Category: Issue Comments

Issue Comments

HSB.PR.E to Settle April 8; Terms Unchanged

HSBC Bank of Canada has announced:

HSBC Bank Canada (the “Bank”) intends to file an amended and restated prospectus supplement for the previously announced offering of Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class 1 Preferred Shares Series E (the “Preferred Shares Series E”). The amendment is a result of ratings action announced on 31 March 2009 by Standard and Poor’s (“S&P”) on the hybrid capital securities of over 60 European financial institutions, including the Bank’s parent company, HSBC Holdings plc. The S&P ratings of the Preferred Shares Series E of ‘P-1(Low)’ and ‘A’ under S&P’s Canadian and Global Preferred Share Rating scales, respectively, are among the highest of the major Canadian banks.

The Bank and a syndicate of investment dealers led by HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc. and Scotia Capital Inc. (the “Underwriters”) intend to enter into an agreement that will amend in certain respects the underwriting agreement they signed on 24 March 2009 (the “Underwriting Agreement” and together with the amending agreement, the “Amended Underwriting Agreement”). The size of the offering will be unchanged at 7 million shares at a price of $25.00 per share, for gross proceeds of C$175 million. The expected closing date for the offering, previously scheduled for 31 March 2009, will be amended to 8 April 2009.

Pursuant to the Amended Underwriting Agreement, HSBC Bank Canada will grant the Underwriters the option (the “Underwriters’ Option”), exercisable in whole or in part at any time up to two business days prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional 3 million Preferred Shares Series E at the issue price. Should the Underwriters’ Option be fully exercised, the total gross proceeds of the financing will be C$250 million.

The Preferred Shares Series E will entitle the holders to receive non-cumulative preferential fixed quarterly cash dividends if, as and when declared by the board of directors of the Bank, of C$0.4125 per share, to yield 6.60 per cent annually for the initial period ending 30 June 2014. Thereafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a rate equal to 4.85 per cent over the then five-year Government of Canada Bond Yield. Subject to regulatory approval, on 30 June 2014 and on 30 June every five years thereafter, the Bank may redeem the Preferred Shares Series E in whole or in part at par.

Based on the anticipated closing date of 8 April 2009, the first dividend on the Preferred Shares Series E will be payable on 30 June 2009 in the amount of C$0.3762 per share.

This resolves the confusion previously noted on PrefBlog. The issue was announced on March 23, with size bumped from $125-million to $175-million same-day.

The release on Newswire is timestamped 8:14 pm, for those who are interested.

Update, 2009-4-6: S&P has released a commentary on HSBC Canada:

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services today commented on the March 31, 2009, downgrade of the rating on the preferred shares of HSBC Bank Canada (HSBC Canada; AA/Negative/A-1+). On that date, the global scale rating on HSBC Canada’s preferred shares was lowered to ‘A’ from ‘A+’, and the Canada scale rating on these instruments was lowered to ‘P-1(Low)’ from ‘P-1’.

This rating action was a direct consequence of a review of the ratings on the hybrid capital securities of various European banks (see “Hybrid Securities Of Over 60 European Financial Institutions Downgraded Following S&P Review”, published March 31, 2009, on RatingsDirect). One of the groups included in this review was HSBC Canada’s ultimate parent, HSBC Holdings PLC (HSBC Group; AA-/Negative/A-1+), which is U.K.-incorporated.

The hybrid capital-related ratings downgrades on HSBC Canada were not related to the previously planned closing date for HSBC Canada’s preferred share issuance on March 31, 2009.

I have communicated my displeasure to HSBC Canada regarding its delay in issuing a press release on this matter. While I am very well aware that it was a nightmarish occurance for them, I think that a March 31 press release to the effect that “Due to S&P’s rating action this morning the issue did not close as planned. HSBC Canada is in discussions with the underwriters to resolve this situation” should have been issued.

Issue Comments

RY.PR.X Closes at Small Premium with High Volume

RY.PR.X, the FixedReset issue announced last week had a very solid opening day, trading 725,748 shares in a range of 24.91-09 before closing at 25.02-05, 27×46.

Its vital statistics are:

RY.PR.X FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-01
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %

This is an issue sure to be at the centre of many trade errors over the course of its existence. A few years back, Royal Bank started a new numbering system for its preferreds, presumably in cooperation with the TSX: Series ‘AA’ has ticker RY.PR.A, Series ‘AB’ has ticker RY.PR.B and so on. It was great, and a lot better than giving Series N the symbol RY.PR.K, for instance.

But now we have Series AV having ticker RY.PR.X. I suspect that the TSX reserves the “V” suffix for USD issues, or perhaps they consider it too soon after the redemption of the old RY.PR.V (USD 250-million, Series K, redeemed in 2003) to recycle the ticker.

One way or another, it would appear a little more communication is in order.

Issue Comments

S&P Downgrades HSB to P-1(low); Confusion Reigns for HSB.PR.E

S&P has announced:

it lowered its issue ratings on the hybrid capital securities of over 60 European financial institutions.

The rating actions followed our review of ratings on the hybrid instruments of financial institutions in Europe. The downgrades reflect our assessment of the deteriorating financial prospects for the European banking industry in the worsening economic environment and our view that European governments and the European Commission (EC) over the medium term may be more willing than previously to encourage or force banks to suspend payments on hybrid securities to preserve cash and build capital. We did not change any of the issuer credit ratings (ICRs) on the banking groups that issue these hybrid securities.

Hybrids for HSBC Bank PLC has been downgraded from A+ to A; HSBC Holdings PLC has been downgraded from A to A-.

The rating of HSBC Bank Canada preferreds, have been reduced from A+ to A, which equates to a change from P-1 to P-1(low) on the national scale.

This has had repercussions for the new issue announced last week, which had been assigned the TSX ticker symbol HSB.PR.E.

The underwriting agreement dated March 24 (available on SEDAR) states:

The Bank shall cause to be delivered to the Underwriters’ Representative on behalf of all Underwriters at the Closing Time, and the Underwriters’ obligations pursuant to this Agreement will be conditional upon:

(j) receipt by the Underwriters of a confirmation in a form reasonably acceptable to them that the Offered Securities have received a final rating from DBRS of Pfd-1 with a negative trend and from S&P of P-1 and A+, using S&P’s Canadian scale for preferred shares and S&P’s global scale for preferred shares, respectively;

It is my understanding that a new term sheet has been issued, but I haven’t seen it.

There is no press release and HSBC has not responded to my inquiry. You can’t expect important people like bankers and underwriters to demean themselves by communicating with investor scum.

This could be fun! Get your popcorn!

Issue Comments

Best & Worst Performers: March 2009

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

March 2009
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “March 31”)
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(high) -8.73% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.10% based on a bid of 14.33 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low) -6.25% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.59% based on a bid of 15.01 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low) -5.39% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.54% based on a bid of 15.61 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 -3.91% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.73% based on a bid of 16.32 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.F PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low) -3.90% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.56% based on a bid of 19.70 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.H PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 +6.24% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.69% based on a bid of 21.45 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 +6.71% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.81% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 +6.72% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.72% based on a bid of 20.97 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 +7.29% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.57% based on a bid of 17.22 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) +9.43% Nice to see one of the BAM floaters on this side of ledger!
Issue Comments

CIU.PR.B Soars to Hefty Premium on Decent volume

The CIU Inc. Fixed-Resets, 6.70%+481 announced last week had a superb opening day, trading 182,555 shares in a range of 25.25-85 before closing with a quote of 25.61-85, 5×15.

Its vital statistics may be summed up as:

CIU.PR.B FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.61
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %

An encouraging sign! I can imagine the brokers are now beating the bushes desperately, looking for more potential issuers with a decent credit rating and the ability to offer cumulative dividends!

One interesting thing about this issue is that it still looks cheap against CIU.PR.A, which closed today at 17.55-90, 15×10, to yield a beggarly 6.64% at the bid, supported by the quite extraordinary premium the market is placing on cumulativity of dividends. This implies that the market is evaluating the value of reset feature at only 44bp … not too much!

Issue Comments

BMO.PR.O Settles at Premium on Heavy Volume

BMO.PR.O, the 6.50%+458 Fixed-Reset announced on March 11 has settled successfully, trading 550,271 shares in a range of 24.90-20 before closing at 25.15-20, 8×50.

Issue size was $150-million plus a greenshoe for $75-million. No announcement has yet been made regarding take-up of the underwriters’ option; but with such heavy volume I’ll bet a nickel it was exercised in full.

Five-Year Canadas have come in considerably since the announcement and are now at 1.58%. This means that the yield-to-Perpetuity of the issue is now a more modest than expected 6.27%, based on a bid of 25.15 and a limitMaturity price of 25.10.

This issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ Fixed-Reset sub-index.

Issue Comments

YPG.PR.A / YPG.PR.B : Wildly Divergent Yields

Assiduous Reader prefhound commented:

May I be baffled at the relative prices/yields of the two Yellow Pages Prefs?:

YPG.PR.A closing $19.80; Dividend $1.0625; Retractible Dec 31, 2012 for a YTM = 11.1%.

YPG.PR.B closing $11.75; Dividend $1.25; Retractible Jun 30, 2017 for a YTM = 17.1%

We are used to flaky pref prices when the lower priced issue has a smaller dividend, but here the Pref A has a lower dividend and lower current yield than the Pref B (5.4 vs 10.7%) — and that is before its lower capital gains potential!

If it is a yield curve difference (due to the extra 4.5 years for the pref B), then YPG.PR.B yields 11.1% through Dec 31, 2012 and 26.5% for the period 2013-retraction. Should we conclude that the company will be fine for 3 years and then fall apart in the subsequent five?

BAM and BPO retractible prefs of different maturity dates often have very similar yields to maturity, but not YPG. The YPG.PR.B yield is often more than PR.A, but the current 6 points seems absurd. If both Pref A and Pref B had the same yields to retraction, the Pref B should be $16.82 — more than 40% higher!

I smell arbitrage potential here, but am not sure how long it would take to sort out. Do you have any special insight into this pair?

… and I responded

I think it all comes down to mortgages.

There is a very real preferred habitat amongst retail investors for short-term bonds, which are usually defined as bonds with five years or less to maturity, which just happens to be the term of most Canadian mortgages.

When you add in the fact that the number of watchers is reduced dramatically by the Pfd-3(high) rating, I think you have an explanation.

You are quite right that BPO retractibles all yield in the same ballpark – but that ballpark is the “penalty yield” ballpark … it is, perhaps, best thought of as a company that is not getting the benefit of the five-year cliff.

And BAM’s just plain wierd.

I suspect that any rationalization of the YPG.PR.B yield will have to wait until 2011-12, when retail will start thinking of it as something with a maturity instead of one of them never get yer money back things.

As I have previously disclosed, the fund holds a position in YPG.PR.B, taken as an optimization trade after the downgrade of BCE.PR.I made me uncomfortable with the fund’s weighting in that name. It’s a relatively small position, with a portfolio weight within the bounds I consider prudent. Barring an increase in credit concern, I’ll hold the damn thing to maturity at a yield of 17+%!

Yellow Pages recently announced that:

it has extended the term of the $500 million tranche of its core revolving credit facility by an additional year to May 2012. Combined with the $200 million revolving tranche, the full amount of the $700 million core revolving credit facility now matures in May 2012. This facility can be used for general corporate purposes and serves as back-up to the commercial paper program.

With the combination of the core revolving credit facility and the $450 million credit facility established in 2008, Yellow Pages Income Fund has access to $1.150 billion in long term committed bank lines, providing ample liquidity to fund its operations and to refinance the Series 1 Medium Term Notes maturing in April 2009.

I note from their most recent Management Discussion and Analysis:

In April 2009, YPG will be repaying at maturity the series 1 medium term notes issued in April 2004 ($450 million) and currently intends to draw under the New Revolving Facility to refinance these notes. We will also continue to monitor conditions in the fixed income market.

YPG Holdings Inc. has a total of $300 million of Exchangeable Unsecured Subordinated Debentures outstanding (the Exchangeable Debentures). The Exchangeable Debentures have a maturity date of August 1, 2011 and are exchangeable at any time, at the option of the holder, for units of the Fund at an exchange price of $20.00 per unit.

So the exchangeable-ha-ha debs mature in 2011 – prior to retraction for YPG.PR.A, so fears regarding these two refinancings is not the issue.

The supplemental disclosures provide a breakdown of the maturities:

Yellow Pages
Debt Term Structure
Date Amount Market
Yield
2009-4-21 $450-million  
2011-2-28 $150-million  
2011-8-1 $300-million  
2012-12-31
Retraction
YPG.PR.A
$300-million 11.21%
(Dividend)
2014-4-21 $300-million 8.36%
2016-2-25 $550-million 8.57%
2017-6-30
Retraction
YPG.PR.B
$200-million 17.67%
(Dividend)
2019-11-18 $250-million 9.25%
2036-2-15 $350-million  

The revolving credit line (of which $359-million is drawn) has maturities:

Yellow Pages
Credit Line Maturities
Date Amount
2011-5-8 $450-million
2012-5-25 $200-million
2011-5-21 $500-million

There is a significant refunding due between the two pref series … but it’s not as if the entire debt matures between the two issues’ maturities, at least! If they can refinance the April maturity (currently being refunded via the credit line) with a ten-year term, that will remove at least a little uncertainty.

I should note that a significant proportion of the YPG.PR.B yield is back-end-loaded; that is, dependent upon maturity at par. It’s only yield if you actually get the money!

Finally, I will note the DBRS Press Release of 2008-11-6:

The rating remains underpinned by the Company’s dominance as the incumbent directories publisher in Canada, a market which continues to maintain high usage rates in traditional print directories, and supports a meaningful and growing online directories and vertical media platform.

The rating is further supported by YPG’s industry leading EBITDA margins of roughly 55% and the Company’s strong liquidity position, as evidenced by good free cash flow generation (approximately $130 million for the latest twelve months ending September 30, 2008), over $600 million of undrawn availability under its $950 million committed bank facilities at the end of the third quarter of 2008, and capability and flexibility to refinance upcoming maturities (including $450 million in notes which mature in April 2009).

YPG’s free cash flow is expected to continue to demonstrate solid growth through 2010 as a result of the Company’s limited capital requirements and a gradual reduction in the distribution payout ratio as YPG prepares to become fully taxable on January 1, 2011.

Through the end of 2008, DBRS expects YPG’s credit metrics to remain stable on a year-over-year basis, with DBRS-adjusted gross debt-to-EBITDA ranging between 2.90 times and 3.00 times. This is also expected to continue through 2009.

YPG is expected to continue to manage its balance sheet in a conservative manner, balancing strategic acquisitions and unit repurchases in line with its long-term unadjusted leverage targets, maintaining net debt-to-EBITDA between 2.80 times and 3.20 times (at September 30, 2008, this metric stood at roughly 2.90 times). These targets remain within the context of a strong investment grade rating when considering the Company’s favourable business risk profile and free cash flow capacity.

Both issues are tracked by HIMIPref™ and both are incorporated in the “Scraps” index due to credit concerns. The last mention of YPG.PR.A discussed its issue price and the last mention of YPG.PR.B commented on its hostile reception on its opening day in June 2007.

Issue Comments

MFC: Moody's Downgrades Insurer Financial Strength

Moody’s has announced:

downgraded the insurance financial strength (IFS) ratings of Manulife Financial Corporation’s (Manulife; TSX: MFC) subsidiaries to Aa3 from Aa1.

Manulife reported the following sensitivities of its capital and earnings to equity markets: (1) MLI’s regulatory capital ratio (known as MCCSR) will decline 2 percentage points for every 1 percentage point decline in the equity markets; and (2) MLI will suffer a C$1.6 billion rise in reserve charges (after-tax) for equity market guarantees for every 10% drop in equity markets. By contrast, some of Manulife’s peers have reported significantly less onerous sensitivities — with MCCSR and reserve charge sensitivities a fraction of Manulife’s. Equity markets, Moody’s notes, are down approximately 10-15% since the start of 2009, and had been down 20% earlier this year, highlighting the potential for further volatility in regulatory capitalization.

The negative outlook reflects the company’s continuing susceptibility to declines in the equity markets. As noted above, Manulife, unlike most of the other large writers of variable annuities and segregated funds in North America, has not implemented a comprehensive equity hedging program, making the company more vulnerable than peers to equity market volatility. After giving benefit for Manulife’s C$450 million preferred share equity raise this month, Moody’s estimates MLI’s MCCSR at or around 200%, which is low relative to historic standards and relative to Moody’s expectations at Manulife’s current Aa3 IFS rating level. Assuming a C$2.4 billion charge for higher variable annuity guarantee reserves (given equity markets are down 15%), Moody’s estimates a consolidated financial leverage ratio of over 25% at present, versus 22% at the end of 2008.

Moody’s Global Rating Methodology for Life Insurers notes:

The IFS ratings are assigned to life insurance operating companies and are Moody’s opinions of the ability of insurance companies to repay punctually senior policyholder claims and obligations.

Manulife has the following preferreds outstanding: MFC.PR.A (OpRet); MFC.PR.B (PerpetualDiscount); and MFC.PR.C (PerpetualDiscount). These issues were last mentioned on PrefBlog when Fitch downgraded MFC on March 2.

Issue Comments

RPQ.PR.A: Underlying Note Now Rated CCC by S&P (?)

RPQ.PR.A is a stuctured product which was last discussed on PrefBlog when dividends were suspended and the rating withdrawn.

Essentially, holders of this issue have written a “financial disaster insurance policy” – they get paid coupons as a premium on their money, but have to make a massive payment if there are too many defaults in the bonds comprising the reference portfolio.

The deal was structured via a Credit Linked Note issued by the Bank of Nova Scotia; I see that this Credit Linked Note – orginally rated A- by S&P – is now rated CCC, with a rating date of March 10. I note that the December ’08 Performance Update for RPQ.PR.A (published by CC&L group, the sponsor) states that the rating for the Credit Linked Note has been withdrawn – I’m not sure what’s going on. It is possible that BNS originally had two credit linked notes with the stated maturity, and that it is an unrelated issue that is now rated CCC … but I suggest that those potentially affected by this change contact CC&L, BNS and S&P … and let me know what you find out!

I confess to a certain morbid curiosity regarding this and its related issues. RPQ.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

RPA.PR.A Downgraded to P-3(low) [Watch Negative] by S&P

ROC Pref. Corp. II has announced:

it was informed on March 10th that Standard & Poor’s Rating services had lowered its rating on the Preferred Shares a notch to P-3(low) and kept them on CreditWatch with negative implications on February 5, 2009.

It was nice of S&P to inform the company only a month after the fact, eh?

RPA.PR.A had a NAV of 8.40 on February 27 and will mature at $25 on or about Dec. 31, 2009 if all goes well.

RPA.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was Downgraded to P-3 / Watch Negative by S&P.

RPA.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.