Category: Issue Comments

Issue Comments

W.PR.J

This is an interesting issue, a member of the PerpetualPremium index. It’s rated Pfd-2(low) by DBRS, where it was confirmed in their latest review of 2005-09-20. The issue had a closing quotation of 25.22-35 on the TSX on 2006-08-16.

The redemption schedule is:

  • Redemption      2004-07-15      2005-07-14  26.000000
  • Redemption      2005-07-15      2006-07-14  25.750000
  • Redemption      2006-07-15      2007-07-14  25.500000
  • Redemption      2007-07-15      2008-07-14  25.250000
  • Redemption      2008-07-15      2999-12-29  25.000000

so it is currently trading at a discount to its current redemption price, but at a discount to its future redemption price.
Analysis of the schedule and its current price gives this calculation for portfolioYield (from the bid-side of the market):

  • Call  2006-09-15 YTM: 26.33 % [Restricted: 2.16 %] (Prob: 10.32 %)
  • Call  2006-10-15 YTM: 15.67 % [Restricted: 2.57 %] (Prob: 5.69 %)
  • Call  2006-12-14 YTM: 10.54 % [Restricted: 3.46 %] (Prob: 5.64 %)
  • Call  2007-04-13 YTM: 8.02 % [Restricted: 5.27 %] (Prob: 5.05 %)
  • Call  2007-08-14 YTM: 6.23 % [Restricted: 6.19 %] (Prob: 7.39 %)
  • Call  2008-08-14 YTM: 5.42 % [Restricted: 5.42 %] (Prob: 7.06 %) 
  • Limit Maturity  2036-08-16 YTM: 5.60 % [Restricted: 5.60 %] (Prob: 58.87 %)

and the cash flow analysis of the YTW scenario is:

  • 2006-10-15        DIVIDEND   0.35   0.991246   0.35
  • 2007-01-15        DIVIDEND   0.35   0.977971   0.34
  • 2007-04-15        DIVIDEND   0.35   0.965158   0.34
  • 2007-07-15        DIVIDEND   0.35   0.952372   0.33
  • 2007-10-15        DIVIDEND   0.35   0.939618   0.33
  • 2008-01-15        DIVIDEND   0.35   0.927035   0.32
  • 2008-04-15        DIVIDEND   0.35   0.914755   0.32
  • 2008-07-15        DIVIDEND   0.35   0.902637   0.32
  • 2008-08-14  FINAL DIVIDEND   0.11   0.898677   0.10
  • 2008-08-14        MATURITY  25.00   0.898677  22.47

The averageTradingValue of the shares (as defined by HIMIPref™) is only 34,088 … too small to attract institutional players, but quite large enough for the occasional retail purchaser.

The issue now has the highest YTW of any issue in the HIMI Proprietary PerpetualPremium index – even if we measure the YTW from the ask price of 25.35.

 

HIMIPref News

RY.PR.S

This is an interesting issue, since it is quoted at $26.31-40, a fat premium despite being imminently callable.

Options on this issue are:

Redemption      2006-08-24      2007-08-23  26.000000
Redemption      2007-08-24      2008-08-23  25.750000
Redemption      2008-08-24      2009-08-23  25.500000
Redemption      2009-08-24      2010-08-23  25.250000
Redemption      2010-08-24      2999-12-29  25.000000

 And the YTW Analysis is:

Call  2006-09-23 YTM: -5.90 % [Restricted: -0.69 %] (Prob: 31.33 %)
Call  2006-12-09 YTM: 1.55 % [Restricted: 0.51 %] (Prob: 5.01 %)
Call  2007-09-23 YTM: 3.75 % [Restricted: 3.75 %] (Prob: 8.58 %)
Call  2008-09-23 YTM: 4.32 % [Restricted: 4.32 %] (Prob: 4.24 %)
Call  2009-09-23 YTM: 4.54 % [Restricted: 4.54 %] (Prob: 3.16 %)
Call  2010-09-23 YTM: 4.66 % [Restricted: 4.66 %] (Prob: 2.78 %)
Option Certainty  2035-02-14 YTM: 5.75 % [Restricted: 5.75 %] (Prob: 44.90 %)

Not the kind of issue I’d like to own! I can understand why some people might not wish to hit the current bid of $26.31 – they may have high transaction costs through their brokers, while a redemption will be done for free – buy why would anybody put a bid up there? It pays $1.525 annually with 10-million shares outstanding and Royal has done two perpetual issues this year with coupons of $1.1125 (RY.PR.A, 12-million shares) and $1.175 (RY.PR.B, 12-million shares) … so why would Royal keep it outstanding? Even a cost of $0.75 for brokerage commissions on a new issue sold entirely to retail through other dealers AND a $1.00 premium on early redemption is recouped pretty quickly with those kind of numbers.

And, as is shown below, it’s been a sell candidate for the past year, with a consistently low YTW (except for few pops in YTW recently, which don’t mean a lot given the short term to presumed maturity): RYPRS_YTW.jpg

There may be some who look at the very high calculated probability of this issue being extand for nearly thirty years in the future and take issue with the calculation. That’s entirely understandable. I do too. HIMIPref™ is known to have a certain amount of difficulty in calculating meaningful numbers for issues whose prices are constrained by a relatively near term call. For this reason, the parameters minCostBidPseudoModifiedDurationBuy, minWorstBidPseudoModifiedDurationBuy and minYTWModifiedDurationBuy were developed, which put a lower limit on three of the calculated modified duration measures. These parameters have been optimized to values of 1.02, 2.481 and 0.00, respectively (the most stringent condition is applied).

Due to these minima, RY.PR.S is not even eligible for purchase by HIMIPref™ regardless of valuation.

Another quibble that may be addressed is the question of declining redemption premia. It could be argued that due to the known decrease in redemption price of $0.25 annually for the next four years, it is proper to evaluate the chance of redemption of these shares as if they were paying $1.525 – $0.25 = $1.275 per annum, this being the net effect on Royal Bank’s cash flow of waiting a year. This calculated rate certainly is a lot closer to the coupon of the recent issues than the raw rate!

From an investment perspective it doesn’t make a lot a difference, though. Essentially, you are buying these in the hopes that the four year yield-to-worst of 4.66% will be realized. There is no hope of a capital gain – any decline in interest rates will simply increase the very high probability that the issue will be called. Given the hopelessness of the potential for capital gains with rate decreases, the high level of protection agains rate decreases is almost worthless.

Investors can do better. A look at the chart Premium-Perpetual Yield Curve, 2006-07-28 shows that there are plenty of alternatives.

Issue Comments

IQW.PR.C / IQW.PR.D Downgraded by DBRS

DBRS has announced that they have downgraded all series of the Quebecor World Inc. preferred shares to Pfd-4 with a negative trend (it was previously Pfd-4(high) with a negative trend.

DBRS cited a “greater than expected weakening of the financial profile”.

 HIMIPref subscribers will not be too concerned about this downgrade, as Hymas Investment Management does not recommend the purchase of anything that’s rated Pfd-4(high) or lower, and will only recommend Pfd-3 issues (of any sub-grade) in certain circumstances and in small amounts relative to portfolio size.

HIMIPref does, however, maintain the Quebecor World preferreds in its database: symbols IQW.PR.C and IQW.PR.D. These issues are recorded solely for the sake of continuity and have no influence on the calculation of yield curves.

Issue Comments

A sparkling debut for PWF.PR.L!

Well – sometimes I get things right! In the post Power Financial Series L, I made the prediction that “I think it will go to an immediate premium over issue price”.

 So far, so good! The issue traded 442,125 shares today (a value of over $11-million) and closed with a quote of 25.30-35. I suspect that there’s more to come, but I’ll wait until I’ve updated HIMIPref with the full universe of prices for August 4 before I start flapping my yap.

Data Changes

BC.PR.B / BC.PR.E

The terms of BC.PR.B changed effective 2006-05-01 with the annual dividend declining from $1.3125 to $1.0875. There’s a haircut for you!

Holders had the option to convert to the Ratchet Rate issue, BC.PR.E, and a little bit more than a quarter of the issue was converted. These issues become convertable into each other again on May 1, 2011 (although you may need to contact the company earlier!).

Changes have been put through on HIMIPref to reflect this conversion. Security codes are:

Issue Code
BC.PR.B (old) A38003
BC.PR.B (new) A38006
BC.PR.E A38007
Data Changes

BC.PR.C

The terms of this issue have changed, effective 2006-08-01, in accordance with the prospectus and the resetting of the coupon.

The coupon rate is now 4.65% until 2011-08-01. HIMIPref assumes that on that date it will become a Ratchet-Rate issue, since the company has discretion as to the fixed rate to which the issue will be reset.

No shares were converted to the Ratchet-Rate preferreds, since the holders of less than 2-million shares wished to exercise that privilege.

The old HIMIPref security code for this issue was A38004; following a “term change” reorganization, the new code is A38005.

Issue Comments

Operating-Retractible Yield Curve, 2006-07-26

Well, what are we to make of this yield curve?

OpRet YTW Curve 2006-07-26

This yield curve was plotted from the data prepared for the ‘Operating Retractible’ Index on 2006-07-26. The x-axis is modified duration, the y-axis is the pre-tax yield to maturity. Both data elements are obtained from the “YTW Scenario” – i.e., assuming a maturity-date and associate redemption price that reflects the worst-case-scenario (given current conditions) for the shareholder.

Retractible prefs are the class of prefs that behave most like bonds (an assertion I’ll prove at some point in the future, probably in a published article … for now, just trust me!) so one would expect that a yield curve would be a relatively smooth looking thing.

No such luck! BAM.PR.J, with a yield of 4.54% until its presumed redemption in March 2018, well above the curve, while PWF.PR.D seems well below its peers, having a YTW of only 1.87% based on a call at $26.00 in November 2007.

Could it be that the market is pricing the latter issue based on a redemption at $25.00 immediately prior to the retraction date in October 2012? Its yield based on the 2012 call is currently 3.72%, which is much closer to what comparable issues are paying. It is, perhaps, due to this sort of behaviour that HIMIPref finds the concept of portfolio yield useful in preferred share valuation.

The graph shown isn’t definitive, of course. No allowance has been made for credit rating and it is certainly possible to argue that the yield premium available on BAM.PR.J is mere compensation for the risk that its Pfd-2(low) rating from DBRS implies relative to the other labelled data points, which are all Pfd-1(low) – or simply that its extremely long time until its retraction privilege becomes exercisable make the other data points irrelevant for pricing purposes. It is also entirely valid to argue that the market is pricing in higher yields for the future, which will make the earlier redemption of PWF.PR.D less likely.

Arguments, arguments … that’s what makes a market!

Issue Comments

HPF.PR.B Credit Rating

I just don’t understand the DBRS credit rating on this issue at all.

 Essentially, the company has two classes of preferred shares and one class of “common”. They have invested the proceeds in a portfolio … part of this portfolio has been sold forward to a counterparty in order to guarantee the return of principal for the senior preferred shares. Got that?

 OK, a simplified balance sheet, as of December 31, 2005, of this Split Share Corporation looks like this:

Assets (thousands, CAD)  
Pledged Portfolio 25,173
Other Assets 29,250
Total Assets 54,423
 
Liabilities (thousands, CAD)  
Misc. 850
Senior Pfd 33,068
Junior Pfd 19,445
Equity 1,060
Total Liabilities and Equity 54,423

Now, maybe to you and me, things look pretty dicey for the “Junior Preferreds” (Note that these are really called the “Series 2”). After all, they’re owed $19,445M on redemption and there’s only $20,505 to cover it – a coverage ratio of just 1.05:1.

But DBRS claims that the coverage ratio is 1.46:1 and, as far as I have been able to tell (and confirmed in a telephone call last March), here’s how they’ve done it: the amount due on maturity to the senior prefs is $33,068M, right? And that’s covered off by the forward agreement, right? And the portfolio to be delivered under the forward agreement is on the balance sheet for $25,173M, right?

 Therefore, DBRS concludes, there’s $7,895M guaranteed capital appreciation sitting right there! The forward contract has an intrinsic value of $7,895M ! So, for analytical purposes, in order to calculate the coverage for the Junior prefs, just stick another $7,895M into equity against the notional forward contract value, and then come up with a coverage ratio of:

Notional Junior Asset Coverage
Presumed Calculation to agree with DBRS Figures
Balance sheet value of Junior Prefs
(thousands, CAD)
19,445
Balance sheet equity 1,060
Off-balance-sheet equity from forward contract 7,895
Total value to cover Junior Prefs 28,400
Asset Coverage
(28,400 / 19,445)
1.46

Now, this calculation is absolutely nonsensical, of course, but as far as I could tell from the DBRS press release and from talking to their analyst, that’s exactly what they did.

‘Why is this nonsensical?’, you ask.

Well, there’s the small matter of the dividends that have to be paid on the Senior prefs. If you’re going to defease the principal repayment on the seniors, you can’t just forget all about the dividends due. They pay 5.85% annually …. they’re not due until June 29, 2012 …. where’s Mr. Calculator? … essentially, that payment stream of $0.1218 monthly has a present value of about $7.50 / share, or a total of about $10-million when discounted at 5.85%.

Knock $10-million off the amount available to cover the Juniors … and, hey, looky-looky! They’re in the red, with an asset coverage ratio of 0.95:1 !

Let’s try it another way, since that doesn’t look so good. Let’s just forget about the damn forward agreement and assign it a value of $0. That’s almost as bad: there is now $20,505 to cover $19,445 … asset coverage is 1.05:1.

It just doesn’t work. If you’re going to consider the Senior’s defeased, you have to defease all of it, not just the principal, and the dividend stream is just way too much.

 So what does an asset coverage of 1:1-ish mean for most companies? Let’s put it this way: on August 19, 2002, Sixty Split (SXT.PR.A) got downgraded to Pfd-4 when its coverage ration reached 1.28:1.

How these HPF.PR.Bs are maintaining their DBRS rating of Pfd-2(low) [Stable] is something I just don’t understand.

Note Added: In case anybody has the idea that dividends on the securing portfolio will offset the dividends to be paid on the senior shares, I’ll quote from the prospectus:

Under the Series 1 Forward Agreement, all dividends and distributions, including extraordinary distributions, declared and paid on the Series 1 Repayment Portfolio securities will be paid to the Company and the amount payable on the Termination Date may be correspondingly reduced. In order to minimize the likelihood that such dividends or distributions will be paid, the Company intends to acquire non-dividend paying shares of Canadian public companies for the Series 1 Repayment Portfolio. If any such dividends or distributions are declared on securities in the Series 1 Repayment Portfolio, the Series 1 Forward Agreement may be amended to provide that replacement securities acceptable to the Counterparty be substituted for the securities in respect of which the dividend or distribution has been declared to preserve the value of the forward transaction prior to the occurrence of such event.

 

Note also that:

The Company will pay dividends on the Offered Shares primarily from net realized capital gains, including premiums from writing covered call options on the securities held in the Managed Portfolio in which it is permitted to invest and from distributions and interest received on that portion of the Managed Portfolio invested in securities of Income Funds and debt securities.

In other words, they’re not going to get any covered call income from the securing portfolio, either, and finally: 

In order to achieve the Company’s regular monthly dividends on the Series 1 Shares and Series 2 Shares, the Company will be required to generate an average annual return on the Managed Portfolio of approximately 12% if the value of the Managed Portfolio is maintained intact until the Termination Date

Well, DBRS apparently thinks they can do it! Let’s hope so, because there’s not much room for error.

Issue Comments

Crazy pricing! RY.PR.A vs. RY.PR.B on 2006-07-20

OK, so the new issue was very badly received and the underwriters didn’t try to catch the falling knife and support the issue during the distribution phase.

 But these relative prices are crazy! RY.PR.A started trading just a few months ago (and I didn’t like them either) and the terms of these two issues are virtually identical: the redemption schedule is simply shifted three months along, the ‘A’ issue pays a dividend of $1.1125 annually and the ‘B’ issue pays $1.1750.

So basically, you get 6.25-cents more per share in annual dividend with the B.

Closing Quotation of A : 24.40-45

Closing Quotation of B : 24.30-45

 Let’s not ever call the pref market efficient!