Category: Market Action

Today’s Workers’ Day, so I’m not doing much. Geez, if I get any lazier, I’m gonna have to become an investor advocate!

But I can’t resist commenting on US Pension Bonds:

Pension bonds are making a comeback, as states and cities from Alaska to Philadelphia bet they can use the proceeds to help fill deficits in their retirement funds and still generate a higher return than what they pay in interest.

Officials may sell a record $35 billion of the securities this year after offerings declined since 2003, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Connecticut issued $2.2 billion of pension debt last month, paying an average rate of 5.88 percent on money state officials project will earn 8.5 percent when invested.

Hmmm … leveraging up a pension account to hell-‘n’-gone … I have to agree with Jon Corzine:

“It’s the dumbest idea I ever heard,” said New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine, the Democrat and former chairman of investment bank Goldman, Sachs & Co.

Naked Capitalism republishes a Financial Times commentary on the CDS basis:

“In cash bonds, companies [that wish to borrow money] provide an offset to investors [who wish to lend]. This allows an equilibrium between supply and demand to form. In CDS, the lack of supply side creates a major imbalance, which increases volatility.”

The problem is that complex investments known as synthetic collateralised debt obligations previously acted as big buyers of credit risk. But these products have withered and left the CDS market dominated by people who want to sell credit risk (go short, or buy protection) when things look bad, or switch to buying back credit risk to cover their shorts when the outlook improves.

“Until the synthetic CDO market re-emerges, the CDS market might be doomed to heightened volatility, moving above cash levels in bear runs (everyone buying protection) and below in bull runs (everyone covering shorts), while volatility of cash spreads will be tamed by supply/demand forces.”

We need more people trading the basis, that’s what we need! Unfortunately, shorting cash bonds is fraught with peril and expense on the borrowing front, so straightforward arbitrage will not happen … what needs to happen is more real-money bond investors willing to write covered CDS as a synthetic bond. As has been noted, though, there are counterparty and convergence problems with such a process so, if it ever happens, it will be the province of big, big shops who can afford to set up a specialty unit.

Avinash Persaud writes in VoxEU on a topic close to my heart: The Inappropriateness of Financial Regulation. He argues that the root of the problem is:

A good bank is one that lends to a borrower that other banks would not lend to because of their superior knowledge of the borrower or one that would not lend to a borrower to which everyone lends because of their superior knowledge of the borrower. Modern regulators believe this is too quaint, and, to be fair, many banks were not any good at it. But instead of removing banking licenses from these banks, regulators decided to do away with relationship banking altogether and promoted a switch away from bank finance to market finance where loans are securitised, given public ratings, sold to many investors including other banks, and assessed using approved risk tools that are sensitive to publicly available prices. Now, bankers lend to borrowers that everyone else is lending to, the outcome of a process where the public price of risk is compared with its historic average and a control is applied based on public ratings.

… but cautions that …

Almost every economic model will tell you that if all the players have the same tastes (reduce capital adequacy requirements) and have the same information (public ratings, approved risk-models using market prices) that the system will sooner or later send the herd off the cliff edge (Persaud 2000). And no degree of greater sophistication in the modelling of the price of risk will get around this fact.

Instead he suggests that:

• Capital charges (when computing regulatory ratios of financial strength) should be contra-cyclical (rising when credit risk is cheap and vice versa)
• regulation should be based on asset-liability mismatches, not bank/non-bank.
• “requiring banks to pay an insurance premium to tax payers against the risk that the tax payer will be required to bail them out.”

The first item sounds great, but might be a little difficult to apply in practice. Who decides whether risk is cheap or expensive? The weakness of the current system is also its strength: it provides a rules-based framework.

I disagree with the second item. Shadow banks are wonderful and the sector should be encouraged, to ensure the banks don’t get too fat on the fruits of regulation: insurance, central bank access and cheap financing.

The third item sounds like an attempt to intervene in the current UK debate on deposit insurance. The principle is great … let deposit insurance premia vary according to financial strength, as measured by standard capital ratios. I believe – although I’m not sure, and frankly, today I’m too damn lazy to check – that CDIC premia in Canada do vary, at least to some extent.

“Gummy” has announced a new spreadsheet that allows intraday updating of home-made indices. But watch out for dividend ex-dates!

There’s some fairly unclear reporting about BoC Governor Carney’s Senate appearance today. Bloomberg says:

The central bank would be hard-pressed to rescue financial institutions as the U.S. Federal Reserve did with Bear Stearns Cos. earlier this year, Carney hinted.

“People bear the cost of their decisions,” he said. “In the case of financial institutions which would have taken excessive risk, the people who bear the consequences of that are the shareholders and the senior management. There should never have been any doubt about that.”

The Bloomberg story also says, by the way:

Carney said potential losses from the global credit crisis are hard to gauge, because financial institutions have used derivatives to estimate the value of some assets that are difficult to trade. The derivatives have “implied default probabilities” that are “substantially higher” than history would indicate and thus may be overstated, he said.

… which is just what I’ve said about the IMF report. The Bloomberg story was picked up essentially unchanged by the Financial Post. As far as I can tell, the Globe doesn’t mention the Bear Stearns speculation, even in the story about acceptable collateral. The Canadian Press story says:

Mark Carney says the central bank won’t be bailing out Canadian financial institutions like the U.S. government did when the Bear Stearns brokerage, one of the giants of Wall Street, ran afoul of the subprime mortgage mess.

“If you cannot make a judgment (on the value of an asset), you should not own the security,” Carney told a Senate committee Thursday.

“There is very high value if a situation came about to ensuring the shareholders and senior managers bear the full consequences of their actions,” Carney said.

“The Bank of Canada has a role to become lender of last resort, but we would do that on the advice of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions that the institution is solvent, not because the institution needed money.”

Carney said the central bank would come to the rescue of a chartered bank in the case of a temporary liquidity problem, if the institution had sufficient capital to be considered viable.

But he added if investors and managers thought there would always be a safety net, they would be encouraged to take inordinate risks in order to maximize profits.

What got me interested in this was the implied criticism of the Fed in the first quoted sentence, Mark Carney says the central bank won’t be bailing out Canadian financial institutions like the U.S. government did when the Bear Stearns brokerage, one of the giants of Wall Street, ran afoul of the subprime mortgage mess.

So … did he actually mention BSC or is this merely reporter’s interpretation? Further, he’s saying that they’ll be the lender of last resort to solvent institutions … but BSC was solvent at the time according to all the information I have (which is confirmed by the SEC, which serves the same role that OSFI would serve in such a case) … so there’s no real contradiction there, in the remarks which are directly quoted. The rest is all standard Central Banker Talk and doesn’t need further interpretation.

A good, solid, positive day for the preferred share market. Volume was a little unusual – there were six issues trading in excess of 100,000 shares, but volume breadth was down.

There were ten other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Professor Dennis Snower reminds us on VoxEU that the effects of the credit crisis will be with us for a while, due to influences that both lag and interact:

• reduced interbank lending leads to less firm & household lending leads to reduced consumption and investment leads to reduced sales of goods and services leads to lower stock market valuations leads to lower interbank liquidity.
• unpaid mortgages leads to increased foreclosures leads to forced sales leads to lower prices leads to increased foreclosures.
• decreased household wealth leads to lower consumption leads to lower profits leads to lower investment leads to lower employment lads to lower labour income leads to lower consumption
• reduced US lending rates leads to a lower dollar leads to higher import prices leads to inflation leads to lower consumption and investment

Cheery fellow, isn’t he?

With respect to lagging effects, a Reuters story picked up by Calculated Risk quotes S&P:

“Due to current market conditions, we are assuming that it will take approximately 15 months to liquidate loans in foreclosure and approximately eight months to liquidate loans categorized as real estate owned (REO),”

The Fed announced:

The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds rate 25 basis points to 2 percent.

Recent information indicates that economic activity remains weak. Household and business spending has been subdued and labor markets have softened further. Financial markets remain under considerable stress, and tight credit conditions and the deepening housing contraction are likely to weigh on economic growth over the next few quarters.

Although readings on core inflation have improved somewhat, energy and other commodity prices have increased, and some indicators of inflation expectations have risen in recent months. The Committee expects inflation to moderate in coming quarters, reflecting a projected leveling-out of energy and other commodity prices and an easing of pressures on resource utilization. Still, uncertainty about the inflation outlook remains high. It will be necessary to continue to monitor inflation developments carefully.

The substantial easing of monetary policy to date, combined with ongoing measures to foster market liquidity, should help to promote moderate growth over time and to mitigate risks to economic activity. The Committee will continue to monitor economic and financial developments and will act as needed to promote sustainable economic growth and price stability.

You, too, can be a Fed Watcher! According to me, the most telling change from the March 18 Statement is that April is missing the March sentence “However, downside risks to growth remain.” By me, I’d say the Fed’s done cutting. But what do I know? At least the Bear Stearns guy agrees with me. The fear is, as has often been mentioned here, that cuts in the Fed Funds rate are very broad in effect – perhaps too broad, they may be pushing on a string.

Accrued Interest, while careful not to get too precise, thinks that the 2-year note is cheap:

Unless the Fed’s favorite inflation gauges start rising, or the Fed really believes inflation expectations are rising, there will be no impetus for hikes any time in 2008.

Look back at the 2-year Treasury. The long-term spread between short-term inter-bank lending rates and Treasury rates is about 40bps. So if Fed Funds were going to remain at 2.25% for the next 2 years, fair value for the 2-year Treasury would be 1.85%. So with the 2-year actually in the 2.30% range, the market seems to be expecting Fed Funds to average something like 2.70% over the next 2-years.

Feels to me like that expectation is a bit high. If the Fed holds at 2% for 9 months, the Fed would have to hike 112bps immediately thereafter for Funds to average 2.70%. The hike would have to be more extreme if we used a discounting method rather than a straight average.

I’m not sure how much this analysis should be trusted, because the 2-year / FF spread is very sensitive to economics (it would be most interesting to know precisely how good a predictor of future Fed Funds rates the two year note is. I’m sure this has been looked at – post a link in the comments if you have one). AI has been taken to task in the comments …

Meanwhile, Carney said in Ottawa:

We at the Bank project that the Canadian economy will grow by 1.4 per cent this year, 2.4 per cent in 2009, and 3.3 per cent in 2010. The emergence of excess supply in the economy should keep inflation below 2 per cent through 2009. Both core and total inflation are projected to move up to 2 per cent in 2010 as the economy moves back into balance. There are both upside and downside risks to the Bank’s new projection for inflation; these risks appear to be balanced.

In line with this outlook, some further monetary stimulus will likely be required to achieve the inflation target over the medium term. Given the cumulative reduction in the target for the overnight rate of 150 basis points since December, including the 50-basis-point reduction announced last week, the timing of any further monetary stimulus will depend on the evolution of the global economy and domestic demand, and their impact on inflation in Canada.

Month end was no great shakes, with routine volume and few significant price changes. Of note was W.PR.H which, after a day of weakness, fell out of bed completely in the last hour.

And that’s another month! CPD finished the month with the same NAVPS as last month: $17.60, total return zip, zero, zilch. My actively managed fund did much better, returning … somewhere between 0.50% and 1.00% … the precise value, in all its four-decimal-place glory, will be posted on the weekend.

There were sixteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

OK, finance geeks, there’s a big treat for you today! I’ve had a little look at the Fed’s push to accellerate payment of interest on reserve balances:

The Fed got the authority to start paying interest in October 2011 under the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, signed into law on Oct. 13, 2006. The reason for the late implementation was budgetary. Paying interest on reserves will reduce the amount of income the Fed earns on its securities portfolio and remits to Treasury each year. Congress pushed back the date of implementation to minimize the near-term impact on the deficit.

The cost isn’t astronomical. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the cost in the first year would be $253 million, rising to $308 million by the fifth year, for a total $1.4 billion over five years.
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The Fed has already raised the issue with Congress, although it hasn’t made a formal push. Getting Congress to agree to swallow the cost a few years early in principle shouldn’t be hard since Congress has already set aside its adherence to the principal of “Paygo” — that all revenue reductions and cost increases need to be offset elsewhere. The Fed could also further reduce the cost by arranging to pay interest only on excess reserves — the amount that exceeds the required minimum.

The idea of paying interest on reserve balances was mentioned briefly on PrefBlog in the post US Fed and Negative Non-Borrowed Reserves, which was largely a copy/paste from January 29, 2008. The former post has just been updated, by the way, with a note from the Fed confirming that negative non-borrowed reserves is a mathematical triviality.

As mentioned there, the Fed has advocated interest payments on reserves for a long time:

The Fed has long advocated the payment of interest on the reserves that banks maintain at Federal Reserve Banks. Such a step would have to be approved by Congress, which traditionally has been opposed because of the revenue loss that would result to the U.S. Treasury. Each year the Treasury receives the Fed’s revenue that is in excess of its expenses. The payment of interest on reserves would, of course, be an additional expense to the Fed.

The Fed didn’t put a number on this additional expense but, as noted above, the Congressional Budget Office did … roughly $250-million to $300-million annually.

The Fed’s arguments in favour of the idea are two-fold, based on ideas of market efficiency and considerations of monetary policy implementation, as described by then-governor Laurence Meyer in 1998:

Reserve requirements are now 10 percent of all transaction deposits above a threshold level. Requirements may be satisfied either with vault cash or with balances held in accounts at Federal Reserve Banks. Depositories have naturally always attempted to reduce such non-interest-bearing balances to the minimum. For over two decades, some commercial banks have done so in part by sweeping the reservable transaction deposits of businesses into nonreservable instruments. These business sweeps not only avoid reserve requirements, but also allow firms to earn interest on instruments that are, effectively, equivalent to demand deposits.

In recent years, developments in computer technology have allowed depositories to begin sweeping consumer transaction deposits into nonreservable accounts. In consequence, the balances that depositories hold at Reserve Banks to meet reserve requirements have fallen to quite low levels. These consumer sweep programs are expected to spread further, threatening to lower required reserve balances to levels that may begin to impair the implementation of monetary policy. Should this occur, the Federal Reserve would need to adapt its monetary policy instruments, which could involve disruptions and costs to private parties as well as to the Federal Reserve. However, if interest were allowed to be paid on required reserve balances and on demand deposits, changes in the procedures used for implementing monetary policy might not be needed.
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The prohibition of interest on demand deposits distorts the pricing of transaction deposits and associated bank services. In order to compete for the liquid assets of businesses, banks set up complicated procedures to pay implicit interest on what are called compensating balance accounts.
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The payment of interest on required reserve balances could remove the incentives to engage in such reserve avoidance practices.

These arguments were largely repeated by then-governor Donald Kohn in 2004:

In conclusion, the Federal Reserve Board strongly supports, as its key priorities for regulatory relief, legislative proposals that would authorize the payment of interest on demand deposits and on balances held by depository institutions at Reserve Banks, as well as increased flexibility in the setting of reserve requirements. We believe these steps would improve the efficiency of our financial sector, make a wider variety of interest-bearing accounts available to more bank customers, and better ensure the efficient conduct of monetary policy in the future.

One gets the feeling that the Fed, if required, could supply an entire bibliography of its attempts to obtain this authority! So could the Treasury!

They finally got their wish in 2006:

Law Passed to Pay Interest on Reserves, Effective in 2011
The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 authorized the Federal Reserve banks to pay interest on reserve balances and gave the Board of Governors authority to lower reserve requirements on all transaction deposits (applied to deposits above a certain threshold level) to as low as zero percent, from their previous minimum top marginal requirement ratio of eight percent. These changes are not effective until October 2011.

I must confess failure in attempting to determing whether Fed Funds Loans are currently themselves reservable. The Reserve Maintenance Manual doesn’t cite these transactions explicitly. Sorry!

Now, there is some concern that this move will reduce interbank lending:

Reserve balances are like checking accounts: they don’t earn interest. For that reason banks have little incentive to hold more reserves than they need to meet the Fed’s requirements and clear transactions. Any excess reserves are loaned to other banks. As Greg Ip explains, “if the Fed paid, say, 2% interest on reserves, banks would have no incentive to lend out excess reserves once the federal funds rate fell to that level.”

This measure would lead to a higher equilibrium level of reserve balances, for a given value of the federal funds interest rate. It would also reduce the amount of inter-bank lending, as banks would keep more of their cash in their safe-deposit box at the Fed. That lending would be replaced by loans from the Federal Reserve.

… and, of course, we can always rely on Naked Capitalism to highlight scary bits.

One of the objectives in paying interest on reserve balances is, in fact, to ensure that reserve balances are still held, as explained by Governor Kohn in 2003:

However, if interest rates were to return to higher levels, sweep activity could intensify again and potentially become a concern. To prevent the sum of required reserve and contractual clearing balances from dropping even lower and to diminish the incentives for depositories to engage in wasteful reserve-avoidance activities, the Federal Reserve has long sought authorization to pay interest on required reserve balances and to pay explicit interest on contractual clearing balances. H.R. 758 would provide such authorization. With interest paid on required reserve balances, some sweep programs would likely be unwound, and new programs would be less likely to be implemented, thereby helping to boost the level of such balances. Eliminating such wasteful reserve-avoidance activities would also tend to improve the efficiency of the financial sector.

Payment of explicit interest on contractual clearing balances could result in an increase in the level of these balances; some depositories are currently constrained in the amount of such balances that can earn usable credits because of their limited use of Federal Reserve services. Moreover, payment of explicit interest would help to maintain the level of clearing balances at a time of rising interest rates. At present, some depositories pay for all their Federal Reserve services with credits earned on clearing balances; these institutions would not be able to use their additional credits if interest rates were to rise. If enough institutions were in this position, contractual clearing balances might drop below levels needed to be helpful for the implementation of monetary policy. With explicit interest, the level of balances on which interest could be effectively earned would not be limited to the level of charges incurred for the use of Federal Reserve services. Therefore, these depositories would not be impelled to reduce their balances when interest rates rise.

In other words, the Fed wants to be able to influence the market via the Fed Funds rate (as well as through reserve requirements, the discount rate and the hoped-for rate paid on reserves), but it won’t be able to do so if there is no Fed Funds market. In addition to the projected business efficiencies to be gained by allowing interest to be paid on demand deposits, the Fed hopes, by paying interest on the balances, to encourage participants to participate in the market in the first place.

There has been an interesting dust-up in the normally sedate world of analyst reports on Canadian banking … Citibank says Royal Bank of Canada might have billions in credit losses this quarter and Royal Bank says that’s horse-patootie. The analyst report is here (hat tip:Yahoo Message Boards). Citibank, by the way, is raising yet another $3-billion equity.

Via Bloomberg comes news that Markit is establishing a Municipal CDS Index. Whether or not contracts on this index will have a delivery option is unclear – I sure hope it does! Markit, by the way, is engaging in a live test of their disaster recovery plan:

Due to a flood in the London Bridge area which has caused an evacuation of the entire More London business district, Markit Group London is currently operating from its Disaster Recovery (DR) site. We appreciate your support whilst we strive to maintain full delivery of our products and services.

… good luck to them!

The Royal Bank new issue closed successfully, but had little impact on the overall market, in which volumes were normal and significant price changes rare.

There were seventeen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

An article in VoxEU draws attention to Chapter 3 of the IMF April 2008 World Economic Outlook, specifically Chapter 3, The Changing Housing Cycle and the Implications for Monetary Policy:

The main conclusion of this analysis is that changes in housing finance systems have affected the role played by the housing sector in the business cycle in two different ways. First, the increased use of homes as collateral has amplified the impact of housing sector activity on the rest of the economy by strengthening the positive effect of rising house prices on consumption via increased household borrowing—the “financial accelerator” effect. Second, monetary policy is now transmitted more through the price of homes than through residential investment. In particular, the evidence suggests that more flexible and competitive mortgage markets have amplified the impact of monetary policy on house prices and thus, ultimately, on consumer spending and output. Furthermore, easy monetary policy seems to have contributed to the recent run-up in house prices and residential investment in the United States, although its effect was probably magnified by the loosening of lending standards and by excessive risk-taking by lenders.

In other words, a well developed mortgage market has had the effect of increasing the liquidity of real-estate, and this effect must be explicitly considered when setting monetary policy.

I have to quibble with their table 3.1, which states that the average term of a Canadian mortgage is 25 years; it may be the average amortization, but the average term will be a lot closer to 5 years … perhaps much less, depending on the call provisions embedded in floating rate mortgages. Those who have endured my grumbling over the financing of long-term assets with short-term debt will note that financing houses with 5-year mortgages is a good example!

Box 3.1 is interesting, indicating (from IMF analysis) that while the US housing market appeared to get about 15% ahead of its fundamentals in the period 1997-2007, the crown is held by Ireland, with a 30+% pricing gap! Canada was negative – so those of us who are “property rich” can breathe a sigh of relief directly proportional to our trust in IMF analysis.

And, skipping along to the practical conclusions:

This chapter also examines the implications for monetary policy of changes in mortgage markets. First, it suggests that monetary policymakers may need to respond more aggressively to housing demand shocks in economies with more developed mortgage markets—that is, with higher LTV ratios and thus, presumably, higher stocks of mortgage debt. They may also need to respond more aggressively to financial shocks that affect the amount of credit available for any given level of house prices. Hence, the model would “predict” a more aggressive reduction of interest rates in the United States compared with the euro area in the face of recent turmoil in the credit markets—and this is in line with what has occurred so far.

Today’s fascinating fact is brought to you by Professors Kish & Robak in a paper published in September 2000:

Attaching a call feature to new debt for any reason was the norm for most of the twentieth century. For example, the majority of new bonds issued prior to 1986 contain a call provision. But over the past ten years, we observe that the number of call options on new debt is now a minority component. The intent of this study is to reproduce the work of Kish and Livingston (1992) for the period 1987-1996. The major structural change that occurred in the debt market warrants the reproduction of this study for the recent decade. For the 1977-1986 period, the ratio of callable to non-callable bonds is approximately 4:1, whereas the ratio during the 1987-1996 period approximates 0.5:1.

Thirty-year treasuries used to be callable after 25-years. One possibility that the authors did not examine was the possibility that embedded options may have simply been unbundled and are sold to the corporation as part of the underwriting package – which would certainly achieve the same sort of interest-rate protection to the company (albeit without the capital-structure flexibility) while giving the dealers some more chance to turn over their inventory. I honestly don’t know the answer to that question.

Main Man Flaherty was self-promoting again today:

Flaherty said the Canadian banks will establish and adopt leading practices for disclosure within 100 days, and expects the Bank of Canada to play a leadership role in some areas.

The minister said he plans to meet with the banks again “before the summer” to review the progress.

Sadly, there was no word regarding whether the seniority of Bankers’ Acceptances would ever be properly disclosed.

In what may well be related news, former World Bank President James Wolfensohn said:

said he’s “pessimistic” on the outlook for financial markets and predicted losses from the global credit turmoil may climb to $1 trillion.
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“It does seem to be a major adjustment on any level,” Wolfensohn said, after addressing the European Pensions and Savings Summit 2008. “There may be a $1,000 billion worth of losses in it somewhere.” He said he “cannot recall anything similar, certainly in the last 30 to 40 years that I’ve worked.”

The International Monetary Fund predicts that losses from the crisis, including those tied to commercial real-estate, may total $945 billion and says global economic expansion may be the slowest since 2003 this year. Wolfensohn said the fund’s loss forecast of about $1 trillion is now a “consensus estimate.”

Now, I don’t want to give the impression that I’m taking serious issue with any scary kind of number anybody wants to throw around. I don’t have easy access to the source data and I wouldn’t have time to look at them carefully even if I did. But we’re seeing in Canada that Flaherty is using the credit crisis in general and ABCP in particular to promote a federal securities regulator. And there are problems with the consistency of calculations in the IMF report. It seems to me that if I was a typical bureaucrat and I thought that scaring people to death would advance my own regulatory agenda, I’d ensure that my estimates erred on the generous side … that’s an old trick.

You can’t trust anybody.

Volume was lightish today, but enlivened by some activity in SplitShares … some managers, perhaps, adjusting positions after Friday’s downgrades? Market direction was mixed with a downward bias … we’re not far off the trough, you know! Total return on CPD (as an indicator) hasn’t been much more than zero since the mark was set in November – so things could prove interesting.

There were eleven other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Lots of speculation and exhortation in the air about the Fed FOMC meeting next week! Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton wants the rate constant at 2.25%:

…there is a compelling case that by rapidly bringing the yield on short-term Treasury bills well below the prevailing inflation rate, the Fed has played a role in the significant depreciation of the dollar and increase in the dollar price of virtually every storable commodity that we’ve seen since the beginning of January.
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If the Fed surprises the market with a pause, we should have unambiguous confirmation or refutation of the hypothesis that the Fed has been contributing to the commodity price run-up within 48 hours of the FOMC’s announcement. That knowledge in itself would also be extremely valuable– valuable to the Fed in calculating how to chart its course from here, and valuable in terms of making clear to the public why sometimes higher interest rates are the better choice for public policy.

Accrued Interest, however, is watching the unemployment numbers with more interest:

I think the worst of the liquidity crisis is past us, but we still have a weak economy will still be dealing with housing-related problems for a while. That will probably keep the Fed in a easy money mode for a while, which will be supportive of interest rates generally.

The thing to watch is primarily inflation data. I think bad housing data is mostly priced in (today’s rally supports this thesis), and while it could turn out worse than currently expected, inflation is actually the more important element for rates. Food and energy inflation has been problematic for a while, but the leakage into core inflation measures has been mild so far. The Fed has been gambling that it could afford to cut rates to improve liquidity because weaker employment would take care of the inflation problem.

If either employment is not as weak as currently expected and/or unemployment fails to contain inflation, the Fed will make a U-turn on rates.

Traders of 2-Years are betting there will be a pause:

“There’s been quite a shift in bond-market sentiment over the past few weeks,” said Nick Stamenkovic, a fixed-income strategist at RIA Capital Market Ltd. in Edinburgh. “The market has become increasingly confident that the worst is over for the financial sector and that the Fed is nearing the end of its easing cycle.”

Government bonds have lost 1.3 percent in April, indexes compiled by Merrill Lynch & Co. showed. The last time the securities declined was in June, when they fell 0.5 percent. The drop is the steepest since July 2003, when they shed 1.9 percent.

The two-year U.S. Treasury note yield rose to a three-month high of 2.50 percent today, before trading at 2.39 percent by 10:40 a.m. in New York, according to bond broker BGCantor Market Data. It has risen 65 basis points in the last two weeks. Yesterday’s government auction of $19 billion of five-year notes drew the least demand since 2003.

And, while financial companies are having to pay up for term money, they are able to issue in size:

Citigroup Inc. and Merrill Lynch & Co. led $43.3 billion of U.S. corporate bond sales, the busiest week on record, as financial companies sold debt at the highest yields since May 2001.

Sales compare with $31.2 billion last week and an average this year of $18 billion, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Citigroup, the biggest U.S. bank by assets, sold $6 billion of hybrid bonds in the company’s largest public debt offering, while New York-based securities firm Merrill Lynch raised $9.55 billion by issuing debt and preferred securities.

On the other hand, the 30-day Fed Funds Contract is showing expectations of a hair over 2.00% until September, in line with the consensus reported by the WSJ of ‘one more, then stop’. Finally, the Cleveland Fed’s analysis of the options on this contract show an overwhelming expectation of 2.00%, with the “2.25% prediction” coming out of nowhere to take second place from the once strongly challenging “1.75% prediction”. We shall see!

There is a good story on Credit Rating Agencies published by the New York Times magazine:

Though some have proposed requiring that agencies with official recognition charge investors, rather than issuers, a more practical reform may be for the government to stop certifying agencies altogether.

Then, if the Fed or other regulators wanted to restrict what sorts of bonds could be owned by banks, or by pension funds or by anyone else in need of protection, they would have to do it themselves — not farm the job out to Moody’s. The ratings agencies would still exist, but stripped of their official imprimatur, their ratings would lose a little of their aura, and investors might trust in them a bit less. Moody’s itself favors doing away with the official designation, and it, like S.&P., embraces the idea that investors should not “rely” on ratings for buy-and-sell decisions.

It’s all reasonably fair minded – as reasonable as one can expect, these days! The author saves himself the unpleasant experience of PrefBlog’s wrath by prefacing his suggestion that the Fed, inter alia bring credit analysis in house with the word “if”.

It’s all craziness. There is no good way to forecast credit. It’s all forecasting, as prone to error and changing circumstances as any other forecast … you do the best you can and diversify, by name, by asset class, by any other source of risk exposure. The only solution for such apparent failures of forecasting as sub-prime and Canadian ABCP is to say something along the lines of … “You put all your money in this stuff and now it’s all gone? Well, you’re stupid. Go away.” But it won’t happen.

My other quibble with the author’s conclusion is:

This leaves an awkward question, with respect to insanely complex structured securities: What can they rely on? The agencies seem utterly too involved to serve as a neutral arbiter, and the banks are sure to invent new and equally hard-to-assess vehicles in the future.

How about … rely on your own credit analysis or don’t buy it?

The vote on the Canadian ABCP restructuring has, apparently, approved the proposed plan, although with some reservations:

However, Jeffrey Carhart, a representative for the ad hoc committee read a statement prepared by the group disputing part of the plan that could potentially release certain financial institutions from lawsuits over selling ABCP to their clients.

“Those who are voting Yes by proxy are preserving their ability to argue both the validity and fairness of the planned release” from legal challenges, Carhart read.

… and the final (?) hurdle comes next week:

Mr. Crawford acknowledged that the committee has “some work to do next week” to face the legal challenges, which the judge overseeing the restructuring will consider at a fairness hearing scheduled for next Friday. Without the judge’s approval, the plan cannot go ahead.

In a ruling this week, the judge said that the corporate challengers had raised “very forceful arguments” about “a very serious issue of law” – whether the plan to extend immunity from lawsuits is legal.

I’ll just bet the corporate challengers have raised very forceful arguments! In some cases, it would appear that glorified bookkeepers recklessly overinvested in the asset class … the investing corporations could well be looking at a few investor lawsuits themselves.

On another topic, the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan has released its 2007 results (hat tip:FWF). Very impressive! Most debates regarding the value of active management implicitly consider all active managers to be equal, which is not the case … active management needs to be marketted, with the result that (i) marketers are in control of the process, not investment managers, and (ii) even investment managers must give some thought to explaining their choices. The split is not passive/active, but passive/active-captive/active-marketted. I have no data, but I’m willing to bet a nickel that active-captive, as a class, handsomely outperforms its benchmarks.

There were twenty-one other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Willem Buiter has commented on the BoE liquidity operation discussed by PrefBlog on April 21:

The Bank of England is now wholeheartedly committed to acting as market marker of last resort for systemically important securities for which the markets have become illiquid, not to say defunct, since the start of the crisis in August 2007.

Dr. Buiter’s phrase “market maker of last resort” was introduced in his post from last August.

The market maker of last resort function can be fulfilled in two ways. First, outright purchases and sales of a wide range of private sector securities. Second, acceptance of a wide range of private sector securities as collateral in repos, and in collateralised loans and advances at the discount window.

I cannot help but feel that this phrasing is imprecise, because “Market Maker” implies a transfer of ownership; in the current agreement, the participating banks continue to bear the risk of the instruments used to collateralize their loans. Dr. Buiter argued last August that injection of liquidity in the market sector where it was needed most to the participants who wanted it most would achieve desirable effects with less disruption to the general market than across-the-board reductions in the lending rate:

Central banks have not been doing the job of market maker of last resort effectively, indeed they have barely been doing it at all. Following the stock market collapse of 1987, the Russian default of 1998 and the tech bubble crash of 2001, all that the key monetary authorities have done is (1) lower the short risk-free interest rate and (2) provide vast amounts of liquidity against high-grade collateral only, and nothing against illiquid collateral. The result has been that the ‘resolution’ of each of these financial crises created massive amounts of high-grade excess liquidity that was not withdrawn when market order was restored and provided the fuel that would produce the next credit boom and bust. By focusing instead on illiquid collateral, it should have been possible to achieve the same effect with a much smaller injection of liquidity.

This point, that overall liquidity changes can be minimized by a more careful targetting of liquidity injection, was mentioned on PrefBlog on March 31, quoting Xavier Vives. I haven’t seen anybody use the phrase “a rifle, not a shotgun” yet, but I’m sure it will be if the Central Bank actions become a political issue.

Anyway, back to Dr. Buiter’s remarks:

The “£50 billion bail-out for banks” headline of that fount of orginal analysis, the (free) London paper, is rubbish. The Special Liquidity Scheme is priced quite unpleasantly for the banks. The so-called fee (the difference between 3-month libor rate and the 3-month General collateral gilt repo rate) will be quite hefty, because it reflects not only bank default risk (libor is the rate for unsecured bank lending) but also liquidity risk. In addition, the haircuts (discounts) applied to the Bank of England’s valuation of the RMBS, covered bonds and credit card ABS ranges from 12 percent, for the shortest maturity to 22 percent for the longest maturity. That valuation will either be based on observed market prices that are independent and routinely publicly available or on the Bank of England’s own calculated prices. As most of the assets are illiquid, the prices of these assets will for the foreseeable future be set by the Bank of England. In that case it will also apply a higher haircut to the valuation. In addition, Bank officials have told me that should any of the assets lent by the banks to the Bank fall, during the life of the swap, below the required AAA rating, these assets will have to be replaced by AAA-rated securities.
…
The UK scheme prices what amounts to a collateralised loan of Treasury bills by the Bank of England quite harshly. And appropriately so. There is no eartly reason for giving the banks a tax payer handout. The banks and their borrowers made the mistakes. They and their borrowers should pay the price.

He contrasts this with the valuation of securities accepted by the Fed:

All this is a lot more sensible and likely to minimise adverse selection than the insane valuation of the collateral offered by US Primary Dealers to the Fed at the Term Securities Lending Facility and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility. The collateral is priced by the clearing bank acting as agent for the Primary Dealer! If ever a scheme was designed to encourage collusion between Primary Dealer and Clearer to dump useless securities at inflated prices on the Fed, this is it.

I hadn’t been aware of that nuance! I am in complete agreement with Dr. Buiter: valuation should be performed by the Fed – with input and advice from the brokers and clearing banks, of course, but the final say should rest with the lender.

And finally, Dr. Buiter points out another nuance:

Unlike the US, where mortgages are non-recourse debt, the UK does not have mortgages that are non-recourse.

The standard terms on US mortgages are ridiculous and the standard provision of non-recourse loans is just one of the problems.

In a new development, a trader has been nailed for spreading false rumours:

Paul Berliner, 32, sought to profit by messaging traders at brokerages and hedge funds on Nov. 29, claiming Alliance Data’s board was meeting to discuss a reduced offer by Blackstone, the Securities and Exchange Commission said today in a suit at federal court in Manhattan. The shares plunged 17 percent in half an hour that day.
…
Berliner, who was shorting the stock to profit from the drop in price, made more than $25,000 before the shares recovered, according to the SEC. He didn’t admit or deny the agency’s claims in agreeing to forfeit his gains, plus interest, and pay a $130,000 fine.

The trivial amounts for which a trader will put his reputation on the line never fails to astonish me … one can only imagine that the real-world repercussions for talking like an idiot to other idiots are not really all that harsh.

The story does not address what, if anything, happened to the morons who traded stock on the basis of an unverified text message. If they were acting as fiduciaries, one can only hope that their licenses will be yanked soon.

The market was off a bit today in what has now become normal volume. There were a few good crosses of the more liquid, high quality, perpetualDiscounts.

There were fifteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Not much today, folks! In the spirit of the day, I had to spend some time slaying dragons and was unable to assemble my List of Interesting Things.

A return of good volume, the market was up and the index was down. What a great day!

There were thirty-four other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Accrued Interest has reluctantly called a bottom in the credit markets:

But yeah, if you stick a gun to my head, I’d say we’ve seen the wides in credit spreads. Not because the economic problems are solved, but because liquidity has improved to the point that people are willing to be opportunistic. That will put a lid on how far investment-grade names will move before yield hungry investors come in. Issuers will be able to come to market with new issues, and the wheels of the credit market will continue to churn.

Meanwhile, today is the day that the CBOT officially attempts to find out why the basis on grain futures isn’t going to zero during the delivery period, as mentioned April 17. Naked Capitalism republishes a NYT article on the issue which suggests:

Mr. Grieder’s crop insurance premiums rise with the volatility. So does the cost of trading in options, which is the financial tool he has used to hedge against falling prices. Some grain elevators are coping with the volatility and hedging problems by refusing to buy crops in advance, foreclosing the most common way farmers lock in prices.
…
Futures, for example, are less reliable. They work as a hedge only if they fall due at a price that roughly matches prices in the cash market, where the grain is actually sold. Increasingly — for disputed reasons — grain futures are expiring at prices well above the cash-market price.

When that happens, farmers or elevator owners wind up owing more on their futures hedge than the crops are worth in the cash market.
…
John Fletcher, a grain elevator operator in Marshall, Mo., started pressing the C.B.O.T. to address the flaws of futures contracts almost two years ago — even before his futures hedge on a million bushels of soybeans failed to fully protect him last September, hitting him with a cash loss of $940,000.
…
Frustrated over the flawed futures contract, Mr. Fletcher is voting with his feet. Last year, he entered into a contract with A.I.G. Financial Products, a leading sponsor of commodity index funds, which allows him and the index fund to hedge their risks without using the C.B.O.T.

Instead of using futures or options, A.I.G. simply buys the commodity directly from Mr. Fletcher, who stores it for a fee and buys it back six months later. His storage fee is lower than the one built into the C.B.O.T. contract, so A.I.G. pays less for its stake in the market. And he has a hedge he can rely on.

In a strong indication that Canadian banks are using their strong balance sheets to sniff around in the States, BMO has announced:

a definitive agreement today to acquire Chicago-based Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson Inc. (GKST). The acquisition will make BMO Capital Markets the sixth-largest bank qualified municipal bond dealer in the United States and the largest in Illinois, greatly accelerating BMO’s national presence in the municipal bond market.

Good for them! It would appear that the BNS / National City rumours discussed on April 11 have come to nothing:

Cleveland-based National City, Ohio’s biggest bank, agreed yesterday to sell a $7 billion stake to a group led by Corsair Capital LLC.
…
National City agreed to sell the Corsair stake at a discount to market price, and increased the size of the offering after finding strong demand. The move, which may dilute existing shareholders by more than 50 percent, sent the stock plummeting almost 28 percent and drew complaints from investors who asked during a conference call whether there wasn’t “a more palatable alternative.”

The bank had to raise enough capital “to stabilize our debt ratings, beyond a shadow of a doubt,” National City Chief Executive Officer Peter Raskind responded, citing speculation about the bank’s condition. “We had counterparties who were uncomfortable interacting with us. That had to stop.”

Royal Bank of Scotland is also raising capital:

Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, the U.K. lender reeling from asset writedowns, will sell 12 billion pounds ($24 billion) of shares to investors in Europe’s largest rights offer and cut the dividend.
…
RBS plans to raise its Tier 1 capital ratio, a measure of capital strength, to more than 8 percent from 7.3 percent and the core equity Tier 1 ratio to more than 6 percent from 4.5 percent by the end of the year, the bank said.

Good for them for doing it by a rights offering! It’s much fairer to existing investors, although I suppose it’s a little more expensive and slower.

Merrill has also joined the parade:

Merrill Lynch & Co., the third- biggest U.S. securities firm, plans to raise at least $7.3 billion by selling bonds and preferred shares after writing down the value of $6.5 billion of assets.

The firm today began offering $7 billion of senior unsecured notes in its biggest debt offering, luring investors with yields over Treasuries that would be as much as triple what it paid a year ago. Merrill is also selling at least $300 million of perpetual preferred shares that yield about 8.625 percent.

It should be noted, however, that the $7-billion headline number addresses liquidity issues, not equity; the preferred share issue is picayune.

I must say, it’s very pleasant for a fixed income guy to see the equity crowd get hit for a change. The last ten years have been all too often in the other direction.

There might be some adjustment to Regulation FD in the future – this is the source of National Policy 51-201, which states that Credit Rating Agencies may have access to material non-public information. Chairman Cox of the SEC said in testimony to the Senate Banking Committee:

To enhance transparency, the Commission may soon consider new rules that would require the disclosure of information about the assets underlying the mortgage-backed securities, CDOs, and other types of structured finance products they rate. This would allow market participants to better analyze the assets underlying structured securities, and reach their own conclusions about their creditworthiness. This data availability could particularly benefit subscriber-based NRSROs, who could use it to perform independent assessments of the validity of the ratings by their competitors who use the “issuer pays” model.

Further improvements in transparency could be considered in the form of enhanced disclosures about how NRSROs determine their ratings for structured products. This disclosure could include the manner of analysis of the mortgages’ conformance with underwriting standards, and the firms’ procedures for monitoring their current credit ratings.

The Commission may also consider rules requiring the disclosure of ratings information in a way that makes it possible for investors to readily distinguish among ratings for different types of securities, such as structured products, corporate securities, and municipal securities.

This is rather convoluted, frankly. The ratings agencies don’t release material non-public data because it’s non-public. The company or issuer makes the decision (subject to the SEC’s disclosure rules) regarding what’s public and what ain’t. All I can imagine is that the intended purpose of the rules the SEC is considering is to get disclosure by the back door … for one reason or another, the issuer can’t (or won’t) be forced by the SEC to disclose data, but the NRSRO’s will be … thus, if the information is to be kept out of the public domain, the company will have to forgo a NRSRO credit rating, which will (presumably) make the issue a much harder sell. If anybody has a better explanation, say so in the comments!

Following the BoC’s easing to 3.00% overnight rate, TD was the first major to cut Prime, although they were behind CCDQ. The second major was RY, followed by BMO, then BNS.

Another poor day for preferred shares, as PerpetualDiscounts are now yielding 5.73%, interest equivalent (at 1.4x) of 8.02%. Given that long corporates now yield about 6.1%, this represents spread maintenance against the competition.

There were fourteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Slowly, slowly, loans are coming off the banks’ books:

Carlyle Group, the world’s second largest private-equity firm, is raising a $500 million collateralized loan obligation to buy high-risk, high-yield debt being sold by banks at discounted prices, according to people with knowledge of the plan.

The CLO is being arranged by Deutsche Bank AG, said the people, who declined to be identified because the terms aren’t public. The fund follows a similar $450 million CLO that Carlyle and JPMorgan Chase & Co. closed this month.

Carlyle, the Washington-based buyout firm run by David Rubenstein, joins Blackstone Group LP and Apollo Management LP in purchasing loans from banks that have struggled to offload the debt after losses on securities tied to subprime mortgages caused investors to shun all except the safest of government bonds. Private-equity firms are emerging as buyers at a time when financial institutions from Goldman Sachs Group Inc. to Citigroup Inc. are willing to sell the loans for as little as 63 cents on the dollar.

Royal Bank of Scotland is doing the same:

Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, the U.K.’s second-biggest lender, plans to start a fund to transfer the risk of losses from 1.5 billion euros ($2.3 billion) of high-yield loans, according to three people with knowledge of the proposal.

The fund will earn a return for investors by selling contracts to RBS that protect the bank from losses on 15 loans in euros and pounds and a further six in dollars, said the people who declined to be identified because the discussions are private.

And hedge funds are still pulling in money! I’m certainly not about to declare the credit crunch over, but this is a good sign:

Some investors expect the current credit crisis will create opportunities for managers who trade distressed bonds and loans. Such funds attracted $8 billion in the quarter. Investors allocated $8.2 billion to equity hedge funds and $6.5 billion relative-value strategies, which try to profit from price discrepancies between securities.

The biggest outflows in the quarter were from funds that trade the securities of companies going through mergers, which lost a net $4 billion. Investors pulled $1 billion out of macro funds, which chase macroeconomic trends by trading stocks, bonds, currencies and commodities. The funds were the best performers in the first quarter, rising 4.7 percent.

In a further sign that the banks are serious about repairing their balance sheets, Citigroup is issuing $6-billion hybrids, although it’s not entirely clear to me whether these are prefs or Innovative Tier 1 Capital, as if there’s any difference anyway:

Citigroup Inc., the biggest U.S. bank by assets, plans to sell $6 billion of hybrid securities to bolster its balance sheet after reporting almost $16 billion in writedowns.

The perpetual, preferred shares may pay a fixed rate of 8.4 percent for 10 years, according to a person who declined to be named because terms aren’t set. If not called, the debt will then begin to float, the person said.

This follows hard on the heels of JPMorgan’s monster deal. How much is enough, already? The Reuters tally grows daily:

Financial companies around the globe have scrambled to raise capital to offset massive write-offs. Below are the 15 largest capital infusions announced by financial institutions since the credit crisis began, totaling more than $150 billion.

The Bank of England is going forward with the bond lending programme discussed briefly on April 17 … it is, in fact, a bond LENDING programme, with quite rational terms:

The measures, backed by Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s government, mimic a swap of $200 billion of securities by the U.S. Federal Reserve last month as central banks around the world struggle to prop up financial markets.
…
Financial institutions will retain responsibility for losses from the assets they loan to the Bank of England. The swaps will be for a period of one year, renewable for up to three years. Only assets existing at the end of 2007 can be used in the swap.

The Bank of England won’t announce how much money has been tapped until the borrowing window closes in six months.
…
Assistance will come at a price. Banks will have to pay a borrowing fee to participate in the plan and the value of the securities they receive will be less than that of the mortgage- backed bonds they hand over to the Bank of England.

“The Bank of England’s actions do seem to be quite punitive,” said James Nixon, a director of Societe Generale SA in London. “The sense yet again from the Bank of England is that it will provide an absolute backstop to the financial system, but won’t make any effort to ease the market’s liquidity.”

The market fell – probably in response to the RY new issue as the RY issues were conspicuous by the presence in the list of poor performers … several issues lost just less than the 1% loss qualifying for mention on the list. Volume was average, as far as recent history goes.

There were fifteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Willem Buiter writes a gloomy piece on financial activity, If it’s broke, fix it, but how?. Hat tip to Naked Capitalism, who commented on the piece … but quite frankly, NC’s commentary can’t be taken seriously:

3. Prohibit Level 3 assets; allow only Level 1 and strictly defined and audited Level 2 assets. This means regulators will not have anything overly arcane to assess; they ought to be able to get a clear picture of risks, processes, and exposures if they are dogged.

4. Prohibit these regulated institutions from lending, providing other funding, or investing in concerns that have Level 3 assets

This is the sort of populist nonsense that betrays complete lack of understanding of the issue. In the first place bonds of virtually all kinds are Level 2 assets – even off-the-run government bonds are marked off half a dozen or so benchmarks. A liquid corporate issue might trade a few times a week – and every time (other than in the highly liquid distribution phase) it will be done at a ballpark guess of a spread to governments (by “ballpark guess”, I mean “what the trader thinks he can get away with”). Things like municipals in the States … well, have a gander at what Accrued Interest had to say on the issue.

Level 3 assets? Let’s talk about preferred shares, just for a moment, to lend some credence to the idea that this blog is about prefs. Say I have to value an issue that has something approximating a current coupon … maybe the new NA issue, for instance. If I price NA.PR.M based on the yield of the two other prefs from this issuer, then it’s a level 2 asset. However, this is a really bad mark – it makes no allowance for convexity. If, however, I adjust the “static”, level 2 price in any way to account for the “dynamic” effect of convexity, then my poor little NA.PR.M become level 3 assets … “convexity” is not an observable input.

One may well wish to impose a regime on regulated capital that allows the firm to assign a range to the unobservable inputs and have them use whichever end of the range is least favourable when valuing their securities for regulatory purposes. One may well wish to increase the capital requirements for level 2 and level 3 assets. But to speak of strict controls and prohibitions is simply a sign of hysteria.

Anyway, back to Prof. Buiter. He leads with an assertion that we have achieved the worst of two worlds:

I believe that the Western model of financial capitalism – a convex combination of relationships-based financial capitalism and transactions-based financial capitalism – has, in its most recent manifestations (those developed since the great liberalisations of the 1980s), managed to enhance the worst features of these two ideal-types and to suppress the best.

These worlds are defined as:

Transactions-based financial capitalism emphasizes arms-length relationships mediated through markets (preferably competitive ones), is strong on flexibility, encourages risk-trading, entry, exit and innovation. It is lousy at endogenous commitment: reputation and trust are not a natural by-product of arms-length relationships. Commitment requires external, third-party enforcement.

Relationships-based financial capitalism emphasizes long-term relationships and commitment. It has, however, compensating weaknesses. Investing time and other resources in building up relationships with customers creates an insider-outsider divide that is very difficult to overcome for new entrants. It also encourages, through the interlocking directorates of the CEOs and Chairmen (seldom women) of financial and non-financial corporations, a cosy coterie of old boys for whom competitive behaviour soon no longer comes naturally. At its worst, it becomes cronyism of the kind that was one of the key ingredients in the Asian crisis of 1997.

I think I will be referring to these definitions a lot in the future! Relationships-based financial capitalism describes the standard business model of a stockbroker or retail-level financial advisor. Transactions-based financial capitalism describes the standard business model of an asset manager. But remember – these are my characterizations, not Dr. Buiter’s.

Importantly, virtually everybody will claim that they want and need the latter, but most retail (and a hefty chunk of institutional) clients will go for the former when it comes time to sign a cheque.

So … now we’ve defined some terms, what’s the problem?

It is clear where the problems are. In the past 20 yearns, the financial sector has, starting as a useful provider of intermediation services, grown like topsy to become an uncontrolled, and at times out-of-control, effectively unregulated, hydra-headed owner of licenses to print money for a small number of beneficiaries. The sources of much of these profits turned out to be either a succession of bubbles or Ponzi schemes, or the pricing of assets based on the belief that risk disappeared by trading it. This belief that there is a black hole in the middle of the financial universe that will attract, absorb and annihilate risk if the risk it packaged sufficiently attractive and sold a sufficient number of times is closely related to the firm conviction of every trader I have ever met, that he or she can systematically beat the market. The fact that all traders together are the market did not constrain these beliefs.

This is a rather breathtaking condemnation and, quite frankly, I do not find much support for these assertions in the text. I can hypothesize, however, using the assumption that the explanation of the huge amount of CDO assets on the Merrill Lynch books (discussed on April 16) is correct (and making a few interpretations). In this case, we would say that the CDO-syndicator is using the worst of the transactions model: he didn’t care about the firm, as long as he could get the stuff off his books and onto the trader’s books. The trader, bullied into inventorying paper he didn’t think he could sell, agreed to the deal due to relationships model: he was making good money as a Merrill trader, and refusing the urgent request of the big powerful syndicator could jeopordize his position. If this is the case, it reflects a failure on the part of Merrill’s management to ensure that such asymmetric viewpoints are minimized.

Could it be true? Well, it’s plausible. And I like it a whole lot more than the everybody-is-stupid-except-me model.

Naturally, the first thing that comes to mind after Dr. Buiter’s assessment of the industry is MORE RULES!

It would be part of the solution if we could find and keep the right regulators and design and implement the right regulations.

… which immediately runs into the problem …

regulators involved in intrusive and hands-on regulation are virtually guaranteed to be captured by the industry they are meant to be regulating and supervising. This regulatory capture need not take the form of unethical, corrupt or venal behaviour by the regulators or members of the private financial sector. It could instead be an example of what I have called cognitive regulatory capture, where the regulator absorbs the culture, norms, hopes, fears and world-view of those whom he regulates.

Sure. Especially with revolving-door regulation being such a popular model. There is another problem:

regulators will serve their own parochial, personal and sectional interests as much as or even instead of the public good they are meant to serve. No bank regulator wants a bank to fail on his or her watch. As a result, either excessively conservative behaviour will be imposed by the regulator on the regulated bank or other financial intermediary (ofi), that is, we will have if-it-moves-stop-it-regulation, or the regulator will mount an unjustified bail out when, despite the regulator’s best efforts at preventing any kind of risk from being taken on by the regulated entity, insolvency threatens.

This is especially the case if, for instance, one takes the editorial stance of the Globe and Mail seriously. They decided that Canadian ABCP was a problem indicative of a failure of regulation, then decided that since OSFI is a regulator, they are at fault. This started with misrepresentation of a speech and continues with wild charges of loopholes, as mentioned on April 11. Despite the fact that you don’t really need more than a handful of functional brain cells to dismiss the charges as nonsense, these gross distortions can’t be a lot of fun for a regulator to endure, and will lead Our Beloved Government to impose MORE RULES!

Anyway, Prof. Buiter has the intellectual honesty to admit:

I don’t know the solution to this conundrum.

I suggest, as I have suggested before, that regulations need tweaking. So the off-balance-sheet vehicles weren’t as off-balance-sheet as they might have been? Make the sponsors consolidate them for regulatory capital purposes if they are intimately involved in the vehicle – e.g., by being the selling agents of the SIV’s paper, or having their name on the fund, or by getting miscellaneous fees from the SIV. Allow a reduced hit due to first loss protection. Lots of details will emerge through discussion. If they’re sponsoring a money market fund (same thing, opposite direction), they should take a charge. It would seem that rules on the assets to capital multiple need to be reviewed, since a lot of the problem was the zero risk weight assigned to synthetic-AAAs by the regulatory authorities.

And for heaven’s sake, let’s approach regulation with the idea that the objective is to mitigate and contain harm, not to eliminate it. How many times must I repeat? Risk is Risky!

When will people learn? You can’t regulate fear and greed. Ask a Chinese or Russian pensioner how well that idea works out! As long as we have fear and greed, we will have booms and busts. And as long as we have stupidity, we will have people being hurt – sometimes badly – through over-exposure to a single class of risk.

From the oh-hell-I’ve-run-out-of-time-here’s-some-links Department comes a speech by David Einhorn of GreenLight Capital, referenced by another blog. Einhorn is always thoughtful and entertaining, although it must be remembered that at all times he is talking his book. The problem with the current speech is that there is not enough detail – for instance, he equates Carlyle’s leverage of 30:1 which was based on GSE paper held naked with brokerages leverage, which is (er, I meant to say “should be”, of course!) hedged – to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon the institution’s committment to moderately sane risk management. But there are some interesting nuggets in the speech that offer food for thought.

Accrued Interest speculates that European credit strains make short-dollar a risky trade:

So rising Libor may say more about tight liquidity in Europe than in the U.S. A combination of tough liquidity in Europe and among smaller banks would explain the divergence between CDS spreads and Libor spreads.

To me, this sends two cautions. First, it should remind anyone who thinks the liquidity crunch is over, that it ain’t. Liquidity does seem to be improving in the U.S. bond market, which is a very positive sign. So maybe the worst case scenario has been taken out. But this will be a long process.

Second, it should caution those who are short the dollar. If the next phase of the credit crunch hits Europe as hard as it hits the U.S., then we may see the Bank of England and the European Central Bank get more aggressive with rate cuts.

Barclays PLC disagrees. Takes two to make a market!

No real direction in the preferred share market today – and not much individual issue price volatility either. Volume returned to levels that are normal for now, but would have been labelled light last year.

There were sixteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.