Category: Issue Comments

Issue Comments

BNS to Acquire DW: DW.PR.A Skyrockets

Scotiabank has announced:

that Scotiabank has agreed to make an offer for all of the common shares of DundeeWealth that the Bank does not own. Scotiabank currently owns 18 per cent of DundeeWealth.

The value of the offer to DundeeWealth shareholders is $21.00 per common share representing an enterprise value for DundeeWealth of approximately $3.2 billion. Scotiabank will offer 0.2497 of a Scotiabank common share and, at the election of each shareholder, either $5.00 in cash or 0.2 of a $25.00, 3.70% five year rate reset Scotiabank preferred share for each DundeeWealth common share (including common shares issuable on conversion of other shares).

Dundee Corporation owns 48 per cent of DundeeWealth. As a result of Dundee Corporation’s commitment to tender, on completion of the offer Scotiabank will own at least 67 per cent of DundeeWealth. After the completion of the offer, Scotiabank also expects to proceed with the acquisition of the balance of the common shares of DundeeWealth.

This will improve the credit quality of DW.PR.A quite considerably, and the cash might have an effect on the credit ratings of DC as well. DW.PR.A closed on Friday at 24.95-30, for a yield-to-worst of 4.94-68%, but is now quoted at 26.01-25. The Modified Duration on Friday was 5.38,

It’s interesting that Scotia is offering partial payment in FixedReset preferreds with an initial coupon of 3.70% – that would make the Issue Reset Spread about 150bp, so this issue will be treated as “more perpetual than otherwise”.

Update: DBRS comments:

The transaction is consistent with BNS’s strategy of growing its wealth management businesses, which the Bank believes offers attractive opportunities. DBRS views BNS’s wealth management businesses as a key component of the Bank’s domestic growth strategy.

BNS will gain significant market share to 7.8% and become the fifth largest mutual fund provider in Canada and the third largest among the Canadian banks with over $55 billion in assets under management, up from tenth position. The Bank is currently under-represented in retail mutual funds.

The transaction provides BNS with added capabilities in the advisor channel, which is the primary distribution channel for DWI. Over the last three years, BNS has been investing to strengthen its distribution capabilities in wealth management, including both the direct and advisor channels. Both mutual fund brands, ScotiaFunds and Dynamic, will be maintained.

Issue Comments

BCE.PR.R FixedFloater – None Converted to Ratchet

BCE Inc. has announced:

that none of its Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series R (Series R Preferred Shares) will be converted into Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series Q (Series Q Preferred Shares).

On October 12, 2010, BCE notified holders of Series R Preferred Shares that they could elect to convert their shares into Series Q Preferred Shares subject to the terms and conditions attached to those shares. Only 71,965 of BCE’s 8,000,000 Series R Preferred Shares were surrendered for conversion into Series Q Preferred Shares. As this would result in there being less than one million Series Q Preferred Shares outstanding, no Series R Preferred Shares will, as per the terms and conditions attached to those shares, be converted on December 1, 2010 into Series Q Preferred Shares. Shareholders who had elected to convert their Series R Preferred Shares will be receiving, by December 1, 2010, share certificates representing the number of shares surrendered for conversion.

The Series R Preferred Shares will continue to be listed on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol BCE.PR.R. The Series R Preferred Shares will pay on a quarterly basis, for the five-year period beginning on December 1, 2010, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE, a fixed dividend based on an annual dividend rate of 4.490%.

BCE.PR.R was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the dividend reset to 4.49% was announced. BCE.PR.R is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

BoC Releases Autumn 2010 Review

The Bank of Canada has released the Autumn 2010 Review with articles

  • Has Exchange Rate Pass-Through Really Declined? Some
    Recent Insights from the Literature

  • Financial Stress, Monetary Policy, and Economic Activity
  • Trends in Issuance: Underlying Factors and Implications

The last article, by Jonathan Witmer, attracted my eye, but was something of a disappointment … typical B-School Look-Mummy-I-Got-A-Spreadsheet broker research stuff.

Update: Not everyone agrees with my assessment of the Witmer paper.

Issue Comments

DBRS Withdraws Ratings on PIC.PR.A, WFS.PR.A & TXT.PR.A

DBRS has announced that it:

has today discontinued the ratings of the Preferred Shares/Securities issued by Mulvihill Premium Canadian Bank, Top 10 Split Trust, and World Financial Split Corp. The ratings are being withdrawn at the request of Mulvihill Capital Management Inc., the manager of the three funds.

PIC.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the Capital Units were consolidated. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

WFS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was downgraded to Pfd-4(low) by DBRS. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

TXT.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was upgraded to Pfd-4(high) by DBRS. It is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

TDS.PR.B Redeemed; Refunded by TDS.PR.C

TD Split Inc. has announced:

that it has completed its treasury offering of 3,120,000 Class C Capital Shares, Series 1 (the “Capital Shares”) and 3,120,000 Class C Preferred Shares, Series 1 (the “Preferred Shares”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $87,360,000. The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares will trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols TDS.C and TDS.PR.C, respectively.

The Company also announced that it has redeemed all of its 712,861 Class B Preferred Shares (“Old Preferred Shares”) and 712,861 Class B Capital Shares (“Old Capital Shares”) currently outstanding in accordance with their terms. The Old Capital Shares were redeemed at a price of $45.2674 per share, in cash, or, if the holder had previously elected, by delivery of a pro rata share of the common shares of The Toronto-Dominion Bank (“TD Shares”) together with a cash amount equal to the holder’s pro rata share of the other net assets of the Company. The Old Preferred Shares were redeemed at a price of $28.10 per share, in cash. The Old Capital Shares and the Old Preferred Shares have been de-listed from the Toronto Stock Exchange.

The Company holds TD Bank Shares in order to generate fixed cumulative preferential dividends for the holders of the Company’s Preferred Shares while providing the holders of the Capital Shares with a leveraged investment, the value of which is linked to the changes in the market price of the TD Bank Shares.

The Preferred Shares were offered at a price of $10.00 per share. Holders of Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly fixed cumulative preferential distributions equal to $0.11875 per Preferred Share, representing a dividend yield on the offering price of the Preferred Shares of 4.75%.

The Capital Shares were offered at a price of $18.00 per share. The Capital Shares will provide holders with a leveraged investment, the value of which is linked to changes in the market price of TD Bank Shares. Holders of Capital Shares will be entitled on redemption to the benefit of any capital appreciation in the market price of TD Bank Shares after payment of the dividends on the Preferred Shares.

There is no prospectus I can find on the company’s website, so I had to go to SEDAR.

The coupon on TDS.PR.C is 4.75%, or $0.475 p.a., paid quarterly in MJSD.

The provisional DBRS rating is Pfd-2(low).

There’s a monthly retraction, but it’s pretty horrible: the formula is (95%NAV – C – 1) which means that, effectively, there’s no point contemplating monthly retraction. There’s an Annual Retraction Date every November 15, but only for Capital Unitholders (who may also submit a preferred simultaneously to get full NAV, if they wish).

The issue matures 2015-11-15 at $10.00. The company can exercise calls at $10.00 to offset Capital Unit retractions on every Annual Retraction Date, or if net assets falls below $15-million.

There’s no NAV test per se, but company will only distribute income to the extent that it receives dividends on its TD holdings.

TDS.PR.B was tracked by HIMIPref™ but was relegated to the Scraps index on volume concerns. It was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was upgraded to Pfd-2(low) by DBRS. TDS.PR.C will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and will be initially assigned to the SplitShares index, although I suspect it will eventually get relegated as well.

Update: DBRS confirms at Pfd-2(low).

Issue Comments

BCE.PR.R to Reset at 4.490%

BCE Inc. has announced that it:

will, on December 1, 2010, continue to have Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series R outstanding if, following the end of the conversion period on November 17, 2010, BCE Inc. determines that at least one million Series R Preferred Shares would remain outstanding. In such a case, as of December 1, 2010, the Series R Preferred Shares will pay, on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., a fixed cash dividend for the following five years that will be based on a fixed rate equal to the product of: (a) the yield to maturity compounded semi-annually (the “Government of Canada Yield”), computed on November 10, 2010 by two investment dealers appointed by BCE Inc., that would be carried by Government of Canada bonds with a 5-year maturity, multiplied by (b) the “Selected Percentage Rate”.

The “Selected Percentage Rate” determined by BCE Inc. is 207%. The “Government of Canada Yield” is 2.169%. Accordingly, the annual dividend rate applicable to the Series R Preferred Shares for the five-year period beginning on December 1, 2010 will be 4.490%.

The announcement of the Selected Percentage Rate was reported on PrefBlog. Data for the Pairs Equivalency Calculator have been updated, but as yet the RatchetRate complement to this issue, Series Q, does not exist.

BCE.PR.R is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

MUH.PR.A Contemplating Reorganization

Mulvihill Premium Split Share Corp. has announced:

that its manager Mulvihill Capital Management Inc. has voluntarily agreed to decrease the management fee from 1.25% per annum of the net asset value to 0.50% per annum of net asset value for an indefinite period. The Fund implemented its Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan as required, to protect the original value of the Priority Equity Shares and is consequently invested in cash and cash equivalents. At this time, the manager has determined to consider strategic alternatives regarding the Fund and its operations.

The Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan was grafted on to the structure with the 2007 reorganization. In the Semi-annual Financials for July 31, 2010, the company disclosed:

Due to the above strategy to protect the Priority Equity shares the Fund is entirely in cash and cash equivalents. The Priority Equity shares have residual risk now, since they will be expected to cover expenses of the Fund in future years.

MUH.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the company announced an issuer bid. MUH.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

YPG: Ticker Change to YLO

Yellow Media Inc. has announced:

that Yellow Pages Income Fund (the Fund) has completed today the previously announced plan of arrangement pursuant to which the Fund’s income trust structure has been converted into a dividend paying publicly traded corporation named Yellow Media Inc. On May 6, 2010, unitholders of the Fund approved the conversion to a corporate structure by a vote of 99.8 percent. Under the plan of arrangement, unitholders of the Fund received, for each unit of the Fund held, one common share of the resulting public corporation. Common shares of Yellow Media Inc. will commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange on November 1, 2010 under the symbol YLO.

This ticker change applies to the company’s four series of preferred shares outstanding: The Operating Retractibles, YPG.PR.A and YPG.PR.B are now YLO.PR.A and YLO.PR.B, respectively. The FixedResets YPG.PR.C and YPG.PR.D, are now YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D respectively.

It is of interest to note the following from the 3Q10 Management Discussion and Analysis:

On June 8, 2010, Yellow Media Inc. received approval from the Toronto Stock Exchange on its notice of intention to renew its normal course issuer bid for its preferred shares, Series 1 and preferred shares, Series 2 through the facilities of the Toronto Stock Exchange from June 11, 2010 to no later than June 10, 2011, in accordance with applicable rules and regulations of the Toronto Stock Exchange.

Under its normal course issuer bid, Yellow Media Inc. intends to purchase for cancellation up to but not more than 1,174,691 and 720,000 of its outstanding preferred shares, Series 1 and preferred shares, Series 2, respectively, representing 10% of the public float of each series of preferred shares outstanding on June 8, 2010.

For the first nine months of 2010, Yellow Media Inc. purchased for cancellation 604,748 preferred shares, Series 1 for a total cash consideration of $15 million including brokerage fees at an average price of $24.76 per share and 260,250 preferred shares, Series 2 for a total cash consideration of $5.2 million including brokerage fees at an average price of $20.17 per share. The carrying value of these preferred shares, Series 1 and Series 2 was $14.9 million and $6.4 million, respectively.

Since June 11, 2009, the total cost of repurchasing preferred shares amounted to $33.9 million, including brokerage fees.

Issue Comments

MFC and the John Hancock LTC Fiasco

In their 2Q10 Quarterly Report to Shareholders, MFC stated:

The Company expects to complete its annual review of all actuarial methods and assumptions in the third quarter. In that regard, we expect that the methods and assumptions relating to our Long Term Care (“LTC”) business may be updated for the results of a comprehensive long-term care morbidity experience study, including the timing and amount of potential in-force rate increases. The study has not been finalized but is scheduled to be completed in the third quarter. We cannot reasonably estimate the results, and although the potential charges would not be included in the calculation of Adjusted Earnings from Operations, they could exceed Adjusted Earnings from Operations for the third quarter. There is a risk that potential charges arising as a result of the study may not be fully tax effected for accounting and reporting purposes.

JH LTC sales in the second quarter increased by 72 per cent compared to the prior year. This reflected the increased group sales from new member enrollments and new group clients as well as increased retail sales in advance of price increases and product re-positioning to improve margins. The Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program, where John Hancock is now the sole carrier, also contributed to the increase in sales from the prior year. As a result of the price increases, JH LTC retail sales are expected to slow during the second half of the year.

In both the second quarter of 2010 and 2009, John Hancock reported unfavourable long-term care morbidity experience. A comprehensive morbidity experience study is expected to be completed in the third quarter of 2010 and if the study concludes that the recent level of experience is expected to continue, price increases and policy liability increases would be required.

In the 3Q10 News Release they stated:

[Chief Financial Officer Michael] Bell added, “There were a number of notable items impacting our financial results this quarter. We completed our annual review of all actuarial methods and assumptions in the third quarter, and this resulted in a total net charge of just over $2 billion. This reserve strengthening included a significant charge related to our John Hancock Long-Term Care (“LTC”) business, where we completed a comprehensive long-term care claims experience study, including an assessment of the positive expected impacts of in-force rate increases.”

John Hancock Long-Term Care (“JH LTC”) sales increased 20 per cent in the third quarter compared to the prior year, driven by sales of retail products which increased in advance of June new business price increases taking effect. As a result of the recently completed claims experience study and the continuing low interest rate environment, JH LTC has temporarily suspended new group sales and is planning other retail product changes. JH LTC sales are expected to decline in the fourth quarter of 2010. In addition, JH LTC will be raising premiums on in-force business and is actively working with regulators to implement increases that are on average 40 per cent and affect the majority of the in-force business.

They also provide a handy table of their enormous actuarial charge:

(C$ millions)
Assumption
To
Policy Liabilities
To Net Income
Attributable to
Shareholders
Mortality and morbidity
   Long-term care $1,161 $ (755)
   Other (258) 182
 
Lapses and policyholder behaviour 648 (485)
Expenses (116) 104
Investment returns
   Variable annuity parameter update 872 (665)
   Ultimate reinvestment rates/grading for corporate spreads 441 (309)
   Other 94 (175)
 
Other valuation model methodology and model refinements (10) 72
Net Impact $2,832 $(2,031)

This charge of over a billion dollars on LTC pricing is explained as follows:

Long-term care mortality and morbidity changes

John Hancock Long-Term Care completed a comprehensive long-term care claims experience study, including estimated favourable impacts of in-force rate increases. As a result:

  • Expected claims costs increase primarily due to increased ultimate incidence at higher attained ages, anti-selection at older issue ages and improved mortality, partially offset by better experience on business sold in the last seven years due to evolving underwriting tools. These collectively resulted in an increase in Active Life Reserves of $ 3.2 billion.
  • Disabled Life Reserves were also strengthened by $0.3 billion to reflect emerging continuance and salvage experience for Retail and Fortis blocks.
  • Claims margins were harmonized for the pre and post rate stabilization blocks. The reduction in margins resulted in a reserve release of $0.2 billion.
  • Expected future premium increases reduced reserves by $2.2 billion resulting in a total of $3.0 billion of future premium increases assumed in the reserves. Premium increases averaging approximately 40 per cent will be sought on 80 per cent of the in-force business. We have factored into our assumptions our best estimate of the timing and amount of state approved premium increases. Our actual experience obtaining price increases could be materially different than we have assumed, resulting in further policy liability increases or reserve releases which could be material.

Kimberly Lankford reported in October:

The specific size of the increase may vary, depending on your age and when you purchased the policy, says Marianne Harrison, president of John Hancock Long-Term Care. The increase applies to both individual and group policies, and the largest increases will be restricted to older policies. But the rate hike will not apply to Leading Edge or Custom Care II Enhanced policies, two of their newer policies that are subject to stricter standards for setting premiums. Nor will the price hikes affect the long-term-care policy run by John Hancock for federal employees, which already had a premium increase of up to 25% in the spring.

But for many policyholders, the proposed price hike comes on top of a rate increase of 13% to 18% in 2008. The other long-term-care insurance leaders, Genworth and MetLife, also increased premiums for many of their policies around that time.

John Hancock is raising rates after a study found that the number of claims, the length of claims and the use of benefits from 1990 to 2010 were much higher than the company had expected — particularly the open-ended expense of providing lifetime benefits in an era when people live longer thanks to medical advances and then require extensive long-term care. “The claims on the lifetime coverage on our older policies were higher than our original policy assumptions,” says Harrison. (John Hancock stopped selling new policies with lifetime benefits in June 2010.)

“This is a last resort, from our perspective,” says Harrison. “But this is not a viable product if we do not have the appropriate money there to pay claims in the long term.”

It has also been reported:

[Marianne Harrison, president of John Hancock Long Term Care] is disclosing the rate increase and group policy suspension in a telephone conference with the company’s LTC insurance distributors [September 20, 2010].

Hancock announced the moves after its recent claims study showed unfavorable claims patterns, Harrison said in an interview.

Hancock’s claims studies, conducted every few years, examine LTC morbidity and termination claim trends based on actual experience. The last time Hancock undertook a thorough LTC claims review was in 2006, the company says.

This year’s study encompassed both open and closed claims, looking at all LTC claims Hancock received from 1990 to 2010.

As the LTC block continued to mature, Hancock’s latest study found it had twice the number of claims it found in its 2006 study. For older policy holders—ages 80 and up—the block had 4 times as many.

The severity and duration of claims in 2010 also were much higher than in 2006, Harrison says, while claims terminations were lower than expected.

Hancock has more than 1.2 million LTC insurance customers–700,000 individual, 350,000 group, and 224,000 under the federal program. Of all these policies, 47,000 have received benefits. Hancock says it has paid more than $3 billion in LTC claims, and now pays more than $1.5 million in claims per day.

Hancock announced in January:

John Hancock has launched a new interactive microsite, www.GetMoreWithMultilifeLTC.com, to help brokers and consultants explore and establish LTC insurance plans for businesses with up to 1,000 employees.

“Over the past 22 years, we have seen LTC insurance increase in popularity among large employers,” said Marianne Harrison, President, John Hancock Long-Term Care. “Today, we’re seeing small and mid-size employers showing greater interest in meeting the LTC needs of their employees, yet few of them know who to turn to for LTC advice and services. This site, in addition to the access to our team of experts, will be very helpful to brokers and consultants who want to provide this important coverage to businesses throughout the US.”

All this may be compared with the action taken by their competitors:

Genworth Financial Inc. says it will raise rates 18% on two older blocks of comprehensive long term care (LTC) insurance.
The policies, no longer marketed, were sold by two Genworth subsidiaries, Genworth Life and Genworth Life of New York.

Genworth, Richmond, Va. (NYSE:GWN), is increasing the rates because the percentage of policyholders in the blocks who have let policies lapse has been lower than expected, the company says.

Now, I will be the first to agree that insurance is a complicated business. And I will also agree wholeheartedly that I am not an expert on insurance and its pricing. But this fiasco goes to the root of investor confidence in MFC, because it is a very real indication that questions need to be asked about their basic competence.

This is a massive write-off, and the degree of under-pricing indicated by the proposed rate increases is astronomical. How can you possibly underprice something by 40% and not know that something is out of whack? Why was a major sales initiative on this product initiated in January, only to have sales through that channel cancelled in October? Shouldn’t you have a reasonable idea of profitability before you spend money on new increasing sales?

Isn’t anybody looking at a report of actual versus actuarial claims expenses and thinking ‘Claims are at 200% of projections for this product, and at 400% for this subgroup … gee, maybe we should have a proper look at it’?

Why was the actuarial review of LTC not done sooner? The prior one was in 2006, so that’s four years between reviews. How are the topics for review chosen? Is there some system of monitoring in place so that an informed decision can be made regarding the areas in which review is required? If not, why not? If so, then it seems as if the system failed: write-offs and price increases on this scale indicate that the review was well overdue. If there is a system, why did it fail and how can investors have any confidence that it will not fail in the future?

Update 2010-11-11: MetLife is exiting the LTC business:

MetLife Inc., the largest U.S. life insurer, will halt the sale of new long-term care coverage after citing “financial challenges” in the business.

Long-term care policies provide coverage to help pay for home-health aides or residence in a nursing home or assisted- living facility. New York-based MetLife will accept applications for new coverage through Dec. 30 and continue to honor previously written contracts after that date, the company said.

“Many Americans remain at risk for needing long-term care services,” MetLife said. The insurer is reviewing a way to combine the coverage with other contracts “ which the company believes can effectively address the long-term care financing needs of the public as well as its business goals.”

Issue Comments

MFC Vague on Capital Requirements; Downgraded by Moody's; S&P Watch-Negative

Manulife Financial Corporation has released its 3Q10 Financials. The Press Release states:

The net loss attributed to shareholders of $947 million included the following notable items:

  • Net gains of $1,041 million related to higher equity markets and lower interest rates.
  • Charges of $2,031 million related to basis changes resulting from the annual review of all
    actuarial methods and assumptions.

  • A $1,039 million (US$1,000 million) goodwill impairment charge on our U.S. Insurance business related to the economic outlook and the repositioning of that business.
  • Other notable items netted to a $303 million gain and are described in more detail below.

After adjusting for these notable items, adjusted earnings from operations was $779 million.

They made a lot of Long-Term Care sales in the States … but was it profitable and can it be sustained?

John Hancock Long-Term Care (“JH LTC”) sales increased 20 per cent in the third quarter compared to the prior year, driven by sales of retail products which increased in advance of June new business price increases taking effect. As a result of the recently completed claims experience study and the continuing low interest rate environment, JH LTC has temporarily suspended new group sales and is planning other retail product changes. JH LTC sales are expected to decline in the fourth quarter of 2010. In addition, JH LTC will be raising premiums on in-force business and is actively working with regulators to implement increases that are on average 40 per cent and affect the majority of the in-force business.

There are not enough details given to form a firm opinion … but a 40% increase in rates? on average? That has all the hallmarks of a major fuck-up. Do these guys know what they’re doing?

They do provide a clearer warning of the effect of OSFI’s new risk requirements:

The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (“OSFI”) has been conducting a review of segregated fund/variable annuity capital requirements. On October 29, 2010, OSFI issued a draft advisory containing new minimum calibration criteria for determining capital requirements for segregated fund business written after January 1, 2011. It is expected that the new calibration criteria will increase capital requirements on these products and our 2011 product offerings will be developed and priced taking into account these new rules. As drafted the new capital requirements will also apply to subsequent deposits to existing contracts and to contracts that reset their guarantee levels after January 1, 2011.

… and the capital requirements for seg funds will be getting even stricter:

OSFI is also expected to continue its consultative review of its capital rules for more general application, likely in 2013. OSFI notes that it is premature to draw conclusions about the cumulative impact this process will have, but the general direction has been one of increased capital requirements. OSFI has stated that increases in capital may be offset by other changes, such as hedge recognition. The Company will continue to monitor developments. However, at this time, it appears that it is more likely than not that the capital requirements for in-force business will increase and this increase could be material.

They are worried by the IFRS Exposure Draft on Insurance Contracts (see also commentary on SLF 3Q10) and are busily sleazing around the regulators and politicians to get an exemption:

This mismatch between the underlying economics of our business and reported results and potentially our capital requirements could have significant unintended negative consequences on our business model which would potentially affect our customers, shareholders and the capital markets. We believe the accounting rules under discussion could put Canadian insurers at a significant disadvantage relative to their U.S. and global peers, and also to the banking sector in Canada. We are currently reviewing the proposals contained in the Exposure Draft, and, along with other companies in the Canadian insurance industry, expect to provide comments and input to the IASB. The insurance industry in Canada is also currently working with OSFI and the federal government with respect to the potential impact of these proposals on Canadian insurance companies, and the industry is urging policymakers to ensure that any future accounting and capital proposals appropriately consider the underlying business model of a life insurance company and in particular, the implications for long duration guaranteed products which are much more prevalent in North America than elsewhere.

Sadly, Prentice has already been bought hired by CIBC, but there are probably many other politicians for sale eager to devote their expertise to the private sector.

DBRS comments:

DBRS has reviewed the Q3 2010 results of Manulife Financial Corporation (Manulife or the Company) released today and believes that, notwithstanding the negative net earnings figure, the Company is on the right track to restoring sustainable profitability. The ratings of Manulife and its affiliates remain unchanged, including the Issuer Rating of its major operating subsidiary, The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company (MLI), at AA (low). The ratings were recently downgraded on August 9, 2010.

The Company has been actively repositioning its product offering by selectively increasing prices and emphasizing products that are less capital intensive. Integrated risk management and control is leading to a systematic reduction in equity and interest rate risk through portfolio shifts. As part of its risk management framework, the Company has now hedged 54% of its variable annuity exposures to equity markets and has plans to use actions based on time schedules and market triggers to reach its risk reduction goals. The Company expects to reduce its equity sensitivity by approximately 60% by 2012 and approximately 75% by 2014. It also expects to take actions to further reduce its interest rate exposures, as measured by the impact on shareholders’ net income, by approximately 25% by the end of 2012 and approximately 50% by the end of 2014. While this could ultimately be expensive for the Company, DBRS believes that ridding itself of this equity market and interest rate risk hangover is fundamental to restoring market confidence in the Company’s longer-term outlook.

DBRS did not comment on the size of the write-down due to changes in actuarial assumptions: they had previously estimated a charge of $700- to $800-million.

Moody’s downgraded the operating subsidiaries:

Moody’s Investors Service downgraded the insurance financial strength (IFS) ratings of Manulife Financial Corporation’s (Manulife; TSX: MFC, unrated) subsidiaries to A1 from Aa3. These subsidiaries include Manufacturers Life Insurance Company (MLI) and John Hancock Life Insurance Company (USA) (JHUSA). Short-term ratings were affirmed. The rating outlook for Manulife’s subsidiaries is stable. These rating actions conclude the reviews for downgrade initiated on August 5, 2010.

The rating agency said the downgrades follow MFC’s announcement of a nearly $1 billion net loss in 3q10 and incorporated the following business developments. First, Manulife’s acknowledgement of higher morbidity experience within its US long-term-care block and the resulting need for an average rate increase exceeding 40% in coming months. Also, the company faces the challenge of redesigning products to restore earnings power, combined with the possibility of continued earnings volatility until the firm’s enhanced market-risk hedging program is substantially complete.

Moody’s said the downgrades also reflect Manulife’s diminished financial flexibility because of reduced earnings coverage and increased financial leverage. At the end of the third quarter, Moody’s estimates that Manulife’s adjusted financial leverage is now over 30%, which exceeds Moody’s limit on this rating sub-factor. Furthermore, the company faces further goodwill charges as it adopts IFRS accounting in 2011. Although these goodwill write-downs are non-cash, they will lead to further deterioration on Moody’s leverage metrics. MLI reported a 234% minimum continuing capital and surplus requirements (MCCSR, the Canadian regulatory capital ratio for life insurers) ratio at the end of the third quarter, which Moody’s views as strong; however, this was due in part to the downstreaming of proceeds from debt raised at the parent as capital to MLI. As the firm’s total leverage increases, management’s ability to deploy double leverage to capitalize the operating company decreases.

According to Moody’s, upward pressure on the ratings would result from a substantial completion of the company’s equity and interest rate hedging programs, the maintenance of a MCCSR ratio above 220% and an NAIC RBC ratio at JHUSA of at least 325% on a sustained basis, with improved financial flexibility including adjusted leverage below 30% and earnings coverage above 8x on a sustained basis. Downward pressure would result from a failure to complete the hedging programs, a MCCSR ratio that dropped below 200%, and/or an NAIC RBC ratio at JHUSA of less than 275%.

S&P had the grace to admit the actuarial change was larger than expected:

2010–Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services today said it placed its ‘A’ counterparty credit rating on Manulife Financial Corp. (TSX/NYSE:MFC) on CreditWatch with negative implications. At the same time, Standard & Poor’s placed its ‘AA’ counterparty credit and financial
strength ratings on MFC’s core and guaranteed insurance operating subsidiaries on CreditWatch with negative implications.

“We placed the ratings on all of the companies in the Manulife group on CreditWatch negative because of Manulife’s continuing earnings volatility and material noncash goodwill impairments that could reach C$3.2 billion,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Robert Hafner. “These goodwill impairments include $2.2 billion under IFRS accounting rules that could follow in the
first quarter of 2011.”

“The earnings volatility is evident in the group’s consolidated third-quarter loss of C$947 million that includes a basis change charge of about C$2 billion arising from its annual review of all actuarial assumptions and methods,” said Mr. Hafner. “These charges somewhat exceed the amount we assumed when we lowered the ratings on the group on Aug. 5 and assigned a negative outlook.”