Category: Issue Comments

Issue Comments

SNP.PR.V Partial Call for Redemption

SNP Split Corp has announced:

that it has called 220,819 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on June 4, 2008 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 12.091% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 578,638 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on June 3, 2008 will have approximately 12.091% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be US$10.25 per share.

SNP.PR.V is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

BCE / Teachers' Deal: Banks Rattle Their Sabres

The New York Times has reported:

The $51.8 billion takeover of Bell Canada, the largest leveraged buyout ever proposed, appeared to be in trouble over the weekend as the Wall Street banks that committed to finance the deal sought to renegotiate the lending terms, people on both sides of the transaction said on Sunday.

The negotiations over the Bell Canada buyout began to fray late Friday, said people on both sides of the deal, who were in closed-door discussions all weekend.

The banks backing the deal, led by Citigroup, Deutsche Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland, sent revised terms to the consortium of buyers. The new terms included higher interest rates, tighter loan restrictions and stronger protections for the banks, far exceeding the original terms, these people said.

Members of the buyers’ group — the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan; the buyout firms Providence Equity Partners, Madison Dearborn Partners and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity; and Toronto-Dominion Bank — held several conference calls over the weekend to discuss their options. Among the possibilities is filing a lawsuit against the banks to force them to complete the deal on its original terms, these people said.

“It’s patently obvious that the banks have no intention of closing the deal,” one executive who read the revised terms said.

The story was picked up by the Globe & Mail and discussed on Financial Webring Forum.

In the day’s most predictable story:

The Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan said Monday it expects its lenders to honour their commitments to finance the $35-billion takeover of BCE Inc. after the company’s share price tumbled almost 6 per cent on reports the lending group is pushing for new financing terms.

BCE spokesman Bill Fox would not comment on whether BCE has been informed about any talks between the company’s buyers and their lenders.

“We have an agreement,” Mr. Fox said. “And we have been working since the deal was signed on all aspects of getting the transaction closed, on the basis of the terms set out in the agreement.”

Desjardins has predicted a repricing of the deal five to 8.16% lower, as reported on PrefBlog May 14. Syndication of the deal has started; the last major development was the loss in court by bondholders challenging the deal.

I simply have no idea what is going to happen here. The Clear Channel precedent is sometimes cited as evidence that the deal will succeed (albeit at a lower price) but in that case, the buyers could threaten the financers with a Texas jury – notorious for awarding crippling damages against whoever has the deepest pockets in the courtroom. I will opine, however, that the deal no longer makes any sense for either the buyers or the financiers … for all their confident, lawsuit-avoiding words, they must be rather eager to pass the billion-dollar-break-fee hot potato to the banks and have done with it.

I don’t have a clue what the implications for BCE’s preferred shares are. It’s possible that the deal could be proceed with the common repriced and the preferred shareholders taken out at the original price; it’s possible that the preferreds could be marked down proportionately to the common; it’s possible that the deal could proceed as a friendly takeover of the common only, leaving the preferred shares outstanding; it’s possible that the deal could collapse completely.

It’s all speculation, not investing, and I doubt whether any of the participants has any better idea than I do at this time.

BCE has the following preferred shares outstanding: BCE.PR.A, BCE.PR.C, BCE.PR.D, BCE.PR.E, BCE.PR.F, BCE.PR.G, BCE.PR.H, BCE.PR.I, BCE.PR.R, BCE.PR.S, BCE.PR.T, BCE.PR.Y & BCE.PR.Z

Update: There’s some calming commentary from the WSJ Deal Blog:

For weeks, chatter has held that, as goes the Clear Channel buyout, so will go the BCE deal. Insofar as both involve banks and money, that may be true.

But, now that some press outlets are reporting that the BCE deal is “in peril” because the banks are fighting on the lending terms, maybe we are all older and wiser enough to realize that asking for new terms — albeit tough terms — does not constitute the death of a deal. It may be time to look at key issues that will distinguish how BCE is different from Clear Channel.

It’s quite possible– and even probable — that BCE will play out just like Clear Channel, with a lot of huffing and puffing ending in a deal everyone can live with.

Issue Comments

DBRS Affirms GWO Ratings After Lengthy Review

DBRS has announced:

has today confirmed the ratings on Great-West Lifeco (GWO or the Company) and its affiliated operating subsidiaries at current levels with Stable trends. The ratings on GWO are no longer Under Review with Developing Implications where they were placed on February 1, 2007 with the announcement that GWO was making a largely debt-financed US$3.9 billion acquisition of Putnam Investments Trust (Putnam).

Over the past year, the Company has made significant progress in reducing the debt incurred to acquire Putnam. Most notably, in November 2007, GWO announced the sale, which closed on April 1, of its U.S. health-care business with almost $1.6 billion in cash proceeds being made available to pay down outstanding credit facilities. In addition, the Company has also issued $1 billion of innovative subordinated debentures, the proceeds of which have been used to retire the bridge financing facilities. Giving some equity treatment to the hybrid subordinated debt issues, DBRS calculates a reported double leverage, pro forma the sale of the U.S. health care segment, which is not significantly higher than that of its peers. While Great-West Lifeco continues to be more aggressively capitalized than its peers at the holding company level, debt-service coverage remains adequate for the rating on a consolidated basis and on a cash flow basis at the holding company level. However, DBRS observes that the Company’s financial flexibility is currently impaired by relatively high financial leverage and the intense use of innovative debt instruments. Should financial leverage increase from current levels, the ratings on the Company are likely to come under downward pressure.

The existing ratings for the Company and its operating subsidiaries reflect the contribution from a diversified portfolio of businesses, including leading market shares across the Canadian insurance industry and attractive market niches in Europe, in the U.S. financial services market and in reinsurance. Although it accounts for a relatively small portion of the total earnings, Putnam should, in the long run, represent an attractive opportunity in the wealth management space given its entrenched distribution network of independent financial advisors, even though current market developments and lagging fund performance has recently reduced Putnam’s level of assets under management (AUM) and reduced prospects for an early recovery. DBRS believes that the Putnam acquisition has better strategic fit and is more complementary with the Company’s chosen strategy than the U.S. healthcare platform.

As an integral component of the Power Financial group of companies, the Company benefits from its parent’s implicit financial support and its strong governance and risk management controls and procedures.

The financing of the Putnam purchase has been previously discussed, as was the DBRS response to the purchase itself.

GWO has the following direct issues outstanding: GWO.PR.E, GWO.PR.F, GWO.PR.G, GWO.PR.H, GWO.PR.I & GWO.PR.X, all of which remain at Pfd-1(low). S&P has rated them P-1(low) all along.

Related issuers are POW, PWF & CL.

Issue Comments

RBS.PR.A : Tiny, Tiny Call for Redemption

R Split III Corp, which recently had its rating confirmed at Pfd-2(low) by DBRS, has announced:

that it has called 2,032 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on May 30, 2008 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 0.090% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 16,444 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on May 29, 2008 will have approximately 0.090% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $29.22 per share.

Holders of Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including May 30, 2008.

Payment of the amount due to holders of Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on May 30, 2008. From and after May 30, 2008 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any rights in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

0.09%? So if you own 10,000 shares, 9 of them will be called? It’s certainly not the company’s fault, but this is more of a nuisance than anything else!

Issue Comments

RBS.PR.A Confirmed at Pfd-2(low) by DBRS

DBRS has:

today confirmed the Preferred Shares issued by R Split III Corp. (the Company) at Pfd-2 (low) with a Stable trend. The rating had been placed Under Review with Developing Implications on March 19, 2008.

In April 2007, the Company raised gross proceeds of $140 million by issuing 2.273 million Preferred Shares at $29.22 each and 4.546 million Capital Shares at $16.19 each. The net proceeds from the offering were invested in a portfolio of common shares (the RBC Shares) of Royal Bank of Canada (RBC). The initial split share structure provided downside protection of 50% to the Preferred Shares (net of issuance costs).

The holders of the Preferred Shares receive fixed cumulative quarterly distributions equal to 4.5% per annum. The current yield on the RBC Shares provides dividend coverage of approximately 1.4 times. Excess dividends net of all expenses of the Company are paid as dividends on the Capital Shares.

The current downside protection available to the Preferred Shareholders is approximately 40% (as of May 8, 2008). The confirmation of the Preferred Shares is based on the current level of asset coverage available to cover the Preferred Shares principal, as well as the strong credit quality of RBC (rated AA by DBRS).

The redemption date for both classes of shares issued is May 31, 2012.

This follows announcement of the mass review of financial-based splits. RBS.PR.A is only the second issue to emerge unscathed; there have been seven downgrades with five issues still in review.

Downside protection of 40% equates to asset coverage of just under 1.7:1. As of May 8, Scotia Managed Companies reports asset coverage of … just under 1.7:1.

RBS.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

SPL.A Downgraded to Pfd-5 by DBRS

DBRS has:

today downgraded the Class A Shares issued by Mulvihill Pro-AMS RSP Split Share Corp. (the Company) to Pfd-5 from Pfd-4; the trend is Negative.

In March 2002, the Company issued six million Class A Shares at $10 per share and six million Class B Shares at $20 per share, both with a redemption date of December 31, 2013 (the Termination Date). The Company invested approximately 34.5% of the gross proceeds in a portfolio of Canadian equity securities to enter into a forward agreement with Royal Bank of Canada (the Counterparty) to provide for the full capital repayment of the Class B Shares on the Termination Date.

The rest of the net proceeds from the initial offering were invested in a diversified portfolio of Canadian and U.S. equities (the Managed Portfolio). After offering expenses, the Managed Portfolio provided asset coverage of approximately 1.8 times to the Class A Shares (downside protection of about 44%). In addition to providing principal protection for the Class A Shares, the Managed Portfolio is used to make distributions to the Class A Shares equal to 6.5% per annum and pay annual fees and expenses. Also, the Company has been making semi-annual contributions of $0.43 per Class A Share from the Managed Portfolio to an account (the Class A Forward Account), which was used to enter a forward agreement with the Counterparty for the repayment of the Class A Shares principal on the Termination Date.

The Managed Portfolio has a current value of $2.65 per share (as of May 8, 2008), a decrease of nearly 85% since inception. About one-third of the decline has resulted from the semi-annual contributions to the Class A Forward Account. The present value of the Class A Forward Account is $6.53, and the future value is $8.08, meaning 80.8% of the Class A Shares principal is now guaranteed by the Counterparty on the Termination Date. In order for the Company to return the $10 principal to each Class A Shareholder on the Termination Date, the Company would still need to contribute approximately $1.54 (present value) to the Class A Forward Account today in order to secure the remaining $1.92 (future value) of required principal protection. Consequently, the Company will find it challenging to meet its annual expenses and monthly dividend payments to the Class A Shareholders.

SPL.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ with a securityCode of A43400. The creditRatings table of the permanentDatabase has been updated to reflect the new information. It was included in the SplitShare Index until the 2002-10-31 rebalancing, when it was transferred to “Scraps” on volume concerns.

This issue was downgraded to Pfd-4 in October, 2007. The rating history is:

SPL.A Rating History
Rating From To
Pfd-2 2002-3-15 2003-4-8
Pfd-3 2003-4-9 2007-10-23
Pfd-4 2007-10-24 2008-5-13
Pfd-5 2008-5-14 ?

Further information is available via the Mulvihill website.

Issue Comments

RY.PR.H : Stealth Greenshoe

RY.PR.H, which closed on April 29, appears to have had some of its underwriters’ greenshoe exercised.

According to the prospectus:

The underwriters have been granted an option (the “Option”) to purchase up to an additional 2,000,000 Series AH Preferred Shares (the “Option Shares”) at the offering price exercisable at any time up to 48 hours prior to closing of the offering. This prospectus qualifies both the grant of the Option and the distribution of the Option Shares that will be issued if the Option is exercised. If the underwriters purchase all such Option Shares, the price to the public, the underwriters’ fee and net proceeds to the Bank will be $250,000,0000, $7,500,000 and $242,500,000, respectively, assuming no Series AH Preferred Shares are sold to the institutions referred to in Note (2) below. See “Plan of Distribution”.

According to the TSX, there are now 8.5-million shares outstanding, which implies that 500,000 shares were taken up on a greenshoe.

I am unable to find any issuer disclosure of this, either on the RBC Press Release page or on SEDAR.

Issue Comments

TCA.PR.X & TCA.PR.Y Ratings Affirmed by DBRS

DBRS has announced:

confirmed the following ratings of TransCanada PipeLines Limited (TCPL or the Company): Unsecured Debentures & Notes at A, Preferred Shares – cumulative at Pfd-2 (low) and Junior Subordinated Notes at BBB (high), all with Stable trends.

The rating confirmations conclude DBRS’s review of the acquisition and reflect the Company’s prudent balancing of financial and business risk factors as demonstrated by today’s announcement of a $1.1 billion common equity issuance with a 15% over-allotment. This will result in a more conservative capital structure than originally envisaged when the proposal was announced on April 1. Most debt issuance should be at the TCPL level, eliminating structural subordination issues. DBRS expects similar prudence will be exercised in any transactions of this nature. DBRS also expects proforma credit metrics to slightly improve from levels achieved at December 31, 2007 (debt to capital of 60% and cash flow to debt of 0.17 times respectively), which should position the Company well for higher capital spending anticipated in the next three to four years associated with its major projects (such as Bruce Power Restart and Keystone). It is noteworthy that most of the Company’s projects are supported by long-term contracts with creditworthy counterparties, providing stability of earnings and cash flow, once completed.

According to TransCanada’s announcement of the equity issue:

it has entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters, led by BMO Capital Markets, RBC Capital Markets, and TD Securities Inc. under which they have agreed to purchase from TransCanada and sell to the public 30,200,000 Common Shares.

The purchase price of $36.50 per Common Share will result in gross proceeds of approximately $1.1 billion. The net proceeds of the offering will be used by TransCanada to partially fund acquisitions and capital projects of the Corporation including, amongst others, the acquisition of the Ravenswood Generating Facility, the construction of the Keystone Oil Pipeline, and for general corporate purposes.

The Common Shares will be offered to the public in Canada and the U.S. through the underwriters or their affiliates. TransCanada has also granted the underwriters an option to purchase up to an additional 4,530,000 Common Shares at a price of $36.50 per Common Share at any time up to 30 days after closing of the offering.

The credit review was previously discussed on PrefBlog.

TCA.PR.Y & TCA.PR.X are both tracked by HIMIPref™ and are included in the PerpetualDiscount index.

Issue Comments

RPQ.PR.A Downgraded by S&P

Connor Clark & Lunn ROC Pref Corp has announced:

that Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) lowered its rating on the preferred shares of the Company today by one notch from P-1 (low) to P-2 (high) and removed the preferred shares from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on March 14, 2008. The move comes as the result of recent downgrades in the Reference Portfolio as well as the removal of Residential Capital Corp. and its replacement with Tribune Corp., which had a lower rating at the time of the replacement. There have been no defaults in the Reference Portfolio since its launch in February 2006.

The rating on the preferred shares reflects the rating on the C$95,040,000 fixed-rate managed credit linked note (the “CLN”) issued by the Bank of Nova Scotia which was also lowered by S&P from A- to BBB+. The return on the CLN, and thus on the preferred shares, is linked to the credit performance of a portfolio of 127 companies (the “Reference Portfolio”). The Reference Portfolio is actively managed by Connor, Clark & Lunn Investment Management Ltd. The CLN benefits from subordination of 2.82% of the Reference Portfolio as well as a trading reserve account which would currently buy an additional 0.07% of subordination. As a result, if there are less than seven defaults in the next three and a quarter years, investors will continue to receive scheduled quarterly distributions as well as the full $25 par value at maturity.

CC&L ROC Pref Corp. matures in June 2011. The S&P rating speaks to the product’s ability to pay all of its dividends and to return the full $25 par value at maturity. CC&L remains confident that CC&L ROC Pref Corp. will meet its investment objectives.

This follows an earlier announcement of the review. RPQ.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.