Category: MAPF

There was a good level of trading in December, most of it intra-sector.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.
Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available on the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

The fund’s performance and the performance of the indices has already been discussed.

Update: Some doubting Thomases, unconvinced of the abject failure of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in characterizing the Canadian preferred share market, might object that outperformance this month is due simply to long duration in an up-month.

I attach a graph and an associated Regression Report plotting total return against Modified Duration (YTW) of issues in the HIMIPref™ Universe that are in the top three rating classes (by DBRS). It may be seen that although Specific Risk increases with MD-YTW, there does not appear to be any Systemic Risk associated with term … at least, not this month!

As a further illustration, I attach an evaluation of the December performances of the individual issues in the PerpetualDiscount index, sorted by performance and by issuer.

While classes will very often show a normal qualitative relationship amongst themselves, variance is generally very high compared to the average (in other words, there’s a lot of noise around each signal).

You know, sometimes everything works. 

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for December, 2007, month-end. The unit value is $9.0070, after giving effect to a dividend distribution of $0.173192. Returns over various periods are:

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The December returns reflect outperformance against CPD (which returned +1.14% on the month) and DPS.UN (estimated at +1.93%).

The quarterly performance includes October’s poor performance, which I have attributed to a move into perpetualDiscount issues that proved to be somewhat early. The move has now been amply rewarded, as volatility in December provided the setting for several profitable trades. The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

It was something of an interesting month, as early strength crumbled in the face of tax-loss selling; after the December 24 deadline for 2007 settlement passed the market rocketted upwards. Actually, many issues started to bounce back on the 24th – it was December 21 that the selling peaked.

One issuer that appeared to be particularly hard hit by tax loss selling was the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CM), which announced on December 19 that:

Following Standard and Poor’s announcement today that it had reduced the credit rating of ACA Financial Guaranty Corp. from “A” to “CCC”, CIBC confirmed that ACA is a hedge counterparty to CIBC in respect of approximately U.S. $3.5 billion of its U.S. subprime real estate exposure.
    It is not known whether ACA will continue as a viable counterparty to CIBC. Although CIBC believes it is premature to predict the outcome, CIBC believes there is a reasonably high probability that it will incur a large charge in its financial results for the First Quarter ending January 31, 2008.

Well, I’m not going to say this news is meaningless to preferred shareholders. Credit Ratings Agencies are annoyed; due, I think, both the loss itself and the revelation that so many eggs were placed in the ACA basket. But. But! The loss will be borne by the common shareholders. That’s what common shareholders are good for, taking the first loss. While this is indeed meaningful to preferred shareholders, the market grossly over-reacted, and MAPF was able to scoop up a good position in two of CM’s perpetual issues – some of which was unwound prior to month end with both a chunky capital gain and a dividend.

There were many other trades, but the CM is the easiest to explain!

I consider 2007 to have been a very successful year for the fund. Although the fund lost 1.63% on the year, it outperformed the benchmark quite handsomely – for those who are seeking a long-term investment in preferred shares due to the various qualities of this asset class, outperformance in a down year is just as good as the same outperformance in an up year.

And down years are rare. Subscribers to Canadian Moneysaver will have seen my exposition of just how bad 2007 was for preferred shareholders (and my attempts to explain why) … cheapskates who don’t subscribe will just have to wait until I republish it after the black-out period is over.

Update, 2008-01-08: The main returns pages have been updated to reflect the BMO-CM 50 index returns: Monthly, Quarterly, Annually to Dec. 31 and Annualized to Dec. 31.

I received some questions from a potential client based in Calgary recently; for the interest and edification of other potential clients, I am transcribing the questions and answers here:

What do you see as the advantages/ differences of investing in the fund or having my own account managed?  I know the fees are higher for the managed account.   I plan to invest under $100k I would be interested in your perspective.  Since I am entering the market now is there an advantage today for one or the other?

The major advantage to an investment in the fund vs. a segregated account is size. Small accounts are difficult to trade, because the perils of a partial fill are magnified – the fund can, for instance, offer 4,000 shares at a certain price; if it only gets filled for 500, that still leaves enough of a position that it may be efficiently traded.

If a smaller account offers 700 shares and gets that fill of 500, that leaves the uncomfortable option of either changing the order to a market order – to clear out the position, but getting a worse price than hoped – or of keeping the 200 shares on the books, which will be relatively expensive to trade.

Do I have the fees correct 1% for the fund and 1.5% for managed account for an investment of under $100k?

Yes, your understanding of the fees is correct; but note that I cannot currently offer you a segregated account for an investment of under $100k due to registration expenses. You should also note that the fund also incurs expenses of (currently) 0.5% [which are deducted directly from the fund prior to calculation of net asset value and performance; thus, the returns quoted on my site are before fees, but after expenses].

How are paid dividends handled in the accounts?  Do they get paid out as cash according to their schedule?

Subscribers to the fund may have quarterly dividends paid in cash or have them reinvested in the fund (the same option applies to the annual capital gains dividend – which, unfortunately, will be zero this year unless something dramatic happens in the next three weeks!). For a segregated account, anything is possible by arrangement. 

The shorterm, medium term and long term future that you see for preferred shares? I know this is a loaded question, especially with the current credit scare in the market.  I would be interested in understanding your perspective of today versus history.  For example, looking at previous years performance of the fund, there are years that have a  higher performance compared to other years  I would be interested in understanding how the economic environment contributed to the performance that year or lesser performance in some other years?  I’m trying to understand the economic environment in which preferred shares do well.  Are the main factors – decreasing interest rates and an experienced manager who can buy and sell opportunities?  Are there other factors?

If you ever come to a solid understanding of the economic environment in which preferred shares do well, tell me quickly what it is, because I’d love to know!

Joking aside, preferred should normally behave much like long-term corporate bonds. They should do well in times when long-term interest rates decline (which is a bit related, but not 100%, to a decline in short-term rates). They should do better than this base in an expanding, happy economy (as perceived default risk declines) and somewhat worse during times such as this year, when there are worries (exaggerated, according to me, but what do I know?) of mass defaults. 

I know “timing the market” is not realistic, however, since this is my first purchase of preferreds, I am interested in understanding if this is a reasonable time to enter?  Is there any obvious reason to wait or to enter  immediately?

Given the current spread of the interest-rate equivalent of discounted perpetual preferreds to long-term corporate bonds (now about 210bp – that is, the average investment-grade PerpetualDiscount issue now yields the equivalent of the long-term investment-grade corporate bond index plus 2.10%, given a tax-equivalency factor of 1.4), I have to say that now looks like a more attractive time than normal. However, there is no reason that the spread couldn’t go to 310bp, which would cause underperformance of such an investment.I talked a bit about spreads in my blog at:
http://www.prefblog.com/?p=1394     

According to me, a spread of 100-150bp is “normal” – whatever “normal” means!My advice is to come up with an asset allocation that makes sense for you over the long term and not vary it much – for instance, 60% stocks, 20% bonds, 20% referreds, with the stocks further subdivided by sector and geography; and all numbers based on how much risk you, personally, can live with, which will be based on both your portfolio objectives and your personal comfort with risk.

I would not adjust these allocations without a compelling reason; for instance, you might say your fixed income will be 50/50 bonds/preferreds when spreads are more than 100bp, but 75/25 when spreads are below this figure; with similar rules applying to your estimated long-term returns on stocks & bonds.

I cannot receive your preferred letter, as I reside in Alberta.  However, I am curious: do individuals follow your recommendations and manage their own accounts or even for those that can get the letter, do you still recommend the fund?

A number of subscribers to PrefLetter are market professionals, who use the recommendations either as their primary source of recommendations to their clients or as a ‘second-opinion’ on their own or their firm’s views. (As a matter of fact, I had been toying with the idea of offering this service for quite some time; then a financial advisor with a national firm called me and demanded that I offer it!)

Others are individual investors who want full control over every aspect of their portfolio, but do recognize that advice from a specialist is a useful thing. Some individual investors have very specific portfolio objectives and risk tolerances that mean, really, that they are the only ones who can possibly manage the account.

From a perspective of pure returns, I recommend the fund since the market is examined constantly with fresh results from my analytical programme and trading is efficient.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for November, 2007, month-end. The unit value is $8.7845. Returns over various periods are:

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The November returns reflect outperformance against CPD (which returned -1.21%) and DPS.UN (estimated at -1.14%).

The quarterly performance still reflects October’s poor performance, which I attributed last month to a move into perpetualDiscount issues that proved to be somewhat early. However, given the quarterly performance of CPD (-4.52%) and DPS.UN (-3.87%), I think I am justified in thinking that the past three months, while disappointing and not reflective of the returns I aim to achieve for clients, have not been a disaster for the fund, which has a superb yield while retaining good credit quality and liquidity.

The BMO-CM-50 Index is not yet available, but I believe that I have outperformed it by about 200bp over the past twelve months. Update: I have just received the report: this index returned -0.83% for the month, -6.55% for the trailing 12 months; hence MAPF has outperformed the index by 157bp over the past twelve months (after expenses, before fees)

The yield is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

While I attempt at all times not to say anything that might be interpreted as an exhortation to time the markets, I will say that there are some signs the market is normalizing … it may still be very low, but a few things lead me to believe that irrationality is abating somewhat.

To illustrate my point, I present the following table tracing the flow of money through a series of trades in November within the perpetualDiscount sector that worked out quite well:

I hope the table is clear! It makes perfect sense to me – but let me know in the comments if it’s really just a jumble of numbers. At any rate, the point is that the money flowing through this series of trades  had a total return of +1.72% for the month, while invested at all times in PerpetualDiscount issues. The PerpetualDiscount index returned -0.07% as has been previously reported.

It would, of course, have been much nicer to have held something other than GWO.PR.G during the period 11/19 to 11/26 – but I didn’t know that when I bought it, did I? And when the HSB.PR.D got cheap – the trade picked up credit, picked up yield AND increased the discount to call price – I had to sell something.

My point is that the sequence of trades was both rapid-fire and profitable. It may have been just a flash in the pan, but that is the sort of trading HIMIPref™ has historically indicated in “normal” markets and its success gives me hope that the market is normalizing.

I just wish the month had ended with December 3 prices … I would have been able to report a gain for November!

There was heavy trading in November.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.), which doesn’t make much of a difference this month. MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The shift from PerpetualDiscount issues into SplitShares was very dramatic, but I must stress that this was not done – and is never done – as a market call on the overall direction of the market. During the month it appeared that there were dramatic undervaluations in specific issues in the SplitShare sector; in order to buy them, something had to get sold!

It’s always useful to do a post-mortem on trades. The following tables are as accurate as I can make them, but I will stress that the trades are rarely precisely cash neutral. If, for instance, I have bought half the number I want of a particular issue at 21.00 during the day, I will not lift an offer at 21.50 just to complete the buying programme! Maybe there is something else that’s attractive on offer; maybe I’ll just keep the cash exposure overnight and put in another bid the next day. It’s important to avoid being too mechanical when trading in a relatively thin market such as preferred shares.

Anyway, here are the basic trades involving the sale of PerpetualDiscounts and the purchase of SplitShares, as well as I can disentangle them!

It should be noted that I am reporting only the specific trades illustrating the transfer of assets from the PerpetualDiscount sector to SplitShares; and at that, there are a few scrappy pieces missing. Full disclosure of all trades is made regularly; the full reports are regularly published on the fund’s main page together with the annual and semi-annual reports.

I will emphasize again that these trades were opportunistic and do not reflect any view on the market; I will also note that I considered BNA.PR.C to be ludicrously cheap, but had to sell the BAM.PR.N perpetuals to get into it in good size without overweighting my exposure to BAM (recall that BNA.PR.C is backed by BAM.A shares).

Credit distribution is:

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available on the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

I’m happy with the portfolio as it now stands. Credit quality and liquidity are good, and yields are well in excess of benchmarks. The positions should do very well as the situation normalizes.

A discussion of November’s performance will be posted shortly.

I received a call today from a client who is most concerned about the preferred share market in general and Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund in particular. It will not have escaped notice that the fund price has been declining in recent months – when will it end?

However, the most important thing about fixed-income investing – and an investment in preferred shares is, for broad asset allocation purposes, an investment in fixed income – is that it is represents an investment in fixed income. A very circular definition to be sure, but I hope my meaning will be made plain shortly.

From now on, I will report sustainable dividends per unit as part of my regular portfolio disclosures. This number will be calculated as follows:

where

• SustDiv is the expected income per unit per year
• NAVPU is the Net Asset Value Per Unit
• PortYield is the Yield-to-Worst of the Portfolio
• Leverage is the degree of leverage in the portfolio

First – I should emphasize that “Leverage” should not be taken as meaning that the fund is leveraged on a regular basis. The fund can often hold relatively large cash balances, either positive or negative, to facilitate trading. If I attempt to purchase one security and sell another, I might not get filled on both sides to the same extent. If I don’t, I won’t force the cash to zero, by buying or selling something at whatever price it takes … I’ll (generally) wait until the next day and patiently wait until the market cooperates. These cash positions are normally wiped out fairly quickly – but when they exist at month end, the fund reporting can look a little odd! Note that in the table below, most of the “Leverage Factors” are less than 1.0, indicating that the fund was holding cash until it could be invested advantageously.

While the figures for Sustainable Income have been worked out in a mathematically precise manner, I must caution investors that these amounts will not necessarily be paid out to them in four equal installments annually. As may be seen from the historical distributions recorded on the Quarterly Performance Reporting Page, distributions are ‘lumpy’. This results from several factors:

• Sometimes, the market wants to capture the dividend a lot more than I want to keep it! Let us say that an issue is fairly priced at $25.00 (flat) and earns a $0.30 dividend tomorrow. The market price should be $25.30. Sometimes, the market really wants to capture the dividend, and the price goes up to $25.40. Why would I keep the issue? Why not just sell, and take $0.40 as a capital gain, instead of $0.30 as a dividend? I don’t have a good answer for that … so I sell. Naysayers may whine that this requires me to have a fairly good idea of what the “fair price” is … but that’s what I do!
• Sometimes I want to capture the dividend more than the market wants to keep it. Perhaps, in the above example, the market price of the issue is only $25.20. Well – I’ll be trying to buy it! If I can get it at that price then I will earn a $0.30 dividend right away and be left with an issue fairly priced at $25.00 … which is good business!
• The fund does not exclusively seek to maximize yield. I do not blindly purchase whatever yields the most.
  • I might, for instance, trade so that while I’m giving up yield, I’m picking up credit (e.g., I might wish to sell a Pfd-2(low) issue at a yield of 5.00% in order to buy a Pfd-1 issue at a yield of 4.80%).
  • There might be other instances whereby I can increase my ‘fair value’ while decreasing yield … I might wish to sell a perpetual at 5.00% in order to buy a retractible at 4.80%.

The first item on the above list will have the effect of reducing the dividend distribution, but increasing the capital gain distribution. The second item will have the opposite effect. The third item will not have a direct effect on distributions, but will reduce my reported portfolio yield. When the trades are successful, each will have the effect of ultimately putting more money in the unitholders’ pockets.

The fund is managed with an objective of maximizing fair value. I am indifferent as to whether this comes in the form of dividends or capital gains; I am indifferent as to whether the quarterly distributions of dividends are bigger or smaller than average.

From the above discussion, it should be understood that these calculations are a guide, intended to illustrate the idea that expected income per unit will be fairly constant. Successful trading – as has occurred in the past – will lead, eventually, to excess distributions and hence, more units.

Many will observe that this is much like one’s attitude should be when holding a bond, preferred share, or other fixed income vehicle directly: in the absence of credit disasters, it keeps on paying its agreed rate.

The RY.PR.F issue, for instance, is now quoted at 20.73, down a lot from its issue price of $25.00, but it’s still paying the same dividend now as when it started: $1.1125 annually. It would have been a lot nicer to have bought that dividend stream for $20.73, of course, rather than having paid $25.00 … but I can’t time the markets and I don’t think anybody else can either (as I have discussed elsewhere). What I do think MAPF can do – and what MAPF has historically been able to do – is to trade between issues, selling them when they’re ten cents expensive in order to buy something else that’s ten cents cheap, and passing those gains through to unitholders.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for October, 2007, month-end. The unit value is $8.8084. Returns over various periods are:

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The October returns are disappointing. As has been stated in the post regarding portfolio composition, the fund made a major move into the PerpetualDiscount sector during the course of the month. The sector looked thoroughly undervalued at the time of the trades … but it just kept on going down. The ghastly performance of the PerpetualDiscount sector has been discussed elsewhere.

As noted in the discussion of portfolio composition, I am very happy with the portfolio as it stood on October 31. HIMIPref™ was, perhaps, too early in determining that sufficient value existed in the sector to be worth a switch – and a switch between sectors requires a much greater increase in value than an intra-sector trade – but that’s the way it goes sometimes. A less sensitive system would miss potentially profitable trades.

More later.

There was heavy trading in October.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.), which doesn’t make much of a difference this month. MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The shift from PerpetualPremium issues into PerpetualDiscounts was very dramatic, but I must stress that this was not done – and is never done – as a market call on the overall direction of the market. During the month it appeared that there were dramatic undervaluations in specific issues in the PerpetualDiscount sector; in order to buy them, something had to get sold!

It’s always useful to do a post-mortem on trades. The following tables are as accurate as I can make them, but I will stress that the trades are rarely precisely cash neutral. If, for instance, I have bought half the number I want of a particular issue at 21.00 during the day, I will not lift an offer at 21.50 just to complete the buying programme! Maybe there is something else that’s attractive on offer; maybe I’ll just keep the cash exposure overnight and put in another bid the next day. It’s important to avoid being too mechanical when trading in a relatively thin market such as preferred shares.

Anyway, here are the basic trades involving the sale of issues that were “PerpetualPremiums” as of 9/28, as well as I can disentangle them!

It should be noted that I am reporting only the trades out of securities held in the  PerpetualPremium sector as of last month end; and at that, there are a few scrappy pieces missing. Full disclosure of all trades is made regularly; the full reports are published on the fund’s main page together with the annual and semi-annual reports.

The above tables make the trend of the portfolio during the month fairly clear:

• PerpetualDiscounts dived
• PerpetualPremiums as a group were cushioned from the blow (as readers of Perpetual Hockey Sticks will have expected)
• The PerpetualPremiums in the portfolio actually outperformed their benchmark during the holding period
• When the PerpetualDiscounts had reached a large discount relative to the premiums, the trades were made
• The PerpetualDiscounts kept falling anyway.

A sad story, but one familiar to most value investors: there is usually a lot more “noise” in the marketplace than “signal”, but occasionally some presumed noise can actually represent a trend. And such was the case this time. 

Credit distribution is:

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.
Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available on the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

I’m very happy with the portfolio as it now stands. Credit quality is very high, as is liquidity, but yields are well in excess of benchmarks anyway. The positions should do very well as the situation normalizes.

A discussion of October’s performance will be posted prior to November 5.

There was heavy trading in September, with the main shift being sales of Split-Share corporations and purchase of Perpetual Premium issues. As always, these changes do not imply a change in view of overall future market performance, but are the result of tactical trades which aim to take advantage of pricing inefficiencies between issues; given that the HIMIPref™ PerpetualPremium index dropped by 93bp while the split-share index rose by 10bp, it is not really very surprising that such trades started looking a lot more attractive in September than they did in August!

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.), and readers may make their own adjustments to reflect interest. MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

The shift from SplitShares into PerpetualPremiums had the effect of improving credit quality; perpetuals of all prices were being hit fairly indiscriminately, with the effect of making the higher quality issues relatively more attractive. Credit distribution is:

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available on the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A discussion of September’s performance is available here.

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for September, 2007, month-end. The unit value is $9.1489, after a distribution of dividends of $0.116224. Returns over various periods are:

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

Claymore has published their final monthly numbers and I have derived the following table:

It should be explicitly noted that the CPD returns are shown AFTER ALL FEES AND EXPENSES, while the MAPF numbers are shown after expenses, but before fees … so to make the numbers more comparable, take the annual fee from the fund’s web page and divide by the appropriate number to obtain the period’s fee.

So … perhaps not the greatest of all quarters, but considering that MAPF did not get the benefit of the huge rise in BCE preferreds in the quarter, staying even – actually, just a tad better than the ‘CPD Competition – after fees isn’t the worst thing that could happen. The last few days of September didn’t help, in either relative or absolute terms, when the market did very poorly, presumably due to digestive problems with the new issues.

More later.

Update, 2007-10-02

The DPS.UN NAV for September 26 has been published, so we can calculate the September-ish returns for it:

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for August and July to derive:

I will also note that the “BMO Capital Markets 50” index returned -1.35% for the month and +0.53% for the quarter, but will not analyze the situation further due to the proprietary nature of this index.

This is an unusual quarter. The basic problem is the BCE/Teachers deal, which had the effect of changing the BCE preferreds from junk issues into speculations on a takeover bid at blue-chip prices. This had a marked effect on returns for these issues, which ranged from a low of +9.52% (BCE.PR.H) to +23.52% (BCE.PR.G). The BMOCM-50 is 8.05% BCE issues as of 2007-9-30, but let’s look at the CPD holdings, which are publicly disclosed:

DPS.UN reported its portfolio in the June 30 Semi-Annual Report:

Anyway, my point in performing this minor piece of attribution analysis is simply to show the enormous influence the presence or absence of BCE issues has had this quarter in preferred share fund returns. A conscious decision was made to avoid these issues for the fund; this action was taken due to a feeling that with BCE in play, the instruments had become unanalyzable by quantitative measures (in addition to my general disdain for issued tied to Canada Prime!). This helped MAPF’s relative returns during the second quarter of this year and has hurt in the third. I have no regrets about the decision – but it certainly has made relative returns more volatile than would otherwise be the case.

Update, 2007-10-14: A discussion of portfolio composition as of September 28, 2007, is available here.