Category: Issue Comments

Charterhouse Preferred Share Index Corporation, which I reviewed last year, is introducing a rather odd shareholders’ resolution:

with respect to the Corporation, a special resolution approving an amendment to the Articles of Incorporation to permit the Corporation without obtaining approval of the Securityholders, to issue Securities at a price per Security that is less than the net asset value per Security at such time.

Their rationale for seeking such authority is:

The Manager is of the view, in respect of each Fund and the Corporation, that the issuance of Securities at a price which may be less than the net asset value per Security of the Fund or the Corporation may, in certain circumstances, be in the best interest of the Fund or Corporation and the Securityholders. For example, the ability to take advantage of certain investment opportunities may depend, in part, on the availability of additional capital to employ at opportune times. By providing the Funds and the Corporation with the ability to issue securities at less than net asset value, without the delay and cost of obtaining Securityholder approval, the Funds and the Corporation would have the ability to efficiently raise additional capital through, for instance, a rights offering, allowing the Funds and the Corporation to take advantage of these time-sensitive investment opportunities, thereby capturing additional returns for Securityholders.

Quite frankly, I’m puzzled. PFD.PR.A is an index fund. Just what “investment opportunities” do they expect to see? To quote from their web page:

The Charterhouse Preferred Share Index Corporation provides holders of the Preferred Shares with:

1. cost-efficient exposure to an indexed portfolio (the “Portfolio”) that is representative of the universe of fixed rate preferred shares and preferred securities of Canadian issuers (“Portfolio Securities”) listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”); and
2. return of capital distributions, paid quarterly

The meeting is set for June 11, full details and the management circular are available on SEDAR, under “Public Companies” – search for “Charterhouse Preferred Share Index Corporation”. If I were a shareholder, I’d have a lot of questions to ask about these “investment opportunities” and I would be voting against the resolution if I didn’t like the answers. My fear would be a rights offering priced significantly under market …. as of May 31, for instance, the NAV was $22.01 and the trading price was $21.70. Now, I’m not sure exactly what limits the TSX puts on rights offerings, but it seems to me that they could issue rights to shareholders allowing the purchase of more stock at $21.00. Now, in a perfectly efficient capital market, I’m basically indifferent as to whether I sell the rights or exercise them. We are not blessed with perfectly efficient capital markets, however, so commissions on the rights sales could leave me worse off, let alone my market risk on the sale.

Shareholders should be looking for answers on this one.

Hat-tip to a Canadian Moneysaver reader for bringing this to my attention!

Well, I wanted to do a little attribution analysis for my own purposes and now find that I have the same viewpoint as a publish-or-perish academic: publish everything! If you have a good laundry list, publish that!

The worst performers of May (of the issues included in the HIMIPref™ Universe) were:

As of May 31, CM.PR.J was quoted at 22.85-90 with a curvePrice of 23.06; GWO.PR.I was quoted at 22.83-85, curvePrice 22.86. These issues are very similar, having the same annual coupon and the same credit rating. It is because these issues now appear reasonably fairly priced that I have characterized the probable cause as “Rationalization”. However, I could just as easily – and perhaps better – characterized the probable cause as simply “Vanishing Liquidity Premium”.

Let’s have a closer look at those curve Prices:

…and…

I discussed the yield curve and the collapse of the liquidity premium in the post HIMI Index Performance, May 2007:

One very interesting thing that happened this month is that a lot of the yieldCurvePremiumLiquidity disappeared, as shown in this graph. I interpret the change in the premium as reflecting a desire by some holders, at least, to get out of the sector in size and quickly; such holders might simply sell their most liquid holdings to adjust portfolio exposures; this will affect the prices of these issues; hence, liquidity will become a lot less expensive. The PerpetualDiscount index is the most liquid of all the sub-indices – it’s dominated by recent issues, apart from anything else – and thus a portion of the decline in this index might be attributed to this factor rather than the intrinsic characteristics of the investment.

Such a hypothesis gains some support from examination of the changes in the yield curve, which I found a little surprising. The long-end hasn’t moved by nearly as much as one might have expected. Note that this graph is of the TAXABLE curve and refers to SPOT YIELDS … therefore, the x-axis shows the yield one might expect on a “stripped dividend”, after tax.

Hopefully, the tables above will make my meaning a bit more clear. However, I should advise explicitly that the huge importance of liquidity in the above tables is probably over-stated. It comes out of the math, all right, and I have no problems with the mechanical correctness of the math … but as I’ve re-stated above, liquidity is not distributed homogeneously across the HIMIPref™ universe – it is highly concentrated in the PerpetualDiscount segment and this can lead to a confounding of the analysis.

In the comments to the June 1 Market Action Report, assiduous reader tobyone posted:

RE: 5.25% LFE.PR.A bid @10.26 indicates yield of over 5% according to Globeinvestor and TDW yield calculators vs. your table. I hope this is an error because I hold this one but don’t want it @4.73%

Well, Globeinvestor and TDW are enormous companies, with an excellent record of sticking their brand name on various things, but I’ll see what I can do.

I stand by my calculation of 4.73%. First, the details, in all their glory, from the HIMIPref™ cashFlowDiscountingAnalysisBox:

A3555025 0138
2007-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.995022   0.04
2007-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.991082   0.04
2007-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.987158   0.04
2007-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.983376   0.04
2007-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.979482   0.04
2007-12-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.975729   0.04
2008-01-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.971866   0.04
2008-02-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.968018   0.04
2008-03-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.964433   0.04
2008-04-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.960614   0.04
2008-05-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.956933   0.04
2008-06-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.953145   0.04
2008-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.949493   0.04
2008-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.945733   0.04
2008-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.941989   0.04
2008-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.938380   0.04
2008-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.934664   0.04
2008-12-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.931083   0.04
2009-01-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.927397   0.04
2009-02-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.923725   0.04
2009-03-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.920421   0.04
2009-04-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.916777   0.04
2009-05-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.913264   0.04
2009-06-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.909648   0.04
2009-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.906163   0.04
2009-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.902575   0.04
2009-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.899002   0.04
2009-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.895557   0.04
2009-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.892011   0.04
2009-12-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.888593   0.04
2010-01-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.885075   0.04
2010-02-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.881571   0.04
2010-03-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.878418   0.04
2010-04-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.874940   0.04
2010-05-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.871587   0.04
2010-06-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.868137   0.04
2010-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.864810   0.04
2010-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.861386   0.04
2010-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.857976   0.04
2010-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.854688   0.04
2010-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.851304   0.04
2010-12-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.848043   0.04
2011-01-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.844685   0.04
2011-02-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.841341   0.04
2011-03-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.838331   0.04
2011-04-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.835012   0.04
2011-05-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.831813   0.04
2011-06-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.828520   0.04
2011-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.825345   0.04
2011-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.822077   0.04
2011-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.818822   0.04
2011-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.815685   0.04
2011-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.812455   0.04
2011-12-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.809342   0.04
2012-01-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.806138   0.04
2012-02-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.802946   0.04
2012-03-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.799972   0.03
2012-04-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.796805   0.03
2012-05-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.793752   0.03
2012-06-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.790609   0.03
2012-07-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.787580   0.03
2012-08-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.784461   0.03
2012-09-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.781356   0.03
2012-10-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.778362   0.03
2012-11-10        DIVIDEND   0.04   0.775280   0.03
2012-12-01  FINAL DIVIDEND   0.03   0.773199   0.02
2012-12-01        MATURITY  10.00   0.773199   7.73
Total Cash Flows    12.8739
Total Present Value    10.2597
Discounting Rate 4.7291 % (Annual rate compounded semi-annually)

More simply, I’ll say: OK, this thing pays $0.525 p.a. At a price of $10.26, it will give rise to a $0.26 capital loss on its maturity 2012-12-1. That’s 5.5 years away so call the annual capital loss $0.05 (for the sake of an argument). Therefore, of the $0.525 dividends received every year, $0.475 is income and $0.05 is return of capital. Over the period, my average capital invested is (10.26 + 10.00) / 2 = 10.13. Therefore, my (very roughly calculated) yield is $0.475/$10.13, or 4.69%, which is close enough to my precisely calculated yield of 4.73% that I’m not going to panic.

I’m not familiar with the GlobeInvestor or TDW yield calculators – if you will send me a link, I’ll take a look at them. The most common errors with such things are:

• Are they calculating current yield = $0.525 / $10.26 = 5.12%? This is wrong, since it ignores the capital loss on maturity.
• Are all the dividends incorporated? Ex-dates can be a little tricky.
• Monthly dividends can be a little tricky to jam in to some calculators. Has this been done properly?

I recommend Keith Betty’s Yield Calculator.

Now I have another question … you indicated that you didn’t want to own this thing at 4.73%, but you didn’t indicate precisely why. Now, I’m not going to take a public position on the merits of LFE.PR.A as an investment at the current price (and please, don’t spend hours parsing everything I write from here on in trying to decide what I really think!), but the comment makes me suspect that you think a sale at a 4.73% yield is a slam-dunk … and whatever the verdict is, I don’t think it’s a slam-dunk-sell.

In your comment, you mentioned CM.PR.J as a possible buying opportunity, given its closing pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03%. Now, this is more than LFE.PR.A, but CM.PR.J is a perpetual and there are other differences besides. In terms of the riskAttributes examined by HIMIPref™, the major differences are:

• Credit Quality: CM.PR.J is better.
• Retractible:LFE.PR.A is better.
• SplitShare: CM.PR.J is better
• Various Duration & Convexity Measures: Well, they’re different!
• Cumulative Dividends: LFE.PR.A is better.
• Liquidity: (not a formal risk measure, but it is important) CM.PR.J is better

Anything you can tell me about how you value LFE.PR.A will, at the very least, give me some ideas regarding what to write about!

This is something both interesting and complicated – it would have to happen at month-end! PAY.PR.A announced today:

the final results of its modified Dutch auction-type substantial issuer bid to repurchase (the “Offer”) up to 300,000 of its preferred shares (TSX: “PAY.PR.A”) which expired at 5:00 p.m. (EST) on May 30, 2007

    Based on the final report provided by the depositary for the Offer, 224,644 preferred shares have been deposited and not withdrawn. Pursuant to the terms of the Offer, HIPAYS determined the purchase price to be $25.90 per preferred share (the “Purchase Price”) to put it in a position to take up the maximum number of preferred shares deposited to the Offer for an aggregate purchase amount of $5,818,279.60.
    All preferred shares properly deposited to the Offer at auction tender prices below the Purchase Price will be purchased at the Purchase Price. Payment to holders of preferred shares tendered and accepted for purchase will be made as soon as practicable, but otherwise in compliance with the Offer.
    The purchased preferred shares represent approximately 10.8% of the preferred shares outstanding as of May 30, 2007. After the purchase, approximately 1,860,752 preferred shares will remain outstanding.

According to the press release that announced the offer:

On July 31, 2008 (the “Termination Date”) the preferred shares will be redeemed for $25.00 and the remaining 15 distributions from the expiry of the Offer to the Termination Date will amount to $1.719. Accordingly, the yield to maturity of a preferred share at $25.50 to the Termination Date is 3.86% and the yield to maturity of a preferred share at $25.90 to the Termination Date is 2.57%.

Now, at first glance, this doesn’t seem to make much sense. Why would the company purchase its own prefs at a premium to par and at a lousy yield-to-maturity? 

I suspect the key may be found in my last comment on this issue:

As far as I can make out from the prospectus, the “Preferred Repayment Portfolio” will be delivered in its entirety to CIBC on the termination date in exchange for the amount due on maturity of the prefs. This is a bit of bad new for the Capital Unit Holders (because it means the current excess value of $3,901,000 will be lost), but the pref holders don’t care!

So I suspect that this is worthwhile for the Capital Unit Holders because they will now capture the excess value … or, at least, a fraction of it! I’m not sure about this, though, so confirmation or denial of this hypothesis is left as an exercise for the student.

S Split Corp announced today:

that it has completed an issuance of additional Shares at prices of $15.00 per Class A Share and $10.00 per Preferred Share for additional gross proceeds of $6.25 million pursuant to the exercise of the over-allotment option granted to the Company’s agents in its recently completed initial public offering. All together, the Company has raised total gross proceeds of $118.75 million under the offering. The Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols SBN and SBN.PR.A, respectively.

SBN.PR.A commenced trading May 17.

As I predicted last week, EPP.PR.A crashed on opening today.

There were only six, count ’em, six trades in the entire day, for a whopping volume of 7,300 shares, closing at 23.75-99, 5×50. Even BAM.PR.N’s opening day was better, which is really saying a mouthful.

Five Million Shares. Somebody’s lost $5-million. Glad it’s not me!

On a cheerier note, the issue does appear to have found a fair level. The curve price is $23.94:

Price due to base-rate :  23.30
Price due to short-term :  -0.44
Price due to long-term :   1.76
Price due to Interest Income :   0.00
Price to to Cumulative Dividends :   0.00
Price due to SplitShareCorp :   0.00
Price due to Retractibility :   0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (2) :   0.00
Price due to Liquidity :   0.83
Price due to Floating Rate :   0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (3) :  -1.71
Price due to error :   0.17
Price due to Credit Spread (High) :   0.03
Price due to Credit Spread (Low) :   0.00

Although the price is now estimated to be fair, I won’t be rushing to buy this one. I suspect the underwriters are stuck with a big pile of these and there will be a blow-out sale before the end of June … and why would I buy something at a price I think is “fair”, anyway?

Well, well, well! The boys at Quadravest, fresh from extending the term of DFN.PR.A, are proving they haven’t run out of ideas!

In a press release today, they announced:

The Company intends to declare a special capital gains dividend, payable partially in cash and partially in Class A Shares, to holders of Class A Shares of record on June 4, 2007, which dividend will be payable on the date the Preferred Shares are issued under the short form prospectus. The number of Class A Shares being issued as a result of this special dividend will be equal to the number of Preferred Shares expected to be issued in the offering.

This is not particularly good news, but it isn’t necessarily bad, either. The NAVPU as of May 15, 2007 was $31.95, implying that the preferred shares had an extremely good asset coverage ratio of almost 3.2:1 – which DBRS wasn’t really giving them a lot of credit for, since the rating hadn’t changed from its initial setting of Pfd-2 on the initial coverage ratio of about 2.4:1.

How much will coverage deteriorate? Well, from the prospectus:

No regular monthly dividends will be paid in any year on the Class A Shares so long as any dividends on the Preferred Shares are then in arrears or so long as the Net Asset Value per Unit is equal to or less than $15.00 (calculated as described under ‘‘Details of the Offering — Valuation of Assets’’). Additionally, no special year-end dividends will be paid if after payment of such a special dividend the Net Asset Value per Unit (calculated as described under ‘‘Details of the Offering — Valuation of Assets’’) would be less than $25.00.

So how bad will it be? I wouldn’t think that they’ll take the NAVPU down below $25 … but I do worry. They’re being rather coy about how they will be calculating the amount of the special dividend … and some of the more cynical souls among us might want to point out that the fund’s year end is November 30 … therefore the special dividend June 4 is not a year-end special dividend … therefore not restricted by the prospectus language.

In favour of the preferred shareholders is the idea that Quadravest has quite a nice little business going, packaging the flavour of the month into a split share corporation and flogging it through an established pipeline.  I wouldn’t think they would contemplate doing anything that would jeopardize that goose and its bonus-filled eggs. Additionally, it won’t take much more than a rounding error to get the issue size over $100-million, and anything that improves liquidity is all right by me. It should also be noted that FFN.PR.A also experienced a term extension, has a NAVPU of $28.03 as of May 15, but did not have such a press release issued today.

But, until the point is cleared up, I recommend that no purchases of DFN.PR.A be made. I wouldn’t recommend a sale of existing positions (based on dilution risk, anyway … obviously, if DFN.PR.A rockets in price for some reason a sale should be contemplated) either. We’ll just have to wait and see.

Update: The quote from the prospectus regarding restrictions on dividends paid to capital shareholders was taken from the Summary. In the Details, we find (emphasis added):

Although there can be no assurance that the Company will be able to pay dividends to holders of Class A Shares, the initial policy of the Company will be to endeavour to declare and pay regular monthly dividends, initially targeted to be $0.10 per month to yield a minimum of 8.0% per annum on the original issue price, to holders of Class A Shares plus, if any amounts remain available for the payment of dividends, a special year-end dividend of such amount as of the November Dividend Record Date in each year.

No regular monthly dividends will be paid on the Class A Shares in any month as long as any dividends on the Preferred Shares are then in arrears or so long as the Net Asset Value per Unit is equal to or less than $15.00 (calculated as described under ‘‘Details of the Offering — Valuation of Assets’’). Additionally, it is currently intended that no special year-end dividends will be paid if after payment of such a dividend the Net Asset Value per Unit (calculated as described under ‘‘Details of the Offering — Valuation of Assets’’) would be less than $25.00.

So … it looks like there are no restrictions at all on the size of this dividend, other than a hope that Quadravest will wish to keep that split-share pipeline throbbing (and remember that first, selling the prefs is rarely a problem, since they generally come with fat coupons; and that second, if the customers had any brains or memory at all, they wouldn’t be buying the capital units in the first place.

Fingers crossed!

Co-operators General Insurance has announced (via CCN Matthews) that:

it has decided to redeem all of its 4 million Series A Shares on July 2, 2007 (with an effective date of June 30, 2007). The redemption price for each Series A Share will be $25.00 plus declared, but unpaid dividends of $0.34375 per share. The redemption of the Series A Shares is subject to approval of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions.

I’m glad of it! It may be just my bookkeeperish soul interfering with innovative finance, but the terms of this issue (paying “Greater of 90% of index and Flat Rate 5.5%”) were unique and hard to value as part of a homogeneous class. Sometimes, it was difficult even to determine dividend dates!

Update: I now observe that the PrefInfo description of this issue did not account for the once-every-five-years redemption at $25.00 – it only noted the at-all-other-times redemption at $25.50. My apologies – this has been corrected. The prospectus for this issue, dated May 29, 1997, is available through SEDAR.

Update 2007-6-21: Cooperators, with all their usual concern for precision, predictability and the convenience of those who lend them money has decided to change the redemption procedure, under the guise of a confirmation:

Co-operators General Insurance Company (“Co-operators General” or the “Company”) confirmed today the arrangements relating to the payment for the previously announced dividend on the Class E Preference Shares, Series A (the “Series A Series”) (TSX: CCS.PR.A) and the redemption of all of the Series A Shares. Notice of redemption was mailed to registered holders on May 31, 2007.

The dividend in the amount of $0.34375 per Series A Shares for the quarter ending June 30, 2007 was previously declared and will be payable on July 3, 2007 (with an effective date of June 30, 2007) to holders of record on June 1, 2007.

The redemption price of $25.00 per Series A Shares will be payable on July 3, 2007 (with an effective date of June 30, 2007) upon presentation of certificates and required letters of transmittal. The declared dividend of $0.34375 per Class A Share for the quarter ended June 30, 2007 will not be included in the redemption price as such dividend will be paid separately to holders of record on June 1, 2007 immediately prior to payment of the redemption price. The Company does not expect to declare any further dividends on the Series A Shares.

To me, that looks just a tiny little bit different from what was announced before … but you be the judge!

Following the S&P downgrade, the DBRS downgrade of Loblaw and the Weston Credit Watch Negative by DBRS, DBRS has announced that it:

today downgraded the long-term ratings of George Weston Limited (Weston or the Company). The Notes and Debentures have been downgraded to BBB (high), the Exchangeable Debentures to BBB and the Preferred Shares to Pfd-3 (high), all with a Stable trend. At the same time, DBRS has confirmed the short-term rating of Weston at R-1 (low), but revised the trend to Negative.

…

Although management of Loblaw and Weston are separate, and there is no cross-default or cross collateralization covenants on the respective debt, Weston’s ratings reflect the investment in Loblaw, as it is a significant portion of the group’s consolidated operations. Weston’s long-term rating has historically been notched lower to reflect Weston’s own financial profile and the implicit structural subordination, given Loblaw’s minority public float.

Weston’s rating also reflects the underlying, albeit lower, credit rating of the bakery business. For the past few years, the bakery operations have stabilized/improved enough to limit further declines in the long-term rating, leading to the Stable trend. As such, any further deterioration in Loblaw’s long-term rating would not necessarily affect the long-term rating of Weston – i.e., ratings could potentially be the same.

Weston has the following preferred issues trading on the TSX: WN.PR.A WN.PR.B WN.PR.C WN.PR.D & WN.PR.E. All except WN.PR.B are fixed-rate perpetual; WN.PR.B is retractible.

This issue was announced May 7. It seemed reasonable – if aggressive – at the time … but the credit ratings aren’t all that great AND it’s a perp.

The HIMI PerpetualDiscount index is down 0.66% since the announcement date AND credit spreads have widened.

The curvePrice of this issue, measured against the taxable curve, is now $24.34.

Price due to base-rate :  23.52
Price due to short-term :  -0.50
Price due to long-term :   1.63
Price due to Interest Income :   0.00
Price to to Cumulative Dividends :   0.00
Price due to SplitShareCorp :   0.00
Price due to Retractibility :   0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (2) :   0.00
Price due to Liquidity :   1.21
Price due to Floating Rate :   0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (3) :  -1.69
Price due to error :   0.17
Price due to Credit Spread (High) :   0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (Low) :   0.00

Now, Pfd-3 issues are very hard to analyze … they behave less like fixed-income instruments than higher rated issues. And this issue has a “split rating” – S&P rates them P-2(low), higher than does DBRS (Pfd-3(high)) – which makes things even more difficult.

When the issue was announced, the curve price was $24.66:

Price due to base-rate :  23.43
Price due to short-term :  -0.24
Price due to long-term :   1.42
Price due to Interest Income :   0.00
Price to to Cumulative Dividends :   0.00
Price due to SplitShareCorp :   0.00
Price due to Retractibility :   0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (2) :   0.00
Price due to Liquidity :   1.48
Price due to Floating Rate :   0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (3) :  -1.57
Price due to error :   0.14
Price due to Credit Spread (High) :   0.00
Price due to Credit Spread (Low) :   0.00

I will be glued to my screen on the projected closing date of May 25, eager to see how this one plays out!

Update, 2007-5-22: Curve Price now 24.22.

Update, 2007-5-23: Curve Price now 24.08.

Update, 2007-5-24: Will commence trading tomorrow, with the symbol EPP.PR.A. Curve Price now 23.81. We shall see!