Category: Market Action

Bloomberg reports that the CDS Clearinghouse will be running by Christmas. The New York Fed issued a press release lauding the plan which includes links to various documents. Of particular interest is:

Incorporating an auction-based settlement mechanism into standard credit derivatives documentation by the end of 2008 to increase the certainty of a transparent and orderly settlement process following a credit event

From the Supplement to the Participants’ Letter:

In relation to the process of incorporating the auction mechanism into the ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions, ISDA reported to supervisors at the June 9 meeting that the working group had taken the decision to move forward, as a first step, with that part of the hardwiring process that will have the greatest impact in a relatively short timeframe. The group will therefore first focus on an Auction Supplement that addresses “Failure to Pay” and “Bankruptcy” Credit Events in respect of North American and European corporates, leaving “Restructuring” Credit Events to be addressed at a later date. A separate working group is addressing the settlement of potential monoline defaults in parallel.

It remains to be seen just precisely how the auction mechanism might work. The question of short squeezes upon a credit event has been previously discussed (update of 2008-3-30); there must be some wiggle-room for protection buyers to delay delivery, otherwise the entire process becomes de-linked from the actual market.

CMHC has announced:

that the Canada Mortgage Bonds (CMB) Program will be expanded to include a CMB with a 10-year maturity.

The CMB Programme buys NHA MBS, which are like American RMBS and finances them (until now) with 5-year paper. The CMHC’s description of this programme is notable for its use of the word “funged”, which is presumably the verbification of “fungible”. The CMB is distinct from the MTN programme which finances training camps for criminals political feel-good projects social housing.

Another solidly up-day for PerpetualDiscounts, again on light volume. For the month, they’re down 3.34% and closed yielding 6.32%, or 8.85% interest-equivalent at the 1.4x conversion factor. Long corporates continue to yield 6.2%, so the PTIE spread is +265bp … well down from the highs, but still well above the previous 10-year peak.

There were eleven other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

A solid up-day on light volume. Only one more day and this horrible month is over!

There were eleven other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Accrued Interest reviews the performance of financial bonds vs. financial stocks and arrives at an interesting conclusion:

For financial stocks, the total return in percentage is graphed. What we see is that financials hit a low at -20% on March 17 (the day after the Bear/JP Morgan “merger”). At that point, the bonds of financial companies had fallen 6.5% vs. Treasuries, and high yield had fallen 10.3%. Then of course there was the rebound in April and early May, but let’s put that aside for a moment.

There are two things to notice here. First stocks, high-yield, and financial corporate bonds have all been highly correlated.
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From May 7 to June 16, the financial corporate index had underperformed Treasury bonds by a whopping 8bps and high yield had actually outperformed by 127. From then until July 24, financial corporates underperformed Treasuries by 397bps and high-yield by 509bps.

Alright so where does this leave us? Looking in total from May 7 to July 24, financial stocks have fallen 23.6% whereas financial bonds have fallen 4.05% vs. government bonds. That’s about a 6-1 ratio. As of March 17, financial stocks had fallen 20% and financial bonds 6.5%, for a 3-1 ratio.

To me that implies that financial bonds remain overvalued vis a vie the equity.

Now, this is an empirical estimate based on not-too-many data points – only the current year-to-date is examined. I would want to see a much longer data sample before putting any credence in such a model; one not so heavily influenced by what must be regarded as one of the most severe modern-developed-market credit crunches ever experienced.

Assiduous Readers will remember my admiration of the Bank of England Financial Stability Report of April ’08 and the Figure 1.18 contained therein:

The methodology on which the charted decomposition depends was discussed in BoE Research: Decomposing Corporate Bond Spreads.

I’m all in favour of empirical analysis – a good chunk of HIMIPref™ is empirical – but such analysis becomes pretty dicey the more dissimilar the two investments being compared. And in the Accrued Interest analysis, the two series analyzed are:

• Stock Return
• Financial Bond return less Government bond return

Clearly, there is a connection; fear of extreme losses by a company will naturally affect – to a greater or lesser extent – market values of any type of investment in that company – but I want a deeper theoretical underpinning of why the two series should be connected with any sort of gearing ratio, with Accrued Interest contending he feels the 3:1 ratio of Dec 31 to March 17 being a better baseline than the 6:1 ratio of May 7 to July 24.

This might be restated as a variant of CAPM, with there being something of a conundrum in the definition of the risk-free rate; but basically, AI is claiming that a Beta of 0.33 for corporate bonds is more appropriate than a Beta of 0.16.

To my mind, I haven’t seen a good discussion of what constitutes the “liquidity” premium in the BoE research. Sure, a big chunk of it is, in fact, liquidity, but that’s kind of a touchy-feely concept used by academics who can’t bear to use the word “irrational” when describing market behaviour. What’s needed is some kind of theory that will describe both stock and bond prices in terms of an overlapping set of factors. Once such a model has been described and parameterized, perhaps we will see that a common factor has been forcing down the prices of both asset classes, perhaps with some kind of ratio attached. If we can show that this factor has a theoretical reason for being – and isn’t just a plug, useful only in describing investments in the financial sector during the period Dec 31, 2007, to July 24, 2008 – then, and only then, will we have something.

I was unable to quantify the historical relationship between financial bonds and financial stocks over time, but I was able to come up with this:

from the Bank of France Financial Stability Review of December 2006.

I am fully prepared to agree that there is a common factor between the returns of an entity’s stock and its bonds – so much is obvious! Don’t get me wrong; I certainly agree that there will be an element of corellation between financial stocks and financial bonds over time, regardless of whether this element dominates, is swamped or is amplified by other factors; I am also aware that by using the difference between financial bonds and government bonds as the return characteristic of note, AI is focussing on spreads, which will lend a great deal of orthagonalization to the picture … albeit not as much as one might think, because spreads tend to go contrary to rates.

Ortenca Kume of Robert Gordon University notes:

• Strong positive impact of leverage ratios on credit spreads
  • Positive impact of the changes in leverage on the changes in credit spreads
• Strong positive relation between company’s stock volatility and credit spreads
  • Positive impact of the changes in stock volatility on the changes in credit spreads
• Changes in credit spreads are significantly positively related to changes in the probability of bond prices’ jumps
• negative impact of the issue size on credit spreads
• credit spreads not significantly related to the variables of:
  • free-cash flows
  • return on equity

I will also note a paper by Campbell & Taksler (full paper republished by Harvard) that points out that in “the late 1990’s the US equity and corporate bond markets behaved very differently … stock prices rose strongly, while at the same time, corporate bonds performed poorly.” There is also an interesting paper by Wesley Phoa Implications of Merton Models for Corporate Bond Investors … but most of the data shows a strong corellation for junk credits. The paper looks at Nextel in detail, but for most of the period Nextel wasn’t just junk, it was distressed. Junk is really just equity dressed up as bonds, and the transition to distressed status simply adds make up to the costume. This paper from 2006 emphasizes volatility over return. And finally – for now – there is a BIS paper by Zhang, Zhou & Zhu, Explaining Credit Default Swap Spreads with Equity Volatility and Jump Risks of Individual Firms:

A structural model with stochastic volatility and jumps implies particular relationships between observed equity returns and credit spreads. This paper explores such effects in the credit default swap (CDS) market. We use a novel approach to identify the realized jumps of individual equity from high frequency data. Our empirical results suggest that volatility risk alone predicts 50% of CDS spread variation, while jump risk alone forecasts 19%. After controlling for credit ratings, macroeconomic conditions, and firms’ balance sheet information, we can explain 77% of the total variation. Moreover, the marginal impacts of volatility and jump measures increase dramatically from investment grade to high-yield entities. The estimated nonlinear effects of volatility and jumps are in line with the model impliedrelationships between equity returns and credit spreads.

Finally, I will refer to Accrued Interest‘s post, A disturbance in the Force, January 4, 2008, in which he published the following graph:

and commented:

From my seat, watching corporate bond spreads widen dramatically over the last 6 months, you’d certainly think recession is on the horizon. In fact, if you draw a horizontal line from where we are now in corporate spreads, you’d see that we’ve rarely been wider than current levels. We are wider than the worst points during the 1991 recession and 2001 recession, although we did touch a bit wider during 2002.

And yet the stock market is very near all-time highs. I did this graph up through 12/31, so the S&P would be a bit lower. But the basic story would be exactly the same: the stock and bond markets don’t agree about where we’re going next.

There are some logical reasons why stocks and bonds can diverge. One is that companies are increasing leverage. So equity returns might increase but bond risk rises. That’s not happening right now. Financial companies have gone into capital preservation mode, and all companies are finding the bond market quite inhospitable.

Expectations of a “gearing factor” that may be used by itself to evaluate financial stocks and bonds as rich/cheap against each other will require a correlation that is large, positive and stable. I find it a little hard to believe and want to see more data! I will also note that, as shown in the very hastily prepared literature survey above, the academics are plumping for volatility rather than performance as the equity characteristic of importance to bond spreads – which makes sense when you think about it terms of individual investors.

For instance, say each investor is characterized on a scale of 1-5, 1 being “raging bull” and 5 being an apocalyptionist. At any time, the universe of investors (dollar weighted!) will be “3”, since if it isn’t then the market level will adjust until they do.

A high volatility environment will result when the distribution of these views is flatter than normal; i.e., there are more 1s and 5s than there are in a normal distribution. The volatility will result from the marginal traders amongst the 1s and 5s temporarily gaining ascendency over their mirrors for a short period of time.

It makes sense that such a high-volatility environment will see increased spreads on corporates: if you’re a raging bull, you’re not going to bother with bonds and if you’re an apocalyptionist you’re going to be buying governments.

Or so goes my mapping of the statistics onto individual behavior, anyway!

For my own part, I suggest that spreads on financials are too wide, not too tight. It takes two to make a market!

Speaking of spreads on financials, PerpetualDiscounts had a good day today, up 0.6031% to yield 6.34%, interest equivalent 8.88%, about 268bp over the long corporates yield of 6.20%. In terms of total return, we are just a little below the closing value of July 9, down 3.67% on the month-to-date, but up 4.81% from the low of July 16. Which gives you a rough idea of just how low the low was!

There were eightteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

The PerpetualDiscount winning streak ended today – the index was down less than a beep, but it was down! Volume continues fairly light.

There were fourteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

PerpetualDiscounts had a good strong day on light volume: up 0.41% to finish just short of the July 10 level. They are now down a mere 4.24% on the month; yield 6.37% or 8.92% interest-equivalent at the standard 1.4x equivalency factor; long corporates continue to yield 6.2%, so the spread is now 272bp.

There were twelve other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Update, 2008-7-28: Newly Assiduous Reader newtoprefs comments that he she has been advised to sell BAM.PR.O short. I have uploaded the HIMIPref™ OpRet Index for 7/25. It is unclear to me why, if you were going to shortsell anything in this index (a big if, in my opinion, but what do I know?) AND you were going to shortsell one of the BAM issues … why wouldn’t you shortsell BAM.PR.I? The yield is 30bp lower than that of BAM.PR.O.

A story on Bloomberg discussed the repercussions of the liquidity freeze-up in US Auction Rate Securities:

New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo filed a lawsuit against UBS AG over its role in the sale of auction-rate securities, five months after the market collapsed, stranding investors.

Cuomo alleges the Zurich-based bank committed fraud by misleading investors in its marketing of the long-term securities as money market-like instruments that were easy to buy and sell. UBS continued selling the debt even as the market unraveled and top bank executives unloaded $21 million in personal auction-rate holdings, Cuomo’s suit alleges.

… and, to my gratification, included a link to the Massachusetts lawsuit site. The complaint against UBS alleges many things, but what it all boils down to is that some people have made an investment that didn’t work out as intended.

Just where to draw the regulatory line is a matter of opinion. I just hope the regulators and politicians know where their current hard line attitude is taking us: to a world where brokerages are on the hook for whatever they sell their clients and therefore offer nothing but the blandest investments possible. It’s regulation by headline and it will ultimately cost us all a great deal of money.

It leads to another interesting thought … if banks are to be on the hook for short-term paper they sell to their retail clients, shouldn’t this be recognized as credit risk (in addition to operational risk) for capital calculation purposes? I’ve already advocated that their exposure to their branded MMFs be recognized.

As far as today is concerned … so much for the financial rally:

U.S. stocks tumbled, sending financial shares to their worst drop in eight years, after home sales slid more than forecast …
…
Financial stocks in the S&P 500 fell 6.7 percent as a group, the third drop in the past three weeks greater than 5 percent. Today’s slump follows a six-day, 30 percent rally spurred by better-than-estimated earnings reports from Citigroup, JPMorgan and Wells Fargo and legislation to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

I wonder how many sigmas that makes?

PerpetualDiscounts managed to eke out a two-basis-point gain today (which, when you annualize it, is about right) keeping the streak alive: there have been six consecutive gains.

There were twenty-three other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

PerpetualDiscounts had a wonderful day today, up nearly a point and closing just short of their value on July 10. They are now down a mere 4.66% on the month, with a weighted-mean-average pre-tax bid-Yield-to-Worst of 6.40% (up 37bp on the month), interest-equivalent to 8.96%, which is a spread of +276bp to long corporates.

There were twenty-one other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Wachovia and Thornberg prefs were mentioned yesterday and as it happens both are in the news today.

Wachovia announced horrible results:

reported a record quarterly loss of $8.9 billion, slashed the dividend and announced 6,350 job cuts. The stock slumped as much as 10 percent in New York trading.
…
The stock fell $1.18, or 9 percent, to $12 at 9:55 a.m. The cost of protecting the bank’s debt rose 10 basis points to 315, according to broker Phoenix Partners Group. Fitch Ratings cut Wachovia one level to A+ from AA-, citing its mortgage business, and Moody’s downgraded the bank to A1 from Aa3.

Wachovia, whose job cuts amount to about 5 percent of the bank’s workforce, lowered the dividend to 5 cents a share from 37.5 cents and will leave 4,440 positions open, according to a presentation to analysts today.

As of noon, the prefs at issue (WBPRC – NYSE) were actually up over 5%, to $16.49. Their dividend didn’t get cut!

And there is an offer for the Thornburg prefs:

Preferred shareholders will receive $5 in cash and 3.5 common shares if two-thirds of holders tender their stakes by Sept. 30. Were the deal to close today, holders would receive cash and stock totaling $6.09 for each preferred share, which closed yesterday between $4.46 and $4.62.
…
In the question-and-answer session that followed, investors expressed their dismay. Those who bought preferred shares at $25 and expected a dividend must sell for $5 in cash plus stock that today is worth $1.09.

“I don’t ever think I have ever seen in my years on the Street, a $25 par being called in at $5,” said Shelley Bergman, of New York-based Morgan Stanley, who said he owned shares for himself and clients.

WaMu has announced horrible results:

Washington Mutual Inc., the biggest U.S. savings and loan, reported a $3.3 billion second-quarter loss as tumbling home prices left a record number of borrowers unable to keep up with mortgage payments. The shares surged 10 percent as the company announced it would cut costs.

The loss of $6.58 a share compared with net income of $830 million, or 92 cents a share, a year earlier, the Seattle-based company said today in a statement. The cost of uncollectible loans jumped 58 percent to $2.2 billion from the first quarter.

… and their earnings release notes:

On July 15, WaMu’s Board of Directors declared a cash dividend of $0.01 per share on the company’s common stock. Dividends on the common stock are payable on Aug. 15, 2008 to shareholders of record as of Jul. 31, 2008. In addition to declaring a dividend on the company’s common stock, the company will pay a dividend of $0.2528 per depository share of Series K Preferred Stock to be payable on Sept. 15, 2008 to holders of record on Sept. 1, 2008, a dividend of $19.8056 per share of Series R Preferred Stock to be payable on Sept. 15, 2008 to holders of record on Sept. 1, 2008.

So … as mentioned yesterday, Accrued Interest propounded the “worst of both worlds” argument … as these events show, it is also possible to propound the “best of both worlds” argument (although Thornburg pref holders might quibble at the use of the word “best”, at least they’re getting some pickings off the carcass).

Prefs are oval pegs; no attempt should be made to fit them neatly into either square or circular holes. Investors should look at prefs for what they are, and not overweight any particular scenario for future developments.

Catching up on a little miscellaneous banking system stuff … Charles Wyplosz reviews the bank-bailout question on VoxEU; not much substance, frankly, but he did point out:

Bagehot principles can be applied when one or two banks fail, but when the whole system is under threat, this is no longer an option.

Also, it looks like the HBOS rights issue has flopped:

HBOS was facing a further period of uncertainty last night, with underwriters holding more than 60 per cent of the bank’s rights issue shares and the City waiting anxiously for the bank’s interim results next week.
As a result of the banking giant’s £4 billion rights issue flop, underwriters Morgan Stanley and Dresdner Kleinwort are likely to have the stake – worth more than £2.4bn – after this evening’s 4:30pm deadline for them to sell the shares on.

That gives them a substantial share in the Edinburgh-based company which has an estimated overall stock market value after the rights issue of about £15bn.

Accrued Interest points out that negative convexity on Agency paper is more negative than usual:

There is a large number of homeowners currently underwater on their mortgage, and an even larger number with less than 20% equity. Given that getting a mortgage with less than 20% down payment is difficult and very expensive right now, homeowners who currently have less than 20% equity would have to come up with a lot of cash in order to move to another home.

So the housing turnover element of mortgage principal payments is set to plummet. In addition, the same factors will prevent many refinancings. A borrower underwater on his current mortgage will not be able to refinance his loan just because rates fall 50bps.

This means that the average life of a mortgage is longer than is currently being assumed.
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As investors come to terms with the extending average lives, prices are likely to fall rather than yield spreads contract. Holding the 271bps yield spread constant but extending the average life to 9 years causes the price to drop by over 3%.

The OSC is attempting to ensure that self-regulatory-organizations have jurisdiction over individuals’ conduct within the industry even after they have quit:

On July 15, 2008, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Divisional Court, allowed an appeal by Stephen Taub on the basis that the Securities Act does not authorize self-regulatory organizations (SROs) that have been recognized by the OSC to discipline former members. The Commission’s recognition of an SRO is designed to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices and to foster fair and efficient capital markets.

“The Commission is concerned that investor protection would be weakened if a registered representative could avoid the consequences of breaching SRO rules by resigning from his or her SRO member firm,” said OSC Executive Director Peggy Dowdall-Logie. “An SRO’s ability to take disciplinary action against former members, and former representatives of its member firms, is fundamental to effective investor protection and the functioning of an effective SRO.”

This has implications for the David Berry saga … RS ruled that it has jurisdiction over him (and could therefore judge whether he violated UMIR) – this ruling was, presumably, jeopardized by the Taub ruling.

Another good strong day for PerpetualDiscounts, but volume was light. Have all the sportin’ gents placed their bets? Despite the gains, the index has not yet recovered to where it was July 11 … we’re still trying to recover from the awful, awful July 14, as Louis XVI used to say. The PerpetualDiscount weighted-mean-average pre-tax yield-to-worst is now 6.46%, or 9.04% pre-tax interest-equivalent at the standard 1.4x equivalency factor. Long Corporates now yield 6.20%, so the PTIE spread now stands at 284bp, still way through the old, recently smashed, record of 250bp.

There were thirteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Accrued Interest has deprecated US Preferreds as an investment, using what I call the ‘worst of both worlds’ argument; that the upside is limited compared to common and the downside is much greater (or at least more probable) than senior bonds.

I have written a short post with some background on US TruPS.

As I noted on FWF on the weekend:

I find – when having conversations such as this with stockbrokers – that it is very useful to look at actual numbers. In my article A Vale of Tiers, I looked at various Royal Bank investment vehicles and compared their expected returns to their degree of subordination.

Perhaps this thread could be profitably employed to update and expand the “Table 1” of my article.

Preferred shares represent a range on the risk/return spectrum that will be of interest to many investors. I will note that despite some alarmist stockbroker talk very few issues actually default. There are nine defaulted issues on the NYSE, according to Quantum Online; four of which are from Thornburg Mortgage. As counterexamples, one may consider Citibank and Fortis Bank, both of which have massively diluted their common shareholders and cut the common dividend (the latter to zero) without inconveniencing the preferred shareholders. For many battered companies, issuance of preferred stock is the only palatable option; they are not going to cut their own throats by cutting the dividend with gay abandon.

For investors in Canadian bank preferreds, it should be noted that preferred stock and innovative tier 1 capital are capped at a limit of 30% of total Tier 1 Equity. If they were to slowly drift into bankruptcy, they would be taken over by OFSI and the CDIC when their Tier 1 ratio declined below 4% (possibly at the 5% level). At these levels, there will still be some common equity left; preferred capital will not be impaired.

Therefore, the most realistic nightmare scenario is a jump to default; investors may assign their own probabilities to this.

Diversify!

I would have been much more impressed with the Accrued Interest post had he used actual numbers and made some effort to quantify risk. Yes, you can lose every dime investing in preferreds – you can lose every dime investing in any corporate security. But what are the odds? Let’s see an attempt to quantify risk whenever we quantify return.

That being said, it should be noted that Wachovia had a Tier 1 Ratio of 7.35% (well below the Canadian average of about 9.5%) and a Total Capital ratio of 11.82% (about the Canadian median). Determining the effective subordination of the issue highlighted by Accrued Interest is made a little more difficult by the prospectus note for the issue highlighted (NYSE: WBPRC):

Wachovia receives a significant portion of its revenue from dividends from its subsidiaries. Because it is a holding company, its right to participate in any distribution of the assets of its banking or nonbanking subsidiaries, upon a subsidiary’s dissolution, winding-up, liquidation or reorganization or otherwise, and thus your ability to benefit indirectly from such distribution, is subject to the prior claims of creditors of any such subsidiary, except to the extent that Wachovia may be a creditor of that subsidiary and its claims are recognized. There are legal limitations on the extent to which some of its subsidiaries may extend credit, pay dividends or otherwise supply funds to, or engage in transactions with, it or some of its other subsidiaries. Wachovia’s subsidiaries are separate and distinct legal entities and have no obligation, contingent or otherwise, to pay amounts due under Wachovia’s contracts or otherwise to make any funds available to it. Accordingly, the payments on the LoTSSM, and therefore the Trust Preferred Securities, effectively will be subordinated to all existing and future liabilities of Wachovia’s subsidiaries. At December 31, 2006, Wachovia’s subsidiaries’ direct borrowings and deposit liabilities was $730 billion.

… and I ain’t gonna do it! I will say, however, that before opining on the merits or lack thereof on an investment in these TruPS, it should be done!

Incidentally, further down in the FWF thread where I made my comment, there was another post:

We were talking upthread about corporate versus preferred rates. While the IShares corporate bond ETF has not moved much, I noticed on the Waterhouse Fixed Income site that virtually all corporate banks now have a significant spread against their provincial same-rated counterparts. The spread approaches 1% starting three years out. Just a couple of years ago, that spread would have been maybe 0.2-0.3% (as I recall). So, it would appear that bank corporates have definitely been hit by the credit crisis.

See my note about the BoC Review of June 2008 … financials used to be 40-ish bp tight to industrials … now they’re even-ish.

Here’s another strangeness in which unitholders in the fund have an interest:

One of these things is not like the others! One of these things is not quite the same! This is a very sloppy market. I have noted the volatility of the BMO.PR.H / BMO.PR.J spread previously. BMO.PR.H has – just now – been deleted from the TXPR index, so that might – might! – have something to do with it.

Sloppiness aside, PerpetualDiscounts moved up again … but are still below the levels they were at on July 11 and are still down 5.94% on the month.

There were twenty-one other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Naked Capitalism reports that the auction of Cheyne Finance’s assets, mentioned July 15 realized forty-four cents on the dollar. It remains to be seen how many of these assets will actually change hands, as Cheyne’s investors can elect to receive the securities rather than the cash.

The week ended well, but we’re still down from last Friday’s close. PerpetualDiscounts now yield 6.50% dividend, equivalent to 9.00% interest; long corporates … oh, call it 6.20, that’s close enough … PTIE spread of 280bp.

So now all you guys can spend the weekend worrying about whether this is a real rally or a sucker rally. My suggestion is that half of you engage in panic buying of the stuff I’m looking to sell, while the other half dump the stuff I want to buy at whatever price you can get.

There were twenty-nine other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.