Category: Issue Comments

Data Changes

BCE.PR.F & PPL.PR.A Added to HIMIPref™ Database

I have bowed to overwhelming popular demand and added the captioned issues to the database.

BCE.PR.F is a FixedFloater, paying $1.10 annually (paid quarterly) until 2010-2-1, at which point the rate gets reset and it becomes exchangeable with BCE.PR.E. Exchange Dates recur every five years thereafter. For analytical purposes, it is assumed that the conversion to ratchet rate is automatic – this is a valid worst-case assumption, since BCE has the discretion to set the five-year rate to a very low value. It is callable on exchange dates at 25.00 and (when ratcheting) at 25.50 at other times. For analytical purposes this is simplified to two calls at $25.00, on 2010-2-1 and 2015-2-1. Dividends are cumulative. There is no retraction.

PPL.PR.A is a split share based on Canadian banks, paying dividends at a rate of Prime, capped at 7%, collared at 5%. It matures 2012-12-1 at $10.00. There is a special monthly retraction provision with the formula 96%(NAV – C). Dividends are cumulative and paid monthly. Current NAV is $16.08 according to the company. Income coverage, according to May’s semi-annual report is a hair over 1.0:1. Maturity is 2012-12-1; there are no embedded redemptions. Distributions to Capital Units will be halted if the NAV falls below 15.00 (asset coverage of 1.5:1).

Documentation

What is the Yield on BCE.PR.Y?

I was recently taken to task for a claim that the yield on BCE.PR.Y was 8.18% based on a dividend of $1.05715 and an end value of $25.00 – my correspondent stated – quite rightly – that:

the most recent monthly dividend, declared Oct 28, 2008, was $0.8333 or $1.00 per year. Also Prime has dropped to 3.5% from 4% earlier this month, (according to the BOC website), indicating a further cut in the dividend in the near future. Even at the rates and prices you quote I make the yield out to be 7.3%.

My defense is as follows:

They system estimates the average future rate of prime by looking at the past. If we stay at 3.5% prime for long enough, the estimated future rate will drop to this level, but for now it’s higher.

Additionally, the system estimates the end-value (a “limitMaturity” is treated as thirty years, remember) by determining the price at which the instrument is fairly valued; determining fairness by comparison with other floating-rate dependent issues. This was the result of some experimentation and proved to be a better predictor than assuming a constant price (as is done with fixed-rate perpetuals).

Basically, the assumption is that an Investment Grade issue will not pay 100% of prime forever. There will be shocks, of course, and every now and then such an issue will be downgraded and quite properly pay 100% of prime; but over the long term such a rate is not sustainable.

I will admit that this analytical framework was formulated when deviations were relatively small; an investment grade issue paying (25.00 / 14.25) = 175% of prime is not something that happens often enough to permit testing!

All the above is not very satisfactory, I know: but there are a lot of moving parts in the analysis of these ratchet rate issues and the framework was determined empirically. In some cases, to my chagrin, the results are not even internally consistent (e.g., I might be estimating a ratchet yield of less than 100% of prime with end values well below par).

All I can say is that the empirically derived system, while having theoretical holes in it, does have a statistical ability to rank the various issues with significantly better-than-random accuracy, which is all I ever wanted it to do.

Now lets do the cash flow analysis! I have uploaded the full HIMIPref™ output; the last part is:

2038-12-16 MATURITY 25.00 0.080242 2.01

Total Cash Flows 56.6052
Total Present Value 13.5028
Discounting Rate 8.5887 % (Annual rate compounded semi-annually)

So for starters, we see that the the discounted present value of the $25.00 maturity is only $2.01. It’s not a particularly important variable.

But compare four bonds priced at par, each one paying $12 p.a., but with differing frequencies (annual, semi-annual, quarterly, monthly). Each one is described by fixed income convention as having a yield-to-maturity of 12%. Which would you rather have? Obviously, the monthly payer, since then you get your money faster … and this is borne out when we look at the annualized internal rate of return for the four bonds: 12.00%, 12.36%, 12.55% and 12.69%, respectively. The limiting case is an infinite number of infinitesimally small payments totalling $12 and has an IRR of exp(0.12) – 1 = 12.75%.

We note from the HIMIPref™ report that the 30-year discounting factor is 0.080242 so
1 / (1 + I)^30 = 0.080242
(1 + I)^30 = 1 / 0.080242 = 12.4623
I = 8.7727%

To convert this annual value to semi-annual, bond-equivalent yield, we note:
1+I = (1+i)*(1+i)
(1+i) = 1.042942
i = 4.2942
and therefore, the bond-equivalent yield is 2*i = 8.5884%, which is slightly different from the quoted figure, but we’ll attribute that to rounding.

But how to calculate this ourselves? The “ratchet yield” is 4.1997% of par, which implies total payments of $1.049925. These are made monthly, so monthly payments are $0.087494, which has been shown as a rounded value of $0.09 in the HIMIPref™ report.

The normal quick-n-dirty calculation is:
i = [Annual Income + Annual Capital Gain]/[Average of Beginning and Ending Price]
Annual Income = oh hell, let’s just call it $1.05, shall we?
Annual Capital Gain = Total Capital Gain / Term = (25.00 – 13.50) / 30 = $0.38333
Average of Beginning and Ending Price = (25.00 + 13.50) / 2 = 19.25

resulting in a quick-n-dirty estimate of (1.05 + 0.3833) / 19.25 = 7.45%.

It’s a lousy estimate. Terrible. Why?

Mainly because the beginning and ending prices are so different. The calculation assumes that the capital gain is realized in a linear fashion … but in fact, if it accrues at a constant rate, nearly twice as much is accruing at the end of the period as at the beginning. Conversely, the $1.05 income is much more interesting at the beginning of the period (current yield = 1.05 / 13.50 = 7.78%) than at the end (current yield = 1.05 / 25 = 4.20%.

When the capital gain through the period is massive, simple methods become simplistic. Such is life! Fortunately, yield calculators and Excel Spreadsheets will be readily available to most people.

Related discussions may be found in the posts regarding Research: Modified Duration and Research: Yield from on-line Calculator.

Listen, take it from an old bond guy: if anybody ever tells you yield is simple, don’t listen to him!

Issue Comments

BIG.PR.B Offering Closes

Big 8 Split Inc. has announced:

that it has completed its public offering of 1,204,980 Class B Preferred Shares, Series 1 (“Class B Preferred Shares”) raising approximately $14.5 million. The Class B Preferred Shares were offered to the public by a syndicate of agents led by TD Securities Inc and Scotia Capital Inc., and including BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., National Bank Financial Inc. and Dundee Securities Corporation. In addition, the Company has redeemed all of its outstanding Class A Preferred Shares and 1,052,334 of its Class A Capital Shares. Holders of 1,204,980 Class A Capital Shares did not retract their Class A Capital Shares pursuant to the special retraction right created in accordance with the capital reorganization approved by holders of the Class A Capital Shares on November 21, 2008.

The Class B Preferred Shares were offered in order to fund in part, the redemption of Class A Capital Shares tendered under the special retraction right and all of the Class A Preferred Shares and to maintain the leveraged “split share” structure of the Company.

BIG.PR.B will not be tracked by HIMIPref™ due to the issue’s small size. The issuance and related redemption of BIG.PR.A has been previously discussed on PrefBlog.

Issue Comments

CYC.PR.A Redeemed

Cyclical Split NT Corp has announced that it:

today redeemed all of its outstanding Capital Shares and Preferred Shares as previously disclosed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares is $25.00 per Preferred Share, and the redemption price for the Capital Shares is $118.36821 per Capital Share for those holders of Capital Shares who elected a cash redemption rather than an in-kind redemption.

The Company’s Capital Shares and Preferred Shares were delisted from the TSX following the redemption.

The last mention of CYC.PR.A was in conncection with last year’s partial redemption. CYC.PR.A was not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

BCE Under Review-Developing by DBRS

DBRS has announced:

has today placed its ratings of Bell Canada Under Review with Positive Implications and maintained its ratings of BCE Inc. (BCE or the Company) Under Review with Developing Implications. Additionally, DBRS has withdrawn its ratings of BCE Acquisition Inc.

DBRS’s review will focus on a re-evaluation of the credit profiles of BCE and Bell Canada. This will include the current business and financial risk profile of Bell Canada and any expected changes to these factors in the near to medium term now that the privatization of its parent, BCE, is not proceeding. This review will include DBRS’s view of the potential for further events over the near term.

In addition to the above, BCE announced that the BCE board will immediately following the termination of its Definitive Agreement address (1) a reinstatement of its common dividend (beginning with declaring its Q4 2008 dividend payable January 15, 2009) and (2) a return of capital to its shareholders through a normal course issuer bid (NCIB). DBRS was largely anticipating the reinstatement of its common dividend, although it is difficult to qualify the magnitude of its NCIB at this stage.

Should there be no significant changes in strategy, business mix or Bell Canada’s capital structure, DBRS believe its ratings could be moved to the A (low) to “A” range given its businesses that generate strong EBITDA margins (at or above 40%) and reasonable leverage with gross debt-to-EBITDA at 2.0 times or below. Concurrently, DBRS plans to remove its recovery ratings on Bell Canada, which will no longer apply. The long-term debt rating of Bell Canada is expected to serve as a reference for BCE’s long-term rating, which could be either one notch lower than Bell Canada’s due to structural subordination or possibly the same.

The NCIB was quantified somewhat in the BCE press release:

BCE will return capital to shareholders in the form of a Normal Course Issuer Bid (NCIB). To that end, BCE will repurchase up to approximately 5% of outstanding common shares, or about 40 million common shares. The NCIB is subject to approval by the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and will be carried out in accordance with the requirements of the TSX and applicable laws.

“A share buyback is the most efficient method of distributing capital to our shareholders, particularly given the current valuation metrics of the Company,” said Siim Vanaselja, Chief Financial Officer of BCE. “The share buyback will be accretive to earnings per share and cash flow. Our improving operational progress provides the Company with confidence in our ability to return value to shareholders now and into the future.”

I noted in the post regarding the death of the deal:

I’m afraid that in the absence of strong, credible statements from BCE regarding their capital structure going forward, BCE prefs remain rather more speculative than I like.

So I share DBRS’ caution! I will say, however, that the absence of dramatic moves by the board to support the stock price – a massive dividend, a massive buy-back – gives comforat and I now consider it more likely than not that BCE will retain its Pfd-2(low) rating.

BCE has the following preferred shares outstanding: BCE.PR.A, BCE.PR.B, BCE.PR.C, BCE.PR.D, BCE.PR.E, BCE.PR.F, BCE.PR.G, BCE.PR.H, BCE.PR.I, BCE.PR.R, BCE.PR.S, BCE.PR.T, BCE.PR.Y & BCE.PR.Z

Issue Comments

BNS.PR.S Closes, sort-of

BNS.PR.S is the new issue of BNS Fixed-Resets, 6.25%+384 that Scotia issued to SunLife as partial payment for CI.

Today Scotia had this to say:

Scotiabank (TSX/NYSE: BNS) today announced it has closed the Bank’s 37 per cent strategic investment in CI Financial Income Fund (“CI”; TSX: CIX.UN) and become CI’s largest single shareholder.

Scotiabank bought Sun Life Financial’s (“Sun Life” TSX/NYSE:SLF) stake of 104,609,895 CI trust units for $1.55 billion in cash, $500 million in common shares at $34.60 per share and $250 million in 6.25 per cent five year rate reset preferred shares. Going forward, Sun Life will continue its strong distribution arrangement with CI.

And SunLife chimed in with:

Sun Life Financial Inc. (TSX/NYSE: SLF) today announced that the previously announced sale of its 37% interest in CI Financial Income Fund to Scotiabank has closed. $1.55 billion of the $2.3 billion (Canadian) purchase price was paid in cash. The balance was paid in a combination of common and preferred shares of Scotiabank

Stockwatch advises:

2008-12-10 18:09 ET – Prospectus Approved

TSX bulletin 2008-1429

An application has been granted for the listing of 10 million non-cumulative, five-year rate reset preferred shares, Series 24, of the Bank of Nova Scotia.

The preferred shares, Series 24, are to be distributed at a price of $25 per share pursuant to the terms of a prospectus supplement dated Dec. 9, 2008, to the short form base shelf prospectus dated April 16, 2008, as amended by amendment No. 1 dated Dec. 3, 2008. The closing of the prospectus offering is expected to occur prior to the open on Dec. 12, 2008. In anticipation of such closing, the preferred shares, Series 24, will be listed at 5:01 p.m. on Dec. 11, 2008, and will be posted for trading at the open on Dec. 12, 2008.

Symbol: BNS.PR.S

Cusip No.: 064149 13 1

Trading currency: Canadian dollars

I have obtained data from the TSX confirming the symbol and that it is listed for trading today, 2008-12-12. I also have a quote: 25.00 bid, no offer; and volume: 0.

Accordingly, the issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database and incorporated into the Fixed-Reset sub-index. But I really wish one of the players would announce what happens next … bought deal? exchange offering? distribution to SLF shareholders? Who knows?

Issue Comments

HPF.PR.A / HPF.PR.B : Normal Course Issuer Bid

High Income Preferred Shares Corporation has announced:

that HI PREFS has commenced a normal course issuer bid to purchase a portion of the outstanding Series 1 Preferred Shares (TSX: HPF.PR.A) and Series 2 Preferred Shares (TSX: HPF.PR.B) on the TSX. Under the normal course issuer bid, HI PREFS intends to purchase up to 37,680 Series 1 Preferred Shares, representing approximately 10% of the public float and up to 65,396 Series 2 Preferred Shares, representing approximately 10% of the public float.

These purchases will be made in accordance with applicable regulations over a maximum period of 12 months commencing on December 16, 2008 and ending on the earlier of December 15, 2009 or on such date as HI PREFS completes its purchase under the normal course issuer bid or on such date as HI PREFS may otherwise determine. Series 1 Preferred Shares and Series 2 Preferred Shares purchased will be cancelled. Within the preceding 12 month period, HI PREFS
purchased 18,500 Series 1 Preferred Shares and 77,100 Series 2 Preferred Shares for cancellation. HI PREFS had 376,806 Series 1 Preferred Shares and 653,962 Series 2 Preferred Shares issued and outstanding as at December 5, 2008. HI PREFS will not purchase in any given 30 day period, in the aggregate more than 7,536 Series 1 Preferred Shares, being 2% of the issued and outstanding Series 1 Preferred Shares as at December 5, 2008 and in the aggregate more than 13,079 Series 2 Preferred Shares, being 2% of the issued and outstanding Series 2 Preferred Shares as at December 5, 2008.

PrefBlog has an informal policy of reporting Normal Course Issuer Bids only if they are highly accretive to NAV (e.g., when a SplitShare trades well below its NAV) or if the previous one has been executed to a meaningful extent.

HPF.PR.A & HPF.PR.B are tracked by HIMIPref™ and are included in the “Scraps” sub-index (rather than SplitShare) due to volume and credit concerns, respectively. HPF.PR.A & HPF.PR.B were mentioned on PrefBlog most recently in connection the DBRS affirmation and downgrade, respectively.

Issue Comments

BMO.PR.N Closes Without Incident

BMO’s new issue of Fixed-Reset 6.50%+383 announced November 25 closed today without incident.

Volume was good at 343,071 shares in a range of 24.86-05. The closing quote was 25.00-01, 44×10.

The issue was relatively small, only $150-million, but there was a greenshoe for $100-million. I am unable to determine whether any of the greenshoe was exercised.

The issue is tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been added to the Fixed-Reset Index.

Update, 2009-6-9: The TSX reports six million shares outstanding; therefore the greenshoe was not exercised.

Issue Comments

NTL.PR.F & NTL.PR.G : DBRS Downgrades to "D"

DBRS has announced that it:

has today downgraded its preferred share ratings of Nortel Network Limited to D from Pfd-5 (low). Nortel Networks Limited is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nortel Networks Corporation (collectively, Nortel or the Company). This rating action follows the Under Review with Negative Implications status, where the ratings were placed November 10, 2008 (see press release dated November 10, 2008). Nortel’s long-term debt remains Under Review with Negative Implications.

This rating action results from Nortel suspending its dividend payments on its preferred shares. This suspension begins with its November 2008 dividends, which will not be paid on December 12, 2008. The last dividend the Company paid was on November 12, 2008, on its Series 5 preferred shares (cumulative) and its Series 7 preferred shares (non-cumulative) as originally declared on July 31, 2008.

DBRS notes that on November 10, 2008 Nortel released its Q3 2008 results, which were below DBRS’s expectations, and lowered its outlook for the year. Additionally, Nortel announced the suspension of its preferred share dividends in an effort to preserve its liquidity. Shortly after this announcement, DBRS placed all of Nortel’s ratings Under Review with Negative Implications.

Notes:
DBRS’s ratings on technology companies are primarily based on factors such as the product suite, the base of customers, the competitive landscape, research and development initiatives, gross operating margins and the financial profile.

These issues were last discussed on PrefBlog when Nortel announced its intention to default.

NTL.PR.F & NTL.PR.G are tracked by HIMIPref™. They would be included in the “Ratchet” index, but have been relegated to “Scraps” on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

BCE Deal Dead

BCE Acquisition has announced:

that the agreement to acquire BCE Inc. (TSX, NYSE: BCE) has been terminated in accordance with its terms.

Receipt of a solvency opinion from a nationally recognized valuation firm was included in the June 30, 2007 definitive agreement between the Purchaser and BCE as a mutual closing condition. The agreement of the Purchaser and BCE to both the selection of KPMG to serve as the valuation firm and the form of the solvency opinion was reflected in the July 4, 2008 amendment to the definitive agreement. Because KPMG has concluded that a required test for the solvency opinion was not met, this mutual condition to completion of the acquisition could not be, and was not, satisfied. Accordingly, the Purchaser terminated the agreement in accordance with its terms. Under these circumstances neither party owes a termination fee to the other.

There is no telling what will happen now. In an ideal world, we return to the status quo ante and the BCE Prefs retain their Pfd-2(low) / P-2(low) credit rating. But Bloomberg reports other ideas:

BCE Inc., the Canadian phone company that had been planning to go private for the past 18 months, may have to buy back shares or restore its dividend to placate investors now that its leveraged buyout has fallen apart.

But I’m afraid that in the absence of strong, credible statements from BCE regarding their capital structure going forward, BCE prefs remain rather more speculative than I like.

The last post in this saga was BCE Buyout in Trouble; Prefs Plunge.

BCE has the following preferred shares outstanding: BCE.PR.A, BCE.PR.B, BCE.PR.C, BCE.PR.D, BCE.PR.E, BCE.PR.F, BCE.PR.G, BCE.PR.H, BCE.PR.I, BCE.PR.R, BCE.PR.S, BCE.PR.T, BCE.PR.Y & BCE.PR.Z

Update, 2008-12-11: BCE is desperately grandstanding:

BCE Inc. (TSX, NYSE: BCE) today announced that it received last evening from the Purchaser, a company formed by an investor group led by Teachers’ Private Capital, the private investment arm of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, and affiliates of Providence Equity Partners Inc., Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC, and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity, a notice purporting to terminate the Definitive Agreement dated June 29, 2007, as amended. BCE disputes that the Purchaser was entitled to terminate the Definitive Agreement, as such notice was delivered prematurely, prior to the outside date for closing of the transaction, and therefore invalid. Given the Purchaser’s position, the BCE privatization
transaction will not proceed.

As previously announced, the closing of the privatization transaction is contingent upon the fulfillment of several closing conditions, including, pursuant to Section 8.1(f) of the Definitive Agreement, the receipt at the effective time of a positive solvency opinion from KPMG. Earlier this morning, KPMG confirmed that it would not be able to deliver an opinion that BCE would
meet, post transaction, the solvency tests set out in the Definitive Agreement.

In light of these developments, BCE will be terminating the Definitive Agreement in accordance with its terms, and will be demanding payment of the $1.2-billion break-up fee from the Purchaser. All closing conditions have been satisfied by BCE, other than the solvency opinion, a condition to closing that was to be satisfied by its nature at the effective time. Under such circumstances, the agreement provides that the break up fee will be owed to BCE by the Purchaser. The Purchaser has taken the position that it is not obligated to pay the break-up fee.

In addition, the BCE Board intends that immediately following termination of the Definitive Agreement in accordance with its terms, it will address a reinstatement of its common share dividend beginning with its fourth quarter common share dividend payable on January 15, 2009, and that it will return capital to its shareholders through a Normal Course Issuer Bid.

I would have a lot more confidence in the credit quality of the BCE Prefs if they indicated the size of the Normal Course Issuer Bid.