Category: Data Changes

Data Changes

Strong Opening for LBS.PR.A

As readers of my earlier post may have expected, LBS.PR.A had a very strong opening day, with 1,671,290 shares trading and closing at 10.55-59.

There may be more to come, as the following HIMIPref™ analysis indicates:

Curve Price Analysis of LBS.PR.A
Component Taxable Curve Non-taxable Curve
Base-Rate 10.35 10.26
Short-Term 0.13 0.56
Long-Term 0.33 0.01
Split-Share -0.26 -0.32
Retractible 0.34 0.44
Credit Spread (2) -0.08 -0.11
Error -0.01 0.00
Intrinsic Price 10.80 10.84
Liquidity 0.23 0.25
Total Curve Price 11.03 11.09

The estimate for the liquidity value is, as with all new issues, a little dicey – especially for a split-share issue, there is no guarantee that a huge liquidity premium will be sustained in the long run … in fact, there is a strong possibility of the opposite! But with an intrinsic value in the neighborhood of $10.80, it would appear there’s still some value left in the issue.

For those interested in more traditional measures, the pre-tax YTW of this issue is 4.34%, with a modified duration of 5.97, both measurements based on a maturity on 2013-11-29.

The issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database with a security code of A47800, replacing the pre-issue code of P50004. It has also been added to the SplitShare Index.

Data Changes

BAM.PR.G Reset Rate Announced

Brookfield has announced that the rate to be paid from Nov. 1, 2006 to October 31, 2011 on BAM.PR.G will be 4.35%, or $1.0875 per share per annum … something of a haircut from the 5.63% they’ve been paying for the last five years!

As previously noted, this issue is exchangeable into BAM.PR.E. The deadline for converting is Wednesday October 18.

BAM.PR.E closed 10/13 at 25.05-45; BAM.PR.G closed 10/13 at 25.00-15.

Data Changes

Quiet Disaster for SLF.PR.D

Readers will be familiar with my earlier comments on this issue … price-wise, things worked out much as expected – the closing quotation was $24.50-55, 14×61. The volume was a surprise, however, with only 12,300 shares trading on its first day out, which can be interpreted in a number of ways.

 I suspect that the correct interpretation is simply that the issue got sold in large chunks to long term investors (e.g., Balanced and Dividend funds run by the big fundcos), who don’t care what price they pay, as long as they can put eight-figures “to work” on a single ticket – and probably all committed before the issue was even thought about! But who knows? We’ll just have to see how this thing looks going forward.

 I never did issue the press release I had been intending. After some thought, I decided that given the presence of such a close comparable as SLF.PR.C (which closed at $24.64-70, 9×70, on volume of 6,300) made the HIMIPref™ evaluation of the new issue as expensive somewhat less than startling news.

SLF.PR.D has been set up on HIMIPref™ and will be added to “PerpetualDiscount” index and prefInfo in the very near future. The Preissue Security Code was P50005; the permanent code is A48983.

The price is actually quite reasonable at 24.50-55 … Now that the Street has given Sun Life it’s $6-million gift (12-million shares, overpriced by about $0.50, according to the first day of trading, if nothing else), the issue is looking like a much more reasonable investment.

Data Changes

DBRS Posts Mass Upgrade of Banks!

DBRS has announced a slew of upgrades to the credit rating of bank preferreds:

Issuer Industry Debt Rated Action Rating Trend
Bank of Montreal Banks & Trusts Cumulative Preferred Shares Upgraded Pfd-1 Stb
Scotia Mortgage Investment Corporation Banks & Trusts Non-Cumulative Preferred Shares Series A (bsd. on BNS) Upgraded Pfd-1 Stb
National Bank of Canada Banks & Trusts Cumulative Preferred Shares Upgraded Pfd-1 (low) Stb
TD Mortgage Investment Corporation Banks & Trusts Higher Yielding Bank Related Securities (bsd. on TD Bank) Upgraded Pfd-1 Stb
Royal Bank of Canada Banks & Trusts Non-Cumulative Preferred Shares Upgraded Pfd-1 Stb
Bank of Nova Scotia Banks & Trusts Cumulative Preferred Shares Upgraded Pfd-1 Stb
Bank of Nova Scotia Banks & Trusts Non-Cumulative Preferred Shares Upgraded Pfd-1 Stb
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Banks & Trusts Cumulative Preferred Shares Upgraded Pfd-1 (low) Stb

Well! This creates an exercise in data-entry, doesn’t it? I won’t be able to get these done tonight, although I will update prices as normal. I will update this post once the upgrades have been reflected in the HIMIPref™ database – and this will happen well before the market opens on Tuesday morning.

I don’t really anticipate much change in HIMIPref™ values as a result of this change, although I will be most interested to see if anything happens to the “Low” spread! I suspect that the most noticable change will be with CIBC issues since

Update, 2006-10-7 : The changes have been processed. There is some discussion of the effects of these changes on calculated values at Effect of Mass-Bank-Upgrade on Calculated Yield-Curve

Data Changes

HIMIPref Parameterization Changes

As a result of continuing optimization of parameters, the following optimizableParameters have been changed:

Parameter Old Value New Value
riskPseudoModifiedDurationPort 0.059 0.060
riskPseudoConvexityPort 0.014 0.012
instrumentYieldDisparityValuation 0.360 0.358

I do not consider any of these changes to be particularly earth-shaking (although every little bit helps!) and do not anticipate that any users will find that a slew of trades has suddenly been recommended.

Data Changes

New Perpetual Issue : Sunlife 4.45%

I have just learned that Sunlife is coming out with a new issue of preferreds, Series 4.

They are perpetual and pay $1.1125 p.a. Closing is expected to be 2006-10-10.

The redemption schedule is:

  • Redemption      2011-12-31      2012-12-30  26.000000
  • Redemption      2012-12-31      2013-12-30  25.750000
  • Redemption      2013-12-31      2014-12-30  25.500000
  • Redemption      2014-12-31      2015-12-30  25.250000
  • Redemption      2015-12-31   INFINITE DATE  25.000000

If we compare this issue with

  • RY.PR.A, which has the same dividend and credit rating, and is perpetual with the call schedule starting seven months earlier
  • SLF.PR.C, which also has the same dividend, is perpetual and has the call schedule starting nine months earlier

, using the yield curve as derived for taxable clients:

  SLF.PR.? RY.PR.A SLF.PR.C
Price due to base-rate 22.69  22.77 22.70
Price due to short-term 0.08  0.08 0.08
Price due to long-term 0.58  0.61 0.62
Price due to error 0.01  -0.01 -0.01
Price due to Credit Spread (Low) -0.29  -0.31 -0.31
Intrinsic Curve Price 23.07  23.14 23.08
Price due to Liquidity  1.32 (?)  1.32 1.32
Total Curve Price  24.39 (?)  24.46 24.40
Closing Quote, 2006-09-28 N/A 24.93-94 24.65-79

Well, I’m going to reserve judgement until I’ve received the prospectus! But this doesn’t look like a very attractive issue at all, given that even after allowing over $1.00 for the privilege of trading a million shares at a time it STILL looks over-valued at the issue price of $25.

Once I’ve seen a prospectus I’ll be issuing a press release. The issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database and full pre-issue analytics are available to subscribers.

Data Changes

BAM.PR.E / BAM.PR.G Reset Rate Percentage Announced

Brookfield has announced – somewhat quietly! I couldn’t find anything on their site and had to look at SEDAR! – that the Selected Percentage Rate for the upcoming reset will be 108%.

So commencing November 1, 2006, the dividend rate paid on BAM.PR.G will be 108% of the Canada 5-year yield as computed on October 11. The 5-years closed today at about 3.84%, so this implies a yield of about 4.15% on the BAM.PR.G (assuming no change in rates over the next two weeks), or about $1.0375 annually per share.

Horrible! Especially compared with the 5.63% (or $1.4075) they’ve been paying for the last five years!

According to Brookfield’s “Notice of Conversion Privilege” the Designated Percentage (which varies only in accordance with trading price, not by company fiat) of prime paid on the BAM.PR.E is 81%, or currently 4.86%.

 Well, pays yer money and takes yer chances. Going with ratchet-rates means taking a risk on the Designated Percentage AND taking a risk on Prime for the next five years. It’s a tough call, just like the BCE.PR.T / BCE.PR.S conversion that’s coming up … although, mind you, BCE’s fixed-rate offer is 112% of the five year yield.

Given that BAM.PR.G closed today at 25.12-32, 3×5 on volume of 2500 shares, I don’t think they’re much of an option … or, to be more explicit, if they’re the best option there is, holders are better off selling them, because a Pfd-2(low) (DBRS) credit on a perpetual paying $1.0375 (at least for the next five years) sure ain’t going to be trading above par for long!

And I just don’t like floaters, anyway, especially ratchet rates. Hard to analyze, hard to plan for, really, really hard to make any capital gains from. Given the current trading price, the percentage of prime will be declining in the near future … perhaps, eventually, to the same level as BCE.PR.S (which have the same credit rating, after all) and then be paying only 64% of prime.

So I’d say these thingies are a “sell” right now. I don’t like either alternative, not when I can get better than par by selling them now.

Hat-tip to Financial WebRing for bringing this to my attention!

Note added 2006-09-28: I have just received an eMail from a concerned user of www.prefInfo.com. The summary information regarding dividend rates for BAM.PR.G is stated as:

1.41  

  • Floating Rate Start Date : 2006-11-01
  • Floating Rate Index ID : Canada Prime
  • FR Formula : Ratchet (#0)
  • Max Ratchet Rate Formula ID : 100% of index (#1)
  • Min Ratchet Rate Formula ID : 50% of index (#2)

My correspondent went to the trouble of reading the prospectus and confirmed for himself that the BAM.PR.G do not, in and of themselves, change to floating rate.

These things are difficult to handle, particularly in the period when, as now, the upcoming reset rate is only “sort-of” known. For the “reset” side of every  Ratchet-Rate-Preferred-Pair, HIMIPref™ assumes that the rate paid on the resettable prefs (which in this case is the BAM.PR.G) will be so lousy that investors will be virtually forced into the “ratchet side” (in this case, the BAM.PR.E).

It’s a conservative assumption, but a difficult one to explain in a brief summary! I’ll put together some kind of post, essentially re-stating this point, and link to it from the appropriate cells on the prefinfo.com table … eventually!