Category: Issue Comments

Issue Comments

BBD.PR.B / BBD.PR.D

Well, I promised in a previous post that I’d write a few words about this issue: and the time has come!

According to the prospectus dated May 13, 1997, available on Bombardier’s website (good for them!), these issues are convertable into each other on August 1, 2007 and on the first of August every five years thereafter. In certain circumstances, conversion may be forced and there will be only one series outstanding.

BBD.PR.B is the “Series 2” and currently pays 100% of the Canadian Prime Rate, according to Bombardier’s website – there’s no direct link, so you have to poke around a little … what you want is Bombardier > Investor Relations > Share Information > Dividend Information > BBD.PR.B. Since the Canadian Prime Rate is now 6%, this translates to $1.50 on the face value of $25.00.

BBD.PR.D is the Series 3, and pays $1.369 p.a., which was set in 2002 and will be reset in 2007 to take effect August 1.

THEREFORE, according to Mr. Calculator, the Bs will pay about 13.1 cents p.a. more than the Ds, provided prime stays put, until the next reset date which is now less than 10 months away. Being more precise and taking account of ex-Dates, we find that the Bs have their next dividend ex-date on or about Nov 28, and at the end of each month until the end of next July, which is a total of 9 more payments of $0.125, total $1.125. The Ds will pay in January, March and July, $0.34225 a time, total $1.02675.

All the above assumes no default and no change in prime, of course! But we can basically say that from now until conversion, the Bs will pay about $0.10 more than the Ds, so, in full accordance with the Holy Efficient Market Hypowhatsit, should be priced about maybe approximately $0.10 higher, as adjusted for liquidity and discounting effects, not to mention the phase of the moon.

So let’s take a look at the quotes: BBD.PR.B was quoted at the close of business November 13 at $18.21-35. BBD.PR.D was quoted at the close of business November 13 at $16.80-84.

This is an absurd price spread. Clearly, a strategy that will work very well on paper, at the very least, is to short the BBD.PR.B and long the BBD.PR.D for a gross take-out of about maybe $1.40. What’s the profit?

Strategy: Short BBD.PR.B, Long BBD.PR.D
Item Effect Notes
Initiate Position +$1.40 Will depend on trading prices, obviously
Net Dividend -0.10 Assumes Prime Constant – decline in prime will reduce loss
Cost of Margining -$0.855 Need to put up 150% on the short = $27.40, can borrow 50% on the long = $8.40, have to put up $19.00, don’t get any interest on this because you’re retail scum and don’t get institutional rates, and call your opportunity cost @ 6% for 9 months = $0.855. NOTE: Different brokers perform their short-margin requirements in different ways and I am not familiar with all of the methodologies! If they insist that you have to have the full $27.40 cash in the account not earning interest; or if they charge you interest on your margin-reducing long side, this calculation will not be applicable and the cost of margining will change accordingly! ENSURE YOU KNOW HOW YOUR BROKER WILL CHARGE YOU BEFORE PUTTING ON THE POSITION!
Commission -$0.10 A nickel a side each way to put the position on – the custodian will do the conversion for free. At least, we hope so
Total Net Profit $0.345 Not bad. See any problems with the calculation?

OK, so it looks like there’s a $0.345 / share profit out there, just waiting to be grabbed, for anyone who wants to take it. The only constraint is how much you can get done without moving the price too much – a constraint I won’t attempt to play down! However, so far today, November 14, the Bs have traded 4,610 shares in a range of $18.31-35, while the Ds have traded 8,350 shares in a range of $16.75-81. So it would seem that there’s enough money available to be worth a ‘phone call.

 This strategy is credit neutral – if Bombardier goes bust in the next 9 months, then both your long and short are worthless, which is fine. And you don’t have to rely on the market to recognize the equality either – you can just convert one to the other next summer and your position will flatten out. All in all, it seems like a pretty good play for those who can short. Especially if you have a facility where you get paid interest on your cash collateral for the borrow!

 The major risk is of a short squeeze on the Bs, where you could be forced to buy back the short, perhaps at a greater spread to the Ds than that at which you entered the position. This is the risk of any short strategy – make up your own mind as to the likelihood of that. And never bet the house on ANYTHING. There’s lots of good ideas out there … do enough of them and the one’s that turn out well will pay for the ones that turn out badly, hopefully with a little bit extra tacked on.

I’m not doing this for clients at the moment: shorting is not currently something I “do”. Which, of course, is why I’m publishing the idea! Have a look, maybe it makes sense for your.

I’ve attached two graphs:

Have fun!

Update re short squeezes: According to the prospectus, conversion is effected by surrender of an actual certificate in the period 14-45 days prior to the actual conversion date. This could give rise to a short squeeze – IF a sufficient number of shareholders choose to convert from the higher priced issue shorted into the lower priced issue held … which doesn’t seem too likely, but worth mentioning.

Erk! Update re taxation: It was noted on Financial Webring Forum Financial Wisdom Forum [edited 2015-3-31] that there are tax effects on shorting dividend paying stocks in Canada … according to Blakes

Payments made to compensate a securities lender for dividends on a borrowed share of a Canadian issuer will generally not be deductible unless the securities borrower is a registered securities dealer in which case two thirds of the payment will generally be deductible;

Therefore, tax will be owing on the dividends received, but nothing may be deducted with respect to the dividends paid … at a marginal tax rate of 21% on the $1.12 received on the Bs, the tax loss due to dividends will be $0.235, which nearly wipes out the pre-tax profit all by itself.

The only hope for this strategy, then (in the absence of very fancy trading arrangements to skip over the dividends … and I will NOT opine on the admissability of such a strategy for tax purposes!) is to get paid on the cash collateral for the short, or to simply hope that the spread decreases faster than the nine-month maximum.

*Sigh* Tripped up by tax effects! That’s what happens when I step outside my specialty … but really, these things are Pfd-4 by DBRS so I wouldn’t want to go long … still, anybody who for any reason owns the Bs should give serious consideration to swapping into Ds … assuming they really want to own the name.

Further update re Tax: The relevent section of the Income Tax Act is 260(6)(a):

(6) In computing a taxpayer’s income under Part I from a business or property

(a) where the taxpayer is not a registered securities dealer, no deduction shall be made in respect of an amount that, if paid, would be deemed by subsection 260(5) to have been received by another person as a taxable dividend; and

(b) where the taxpayer is a registered securities dealer, no deduction shall be made in respect of more than 2/3 of that amount.

And please note that I am not a tax specialist! Consult your own tax advisor before making or not making any decision based on the above!

Issue Comments

ENB.PR.A

This member of the premiumPerpetual index slid into negative YTW territory, so let’s have a look at it.

The listing date was 1998-12-01 and it pays $1.375 annually on a par value of $25: 5.5%. The option schedule (as shown on the embeddedOptionsBox) is:

  • Redemption      2003-12-02      2004-12-01  26.000000
  • Redemption      2004-12-02      2005-12-01  25.750000
  • Redemption      2005-12-02      2006-12-01  25.500000
  • Redemption      2006-12-02      2007-12-01  25.250000
  • Redemption      2007-12-02   INFINITE DATE  25.000000

which at the 2006-11-09 quotation of $25.72-95 leads to the following call scenarios, reported on the pseudoPortfolioReportBox:

  • Call  2006-12-09 YTM: 7.42 % [Restricted: 0.61 %] (Prob: 25.91 %)
  • Call  2007-01-01 YTM: -0.26 % [Restricted: -0.04 %] (Prob: 13.07 %)
  • Call  2007-10-05 YTM: 4.53 % [Restricted: 4.09 %] (Prob: 5.00 %)
  • Call  2008-01-01 YTM: 3.87 % [Restricted: 3.87 %] (Prob: 5.43 %)
  • Limit Maturity  2036-11-09 YTM: 5.44 % [Restricted: 5.44 %] (Prob: 50.59 %)

One feature of the calculations is the fact that the issue goes ex-Dividend TODAY, November 10, and at time of writing is quoted at 25.46-57 on volume of 2,100 shares. It doesn’t look as if anybody got caught on the ex-Dividend, with the odd skip-day of November 13 (odd because the TSX is open, but banks are closed): the day’s range is 25.46-55. So it’s lost $0.26 (bid/bid) on the day, having gone ex a dividend of $0.34375. Which means it’s actually up!

I’ve attached some graphs, prepared by the graphDocument:

 

Issue Comments

BMO.PR.I

We’ve looked at BMO.PR.G (YTW at the 11/7 closing bid of $25.48 is -9.24%) and at RY.PR.K (YTW at the 11/7 closing bid of $25.52 is -10.64%), but there is another member of the OperatingRetractible Index that has a negative Yield-to-Worst.

The option schedule for BMO.PR.I is:

  • Redemption      2005-11-25      2006-11-24  25.500000
  • Redemption      2006-11-25      2007-11-24  25.250000
  • Redemption      2007-11-25   INFINITE DATE  25.000000
  • Retraction      2008-11-25   INFINITE DATE  26.040000

which, at the 11/7 closing bid of $25.51, gives rise to the optionCalculationList:

  • Call  2006-12-07 YTM: 1.08 % [Restricted: 0.09 %] (Prob: 16.76 %)
  • Call  2006-12-25 YTM: -4.99 % [Restricted: -0.66 %] (Prob: 11.55 %)
  • Call  2007-12-25 YTM: 2.69 % [Restricted: 2.69 %] (Prob: 0.44 %)
  • Soft Maturity  2008-11-24 YTM: 3.60 % [Restricted: 3.60 %] (Prob: 71.25 %)

So: YTW = -4.99%. If it makes it to the softMaturity, then the yield will be considerably greater (one might even call it respectable: 3.60% in dividends net of capital loss converts to 5.04% interest-equivalent for Ontario Investors who don’t need the money anyway, which is a lot better than you can get at the bank for a two-year deposit … or in the bond market.

There are clearly at least some people who are willing to slap some money on the table and bet that it won’t be called as soon as the call price declines to $25.25!

There may be some validity to this view: BMO.PR.I pays $1.1875 p.a. as a dividend and BMO can save $0.25 by waiting an extra year before calling, giving the shares a net cash cost of $0.9375 for that year, which is simple interest of 3.71% on the $25.25 that they’d have to pony up for the shares, interest-equivalent of 5.20% using the shareholders’ conversion factor … I’m not sure what factor the bank would use.

I’d call it a tossup, really: the answer will be somewhat dependent upon BMO’s balance sheet objectives (since these are retractible, they get counted as long-term debt for capital calculation purposes … perpetuals with non-cumulative dividends get counted as equity) and their ability to refinance. Against that is the consideration that a new issue of prefs would come with issuance costs attached of perhaps 3% of face value (which is a major reason why immediate calls are not calculated to have a larger probability).

 Tossups, feh. Paying $25.51 for this issue is taking too much risk for not enough return, according to me. HIMIPref™ won’t recommend it, firstly because the eligibleForPurchase function doesn’t like the short-term nature of the instrument and secondly because the totalRewardAsk is so low, which is largely due to the negative YTW.

Attached to this post for your delectation and amusement are graphs of this issue’s Yield-to-Worst and flatBidPrice for the past year.

BMO.PR.I has had a total return of 2.97% since 2005-11-30, based on the following data reported by the performanceBox:

Account Name Bank of Montreal Cl ‘B’ Pr Series 6
Account Number XXA40004
Period From 2005-11-30
Period To 2006-11-07
Pre-tax Calculation Pre-Tax (approximate)
Trade Date Valuations YES
Tax Schedule ID -1
Total Return for Period 2.97%
 
Date Cash Flow Bid Price
2005-11-30 0.00 25.95
2005-12-30 0.00 25.75
2006-01-31 0.00 25.85
2006-02-01 -0.30 25.64
2006-02-28 0.00 25.71
2006-03-31 0.00 25.75
2006-04-28 0.00 25.60
2006-05-03 -0.30 25.34
2006-05-31 0.00 25.42
2006-06-30 0.00 25.47
2006-07-31 0.00 25.75
2006-08-02 -0.30 25.40
2006-08-31 0.00 25.41
2006-09-29 0.00 25.48
2006-10-31 0.00 25.69
2006-11-01 -0.30 25.40
2006-11-07 0.00 25.51

 

which just goes to show that you usually shouldn’t put money into issues with lousy YTWs, because you usually get burned!

Issue Comments

CM.PR.B to be Redeemed!

CIBC has announced that CM.PR.B (Non-cumulative Class A
Preferred Shares Series 24) will be redeemed at $26.00 on January 31, 2007. [Note: the link is to a cgi script. If not accessible, try here.]

 Not a surprise, really … perpetuals paying $1.50 are an endangered species, but the idea that they might have saved $0.25 p.a. on the redemption price (due to a declining call price) added a little piquancy to the speculation.

 What will be interesting is the resolution of the question: will they replace them with a new issue?

Update, 2007-5-10: For some odd reason this post has become the target of spambots. I am therefore disabling comments on this post.

Data Changes

RY.PR.C Off to a Fine Start!

The new Royal Bank 4.6% perpetuals were off to a good start today, trading 239,875 shares in a range of 25.15-25 to close at $25.16-18, 3×13.

The reorg entry has been processed on HIMIPref™: the pre-issue code was P50006, the new security code is A45012.

I’ll update this post with some comments about valuation when I update HIMIPref™ with today’s closing quotations later tonight.

Update : The issue still looks attractive at the closing quotation. Consider the YTWs of the other Royal Perpetual issues that are outstanding (except for the soon to be redeemed RY.PR.O:

Issue Pre-tax YTW Quote “Taxable Curve” Price
RY.PR.A 4.47% 24.84-91 24.97
RY.PR.B 4.30% 25.70-75 25.83
RY.PR.C 4.54% 25.16-18 25.59
RY.PR.W 4.07% 26.27-55 25.89

So, it’s my guess there’s still a little value left in this issue!

Issue Comments

BCE Trust Conversion and Preferred Offer Now Dubious?

It has just been announced that there will be a tax on trusts. Any trusts created after today will be subject to the tax in 2007; existing trusts will be taxed in 2011.

 This makes execution of the BCE offer to buy their preferreds rather dubious, since it was conditional on their conversion taking place.

Of course, the pref market never fully believed the conversion would take place anyway: see the attached graph of the flatBidPrice of the most active affected issue, BC.PR.C, for this issue’s reaction to the offer. The putative offer price was $26.25, announced October 11.

The market could be very active tomorrow, and not just in the issues affected by the offer! There may well be a stampede of income investors into prefs out of trusts – well overdue, since they should never have been in those things in the first place.

 

Data Changes

DBRS Upgrades Canadian Utilities!

DBRS announced today that they are upgrading the Canadian Utilities Limited preferred shares Series O, T, W & X from Pfd-2 to Pfd-2(high), where they will now match the series Q, R, S, U & V.

HIMIPref™ tracks four of these issues:

CU Issues & HIMIPref™
Series Symbol Status
Q CU.PR.T Unchanged
R CU.PR.V Unchanged
W CU.PR.A Upgraded
X CU.PR.B Upgraded

I do not anticipate much excitement to result from this upgrade. The two issues affected are high-dividend perpetuals with a short period until their YTW call. Due to the shortness of their expected term, NONE of the CU issues are eligible for purchase recommendations from HIMIPref™.

And anyway, as far as I can tell, the market isn’t putting much of a premium on “High” modifiers anyway!

The HIMIPref™ credit rating adjustment will take effect commencing October 31.

Issue Comments

SLF.PR.D : Clearance Sale Winding Down?

Well, here it is, the market’s been open for two hours and a mere 35-thousand-odd shares have traded. What a slow day! This might be an indication that the blow-out sale has run its course and the underwriters now have some shelf-space free for the next issue.

It is possible that this has something to do with the banks’ year-end: I will not pretend to be an expert on bank finances, but today is the first day that trades will settle after their year-end, which is October 31. Having sales settle on or prior to this date would go a little way, at least, towards deleveraging their reported balance sheets and improving their capital ratios – but I will leave it to others to determine how much of an incentive this was in the determination of blow-out timing.

All this is now ancient history, of course, and the question on everybody’s lips is “when are these shares going to recover? ARE they going to recover?”. My answer to the latter question is ‘I think so.’ Not ‘I know so’, because the market has a special way of humiliating those who profess to know its secrets, but this issue looks quite cheap by a variety of measures – and is actually trading at even-yield to Sunlife bonds, which means that, if we take the market price as fair, the perpetual nature of this issue is considered to offset the tax benefits of dividend income entirely. This does not sound reasonable!

 Timing? Holy smokes … making predictions about what the market will do is risky enough … making predictions about WHEN it’s going to do it is foolhardy! The price could go up tomorrow … it might go up by the end of November … it might, of course, never happen and leave me looking silly. The last blow-out was the WN.PR.E issue: I’ve prepared a HIMIPref™ graph of the price and Yield-to-Worst of this issue since issuance. It flatlined at $24.00 for a long time, but once it got moving, it moved quickly!

 Now, watch! As soon as I click the “Publish” button for this post, half a million shares will trade at $23.50! Such are the perils of forecasting!

Issue Comments

BMO.PR.G

We’ve had a look at RY.PR.K … now let’s have a look at the other constituent of the HIMI OperatingRetractible Index with a negative Yield-to-Worst: BMO.PR.G. The option schedule is:

         

  • Redemption      2005-08-25      2006-08-24  25.500000
  • Redemption      2006-08-25      2007-08-24  25.250000
  • Redemption      2007-08-25   INFINITE DATE  25.000000
  • Retraction      2008-05-25   INFINITE DATE  26.040000

Which, when analyzed with the 2006-10-24 closing bid of $25.59 results in the optionCalculationList:

        

  • Call  2006-11-23 YTM: -2.10 % [Restricted: -0.17 %] (Prob: 28.69 %)
  • Soft Maturity  2008-05-24 YTM: 3.78 % [Restricted: 3.78 %] (Prob: 71.31 %)

These bonds are not recommended by HIMIPref™ as their Eligible For Purchase (Code) has a numerical result of “14” : “pseudoModifiedDuration (Worst) of buy side less than minimum setting”. The pseudoModifiedDurationWorstBid of this issue is 0.11 based on the following calculation:

Calculation of pseudoModifiedDurationWorstBid for BMO.PR.G
Price Yield-to-Worst
25.3341 4.45%
25.59 -2.10%
25.8459 -13.73%
Summary
Price of Instrument measured 25.5900
Percent Price Difference 2.0000 %
Yield Difference (Worst Method) -18.1862 %
PseudoModified Duration (Worst) 0.1100

These data are taken from the pseudoModifiedDurationCalculationBox and pseudoPortfolioReportBox.

The analyticalParametersReportBox shows that the value of minWorstBidPseudoModifiedDurationBuy is an optimizableParameter with a value currently set to 2.481. Thus, we can infer that HIMIPref™ analysis has been found to work better on a long-term portfolio basis when issues with such imminent callability are excluded from consideration.

Issue Comments

SLF.PR.D : Inventory Blow-out Sale!

Readers will remember that I wasn’t too impressed with this issue when it came out.

The market apparently agreed with me, as this issue is now a Blue-Light Special : currently at $23.67-95, last trade at $23.94, down $0.80 on the day. Over 17,000 shares have traded, mostly between $23.94 and $24.00.

 At these levels the issue looks quite attractive! The dividend of $1.1125 represents a current yield of 4.63% on a price of $24.00, and it’s OK to use current yield on a discounted perp! This yields exceeds the issue yield of the new Royal Bank Issue, which I quite liked.

More later.

Later, more: At the close, this looked pretty good! At the closing bid of $24.00 the current yield was 4.64% and the Yield-to-Worst 4.66%, second only to the Pfd-2(low) (DBRS) rated WN.PR.E in the PerpetualDiscount index. There certainly seems to be plenty available, but there’s no telling how long it will stay at these levels … the bid size is 11,900 shares.

 Deep thinkers fresh from reading the FOMC entrails will note that I am assuming that it won’t go down any further. Well … I don’t think it will … the objective of these blow-outs is to put such a ridiculously low price on your inventory you can dump it all quickly and stop worrying about it … but nothing is certain in this wicked world.