are listed for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols EN and EN.PR.A, respectively. The Capital Yield Shares and ROC Preferred Shares will be de-listed from the Toronto Stock Exchange as at the close of trading on December 16, 2010.

EN.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog last December when there was a tiny partial redemption. EN.PR.A has been tracked by HIMIPref™, but relegated to the Scraps index on volume concerns – there were less than 1-million shares outstanding.

December 14, 2010

Tuesday, December 14th, 2010

The FOMC Statement held no surprises:

To promote a stronger pace of economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at levels consistent with its mandate, the Committee decided today to continue expanding its holdings of securities as announced in November. The Committee will maintain its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its securities holdings. In addition, the Committee intends to purchase $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month. The Committee will regularly review the pace of its securities purchases and the overall size of the asset-purchase program in light of incoming information and will adjust the program as needed to best foster maximum employment and price stability.

The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions, including low rates of resource utilization, subdued inflation trends, and stable inflation expectations, are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate for an extended period.

Voting against the policy was Thomas M. Hoenig. In light of the improving economy, Mr. Hoenig was concerned that a continued high level of monetary accommodation would increase the risks of future economic and financial imbalances and, over time, would cause an increase in long-term inflation expectations that could destabilize the economy.

It occurs to me that Mr. Hoenig is being used – probably with his enthusiastic cooperation – as a straw man. The Fed wants to send an explicit signal that they’ve thought about this, discussed this and reached a concensus to reject this. There’s no shortage of blogs out there claiming hyperinflation is imminent! Given the increased public discussion of economic data, with various levels of competence, one wonders if more public pronouncements by governments and their agencies will set up straw men in their releases and recognize that forecasts are necessarily imprecise.

“The Cabinet today decided that all protesters at G-20 meetings held in Canada will be billy-clubbed. Voting against the motion was the Public Safety Commissioner, who wished to place land-mines in approved protest areas”.

Oh boy, this is just like the old days! The Canadian preferred share market got clobbered today, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 70bp and FixedResets down 12bp. Volume continued at elevated levels.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0499 % 2,281.1
FixedFloater 4.73 % 3.22 % 27,492 19.00 1 0.0000 % 3,557.5
Floater 2.62 % 2.40 % 52,063 21.23 4 0.0499 % 2,463.0
OpRet 4.82 % 3.40 % 70,159 2.39 8 -0.1060 % 2,379.8
SplitShare 5.35 % 1.12 % 1,162,643 0.98 4 2.4532 % 2,440.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1060 % 2,176.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.62 % 154,216 13.76 27 -0.4668 % 1,993.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.46 % 5.49 % 274,996 14.68 51 -0.7021 % 1,995.6
FixedReset 5.27 % 3.63 % 369,356 3.16 52 -0.1246 % 2,244.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium -8.07 % Just another dumb quote. the issue traded 1,610 shares today in a range of 24.70-91 before being quoted at 22.77-24.71. No rants today. I’m getting closer to solving the puzzle … just need the results of one more inquiry.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 22.64
Evaluated at bid price : 22.77
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -2.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 25.11
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount -1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 22.88
Evaluated at bid price : 23.09
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 19.43
Evaluated at bid price : 19.43
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 20.55
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 22.29
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 22.83
Evaluated at bid price : 23.06
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 22.94
Evaluated at bid price : 23.15
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 21.23
Evaluated at bid price : 21.23
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 21.62
Evaluated at bid price : 21.62
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 5.45 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 19.54
Evaluated at bid price : 19.54
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 19.57
Evaluated at bid price : 19.57
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 23.04
Evaluated at bid price : 23.27
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.30
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.11
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 21.68
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.66
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 19.70
Evaluated at bid price : 19.70
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 25.20
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare 10.82 % Just a reversal of yesterday’s nonsense. Even after the price drop from Friday’s issue price of $25.00, it’s still hellishly expensive … BNA.PR.C is now quoted at 22.10-32, for a bid-side YTW of 6.25%.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.38
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 108,550 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 21.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 102,090 Desjardins crossed 73,900 at 22.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 22.56
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 5.58 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 91,082 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 20.30; T crossed 49,000 at 20.34.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Premium 68,701 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 58,672 Desjardins crossed 38,500 at 20.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 20.86
Evaluated at bid price : 20.86
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 58,193 Desjardins crossed blocks of 35,000 and 11,200, both at 24.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-14
Maturity Price : 23.98
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
There were 51 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

BoC Releases December 2010 Financial System Review

Tuesday, December 14th, 2010

The Bank of Canada has released the December 2010 Financial System Review which includes reports on:

  • The Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffer: Insights for Canada
  • Strengthening the Infrastructure of Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets
  • Central Counterparties and Systemic Risk
  • Contingent Capital and Bail-In Debt: Tools for Bank Resolution

The Bank identifies:

Four major interconnected sources of risk emanate from the external macrofinancial environment: (i) sovereign debt concerns in several countries; (ii) financial fragility associated with the weak global economic recovery; (iii) global imbalances; and (iv) the potential for excessive risk-taking behaviour arising from a prolonged period of exceptionally low interest rates in major advanced economies. The main domestic source of risk arises from the increasingly stretched financial position of Canadian households, which leaves them more vulnerable to adverse events

They identify a central contradiction in monetary policy:

While stimulative monetary policy is needed to support the global economic recovery, experience suggests that a long period of very low interest rates may be associated with excessive credit creation and undue risk-taking as investors seek higher returns, leading to the underpricing of risk and unsustainable increases in asset prices.

One wonders if they are sending a signal by picking on the insurers:

Institutional investors with liabilities having a duration exceeding that of their assets, such as life insurance companies and defined benefit pension plans, are particularly affected by a sustained period of low interest rates. In this environment, the combination of upward pressure on the actuarial value of contractual liabilities and reduced yields on assets is likely to put pressure on the balance sheets of these entities, and potentially encourage risk-taking behaviour as these institutions strive to achieve the minimum returns they have guaranteed to policyholders and beneficiaries.

… and then return to the theme:

In Canada, household credit has continued to expand rapidly during the recession and the early stages of the recovery. While this expansion—in contrast with the experience in previous downturns and in other advanced economies—is in part a testament to the resilience of Canada’s financial system, it is also an important source of risk. The proportion of households with stretched financial positions that leave them vulnerable to an adverse shock has grown significantly in recent years, as the growth rate of debt has outpaced that of disposable income. The risk is that a shock to economic conditions could be transmitted to the broader financial system through a deterioration in the credit quality of loans to households. This would prompt a tightening of credit conditions that could trigger a mutually reinforcing deterioration of real activity and financial stability.

So there’s an inherent contradiction here. In bad times, interest rates are lowered so that people will borrow more and spend it. But now they’re worried that the borrowers won’t be able to pay it back, in sufficient numbers to cause problems of its own.

Clearly, monetary policy is too blunt a tool to do much. The bank wants to encourage borrowing and spending, sure, but it wants to encourage productive borrowing and spending – and the Wrong Type of People are exploiting monetary policy and blowing their loan proceeds on houses, beer and prostitutes instead of on productive equipement.

This becomes a political issue. Accellerated Depreciation is being tried in the US:

Tax cuts intended for businesses are a relatively small part of the $858 billion tax bill scheduled for a final vote in the Senate as early as Tuesday.

The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that about $75 billion of the tax breaks in the plan were aimed at businesses, including $13 billion for a two-year extension of the coveted research and development credit, which helps cover the cost of wages for employees involved in research. The proposal also commits $22 billion for accelerated depreciation, which in 2011 would allow businesses to write off 100 percent of their capital expenditures immediately instead of over several years.

Many economists are skeptical of the tax breaks’ potential to stoke the economy in any meaningful way. Businesses are sitting on more than a trillion in cash, but are reluctant to invest because of lagging demand, a problem that tax incentives are not devised to address.

“The research and development credit is a good thing, with a limited effect, and the accelerated depreciation will get people to move forward with investment that they probably would have done anyway,” said David Wyss, chief economist at Standard & Poor’s. “But when you look at the amount of money involved, you’re not getting a lot of bang for your buck.”

The BoC cheerfully concludes:

The probability of an adverse labour market shock materializing is judged to have edged higher in recent months, owing to the downward revision in the October Monetary Policy Report to the outlook for the global and Canadian economies. The Bank has conducted a partial stress-testing simulation to estimate the impact on household balance sheets of a hypothetical labour market shock that would increase the unemployment rate by 3 percentage points. The results suggest that the associated rise in financial stress among households would double the proportion of loans that are in arrears three months or more. Owing to the declining affordability of housing and the increasingly stretched financial positions of households, the probability of a negative shock to property prices has risen as well.

The Bank judges that, overall, the risk of a system-wide disturbance arising from financial stress in the household sector is elevated and has edged higher since June. This vulnerability is unlikely to decline quickly, given projections of subdued growth in income.

The section on the macro-financial environment has a few interesting things to say:

The current environment has supported elevated corporate bond issuance across the credit spectrum (Chart 4). In particular, issuance of U.S.-dollar high-yield debt has reached a historic high. The search for yield has also supported increased issuance of securities with longer maturities, especially in the most recent period.(1) Owing partly to the relative strength of Canada’s banking, corporate and government sectors, demand by foreign investors for Canadian debt securities remains robust.(2) A number of Canadian issuers, including some banks and provincial governments, have taken advantage of this strong international demand for Canadian debt products by accessing markets outside Canada.

1 For instance, 45 per cent of total corporate debt issued in the Canadian market in the third quarter had a maturity of 5 to 10 years, and 9 per cent a maturity of 30 years or more, compared with averages of 32 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively, since 1999.

2 Statistics Canada data show that, in the 12-month period ending in September 2010, nonresident investors purchased $105 billion in bonds in Canadian markets, compared with $43 billion over the same period in 2009.


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Not surprisingly, given the strength of demand, credit spreads have tightened further in Canada and in other key developed markets, although they generally remain above historical averages (Chart 5).(3) Assuming a 40 per cent recovery rate, the current spreads on North American indexes for corporate credit default swaps (CDS) imply a default rate for the next five years of 1.50 per cent per year for investment-grade issuers and 5.25 per cent per year for high-yield issuers. Based on historical data, these implied default rates, although well below the peaks reached in previous recessions, are higher than the average realized default rates.(4) Overall, this suggests that current pricing in corporate bond markets is consistent with expectations of a modest economic recovery in industrialized economies.

3 While corporate spreads in Canada and the euro area are above their levels from the early 2000s, U.S. spreads are somewhat lower, particularly for high-yield investors.

4 Default rates for high-yield issuers have peaked at about 12 per cent during every recession since 1990, and the average default rate since the 1980s has been 4.5 per cent. Moody’s reports that, for the period from 1989 to 2009, the average cumulative default rate over a five year window was 0.9 per cent for Canadian investment-grade issuers and 1 per cent for U.S. investment-grade issuers.


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In contrast to the term extension for corporate issuers:

International banks continue to increase liquid assets and search for stable, longer-term funding, but progress has been slow. Many institutions still rely on wholesale funding, and the average maturity of new issuances has declined since the beginning of the crisis (Chart 12). Some small banks that have traditionally relied on retail deposits to finance their operations are facing stronger competition, given that the banking sector as a whole is seeking to improve the stability of its liquidity position by reducing its reliance on wholesale sources of funds.


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I’m including the next chart just because it’s cool:


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Is monetary policy pushing on a string?

New information received since June indicates that the aggregate financial position of the Canadian non-financial corporate sector remains robust despite the recent slowdown in economic growth. The corporate sector appears well placed to withstand the financial consequences of adverse shocks. Corporate leverage declined in the third quarter of 2010, reaching the lowest ratio observed since the end of the financial crisis (Chart 23). Canadian corporate leverage, measured at market value, remains significantly below that of the United States, the United Kingdom and the euro area. Moreover, liquidity in the Canadian non-financial corporate sector—as measured by the ratio of short-term assets (less inventories) to short-term liabilities—remains elevated (Chart 24).


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The individual reports are important enough that I’ll deal with them separately … some time.

MFC Prefs Downgraded to P-2 / BBB by S&P

Monday, December 13th, 2010

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • We believe that the prospective earnings profile of Manulife Financial’s U.S. operations will be weaker than we previously expected given the current economic environment.
  • In addition, we expect the volatility associated with Manulife Financial’s net earnings and capital to remain elevated over the intermediate term, until it makes more progress in reducing and containing its risks more in line with its updated risk tolerances.
  • We have lowered our counterparty credit and financial strength ratings on Manulife Financial’s core and guaranteed insurance operating subsidiaries to ‘AA-‘ from ‘AA’ and our counterparty credit rating on Manulife Financial (the holding company) to ‘A-‘ from ‘A’.
  • The outlook is stable.

This follows their Credit Watch Negative in November and the downgrade to P-2(high) in August.

Manulife has a fair batch of preferreds outstanding: MFC.PR.A, MFC.PR.B, MFC.PR.C, MFC.PR.D and MFC.PR.E.

December 13, 2010

Monday, December 13th, 2010

CalPERS, the gigantic California pension fund most notable for not doing its own credit analysis, has been told to take a running jump:

Judge Richard Kramer in San Francisco state court said yesterday that the companies’ ratings of three structured investment vehicles that the California Public Employees’ Retirement System lost money on are a form of speech about an issue of public interest that is protected under a state law designed to fend off cases meant to chill public debate.

The companies all gave their highest ratings to Cheyne Finance LLC, Stanfield Victoria Funding LLC and Sigma Finance Inc., prompting Calpers to invest $1.3 billion in them in 2006, the fund said in its complaint.

The Australian covered bond market is attracting attention:

Westpac Banking Corp., Commonwealth Bank of Australia, Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. and National Australia Bank Ltd. may be able to issue three-year covered bonds priced to yield about 50 basis points more than the bank bill swap rate, less than the 85 basis-point spread on senior debt, according to Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc. Moody’s Investors Service estimates savings of 20 percent.

Covered bonds are “essential weapons as banks look for cheaper and more diversified sources of funding,” John Manning, a credit analyst at RBS in Sydney, said in a telephone interview. Even when global credit markets seized up, European banks “had good access to covered bond markets and were able to access the funding they required at quite commercially acceptable rates,” he said.

The Australian government will amend the law to let financiers issue the securities for the first time, Treasurer Wayne Swan said Dec. 12 as he announced an overhaul package aimed at spurring competition in the banking industry. Global sales of the securities, including Pfandbriefe, as they are known in Germany, have surged 33 percent to a record 329 billion euros ($435 billion) in 2010, according to data compiled by Bloomberg, as investors seek the relative safety of debt backed by both the issuer and an underlying pool of assets.

Investors in Europe demand 177 basis points of extra yield to hold covered bonds instead of government debt, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch’s EMU Covered Bonds index. Spreads average 237 basis points, or 2.37 percentage points, on the region’s financial debt, a separate index shows.

Australia’s government will release draft amendments to the Banking Act to allow the sale of covered securities during the first sitting of Parliament next year, according to a federal document detailing the planned changes.

Allowing covered bonds will help “secure the long-term safety and sustainability” of Australia’s banking system, the document states. Treasury may impose a cap on the amount of covered bonds that each bank can sell, “for example five percent of an issuer’s total Australian assets,” it said.

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce raised A$750 million in October in the first sale of Australian dollar-denominated covered bonds since the start of the credit crisis in 2007. The Australian laws don’t block overseas banks issuing the notes.

The 5.75 percent notes due December 2013 were priced to yield 91.25 basis points more than similar-maturity government debt, according to a statement at the time. The spread has narrowed to 87 basis points, according to ANZ Bank prices on Bloomberg. A basis point is 0.01 percentage point.

It was clobberin’ time on the Canadian preferred share market, as high volume and losses continued. PerpetualDiscounts got smacked for 42bp, while FixedResets were down 10bp.

The most irritating news of the day was the closing quote on BNA.PR.E, which settled on Friday and has already been forgotten by the underwriters who made a nice little fee for flogging it. It traded 64,885 shares on the day in a range of 24.81-91. So far, so good, right? The closing quote was 22.00-24.80, 20×50. That’s a two dollar and eighty cent spread on issue that closed on the previous trading day. This is a disgrace; the market maker, the exchange and the underwriters should be ashamed of themselves.

One factoid of note is that Scotia was the only broker with any buying interest, responsible for 60,500 of the buy side, leaving only 4,385 for the rest of the street.

Meanwhile, remember GWO.PR.J? It was quoted Friday at 26.40-27.60 after trading 2,457 shares and today traded 5,764 shares in a range of 26.75-95 before closing with a quote of 26.80-60, 1×8.

This is simply not acceptable. Market makers get valuable privileges and if they want to keep them, should be required to earn them.

I have sent the following eMail to the Exchange:

Sirs,

I have not yet received a reply to the eMail below. Can you tell me when I might expect to receive it?

I note additionally that GWO.PR.J had a closing quote 26.40-27.60 on Friday and a quote of 26.80-60. Can you explain why you permit such incompetent market making?

I also note that BNA.PR.E, a new issue which settled on Friday, closed the second trading day of its existence with a quote of 22.00 – 24.80. Why does the Exchange permit such a lackadaisical attitude by those whom it rewards with market making privileges?

I sent the original eMail on December 2.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2473 % 2,279.9
FixedFloater 4.73 % 3.22 % 27,662 19.00 1 0.0000 % 3,557.5
Floater 2.62 % 2.40 % 51,752 21.24 4 0.2473 % 2,461.7
OpRet 4.81 % 3.46 % 70,954 2.40 8 0.2896 % 2,382.4
SplitShare 5.49 % 0.73 % 118,649 0.99 4 -2.8850 % 2,381.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2896 % 2,178.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.72 % 5.61 % 156,596 6.43 27 -0.1549 % 2,002.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.42 % 5.42 % 272,507 14.74 51 -0.4207 % 2,009.7
FixedReset 5.26 % 3.62 % 365,525 3.11 52 -0.1026 % 2,247.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.E SplitShare -11.65 % A disgraceful quote that needs to be explained by the Exchange. See discussion in main post.

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 7.09 %

CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 23.98
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 24.27
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
GWO.PR.M Perpetual-Premium -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 24.31
Evaluated at bid price : 24.52
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 19.90
Evaluated at bid price : 19.90
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 23.53
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.58 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 3.67 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 23.11
Evaluated at bid price : 23.35
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 91,420 Scotia crossed blocks of 45,700 and 41,300, both at 24.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 24.27
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 70,675 TD crossed 11,300 at 26.10; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 64,894 RBC crossed 38,400 at 20.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 20.41
Evaluated at bid price : 20.41
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare 64,885 Recent new issue. See also main post.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 7.09 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 54,804 RBC crossed 35,000 at 22.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 21.96
Evaluated at bid price : 22.08
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 40,364 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-12-13
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
There were 48 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Moody's Downgrades RY Preferreds to A3

Monday, December 13th, 2010

Last February, Moody’s slashed bank preferred ratings by three notches, reflecting a reappraisal of the likelihood of government support, at least as far as preferreds were concerned:

Prior to the global financial crisis, Moody’s had incorporated into its ratings an assumption that support provided by national governments and central banks to shore up a troubled bank would, to some extent, benefit the holders of bank subordinated capital as well as the senior creditors. The systemic support for these instruments has not been forthcoming in many cases. The revised methodology largely removes previous assumptions of systemic support, resulting in today’s rating action. In addition, the revised methodology generally widens the notching on a bank hybrid’s rating that is based on the instrument’s features.

In that action, RY prefs were downgraded three notches, taking them from Aa2 to A2. The three notch downgrade was in line with almost every other bank. Almost.

A little while earlier, Moody’s had taken BMO prefs down four notches, due to concerns over the volatility of its capital market business.

In the RY Annual Report for 2010, they stated their strategic goals:

  • In Canada, our goal is to be the undisputed leader in financial services.
  • Globally, our goal is to be a leading provider of capital markets and wealth management solutions
  • Intargeted markets, our goal is to be a leading provider of select financial services complementary to our core strengths.

Moody’s takes exception to the goal of growing the capital markets business:

Moody’s Investors Service has downgraded the ratings of Royal Bank of Canada, driven principally by the bank’s commitment to its sizeable and growing capital markets business, which potentially exposes bondholders to increased earnings volatility and poses significant risk management challenges .

As part of its universal banking strategy, RBC management is selectively expanding upon its strong domestic investment banking and trading capabilities to build a global investment banking platform. Tactically, RBC has been able to exploit the continuing disarray at many of its investment banking competitors to upgrade and build out its banking, sales and trading capabilities outside Canada.

“Shareholders and bank managers are attracted to the growth potential of capital markets businesses, but these businesses can expose bank bondholders to hidden tail risks,” said Peter Nerby, a Moody’s Senior Vice-President.

Although Moody’s expects RBC’s other businesses will provide a substantial buffer against these risks, the rating agency believes the opacity and the potential volatility associated RBC’s enlarged and expanding capital markets operations are not consistent with its former B+ unsupported bank financial strength rating.

RBC already has a substantial commitment to the capital markets business. At year end 2010, the capital markets segment represented roughly 45% of the bank’s consolidated balance sheet, and management is attributing roughly 25% of the firm’s $33 billion in common equity to the capital markets segment. Over the long run, management has signaled that the contribution from capital markets businesses could be as much as 30% of overall revenue and earnings through the cycle.

..Issuer: Royal Bank of Canada

….Preferred Stock Preferred Stock, Downgraded to A3 from A2

Royal Bank has a host of preferreds outstanding: RY.PR.A, RY.PR.B, RY.PR.C, RY.PR.D, RY.PR.E, RY.PR.F, RY.PR.G, RY.PR.H, RY.PR.I, RY.PR.L, RY.PR.N, RY.PR.P, RY.PR.R, RY.PR.T, RY.PR.W, RY.PR.X and RY.PR.Y.

December Edition of PrefLetter Released!

Monday, December 13th, 2010

The December, 2010, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The December edition contains an appendix discussing the determinants of the credit quality of SplitShare preferreds, and links to a spreadsheet that can be downloaded to evaluate this credit quality through Monte Carlo analysis.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the December 2010, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the January, 2011, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close January 14 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on January 17.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

December PrefLetter Now In Preparation

Friday, December 10th, 2010

The markets have closed and the December edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The December edition will contain an appendix discussing the determinants of credit quality of the preferred shares issued by SplitShare corporations with a link to, and discussion of, a spreadsheet I have developed to assist investors to gain a quantitative understanding to the potential for default.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The December issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the December issue.