Fabrice Taylor had a column in the Globe yesterday, Preferred offer value, but watch your step. I confess to being a little perplexed by his remarks on discounts to call:
And you have to understand the math. Take a $20 par value preferred that can be called from you (i.e., the company can buy back from you) in two years. If it pays a fixed dividend of $1 per year but can be had for $16, you’re not getting 5 or 6 per cent, you’re getting almost 18 per cent annually. That’s the real beauty of buying these things below par.
Call options are bad. They are always bad. They always limit your winnings in the event of yield declines, while doing nothing to protect you in the event of yield increases. Unfortunately, they cannot be avoided – so the question on an investor’s mind should always be “How bad is this particular call option schedule and how much extra yield do I want in this particular case as compensation?”.
Mr. Taylor also quotes John Nagel, who has been mentioned on PrefBlog previously, touting BCE Prefs:
When we spoke, [Desjardins’ preferred share trader] Mr. Nagle [sic] was partial to a Brookfield Asset Management floating rate preferred issue that, while enjoying the same rating as a Thomson Reuters issue, is quoted at half the price. He’s waiting for Brookfield’s earnings next week to see if that discount is warranted, but otherwise finds the discount highly attractive, and there are other opportunities for those who can roll up their sleeves and do some hard-nosed work.
Mr. Nagel’s track record was not disclosed. Brookfield’s quarterly earnings will be released on November 7, but I can’t help but think that waiting to see them is a bit of an affectation. Brookfield is an investment grade company. Black swan events excepted – always excepted! – one quarter’s earnings are not going to make a huge amount of difference to its credit risk, whatever it might do to the stock. If it were otherwise, the company would not be investment grade: virtually the whole meaning of “investment grade” is that a bad quarter or two – even the occasional horrible quarter – will not dislodge the company’s status.
There have been no rumours of a Black Swan event at Brookfield and,while the common (which takes the first loss) has done just as badly as everything else lately, it hasn’t been taken out to the woodshed for particular punishment. While I will be just as interested in Brookfield’s earnings as anybody else, I’m not about to recommend freezing trading in its issues until they have been released.
The BAM issues are discussed often on PrefBlog – f’rinstance, with respect to the BAM / BPO Floater Credit Inversion and the recent DBRS affirmation of BAM’s credit quality.
I’ve uploaded some charts [click for big] … for instance BAM.A (common) versus BAM.PR.K (floater):
and TRI (common) vs. TRI.PR.B (floater): 
and, just for fun, RY (common) vs. RY.PR.F (PerpetualDiscount) 
and BMO (common) vs. BMO.PR.J (PerpetualDiscount): 
Update, 2008-11-14: I missed this at the time, but Brookfield issued (small) US debt 2008-10-24:
TORONTO, October 24, 2008 – Brookfield Asset Management Inc. (“Brookfield”) (NYSE/TSX: BAM) announced today that it has issued US$150 million of unsecured term debt comprising US$75 million of 5-year 6.65% notes and US$75 million of 4-year 6.4% notes.
Small issues, but in this environment those are pretty good terms.